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ATTITUDE OF BRITISH GOVERNMENT.

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communicated to Lord Lyons, then Her Majesty's Chap. VI. Minister at Washington, the "concern" with which the "danger of secession" was regarded by the Queen's Government.1 He had expressed some surprise at Mr. Buchanan's Message, which "appeared to be preparing beforehand an apology" for it; but had instructed Lord Lyons to abstain carefully from any interference, even in the form of advice.2

Four days before the expiration of President Buchanan's term of office, Mr. Black, who had succeeded General Cass as Secretary of State, addressed to all the Ministers of the Republic at foreign Courts a circular desiring them to use all proper and necessary means in order to prevent the Governments, to which they were respectively accredited, from recognizing the independence of the seceding States. "This Government," said Mr. Black, "has not relinquished its constitutional jurisdiction within the territory of those States, and does not desire to do so." "It had the right," he added, "to ask of all foreign Powers that they should take no steps which may tend to encourage the revolutionary movements of the seceding States, or increase the danger of disaffection in those which still remain loyal." This despatch was read by Mr. Dallas to Lord Russell, who "replied shortly and verbally, stating that, even if the Government of the United States had been willing to acknowledge the separation of the seceding States as founded in right, Her Majesty's Government would have seen with great concern the dissolution of the Union which bound together the members of the American Republic: that the opposition of the Government of the United States to any such separation, and the denial by them of its legality, would make Her Majesty's Government very reluctant to take any step

1 Lord J. Russell to Lord Lyons, 29th November, 1860. 2 Lord J. Russell to Lord Lyons, 26th December, 1860.

3 Mr. Black to United States' Ministers abroad, 28th February, 1861.

Chap. VI. which might encourage or sanction the separation: that, however, it was impossible to state, at the present moment, in what shape the question might present itself; nor was it in his power to bind the British Government to any particular course of conduct in cases of which the circumstances and the significance were at present unknown to us."l

Mr. Seward, on assuming office as Secretary of State, renewed, by a second circular, with increased emphasis, the injunctions given by his predecessor, urging "the exercise of the greatest possible diligence and fidelity to counteract and prevent the designs of those who would invoke foreign intervention to embarrass or overthrow the Republic."

Government the con

"You will truthfully urge upon the sideration that the present disturbances have had their origin only in popular passions, excited under novel circumstances of very transient character, and that while not one person of well-balanced mind has attempted to show that dismemberment of the Union would be permanently conducive to the safety and welfare of even his own State or section, much less of all the States and sections of our country, the people themselves still retain and cherish a profound confidence in our happy Constitution, together with a veneration and affection for it such as no other form of Government ever received at the hands of those for whom it was established."

He suggested that the revolt, should it break up the Union, "might tend by its influence to disturb and unsettle the existing system of government in other parts of the world, and arrest the progress of civilization and improvement;" and he expressed his confidence "that these, with other considerations, would prevent foreign Governments from yielding to solicitations to intervene in any unfriendly way in the domestic concerns of the country."2

On this despatch, when communicated to him, Lord Russell repeated in substance what he had said before.

1 Lord J. Russell to Lord Lyons, 22nd March, 1861.

2 Mr. Seward to United States' Ministers abroad, 9th March, 1861.

The Government regretted the secession, and was "in Chap. VI. no hurry to recognize the separation as complete and final;" but it was impossible to tell "how and when circumstances might arise which would make a decision necessary." On that subject, therefore, he thought it well to decline further discussion at the time.1

The American Government appears to have been extremely apprehensive at this time lest the revolted States should succeed in obtaining from foreign Powers a recognition of their independence. The elaborate series of separate instructions composed by Mr. Seward for its diplomatic agents in Europe-instructions in which no pains were spared to shape the argument according to the interests or sentiments which he supposed most likely to influence each individual Courtwere evidently dictated by this apprehension. And, had the United States forborne altogether to attempt

1 8th April, 1861. This reply, as reported by Mr. Dallas, was complained of by the American Government as " abrupt and reserved," and "seeming to imply that under some circumstances, not explained, a recognition might be made." In a subsequent conversation, on the 18th May, Lord Russell gave a somewhat fuller explanation of his meaning, and this was accepted as satisfactory, and may be stated here in his own words:

"I repeated to Mr. Adams what I had said to Mr. Dallas: that, had a separation taken place between different parts of the American Union in an amicable manner, Her Majesty's Government would still have regretted that a Union of States so famous and so conspicuous for its love of liberty and enlightened progress should have been dissolved. That the opposition made by the Government of the United States to the secession would make us still more averse to take any step to record and recognize that secession. I explained to Mr. Adams, however, that the despatches of Judge Black and Mr. Seward seemed to ask on our part for a perpetual pledge that we would, under no circumstances, recognize the seceding States. I had, therefore, thought it necessary to add that Great Britain must hold herself free to act according to the progress of events and as circumstances might require."

2 Mr. Seward to Mr. Adams, 10th April, 1861; to Mr. Dayton, 22nd April; to Mr. Burlingame, 13th April; to Mr. Judd, 22nd March; to Mr. Sanford, 26th March to Mr. Schurz, 27th April; to Mr. Clay, 6th May; to Mr. Wood, 1st May; to Mr. Marsh, 9th May; to Mr. Fogg, 15th May; to Mr. Pike, 16th May.

Chap. VI. the re-conquest of the seceders, it would certainly have been realized sooner or later. Recognition would then have become a matter of course, after the lapse of a reasonable time. The mere assertion of a claim on the part of the United States, however energetic or persistent, could only delay this, and could not have prevented it in the long run. But the idea of recognizing them immediately, before their independence had been firmly established, does not appear to have been entertained by any European Government. Lord Russell's answers to Mr. Dallas were brief and extremely cautious, but there is no doubt that they were perfectly conformable to the principles which in America, no less than in England, have been held to govern these questions, and that no answer substantially differing from them would have been consistent with those principles. It was certain at this time that the Con

1 Such answers as the following would not, I presume, be expected by America from England, as they would not be expected by England from America :

Russia, "from the principle of unrelenting opposition to all revolutionary movements, would be the last to recognize any de facto Government of the disaffected States of the American Union.”—Mr. Wright to Mr. Seward, 8th May, 1861.

Austria 66 was not inclined to recognize de facto Governments anywhere."-Mr. Jones to Mr. Seward, 15th April, 1861.

Spain "would have nothing to do with the rebel party in the United States in any sense."-Mr. Perry to Mr. Seward, 13th June, 1861.

M. Thouvenel's answer was substantially the same as Lord Kussell's:"M. Thouvenel, in reply, said that no application had yet been made to him by the Confederated States, in any form, for the recognition of their independence; that the French Government was not in the habit of acting hastily upon such questions, as might be seen by its tardiness. in recognizing the new Kingdom of Italy; that he believed the maintenance of the Federal Union, in its integrity, was to be desired for the benefit of the people North and South, as well as for the interests of France; and the Government of the United States might rest well assured that no hasty or precipitate action would be taken on that subject by the Emperor. But whilst he gave utterance to these views, he was equally bound to say that the practice and usage of the present century had fully established the right of de facto Governments to recognition when a proper case was made out for the decision of

federate States possessed a political organization which Chap. VI. would have qualified them for a place among independent nations. It was not certain whether, if a serious effort were made to subdue them, they could maintain their independence. It was uncertain, also, whether such an attempt would be made.

On this latter head all doubt was at an end when the news reached Europe that civil war had begun. The path to be pursued by the European Powers was now clear; their duty was to wait till the contest should be decided, and to stand scrupulously neutral in the meantime. At every Court in Europe the United States had asked for neutrality-only neutrality; and an impartial neutrality was the course dictated by the highest considerations of expediency, as well as by the lowest and most palpable. The question what was to be the future of the American Commonwealth, momentous as it might be for Europe, was an American question, which ought to be fought out-if fought out it must be-in America and by Americans alone.

On the 30th April the British Government received from Lord Lyons information of the bombardment of Fort Sumter, and of President Lincoln's call for 75,000 men. A telegram, announcing that Mr. Davis had

foreign Powers. Here the official interview ended."-Mr. Faulkner to Mr. Seward, 15th April, 1861.

1 "The President neither expects nor desires any intervention, or even any favour, from the Government of France, or any other, in this emergency. Whatever else he may consent to do, he will never invoke, nor even admit, foreign interference or influence in this or any other controversy in which the Government of the United States may be engaged with any portion of the American people. It has been simply his aim to show that the present controversy furnishes no one ground on which a great and friendly Power, like France, can justly lend aid or sympathy to the party engaged in insurrection; and therefore he instructs you to insist on the practice of neutrality by the Government of the Emperor, as all our Representatives are instructed to insist on the neutrality of the several Powers to which they are accredited."Mr. Seward to Mr. Dayton, 22nd April, 1861.