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opened a rapid enfilade fire from all his batteries at about one thousand yards range. The batteries on School-house Hill attacked the enemy's lines in front. In a short time the guns of Colonel Crutchfield opened from the rear. Those of Pegram and Carpenter opened fire upon the enemy's right; the artillery on Loudon Heights again opened on Harper's Ferry, and also some guns of General McLaws from Maryland Heights. In an hour, the enemy's fire seemed to be silenced, and the batteries were ordered to cease their fire, which was the signal for storming the works. General Pender had commenced his advance, when the enemy again opening, Pegram and Crenshaw moved forward their batteries and poured in a rapid fire. The white flag was now displayed, and shortly afterwards Brigadier-General White (the commanding officer, Colonel D. S. Miles, having been mortally wounded), with a garrison of about eleven thousand men, surrendered as prisoners of war. Under this capitulation, we took possession of seventy-three pieces of artillery, some thirteen thousand small arms, and other stores. Leaving General A. P. Hill to receive the surrender of the Federal troops and take the requisite steps for securing the captured stores, I moved, in obedience to orders from the commanding general, to rejoin him in Maryland, with the remaining divisions of my command."

The denouement at Harper's Ferry restored Lee's fortunes; for up to the time that he received tidings of its fall, it seemed probable that he would be compelled to re-cross into Virginia and abandon the campaign.



Descending the western slope of the South Mountain, one suddenly emerges into a lovely valley, spreading out in many graceful undulations and picturesque forms of field and forest,

to the Potomac. This stream, turning sharply to the north at Harper's Ferry, forms the westward limit of the valley, whose breadth from the mountain to the river may be from eight to twelve miles. But before reaching the Potomac, at a distance of six or eight miles from the passes of the South Mountain, one comes upon the stream Antietam, which, flowing from the north in drowsy, winding course, empties into the Potomac a few miles above Harper's Ferry. As this brook makes with the Potomac an acute angle, and the Potomac forms a reentrant angle on itself, there is thus left between the two streams an enclosed space of two or three miles broad and twice or thrice that length. From the western margin of the Antietam the ground rises in a slope of woods and cultivated fields to a bold crest, and then falls back in rough outlines of rock and scaur to the Potomac. The town of Sharpsburg nestles just behind the ridge, above which the steeples of its churches are visible from the east side of the Antietam, and in the rear of Sharpsburg is the Shepherdstown ford of the Potomac.

It was upon this coign of vantage, his back towards the Potomac, his front covered by the Antietam, that Lee, on the morning of the 15th of September, drew up his force, or rather what of his force was with him to wit: the divisions of Longstreet and Hill that during the night had been compelled to abandon the defence of the South Mountain passes. Jackson and McLaws and Walker were still at Harper's Ferry, which did not surrender till the morning of the 15th, and from which Lee had yet no reports. In taking post behind the Antietam, therefore, Lee was in position either to repass the Potomac by the Shepherdstown ford, if he should be pressed too hard by McClellan, or to stand and receive battle if the conclusion of operations at Harper's should set Jackson and his companions free to unite with him at Sharpsburg. While there anxiously awaiting the turn of events, Lee, during the forenoon of the 15th, received from Jackson

tidings of the surrender of Harper's Ferry — tidings which he says "reanimated the courage of the troops." Forthwith he instructed his lieutenant to march with all haste by way of Shepherdstown ford and join him at Sharpsburg. His arrival was hardly to be looked for that day, but it was certain next morning; and in the interim Lee judged he could readily hold McClellan in check.

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Howbeit, it was now manifest to Lee that the terms on which he would be compelled to meet his antagonist were very different from those he had hoped to establish for himself ere he should be brought to battle. In the revelation already made of his intent, it will be remembered that he had expected the words are his own "to move the army into Western Maryland, establish our communications with Richmond through the valley of the Shenandoah, and, by threatening Pennsylvania, induce the enemy to follow, and draw him away from his base of supplies." Now if we may translate this very general statement into specific terms, it probably means that Lee designed to take position in the Cumberland valley as far north as Hagerstown, where, masking his movement by the mountains he would be able to send forward a raiding column towards the Susquehanna, and if this manœuvre should prompt the Union commander to follow his impulse by an advance northward, east of the South Mountain range (as a like movement induced Meade to do during the campaign of the following year), an opening would then be afforded him of moving upon Washington. It was otherwise decreed. The retention of the Union armies at Harper's Ferry obliged Lee to detach two thirds of his force to secure its capture, and by its capture his communications with Richmond. The unwonted rapidity with which his opponent moved forward from Frederick made it necessary for him to use the remaining third of his strength in covering the siege of Harper's Ferry. Finally, the expulsion of this force from the South Mountain before yet Harper's Ferry had fallen, com

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