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'Sir,

"United States' Steam-ship' Iroquois,' St. Thomas, W. I.,

November 25, 1861.

"As I expected, I have to report the escape of the Sumter, to the great dejection of us all, for never were officers and crew more zealous

for a capture.

"At 8 o'clock on the night of the 23rd, the signal was faithfully made us from the shore, that the Sumter had slipped to the southward. Instantly we were off in pursuit, soon at full speed, rushing down to the southern part of the bay, but nothing was visible on the dark background.

"A small steamer, apparently one plying between St. Pierre and Port Royal, was off the point making signals, doubtless for the benefit of the Sumter. But we could see nothing of her as we proceeded on, so dark was the shadow thrown by the high land. Still we went on, all searching the darkness in vain. So soon as I had opened Port Royal Point, and seen nothing on the now open horizon, I concluded that we had passed her, or that she had doubled on us and gone to the northward. I then turned, keeping close on the shore, looking into her former anchorage, thinking she might possibly have returned.

"No sign of her there. We continued on to the northward, but when we opened the port nothing of her this way.

"We were now at fault which way to steer. Something like smoke being reported to seaward, I determined to start out, taking the direction to St. Thomas, to which place I was anxious to return, ere the vessel with our coals and provisions should leave, and thus check at least a small evil, for I now became hopeless of ever discovering the Sumter. "I reached this port this morning, and found that the Dacotah, which had arrived on the 21st from the East Indies, had taken in tow my vessel, with her stores, and gone to meet me.

"It is, of course, all conjecture where the Sumter will next cruise. I learned at St. Pierre that she had purchased sea-jackets for her crew, which may look like a cruise on our Northern coast, though I question whether she is calculated for winter service in that quarter. Should she continue in this vicinity, I will soon hear of her from the constant arrivals here.

"I shall be glad to understand from the Government whether they wish me to respect international law in the case of the Sumter, which gives her so great immunity, and makes every foreign port her asylum. "I was informed at Martinique that France would regard it as an act of war if I attacked her within the marine league of the island. "I have, &c.

(Signed) "JAMES S. PALMER, Commander.

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1 These despatches are extracted from Moore's Rebellion Record,

vol. iii, pp. 452–455.

Chap. XI.

Chap. XI.

The Sumter had in fact doubled, as Captain Palmer supposed, and as he might perhaps have foreseen, since the red lights which served him for signals were as visible to his enemy as to himself; and she was running northwards with all the speed she could muster while the Iroquois was racing to the south. He fully merited his disappointment. A ship which, after dropping anchor, proceeds to station herself in the offing, just beyond the marine league, keeps up, while there, communication by boats with the shore, and gets her enemy's movements signalled to her, grossly infringes the neutrality of the port; and these acts, which the Governor of Martinique was perhaps unable to prevent, would not have been tolerated at Cherbourg, nor, as we have already seen, at Southampton.

CHAPTER XII.

History of the Blockade continued.-Sinking of Stone-ships at Charleston and Savannah.-Effect of the Blockade on the South.-Its Effect on the Export and the Cultivation of Cotton.-Blockade-running.— Great Britain urged by the Confederate Government to declare the Blockade ineffective; by the Government of the United States to prohibit Trade with Blockaded Ports.-Correspondence with Mr. Mason; with Mr. Adams.-Remarks.-Nassau Trade.-Repressive Measures adopted in the United States.-Fruitless Remonstrances of Great Britain.-Doctrine of "Continuous Voyages" applied to Breaches of Blockade.- Decisions of the Supreme Court.-Remarks. -Blockade-running. ultimately made unprofitable. - Trade with Matamoros, and Questions raised by it.-Correspondence as to Mails and Mail-bags.-Regulations as to persons captured in Blockaderunners.-Case of the Emily St. Pierre.

THE difficulties with which the Federal Government had to struggle in blockading an extended coast with a hastily armed and comparatively slender force suggested, at the approach of winter, a peculiar expedient for economizing the services of its scattered marine, which was thus described by the Secretary of the Navy:

"One method of blockading the ports of the insurgent States, and interdicting communication, as well as to prevent the egress of privateers which sought to depredate on our commerce, has been that of sinking in the channels vessels laden with stone. The first movement in this direction was on the North Carolina coast, where there are numerous inlets to Albemarle and Pamlico Sounds and other interior waters, which afforded facilities for eluding the blockade and also to the privateers. For this purpose a class of small vessels were purchased in Baltimore, some of which have been placed in Ocracoke Inlet.

"Another and larger description of vessels were bought in the eastern market, most of them such as were formerly employed in the whale fisheries. These were sent to obstruct the channels of Charleston harbour and the Savannah River; and this, if effectually done, will prove the most economical and satisfactory method of interdicting commerce at those points."

Chap. XII.

To each of the two latter places were sent in November or December a fleet of old ships laden with five or six thousand tons of stone. They were towed in and sunk in several rows, so disposed as to obstruct the navigation without impeding the flow of water. This mode, said the officer employed to superintend the operation at Charleston (he had been previously employed on a Commission for the improvement of the harbour, and was, therefore, well acquainted with it), "is intended to establish at Charleston a combination of artificial interruptions and irregularities resembling on a small scale those of Hell Gate or Holmes Hole, and producing, like them, eddies, whirlpools, and counter-currents, such as to render the navigation of an otherwise difficult channel hazardous and uncertain."1 Being sunk inside the bar, or rather on both crests of it, it was expected that the sand carried up and down by the tides and the river would accumulate around them, and that they would soon become firmly imbedded.

Of the six entrances or channels leading to Charleston Harbour from the sea, there are but two, I believe, which have as much as eleven feet of water; and only onethe "main ship channel"-is much used by vessels of considerable burthen, the other being difficult and narrow. The stone-ships were deposited in the main channel.2

This operation, which threatened to choke up or

1 Lord Lyons to Earl Russell, 2nd January, 1862.

2 The whole operation was described with minute detail in a letter from a looker-on, published in the New York Tribune. "The work of the expedition," said the writer in concluding his narrative," is a complete success. If it seemed sometimes a sad one even to us, with what feelings must the people of Charleston have looked on its progress? All the operations of the fleet were in full sight of Moultrie, Morris, and Sullivan Islands, and Sumter, but not a man could lift a finger to imperil or arrest them. The fire which swept the streets of half the city was a trivial misfortune compared with this final disaster. Its distant results it is impossible to foretell with certainty, for it is necessarily an experiment. An effort to blockade a tidal harbour like

permanently injure the most flourishing and important Chap. XII. harbours of the whole Southern coast, excited some uneasiness in England. The Liverpool Shipowners' Association addressed Lord Russell on the subject, as one which seemed to touch the general interests of commerce; and Lord Lyons was directed to make representations to Mr. Seward. In America itself it was variously regarded. By some," wrote the British Envoy, "it is characterized as an odious and barbarous measure, not sanctioned by the usages of civilized warfare. Others maintain that it is perfectly fair and proper." "The question seems to depend," he justly observed, "on the extent to which the harbours will be permanently injured."

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Mr. Seward, on being spoken to, declared at once "that it was altogether a mistake to suppose that this plan had been devised with a view to injure the harbours permanently. It was, he said, simply a temporary military measure, adopted to aid the blockade. The Government of the United States had, last spring, with a navy very little prepared for so extensive an operation, undertaken to blockade upwards of 3,000 miles of coast. The Secretary of the Navy had reported that he could stop up the "large holes" by means of his ships, but that he could not stop up the "small ones." It had been found necessary, therefore, to close some of the numerous small inlets by sinking vessels in the channels. It would be the duty of the Government of the United States to remove all these obstructions as soon as the Union was restored. It was well understood that this was an obligation incumbent on the Federal Government."

this presented a wholly new problem, which was worked out by Captain Davis with great ingenuity and scientific skill; and for his present success it is enough to know that all access by the main ship channel is effectually closed. The bar is paved with granite, and the harbour a thing of the past."-Moore, vol. iii, p. 508.

1 Lord Lyons to Earl Russell, 29th November, 1861.

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