best). "We must have them," is better than "we have a right to them." But, again, when Napoleon, still keeping his idea prominent of aggrandizing France, had obtained the cession of Savoy and Nice, was he, or were the French, content? Far from it; this only whetted their appetite for more. In one of their journals we were gravely told, that "Geneva, the Valais, and the canton of Vaud must follow Savoy, for the latter is quite useless to us if we do not get possession of the road over the Simplon, which must be regarded in the light of a twin brother to Mount Cenis." And again, To make Savoy a complete territory, we require three cantons of Switzerland, besides the Simplon and St. Bernard; as for them, they are absolutely necessary. These districts were departments of France from 1798 to 1814, and the Emperor must now reclaim them." Thus the Emperor is urged on, whether he will or no, to acts of spoliation and robbery, and he knows that he will be the idol of France only so long as he works towards and in behalf of the accomplishment of such claims. Here is a country which it is the duty and interest of Europe to preserve in its integrity, and prevent the aggressions of any power upon it, scriously threatened. Nearly one-half of its territory is claimed on the ground of necessity. To make the other encroachments fully available in the service of the aggressor more must be taken. It is true the Switzers are fully aware of their danger, and determined to resist to the last any encroachments upon their territory; but, we ask, is such a state of things beneficial to Europe? Can any nation feel secure, or enjoy that peace which is necessary for the development of its civilization and the progress of the arts and sciences, when it knows that a large and powerful nation, which has been always distinguished by restlessness, love of war, and change, has a very large and excellently appointed army and navy burning for action, and who consider it a sacred duty to add to their own country by robbing from others, and are regardless, as a matter of course, what means they employ to attain their end? We know also that Napoleon had, and no doubt still has, his eyes upon the island of Sardinia, and that he was only prevented by the firm tone of England from making it, like its neighbour Corsica, a French province. Again, in the eagerness to rush to war in the cause of Poland, we know well that Napoleon calculated upon Prussia rising against him; in which case he would grasp at the Rhine provinces, and thus, if successful, rectify the boundaries by taking in the natural frontier, and claim again what had once been part of the dominions of France. Take, again, the recent proposal for a congress. A congress is certainly needed, and might be productive of great good. But the proposition coming from such a quarter was looked upon by all the great powers, who had no interests of their own to serve, with coldness, and suspicion that the Emperor had some ulterior purpose in view, and that he hoped to gain by the congress, or, at any rate, strengthen his own position among the French, and obtain some assistance in the carrying out of his idea. It is noticeable, also, that all the powers who had an interest to serve in the congress, or hoped to obtain any advantage from it-Rome, Saxony, &c.,-have been the most willing and eager for its meeting. With Napoleon, indeed, the congress is almost a matter of necessity, as affording something on which to fix the attention and engross the thoughts of his people and army. There is nothing now for the latter to do. Mexico has been conquered, and the army is kept in Italy, not only because the Emperor of the French wishes to obtain and maintain an influence in foreign courts, but because the farther it is from home the more secure he will feel; and occupation, whatever its nature, will allay in some measure the ardour of their thirst for glory. But we further observe that,— 3. Napoleonism is not beneficial to France. The beneficiality or otherwise of Napoleonism to France will afford a fair criterion of the good or evil it has produced upon Europe, not only because France is an important part of Europe, but because the real prosperity of one country acts beneficially upon its neighbours. If one country be in a high state of civilization, enlightenment, and freedom, it is impossible that the adjoining countries shall not be benefited by it, and gradually assimilate their condition to the improved one of their neighbours. Let us see, then, how Napoleonism has acted upon France. We admit, at the outset, that France is a very civilized country; though it is not the most civilized country, nor fitted to take the lead in the civilization of the peoples. But Napoleonism acts as a barrier to the progress of civilization in that country. It is true that splendid buildings, promenades, and parks have arisen at his instigation, that the capital has been greatly improved, a large and efficient army and navy provided, and many luxuries introduced; but these do not constitute civilization. The French court may be the most splendid in Europe, but it retards, instead of promoting, the amelioration of the social condition of the people; for a love of luxury and gaiety is engendered in the nation, which results in effeminacy and decay. Intellectual freedom is proscribed. No free expression of opinion is permitted if it differ from the imperial; though Napoleon has various methods of sounding the depths of public opinion, and of estimating the natural direction and force of the suppressed current. The liberty of the press is proclaimed on one day, and the next an editor receives an avertissement in consequence of availing himself of the offered boon; or it may be the paper is prohibited altogether, and the writer of the offending article fined and imprisoned. Many of the most talented men of that country have either been expelled or had to seek safety from imprisonment and death by a voluntary exile. Universal suffrage is declared, yet the most rigorous measures are taken at each election to secure the return of the Government, and the rejection of that popular candidate. The latter do sometimes, and in some cases, succeed, as was exemplified in the recent election ; but in the majority of instances the imperial will is victorious. Napoleonism, instead of doing all in its power to allay that restlessness of the French nation which is its chief characteristic, and which has made it an object of suspicion to Europe, does everything to foster and extend it. Instead of developing to the utmost the internal resources of the country, and teaching his people-as Fénélon taught his royal pupil-that the prosperity of a country depends upon the condition of each family in the country, the energy and industry they display in obtaining wealth for themselves by the development of its resources, and the immunity they enjoy from invasion or suspicion, the people are taught to look to foreign interventions and expeditions as things most conducive to the prosperity of the country. This love of intervention keeps the people in a restless and feverish state. The large army maintained in the country contributes most powerfully to this. Many splendid and useful buildings have been erected; but these, instead of turning the minds of the people into other channels, keep them still fixed upon splendour and magnificence as the chief requisites for prosperity. Another course might easily be adopted. France is quite safe from aggression, and hence has no need of such a large army. By acting uprightly with Europe, Napoleon would remove the suspicion which must ever be attached to the actions of a man who declares one day "L'empire c'est la paix," and the next undertakes war for an idea. Finally, Napoleonism has made France nearly bankrupt, and, if persisted in, must make her completely So. * No one will assert that the actions of the first Napoleon were beneficial to Europe; and as the present Emperor feels pledged to carry out the ideas of his uncle in every particular, we have no hesitation in affirming that Napoleonism has not been, and cannot be, beneficial either to Europe or to France. R. S. * Since the above was written, the following substantiation of the opinions here given has appeared in the National Review, viz.:---" Practically, perhaps, his most pernicious characteristic is his restlessness. His mind is naturally busy, scheming, and prolific; and he finds it for his interest, as the elected chief of a most restless people, to follow his natural bent. He broods over a variety of conflicting plans, sometimes throwing out one feeler to the public, sometimes another; sometimes waiting till the project is matured, sometimes offering the world a sort of option between several disturbances, but never leaving it an hour's conscious security of repose. He is incalculable, too, as well as remuant. He is for ever breaking out in a fresh place. You never know what he may do or say next. You only feel certain that he will never be long without doing or saying something. His mind may grow any sort of crop-wheat or weed. The only positive thing is, that it can never lie fallow. As long as he lives, to use an expression of one of his countrymen, 'il n'y aura rien de certain, hors l'imprévu.' Politics. WAS SLAVERY THE REAL CAUSE OF THE AFFIRMATIVE ARTICLE.-II. HAVING enjoyed the advantage of reading the opening articles which appeared on this subject in the January number of this Magazine, we trust to be able to steer clear of again treading on ground over which our colleague "Nam Der" has already travelled, and to reply to such arguments as our opponent R. S. has seen fit to advance. The question itself, though of vital importance in many points of view, is free from all ambiguity and uncertainty; its terms are simple and precise, and the inquiry it awakens one of fact rather than of theory. Such being the case, we shall endeavour to deal with it in a practical, common-sense way, as being best calculated to lead to a right decision in the matter. And first, as to the arguments of our friend R. S., there can be no question whatever as to the propriety of the position he lays down, when he says that "the immediate cause of the war was the secession of the Southern States;" and we coincide with him in thinking that our inquiry is, practically, "What induced the South to secede ?" This direct question he answers by stating that "the idea of secession did not spring up in a day; it is the matured growth of years," because "the interests" of the South" are, and have been, diametrically opposed to those of the North." R. S. further informs us that this result-secession-was prophesied in 1775, when John Adams wrote that the "dissimilitude of character" which then prevailed in the States would, in all probability, prove fatal to the Union. Now this "dissimilitude of character," which presented such a gloomy prospect to the mind of John Adams, had no reference whatever to the antagonistic "interests" of the people at all, but is identified with and founded upon the difference of the constitution of society in the two divisions of the nation, a difference caused by and wholly attributable to the presence of slavery on the one side and its absence on the other. Adams foresaw that a fatal result might in time follow from this dissimilitude; and his prophecy, if valuable at all as an argument in our present inquiry, is in favour of the affirmative side. Our friend R. S. brings forward Mr. Adams as a witness on the negative side, forgetting that in the attempt to make use of such a piece of evidence he upsets the whole of his subsequent reasoning, which is devoted to a proof that the American war has been caused by tariffs and taxes which had no existence to 66 produce a dissimilitude of character of any kind in 1775, when ! |