Marlene Dietrich, shown at a Belgium hospital in 1944, performed "black" songs.

Mom Philidelph t Toga-Clad Goering Plays With Jewels and Toy Trains

"Personal gossip" rumors were designed to undermine the images of enemy leaders. This "comeback" appeared in the November 28, 1944, Philadelphia Inquirer.

The September 1944 capture of Luxembourg City gave Allied propagandists the use of the most powerful commercial transmitter in Europe. While "white" propagandists of PWD dominated daytime broadcasts, MO ran a nightly program named "Operation ANNIE," or "1212" after its frequency. The program ran from 2 A.M. to 6 A.M., and purported to come from a Rhineland resistance group. It initially concentrated on providing detailed and truthful news to build up audience trust and then began to insert false reports, orders, and rumors in order

CORNFLAKES used replicas of German mail bags to distribute MO materials.

to create chaos in front of the Allied advance. Reports from POWs and civilians indicated that "1212" had a wide audience. 47

V-E Day ended European morale operations, which had actually begun winding down in the fall of 1944 as more MO agents were sent to the Far East. By September 1945, responding to a presidential directive, the OSS ceased its worldwide operations and disbanded. OSS functions were taken over by military and civilian agencies. The Morale Operations Branch. was not recreated when the Central Intelligence Agency was formed in 1947, but the various CIA branches did apply the same principles and use similar techniques throughout the years of the cold war and in Vietnam.48

Opinions on the effectiveness of "black" propaganda varied, and controversy concerning the role of the OSS Morale Operations Branch in the overall Allied victory continued well into the postwar era. One indication of success, the OSS claimed, was the significant quantity of MO leaflets always found on POWs at the time of capture. MO propagandists producing Das Neue Deutschland determined that upwards of 30 to 50 percent of POWS knew of the paper and the movement it represented. Many prisoners claimed that they had learned of it through denunciations in the SS paper Das Schwarze Korps."

49

during the war, and interrogators frequently confirmed that stations such as "Soldatensender West" (the name of "Soldatensender' after Calais was liberated) had a regular following. The USSBS further discovered that Allied "black" propagandists raised the level of skepticism so high that people no longer believed Nazi propaganda. German attempts to jam Allied radio transmissions and public efforts to denounce known propaganda broadcasts had little effect. Joseph Goebbels repeatedly referred to the effectiveness of specific programs such as the campaigns to prove that Hitler was dead, the frequent reports of Germany's sur

the official OSS history, which stated that MO carried on its efforts despite great handicaps at home and abroad, but by the war's end it had gained the acceptance of Allied military and political agencies for the principle of morale operations. Most significantly, it

had brought to the attention of American authorities a weapon which the United States had not theretofore systematically and effectively employed. It drew attention... to the advantages of a specialized type of intelligenceinformation on the morale, social cleavages and underlying worries of foreign peoples, and how these could be used for national advantage.

52

NOTES

1Entry 91, box 5, vol. 3, book I, pp. 27-43; for broadcast transcripts, see box 6, vol. 3, book II, pp. 47-119; for Bradley's reaction, see box 16, folder 67, all in Records of the Office of Strategic Services, Record Group 226, National Archives, Washington, DC (hereinafter, records in the National Archives will be cited as RG, NA).

2For OWI, see Allen W. Winkler, The Politics of Propaganda: The Office of War Information, 1942-1945 (1978); and Charles A. H. Thompson, The Overseas Information Services of the United States Government (1948).

'Donovan quoted in Kermit Roosevelt, The War Report of the OSS (1975), 1: 211, 213. The OSS is the subject of a growing number of histories. See Thomas F. Troy, Donovan and the CIA: A History of the Establishment of the Central Intelligence Agency (1980); R. Harris Smith, OSS: The Secret History of America's First Central Intelligence Agency (1972); Bradley F. Smith, The Shadow Warriors: OSS and the Origins of the CIA (1983); Edward Hymoff, The OSS in World War II (1972); and Lawrence H. McDonald, "The Office of Strategic Services: America's First National Intelligence Agency," Prologue 23 (Spring 1991): 7–22. For Donovan, see Anthony Cave Brown, Wild Bill Donovan: The Last Hero (1982).

*J. A. Pollard, "Words are Cheaper than Blood: Overseas OWI and the Need for a Permanent Propaganda Agency," Public Opinion Quarterly 7 (Fall 1945): 284–185.

"Pollard, "Words are Cheaper than Blood," pp. 284–287; James Kellis, “The Development of United States National Intelligence" (Ph.D. diss., Georgetown University, 1963), pp. 8–9.

"Roosevelt, War Report, 1: 18-27; Kellis, "Development of U.S. National Intelligence," pp. 41–44.

Leonard W. Doob, "The Utilization of Social Scientists in the Overseas Branch of the (US) Office of War Information," American Political Science Review 41 (August 1947): 649-667; Howard Becker, "The Nature and Consequences of Black Propaganda," American Sociological Review 14 (April 1949): 221.

Entry 99, box 97, folder 145, JCS 155/4/D, Dec. 23, 1942, Functions of OSS, RG 226, NA.

'Entry 99, box 75, folder 32, vol. 1, chap. 2, p. 1, Wash. MO Exhibits, MO Reports, RG 226, NA; Roosevelt, War Report, 1: 212-215.

19Roosevelt, War Report, 1: 211. Entry 99, box 15, folder 1, MO/ PWD/ETO Black Operations; box 32, folder 159b, MEDTO MO

w/PWB, 1942–44/G-2 Military Reports, October 1944; box 75, Propaganda Techniques/Doctrine Behind MO Branch; and box 75, folder 37, Wash. MO Exhibits, vol. 4, all in RG 226, NA.

11Entry 99, box 57, folder 32, vol. 1, chap. 2, pp. 4–5, 8, Wash. MO Exhibits, MO Reports, RG 226, NA; Roosevelt, War Report, 1: 236. The other OSS branches were Secret Operations, Secret Intelligence, Research and Analysis, Research and Development, Counter-Intelligence, Maritime Units, Foreign Nationalities, and Operations Groups.

12These were the executive order of Mar. 9, 1943, and JCS directives of Apr. 4 and Oct. 27, 1943. See also Roosevelt, War Report, 1: 18-26, 107; Kellis, "Development of U.S. National Intelligence," pp. 107, 109, 120-123; and entry 99, box 75, folder 37, vol. 4, Wash. MO Exhibits, box 37, folder 189, MEDTO MO North Africa Reports, 1-43 to 4-44, and box 69, folder 306, MO Missions ETO, RG 226, NA. For MO doctrine, see entry 116, box 4, Planning Group 42/1, 5, Provisional Basic Field Manual Psychological Warfare, RG 226, NA.

13Entry 99, box 32, folder 158, MEDTO MO Operations General, 1943-45; report, Oechsner to Donovan, MO Activities, NATO, Aug. 24, 1943; and memo, Williamson to Donovan, Oct. 18, 1943, all in RG 226, NA. Roosevelt, War Report, 2: 214; Smith, Shadow Warriors, p. 180.

14Quotes from entry 99, box 32, folder 159b, report, Whitaker to Oechsner, Sub.: MÉDTO MO Operations w/PWB, 1942–44, RG 226, NA. See also report, Taylor to Donovan, Sub.: Psy. War., NATO, RG 226, NA. For OSS Mediterranean operations, see entry 116, box 1, OSS Planning Group: Overall and Special Programs for Strategic Activities in MEDTO, Aug. 30, 1944, pp. 21– 22, RG 226, NA; Roosevelt, War Report, 2: 96; Frederick C. Painton, "Fighting With Confetti: How the Army's Psychological Warfare Branch Works and How it Saved American Lives in the Sicilian Campaign," Reader's Digest, December 1943, pp. 99–100; and James Erdmann, "U.S. Army Air Force Leaflet Operations in the ETO in World War II" (Ph.D. diss., University of Colorado, 1970), p. 86.

15Entry 116, box 2, OSS Planning Group Program for Italy, Feb. 2, 1943, and OSS Planning Group for Sicily, June 10, 1943, RG 226, NA.

16Entry 99, box 5, MO War Diaries/Publications, vol. 2, pp. 13-15, 19-20, box 15, folder 65b, MO/PWD/ETO Black Opera

tions, sec. III, p. 4, RG 226, NA.

17Entry 99, box 86, folder 95, Progress Report, NA Area, July 3, 1944, RG 226, NA; Roosevelt, War Report, 2: 93.

18Entry 99, box 16, folder 67, ETO MO Operations in MEDTO, 1944-45, and box 86, folder 94, Monthly Progress Report, NA Area MO, June 1, 1944, RG 226, NA; Roosevelt, War Report, 2: 97. 19Entry 99, box 86, folder 94, Monthly Progress Report NA Area MO, June 1, 1944, and box 92, folders 114, 115, OSS Activities, April-May 1944, MO/NATO, RG 226, NA. For partisan leaflets, see entry 91, box 5, MO War Diaries, vol. 2, MO-21, RG 226, NA; Cave Brown, The Secret War Report of the OSS (1976), pp. 525-526.

20Roosevelt, War Report, 2: 97-98.

21 Entry 99, box 92, folder 114, OSS Activities, April 1944, MO MEDTO, and entry 116, box 2, OSS Planning Group for Italy, Feb. 2, 1943, RG 226, NA.

22 Entry 99, box 94, folders 124, 125, OSS Monthly Activities, February-March 1945, pp. 34, 36-37, RG 226, NA.

23 Entry 99, box 15, folder 60; box 32, folder 159; box 69, folder 306; box 86, folder 94; box 87, folder 97; box 92, folder 113; box 93, folder 119; and box 94, folder 126, all in RG 226, NA.

24 Maj. Stacy Lloyd and Maj. Paul Mellon, USA, commanded these units. Entry 99, box 15, folder 65b, MO/PWD/ETO_Black Operations, sec. II Agents; box 93, folder 121, OSS Activities, November 1944; and box 88, folder 99, Wash. Branch Progress Reports, Oct. 1-Nov. 1, 1944, MEDTO/ETO, all in RG 226, NA. 25Daniel Lerner, Sykewar: Psychological Warfare Against Germany, D-Day to V-E Day (1949), pp. 47, 73; entry 99, box 32, folder 159b, MO War Diaries PWD/MO Combat Psy. War., book 1, and MEDTO MO Operations w/PWB, 1942-44, and box 93, folder 117, OSS Activities, July 1944 ETO/MO Reports, Oct. 23, 1944, RG 226, NA; Roosevelt, War Report, 2: 3, 5-7, 299.

26Entry 99, box 75; box 16, folder 67, MO Black Pamphlets, ETO MO Operations, 1944–45, RG 226, NA. Roosevelt, War Report, 2: 301-302.

27 Entry 99, box 15, folder 65b, MO/PWD/ETO Black Operations SKORPION, sec. I-III, RG 226, NA; Roosevelt, War Report, 2: 301. 28 Entry 91, box 5, MO War Diaries, vol. 2, Publications, and entry 99, box 75, Propaganda Techniques—MO black stickers, RG 226, NA.

29 Entry 91, box 5, MO War Diaries, Publications MO Poster Examples, vol. 2, RG 226, NA.

30Entry 99, box 75, folder 36, Wash. MO Exhibits, vol. 3, RG 226, NA.

31 Entry 99, box 75, folder 32, and entry 91, box 5, MO War Diaries Publications—Harvard Plan, vol. 2, pp. 34–36, 38–39, RG 226, NA; Roosevelt, War Report, 2: 266. For Casey's OSS service, see William J. Casey, The Secret War Against Hitler (1988), Joseph Persico, Casey: From OSS to CIA (1990), and Persico, “Casey's German Gamble,” Military History Quarterly 3 (Autumn 1990): 72. 32Entry 91, box 5, MO War Diaries, vol. 2, Publications, RG 226, NA. Entry 99, box 15, folder 165a; box 16, folder 67, ETO MO Operations, 1944-45; box 85, folder 92; box 85, folder 91, Background Report, Feb. 29, 1944, ME Area, MO; box 92, folder 115, OSS Activities, May 1944 MO, Algiers, 58; box 93, folder 116, OSS Activities, June 1944 MEDTO; and box 94, folder 125, OSS Monthly Activities, MEDTO March 1945, all in RG 226, NA.

33 Entry 99, box 75, Propaganda Techniques MO Black Propaganda, RG 226, NA.

34Entry 99, box 16, folder 67, ETO/MEDTO MO Operations, 1944 45; box 16, folder 67; box 75, folder 35; box 86, folder 96; and box 89, folder 102, all in RG 226, NA. Roosevelt, War Report, 2: 97. 35Entry 99, box 69, folder 306, MO Forgeries, and box 94, folder 124, OSS Activities ETO, February 1945, RG 226, NA; Roosevelt, War Report, 2: 98-99.

36 Entry 99, box 75, Propaganda Techniques MO Rumors, and box 15, folder 65a, memo, Creedy to Wilkins, Oct. 5, 1944, RG 226, NA; Roosevelt, War Report, 2: 302.

37 Entry 99, box 69, folder 306, MO Directives, May 30-June 6,

1944, and box 88, folder 100, Wash. Branch Progress Report, Nov. 1-Dec. 1, 1944, RG 226, NA.

38 Entry 99, U-boat rumor, box 69, folder 306; Luftwaffe rumor, box 15, folder 65a; refugee rumor, box 15, folder 65a; SIOUX Mission, box 15, folder 65a; Letter, Creedy to SIOUX, Apr. 27, 1945, all in RG 226, NA.

39 Entry 99, box 69, folder 306, MO Rumors, RG 226, NA. 40Entry 99, box 16, folder 67, ETO MO Operations, Field Report, Eugene Warner, Sept. 8, 1944, and box 69, folder 306, MO Black Radio, RG 226, NA; Roosevelt, War Report, 2: 97.

41Entry 99, MORSE, box 69, folder 306; box 87, folder 98, BOSTON; box 16, folder 67, Balkan stations; and box 86, folder 94, all in RG 226, NA. Roosevelt, War Report, 2: 122.

42Entry 99, performers and fan mail, box 5, MO Radio Soldatensender, vol. 3, book 1, pp. 11, 19, 23; box 15, folder 65b; box 16, folder 67; box 88, folder 100; and box 90, folder 105, all in RG 226, NA. For Goebbel's reaction, see Sefton Delmer, Black Boomerang (1962), pp. 123–124.

43 Delmer, Black Boomerang, pp. 205–206.

**Entry 91, box 6, vol. 3, book II, pp. 189–204; entry 99, box 69, folder 306; and box 16, folder 66, all in RG 226, NA.

45 Entry 87, box 2, folder 000.77, Broadcast Voice of SHAEF, memo, Harris to McClure, Oct. 9, 1944, Sub.: Black Radio Programs, Oct. 10-20, Psychological Warfare Division, Records of Allied Operational and Occupation Headquarters, World War II, RG 331, NA. Entry 148, box 79, Folder 1143, memo, Harris to Oechsner, PWD-SHAEF, Sept. 30, 1944, memo, McClure to MOOSS, Oct. 26, 1944, memo, McClure to MO-OSS, Sept. 11, 1944, and entry 136, box 126, folder MO Reports Office Brochure, Directive from PWD-SHAEF to Smith, MO-OSS, Sept. 30, 1944, RG 226, NA.

Entry 99, Volksender Drei, box 5, vol. 3, book 1, pp. 27–43; box 6, vol. 3, book 2, pp. 47-119; Bradley's reaction in box 16, folder 67, box 94, folders 122, 125, 126, box 95, folder 128, all in RG 226, NA. See also Allied Forces, Supreme Headquarters, Psychological Warfare Division, The Psychological Warfare Division, Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force: An Account of its Operations in the Western European Campaign, 1941–1945 (1945), pp. 54-55.

"

47 For Operation Annie (“1212′′), see Roosevelt, War Report, 2: 301; Lerne, Sykewar, p. 99; entry 99, box 15, folder 65b, annex G, pp. 17-31, and annex H, pp. 8–9, 13, 32–41, 66, RG 226, NA. See also H. H. Burger, 'Operation Annie': Now It Can Be Told," New York Times Magazine, Feb. 17, 1946, pp. 12–13; William Harlan Hale, "Big Noise in Little Luxembourg," Harper's Magazine, April 1946, pp. 377-384; and Brewster Morgan," 'Operation Annie': [The US Army Radio Station That Fooled the Nazis by Telling Them the Truth," Saturday Evening Post, Mar. 9, 1946, pp. 18-19.

48 Entry 99, box 89, folder 103, box 90, folders 104, 106, box 91, folder 110, box 94, folders 127a, 118; and entry 116, box 1, all in RG 226, NA. Roosevelt, War Report, 1: xi, 115. For post-1947 CIA covert operations, see John Prados, President's Secret Wars: CIA and Pentagon Covert Operations Since World War II (1986); Stephen E. Ambrose with R. H. Immerman, Ike's Spies: Eisenhower and the Espionage Establishment (1981): Peer de Silva, Sub Rosa: The CIA and the Uses of Intelligence (1978); and Robert W. Chandler, War of Ideas: The U.S. Propaganda Campaign in Vietnam (1981).

49Entry 99, box 69, folder 306; box 75, folder 35; and box 94, folders 122, 126, 127a, RG 226, NA.

50 Entry 99, box 5, vol. 3, book 1, pp. 21–22, MO War Diaries, RG 226, NA.

51United States Strategic Bombing Survey, Effects of Bombing on German Morale (1948), 1: 1–2, 27, 77, 96, 98–99, 121; Paul Joseph Goebbels, Final Entries, 1945: The Diaries of Joseph Goebbels, ed. Hugh Trevor-Roper (1978), pp. 80, 97, entries for Mar. 8 and 10, 1945.

52Roosevelt, War Report, 1: 222-223.

W

hen Egbert, king of Wessex, defeated the Mercians in 829, he could not have thought of the engagement as anything more than a quick way to win dominance over some pesky neighbors and gain a bit of land. Even one hundred years later, when Egbert's heirs had established a kingdom with boundaries roughly equivalent to those of modern England, it is doubtful that anyone could have guessed that Egbert's victory had established a monarchy that today can claim to be the oldest in the world. In fact, save the papacy, no other comparable institution can claim greater age or continuity. And while a number of monarchies still exist, some admittedly more powerful than that of modern Britain, few can boast a current monarch who is a lineal descendent of its first.1 Only England can claim a monarchy that has reigned in a virtually unbroken chain for more than one thousand years.2

herited many of its democratic principles, including the very notion of a "liberty," from the British. In this year, which marks the 2,500th anniversary of the advent of democracy, it is important to remember that democracy is a process of continual development. And while Greece may have been its birthplace, the evolution of democracy, and therefore the evolution of our own government, owes much to the growing pains of England.

Although the monarchy has been a constant in British history, its longevity has not precluded change. How could any institution, after all, remain static in the face of crusades, civil and world wars, a religious reformation, revolutions both political and industrial, the Enlightenment, and expanded education and franchise? All these events have forced England, and the world, to evolve. In the West, these changes have gradually moved us towards democracy, and England is no exception. Despite its status as first an absolute and now a constitutional monarchy, England has a democratic tradition longer than our own. It is not surprising, therefore, that the United States, while drawing its inspiration from ancient Athens, in

་་་་་་་་་་་

Sharing space with the Constitution, Declaration of Independence, and Bill of Rights in the National Archives Rotunda is a 1297 version of the Magna Carta, issued as part of Edward I's Confirmation of the Charters. (The document is on indefinite loan from the Perot Foundation.) The original charter, conceded by King John at Runnymede on June 15, 1215, was the result of the Angevin king's disastrous foreign policy and overzealous financial administration. The previous year, John had suffered a staggering defeat to the French king at Bouvines, losing with the battle all hope of regaining the French lands he had inherited. When the defeated John returned from the Continent in October 1214, he demanded scutage (a fee paid in lieu of military service) from those barons who had not joined his war with Philip. The barons in question, predominantly tenants of northern estates, refused, and a verbal battle ensued-John demanding the money he thought himself due