charging on foot, he retook his headquarters and guns, just as the enemy were harnessing the horses to draw them off, and opened upon their receding backs when scarcely twenty paces distant, quickening the pace of all who still retained the power of locomotion. Hampton soon rallied his command, and tried hard to regain all that he had so suddenly won and lost; but Kilpatrick kept him at bay till Gen. Mitchell, hearing the guns, at 8 A. M. came hastily across with a brigade of infantry of the 20th corps; when the enemy disappeared; having inflicted a loss of 19 killed, 61 wounded, and 103 prison ers. Kilpatrick reached Fayetteville, N. C., on the 11th, and the whole army was concentrated there next day; when the army tug Davidson and the gunboat Eolus steamed up from Wilmington with news of the capture of that city and of all that had occurred during the six weeks that the army had been corduroying its way through the interminable swamps and pontooning across the swollen streams of South Carolina. At Columbia, the disastrous fire and the bitter hostility of the people had prevented the only corps that entered that city from learning much of the outer world; but here Sherman was in full communication with the Government and the cooperating Generals, and able to dispatch full instructions to Gen. Schofield; who, having been brought around from Tennessee to Newbern, was preparing to rëenforce him at Goldsboro'. Sherman halted three days at Fayetteville; completely destroying the U. S. Arsenal and the costly machi nery which had been brought hither from the U. S. armory at Harper's Ferry on its first capture in April, 1861. His army greatly needed rest; and besides, there was reason now to apprehend other resistance than that afforded by the swamps, the streams, and the elements. Hardee from Savannah and Charleston; Beauregard from Columbia; Cheatham from the Tennessee; with a considerable force drawn from North Carolina and her seaward defenses under Bragg and Hoke, made up, with Wheeler's and Hampton's cavalry, a body of not less than 40,000 men, mainly veterans, now united under the able and wary Jo. Johnston. It would no longer answer to move as hitherto; our columns must be kept well closed up, the corps within easy supporting distance, on peril of surprise and disaster. True to his favorite policy, Sherman again pushed " four divisions of his left wing, covered by Kilpatrick, directly northward to AVERYSBORO', as if intent on Raleigh; while Slocum's train, his two remaining divisions, and the right wing, moved by various roads nearly east, toward Goldsboro,' his true destination. The incessant rains had reduced the roads to a state wherein horses would mire almost anywhere, and 'corduroy' was essential wherever guns or wagons were to be moved. Sherman was on the left with Slocum, who was that day required to send up a brigade of infantry to the aid of Kilpatrick, who was skirmishing heavily in the advance. Next morning, when near Averysborough, on approaching the road, which runs eastward to Bentonville, the enemy, under Hardee, was found 49 March 15. JOHNSTON ATTACKS SLOCUM AT BENTONVILLE. posted on a narrow, swampy neck of land between the Cape Fear and South rivers; his total strength being estimated at 20,000. Ward's division of the 20th corps, in our left advance, was deployed, sending forward a skirmish line, developing a brigade of infantry behind a light field-work, with a battery enfilading the approach. Williams sent Case's brigade by a circuit to our left; turning the enemy's work, and, by a quick charge, driving back the infantry brigade holding it, under the fire of Winnegar's battery, to a stronger and better line behind it; whereupon, Ward's division charged directly on the retreating foe, capturing 3 guns and 217 prisoners, of whom 68 were wounded; while 108 of the enemy's dead were buried by Williams on the field. Jackson's division was now sent up on the right of Ward, and two divisions of the 14th corps on the left while Kilpatrick, massing his cavalry farther to the right, was directed to feel for the road to Goldsborough. He had gained that road with one brigade, when he was vehemently assailed by McLaws's Rebel division, and pushed back, fighting gallantly; until, at length, our whole line advanced, driving the enemy within his intrenchments and pressing him there till night fell, dark and stormy; under cover of which he retreated, taking the road not to Raleigh but to Smithfield. Slocum's loss was 77 killed and 477 wounded (no prisoners)-which may or may not include that of Kilpatrick. The enemy's was probably about the same. Ward's division made a show of pursuing the enemy; 707 while the rest of our army, bearing to the right, pushed directly for Goldsborough. Sherman, supposing the fight all out of the Rebels for the present, had ridden across to the right wing, and was intent on reaching Goldsborough and meeting Schofield, when the sound of guns on the left again challenged his attention. Slocum, approaching BENTONVILLE, had been assailed by Jo. Johnston with the entire Rebel army. Couriers from Schofield and from Terry now arrived; the former reporting himself at Kinston, short of provisions, but able to reach Goldsboro' on the 21st, which he was directed to do; Terry being likewise directed to advance. Meantime, the several divisions of the right wing were ordered to move on rapidly to the relief of the outnumbered left. Slocum had at first encountered Dibbrell's cavalry; which he was driving, when he ran headlong upon the whole Confederate army: the two leading brigades of Carlin's division being hurled back on the main body, with a loss of 3 guns and their caissons. Slocum thereupon, very properly, stood on the defensive; showing a front of four divisions, and throwing up slight barricades; while Kilpatrick came into action on the left. Here our left received six holdassaults from Johnston's army; ing our ground firmly, and inflicting heavy loss on the foe with our artillery-they having brought up Johnston had hurlittle or none. ried hither by night from Smithfield, moving very light, expecting to crush Slocum before he could be supported; but he was mistaken. Night fell BO March 18. cure. without giving him any ground; and, | before morning, Slocum got up his wagon-train, with its guard of two divisions, while Hazen's division of the 15th (Logan's) corps came up on his right, rendering his position seThe enemy not risking further attacks, Slocum awaited the coming up of Howard and the entire right wing; by which time, Johnston had intrenched thoroughly in a strong position, forming a sort of triangle, with its apex at the front, but facing Slocum on one side and Howard on the other. Here he was very cautiously approached and felt of by Sherman, who was aware that Schofield was improving this delay to get possession of Goldsborough in the enemy's rear, while Gen. Terry advanced to the Neuse at Cox's bridge, some 10 miles higher up. And now," during a heavy rain, under cover of a noisy demonstration along the Rebel front, Mower's division of Blair's corps worked around by our right to the enemy's rear; hoping to secure the bridge over Mill creek, which was his only line of retreat. But Johnston was not to be thus caught; nor did he choose to stop here and fight 60,000 men with (at most) 40,000; so he decamped during the night, retreating on Smithfield and Raleigh so suddenly as to leave his pickets behind, as well as his severely wounded. Our total loss here was 191 killed, 1,108 wounded, and 344 missing: in all, 1,643. We buried here 267 Rebel dead, and took 1,625 prisoners-many of them wounded. No further resistance being made, our army moved on to Goldsboro', where it rested and was reclad, while We may now narrate the events of the Winter in North Carolina, which signally contributed to the final overthrow of the Rebellion. WILMINGTON, N. C., had-because of its location, so convenient for the supply of ordnance, munitions, &c., to the main Rebel armies, and the extraordinary difficulty of precluding the ingress and egress of blockaderunners, at this port-been, from the outset, one of the most important sea-ports of the Confederacy, before, by the gradual closing of the others, it became the only one of consequence that, remained accessible. To close it, therefore, became at length synonymous with barring all direct and nearly all commercial intercourse between the Confederacy and the non-belligerent world. Early in the Autumn of 1864, Gen. Grant proposed to Gen. Butler the dispatch of Brig.-Gens. Weitzel and Graham to reconnoiter FORT FISHER, the main defense of the seaward approaches to Wilmington, to determine its strength, preparatory to a combined attack. The reconnoissance was made accordingly, and its result duly reported."" The meditated attack was intended to have been a virtual surprise, when the pressure of our armies at all points should have probably re64 About Sept. 20. 53 March 27. BUTLER AND PORTER OFF WILMINGTON. duced the garrisons of Fort Fisher and its adjuncts to a minimum; but even the small number required was not available for this purpose till October; when it was judged that the collection and evolutions of a great fleet in Hampton Roads must have attracted the enemy's attention and prompted a rëenforcement of the threatened defenses. (The original plan of the expedition contemplated the collection and outfit of this fleet at or near Port Royal, under the guise of a demonstration against Fort Sumter and Charleston; but this was overruled by considerations of obvious convenience.) Meantime, the fertile genius of General Butler had been stimulated by the accounts of a tremendous gunpowder explosion at Erith, England, whereby destructive effects had been produced at a considerable distance; and he had conceived the project of running a vessel filled with gunpowder under the sea-wall of Fort Fisher, and there exploding it; trusting that, at least, the garrison would be so paralyzed by the resulting earthquake as to facilitate a prompt seizure of the fort by its expectant besiegers. Delays in preparation occurred, as usual; Gen. Butler was ordered" by telegraph to New York, to keep the peace there during the Presidential election; and, when he returned," the powder experiment had been resolved on and preparation for it partially made. But Gen. Grant now left the front for a flying visit to his family in New Jersey, devolving on Gen. Butler the chief command; and, when he returned, of the 250 tons of powder required, 100 tons were still wanting, and did not arrive 65 Nov. 1 1864. 709 at Fortress Monroe till December: thus the expedition did not get fairly off till the 14th. Admiral Porter, commanding the naval part of it, was off Beaufort, N. C., on the 16th; though Gen. Butler, in advance of the transport fleet, had reached our blockaders off Wilmington the night before. The transports and troops were at Masonborough inlet, 18 miles north, or nearly east of Wilmington. Gen. Grant, it is clear, had not designed that Butler should accompany the expedition, but intended that Weitzel should be its commander; yet it is equally plain that, up to a very late hour, Gen. Butler undoubtingly understood that he was not merely to fit it out, but personally command it. So he did. Porter, with his war vessels, arrived on the 18th, and at once sent up the powder-boat Louisiana, intending to explode her forthwith; but, on Butler's remonstrance that the land forces must be ready to follow up the explosion with an assault, he countermanded the order. It appears that the Rebels were not aware of the presence or imminence of the expedition till the 20th-a few vessels more or less in the offing, where several blockaders were generally visible, not wearing any special significance. But now, as the wind was high and the sea rough, with a prospect of still worse weather, the transports put back 70 miles to Beaufort, N. C., for water, &c.; when a storm ensued which prevented their return till the 26th. Admiral Porter-who was not on terms of cordiality with Gen. Butler set to work by himself. He had sent in the powder-boat Louisiana, 56 Nov. 16. ་ |