iards was certainly, as it turned out, a fault, but it was one of the fair chances of war, and it was a fault in which Wellington, made wise by experience, was never again detected. When the news of the untoward result of this campaign reached England, the clamor against the government and against Wellington was quite as violent as that excited by the disasters of Sir John Moore's army. The opposition in Parliament took advantage of this feeling to rouse public opinion to such a manifestation as might compel the termination of the war in the Peninsula and drive the ministry from office. The Common Council of London, probably a fair exponent of the opinions of the middle class, petitioned the king not to confirm the grant of £2,000 a year, which the ministry had succeeded in getting Parliament to vote to Wellington. The petitioners ridiculed the idea that a battle attended with such results should be called a victory. "It should rather be called a calamity," they said, "since we were obliged to seek safety in a precipitate flight, abandoning many thousands of our wounded countrymen into the hands of the French.” In the opinion of the strategists in the Common Council and of their friends in Parliament, Wellington might be a brave officer, but he was no general; he had neglected the protection of his flanks and his line of com and Sir Arthur Wellesley was appointed to the chief command. The government, not yet wholly awakened from its illusions, still thought it practicable to reach Madrid in a single campaign, and to that end the efforts of Wellington were directed. It became necessary at first to dislodge Soult at Oporto, and the magnificent victory of the English, gained by the passage of the Douro at that point, went far to revive confidence at home in the invincibility of their army. Yet so clear is it that victory in war often depends upon what, for some better name we may call mere good fortune, that we have the authority of the Duke of Wellington himself for saying that this army which had just exhibited such prodigies of valor, was then in such a state of demoralization, that although "excellent on parade, excellent to fight, it was worse than an enemy in a country, and liable to dissolution alike by success or defeat." Certainly no severer criticism has ever been justified by the inexperience and want of discipline of our own raw levies than that contained in this memorable declaration. A little reflection and candor might perhaps teach us, as it did the English, that nothing can compensate for the want of experience, and that every allowance is to be made for disasters where it is necessary to educate both officers and soldiers in the actual presence of the enemy. Wellington soon afterwards moved towards the Spanish munication. When it is remembered, that frontier, hoping by a junction with the army at this very time, Wellington, profiting by under Cuesta to fight a battle with the the experience of the past, was diligently French which would open to him the road to making his army really effective within the the capital. The battle was fought at Tala- lines of Torres Vedras, from which strongvera, and although it has since been claimed hold it was in due time to sally forth like a by the English as one of their proudest vic- giant refreshed, never to rest until it had tories, and the name of TALAVERA is now in-planted the English flag on the heights of scribed upon the standards of the regiments Toulouse, we may perhaps smile at the prewho took part in it with those of Salamanca and Vittoria, yet the result was, in the end, that Wellington was obliged to retreat to Lisbon just three months after he had set out from that place, having left his wounded in the hands of the French, having escaped as if by a miracle from being wholly cut off in his retreat, and having lost one-third of his army in battle and by disease. Of course the blame was thrown upon the want of co-oporation on the part of the Spaniards. This we have nothing to do with; it is the result of the campaign with which we are That hideous moral leprosy, which seems concerned. Dependence upon the Span- to be the sad but invariable attendant upon sumption of those who, sincere well-wishers to the cause, displayed only their ignorance in their criticism. But what shall be said of those who, knowing better, being quite able to understand the wisdom of the policy adopted by the general to ensure success in the stupendous enterprise in which the country was engaged, yet with a factious spirit and with the sole object of getting into power themselves, took advantage of the excitement of the ignorant multitude to paralyze the energies of the government ? all political discussions in a free government, | from the vigorous assaults of the opposition; corrupting the very sources of public life, and from its own unpopularity occasioned by breeding only the base spirit of faction, had the failure of the Walcheren expedition, and taken complete possession of the opposition, the disasters in the Peninsula, he could exand in its sordid calculations, the dishonor pect no thorough and reliable support. Inof the country, or the danger of the army, deed the government, almost in despair, was as nothing, provided the office, the power, threw the whole responsibility for the miliand the patronage of the government were tary measures on the Continent on him alone. secured in their hands. It mattered little to He accepted the responsibility in a most them, provided they could drive the ministry magnanimous spirit. "I conceive," he from office, whether its downfall was brought writes, "that the honor and the interests of about by blunders in Spain, or by the king's the country require that we should hold our obstinacy about Catholic Emancipation, or by position here as long as possible, and, please an obscure quarrel about the influence of God, I will maintain it as long as I can. I the lords of the bed-chamber. The sincerity will neither endeavor to shift from my own of these declamations of the opposition was shoulders on, those of the ministers the recuriously enough put to the test some time sponsibility for the failure, by calling for afterwards, when the ministry, wearied by means which I know they cannot give, and the factious demagogueism with which all which perhaps would not add materially to their measures were assailed, and under- the facility of attaining our object; nor standing perfectly their significance, boldly will I give to the ministers, who are not challenged their opponents, if they were in earnest, to make a definite motion in the House of Commons, that Portugal should be abandoned to its fate. This move completely unmasked their game, and for a time silenced the clamor, for it was perfectly understood on all hands, that deep in the popular heart, undisturbed by the storms which swept over its surface, there was a thorough and abiding conviction of the absolute necessity of resisting the progress of Napoleon's arms, and that the real safety of England herself required that that resistance should then be made in Spain. Still this noisy clamor did immense mischief; it weakened the government, it prolonged the strife, it alarmed the timid, it discouraged the true, and it so far imposed upon Napoleon himself, that thinking that in these angry invectives against the government he found the real exponent of English sentiment, he concluded, not unnaturally, that the people were tired and disgusted with the war, and that the privations which it occasioned were like a cancer, slowly but surely eating out the sources of national life. In the midst of these violent tumults at home, Wellington was silently preparing for his great work within the last lines of Torres Vedras. It would not be easy to overrate the difficulties by which he was surrounded. He was fully aware of the outcry which had been raised against him; he knew that from a Cabinet so weakened by internal dissensions as to be on the verge of overthrow strong, and who must feel the delicacy of their own situation, an excuse for withdrawing the army from a position which, in my opinion, the honor and interest of the country require they should maintain as long as possible." Animated by this heroic sense of duty, the commander-in-chief prepared to contend against the 200,000 men under Massena, whom Napoleon had sent to chase him into the sea. He had, to oppose this immense force, only 25,000 English soldiers, and about the same number of Portuguese tolerably organized. Secure within the lines of Torres Vedras, he quietly waited until the want of provisions, and the utter hopelessness of an assault upon his position, forced upon Massena the necessity of retreating. Then instantly pursuing, in a series of battles, of almost daily occurrence, he drove Massena out of Portugal, and reached once more the Spanish frontier in May, 1811, nearly three years after the English had sent an army to the assistance of the Peninsula. Here he rested for a long time making preparations for the siege of Badajoz and Ciudad Rodrigo, operations requiring time, and the success of which was essential to the safety of the army in its further progress. Still, so little was Wellington's position, military and political, understood in Engiand even at that time, after all the proofs he had given of consummate ability, that public clamor was again roused against the mode adopted by him for conducting the war. As there were no disasters at which to grumble, people talked of "bar- | a hope of the final success of our arms in ren victories," because like those of Crecy the Peninsula. Our laurels were great, but and Azincourt, they brought no territorial barren, and our victories in their effects acquisitions, forgetting then what they have mere defeats." Mr. Whitbread, too, as never been weary of boastingly proclaiming usual, was not behindhand with his prophsince, that these victories were the best ecies. "He saw no reason," he said, "to proofs that their army was distinguished by alter his views respecting peace; war must the highest military qualities, which, prop- otherwise terminate in the subjugation of erly directed and supported, were capable of either of the contending powers. They achieving the most glorious results. So pro- were both great; but this was a country of found was the conviction of the immense su- factitious greatness. France was a country periority of the French, both in numbers, of natural greatness." So, General Tarleand in the quality of their troops, that the public mind was in a state of feverish anxiety, and many of the stoutest hearts gave way to despair. ton "had the doctrine of Mr. Fox in his favor, who wished for the pencil of a Cervantes to be able to ridicule those who desired to enter upon a continental war." Thus, from universal enthusiasm in favor of the Spanish War, public opinion, at first manifesting itself through the factious spirit of the opposition, at length spoke through all its organs, in tones of despondency and despair, of the situation and prospects of the country, and simply because there had not been that sort of military success which it could understand, to sustain and direct it. Universal distrust seized upon the public mind; and had it not been for the heroic constancy of that great commander, whose task in supporting the ministry at home was at least as difficult as that of beating the French in Spain, the glory of England had sunk forever. About this period Sir Walter Scott writes to Mr. Ellis: "These cursed, double cursed news (from Spain) have sunk my spirits so much, that I am almost at disbelieving a Providence; God forgive me, but I think some evil demon has been permitted in the shape of this tyrannical monster, whom God has sent on the nations visited in his anger. The spring-tide may, for aught I know, break upon us in the next session of Parliament. There is an evil fate upon us in all we do at home or abroad." So Sir James Mackintosh, writing to Gentz, at Vienna: "I believe, like you, in a resurrection. because I believe in the immortality of civilization, but when, and by whom, and in what form, are questions which I have not the sagacity to answer, and on which it would be boldness to hazard a conjecture. A dark and stormy night, a black series of ages may be prepared for our posterity, before the dawn that opens the more perfect day. Who can tell how long that fearful night may be before the dawn of a brighter morrow? The race of man may reach the promised land; but there is no assurance that the present generation will not perish in the wilderness." As if to render the situation more gloomy, if possible, the Marquis of Wellesley, the brother of Wellington, left the ministry upon the avowed ground that the government would not support the war with sufficient vigor. History has stripped his conduct of any such worthy motive, and shown that the real trouble was his anxiety to supplant Mr. Perceval. At the same time, the attack was kept up in the opposite quarter. "No man in his senses,' ,,credit for the undaunted and unwearied firmness with which they have set themselves against abuses said Sir Francis Burdett, "could entertain and against every instance of oppression." THIRD SERIES. LIVING AGE. 981. that day, taken from the Annual Register for 1812, Were it Yet it happend, as it so often happens in | grace to the French military occupation of the order of Divine Providence, in the moral as in the physical world, that the night was darkest just before dawn. Amidst all this universal despondency and sinister forboding, events were preparing which in a few short months changed the whole face of Europe, and forced back that torrent of revclutionary success which had spread over the whole continent, until it overwhelmed the country where it had its source in complete ruin. The discussions in Parliament to which we have referred, took place in February, 1812. With the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo on the 18th of January of that year, with the fall of Badajoz on the 26th of March, the first battle of Salamanca on the 20th of July, and Napoleon's invasion of Russia in June in the same year, began the downfall of the French Empire. Wellington at last reached Madrid in August, 1812, more than four years later than he ought to have done, according to the strategists of Parliament and the press. This was all forgotten at the moment, so magic a wand is held by success. The fickle voice of popular applause was again heard, echoing the spirit of confidence which his persistent and undaunted conduct had revived in the hearts of his countrymen. His career of victory, however, was destined not to be unchecked; and when, after his occupation of Madrid, his unsuccessful assault upon the Castle of Burgos rendered a retreat to the Portuguese frontier and the evacuation of the capital a proper military movement, although that retreat was compensated for by the abandonment of Andalusia by the French, in order to concentrate their whole force against him, still the blind multitude could not be made to understand it, and began again to murmur. Spain. It is not our present purpose to trace the history of the next campaign, but it is curious to observe the effects produced by assured success upon that public opinion which had shifted so often and so strangely during the progress of this eventful struggle. The opposition, as their only hope of escape from political annihilation, and thinking to swim with the popular current, abused the ministers for not supporting Wellington with sufficient earnestness, complaining that they had taken the advice which they themselves had so often and so eloquently tendered. But it was of no avail. This wretched charlatanism was too transparent to impose upon any one; and of the great party who opposed the war, no one ever after rose to office or power in England. It required a whole generation, in the opinion of the English constituencies, to expiate the faults of those who had sneered at the great duke, and had called the glorious fields of Vimeiro, Busaco, Talevera, Fuentes d'Onor, Ciudad Rodrigo, and Badajoz, names which had become associated with the proudest recollections of English renown, mere barren victories, equal in their effects to defeats." We pass now to the consideration of another class of difficulties inherent in the prosecution of every war, and generally of far greater magnitude than any other,those connected with the raising of the vast sums of money required for the support of military operations. In this important matter, if we mistake not, there are some striking points of resemblance between the English experience during the war, and our present situation. It is the fashion among many who seek to excite the public alarm on this subject from unworthy, and sometimes, it may be feared, from treasonable motives, to It is not now difficult to see that the vic- represent the enormous outlay of the nation's tory at Salamanca was really what the far- wealth which is poured out to save the naseeing sagacity of Marshal Soult predicted tion's life, as wholly unparalleled in history. at the time it would become, "a prodigious Yet it may be asserted, without any fear of historical event," that it was the pivot on contradiction, that England, with a populawhich at that time hinged the destinies of tion then little more than half of that which England, one of those battles of which we see now inhabits our loyal States, with resources perhaps a dozen only in the whole course of infinitely less in proportion at that time than history, which are really decisive of the fate our own, her manufacturing industry, so far of empires. It completely unloosed the as external outlet was concerned, wholly French power in the Peninsula, and pre- crippled by the operation of the French conpared the way for the great success of Vit-tinental system, and her own Orders in Countoria, the next year, which gave the coup de cil, expended, during every year of the Pen insular War, as large a sum as has been required here each year to create and keep up the gigantic force now in arms to put down the rebellion. During the five years that the war lasted, her average annual expenditure exceeded, ninety milllions of pounds sterling, or four hundred and fifty millions of dollars, which is about the same sum which is demanded of us. No one, of course, pretends to say that this rate of expenditure is not appalling, yet it concerns us to know that it is not unprecedented, and that these vast amounts have been raised from national resources far inferior to our own. It should not be forgotten, also, that they represent the money price of England's independence, and if ours is secured by a far greater outlay, we certainly are not disposed to quarrel with the wisdom of the investment. enforcement of the Continental system, which were coincident in point of time with the commencement of the Spanish war, the average annual exports sank from fifty-seven millions to twenty-three millions, taking the average of three years after they had been in operation. Taxes were laid on at a most burdensome rate. The income tax was ten per cent., and besides, specific war taxes amounting to more than twenty millions a year were imposed. Notwithstanding all these taxes, the debt increased more than one thousand millions of dollars during the Peninsular War. Discontent and violence among the laboring classes became universal, and it was remarked that the achievement of the greatest victories in Spain was celebrated in England "amidst a population who had been prevented by the The question is, how were these immense burden of taxation on the absolute necessasums raised in England? The man who ries of life, from securing a livelihood by the would have predicted, at the commencement strictest industry, and thus pauperism had of the war with France, that the English been generated throughout the land, a paunational debt would at its close exceed one perism aggravated by a spirit of pillage, thousand millions of pounds sterling, and which it required a strong military force to that the country would be able to bear such repress." Bankruptcy and ruin fell upon a burden, would have been regarded as a the trading classes, and absolute exhaustion visionary as wild as he who in this country, of the resources of the country seemed altwo years ago, might have foretold the most reached. The public stocks had sunk present amount of our national debt, and to such a degree that the three per cents., have contended that, in spite of it, the pub- which are now always above ninety per lic credit would remain unimpaired. The cent., were rarely higher during the war difficulty in England of raising these vast than sixty-five per cent., and so depressed sums was tenfold greater than it is here. at last had the public credit become, that Napoleon, looking upon England as the the last loan of the Continental war, that of Southern people have been taught to regard April, 1815, was taken by the contractor at us, as a purely commercial nation, undoubt- fifty-three per cent., and paid for in the deedly placed more reliance for ultimate suc-preciated paper of the day; and yet the cess upon the instinct of money getting, Chancellor of the Exchequer was congratuwhich would shrink from the pecuniary sacrifices necessary in a prolonged struggle, than upon the mere victories of his army. Hence he pursued, during his whole career, an inflexible purpose of ruining English commerce, and by a series of measures known as the Continental system, endeavored to exclude English ships and English products from the markets of the world. The effect of these measures, although not so serious as he wished and had anticipated, nevertheless crippled enormously the resources of England just at the period when they were most needed. Taking the three years before the issuing of the Orders in Council and the vigorous lated even by the opposition for having made "a good operation." The Bank was in a state of chronic suspension, the buying and selling of gold were prohibited to the public under severe penalties, and yet every gold guinea which was sent by the government to the army in Spain (and nothing else would answer the purpose of money in that country) cost thirty per cent. premium. How England survived all this complication of troubles is one of the marvels of history, but it is not our purpose to discuss that question. The great fact that the money required was somehow raised is all that we have to do with at present. When we have been at war for twenty years, and 1 |