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FUTILITY OF THE 'PEACE' CLAMOR.

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Mr. Lincoln intended peace or war, | sealed against the commerce and navigation of the other half, save on payment of duties utterly unknown. to our laws; while goods could be entered at those ports at quite other (and generally lower) rates of impost than those established by Congress. Hence, importers, with good reason, refused to pay the established duties at Northern ports until the same should be exacted at Southern as well; so that three months' acquiescence by the President in what was untruly commended as the "Peace policy," would have sunk the country into anarchy and whelmed the Government in hopeless ruin.

was a sore trial to human patience. A government which cannot uphold and vindicate its authority in the country which it professes to rule is to be pitied; but one which does not even attempt to enforce respect and obedience is a confessed imposture and sham, and deserves to be hooted off the face of the earth. Nay, more: it was impossible for ours to exist on the conditions prescribed by its domestic foes. No government can endure without revenue; and the Federal Constitution (Art. I. § 9) expressly prescribes that

"No preference shall be given, by any regulation of commerce or revenue, to the ports of one State over those of another; nor

Still, no one is required to achieve

shall vessels bound to or from one State be the impossible, though to attempt

obliged to enter, clear, or pay duties, in another."

But here were the ports of nearly half our Atlantic and Gulf coasts

ate's called Session, which followed-yet, when war actually grew out of the conflicting pretensions of the Union and the Confederacy, took nobly and heartily the side of his whole country But, even before the close of the called Session, a decided change in his attitude, if not in his conceptions, was manifest. On the 25th of March, replying to a plea for 'Peace,' on the basis of 'No Coercion,' by Senator J. C. Breckinridge, of Kentucky, he thus thoroughly exposed the futility of the main pretext for Disunion:

"From the beginning of this Government down to 1859, Slavery was prohibited by Congress in some portion of the territories of the United States. But now, for the first time in the history of this Government, there is no foot of ground in America where Slavery is prohibited by act of Congress. You, of the other side of this chamber, by the unanimous vote of every Republican in this body, and of every Republican in the House of Representatives, have organized all the territories of the United States on the principle of non-intervention, by Congress, with the question of Slavery-leaving the people to do as they please, subject only to the limitations of the Constitution. Hence, I think the Senator from Kentucky fell into a gross error of fact as well as of law when he said, the other day, that you had not abated one jot of your creed-that you had not abandoned your aggressive policy in

what to others will seem such may sometimes be accepted by the unselfish and intrepid as a duty; and this practical question confronted the

the territories, and that you were now pursuing the policy of excluding the Southern people from all the territories of the United States. *** There never has been a time since the Government was founded when the right of the slaveholders to emigrate to the territories, to carry with them their slaves, and to hold them on an equal footing with all other property, was as fully and distinctly recognized in all the territories as at this time, and that, too, by the unanimous vote of the Republican party in both Houses of Congress.

"The Senator from Kentucky [Mr. Breckin ridge] has told you that the Southern States, still in the Union, will never be satisfied to remain in it unless they get terms that will give them either a right, in common with all the other States, to emigrate into the territories, or that will secure to them their rights in the territories on the principle of an equitable division. These are the only terms on which, as he says, those Southern States now in the Union will consent to remain. I wish to call the attention of that distinguished Senator to the fact that, under the law as it now stands, the South has all the rights which he claims. First, Southern men have the right to emigrate into all the territories, and to carry their Slave property with them, on an equality with the citizens of the other States. Secondly, they have an equitable partition of the territories assigned by law, viz.: all is Slave Territory up to the thirty-seventh degree, instead of up to the parallel of thirty-six degrees thirty minutes-a half degree more than they claim."

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President on the threshold: 'What | ton on the 20th, and had a long means have I at command wherewith interview with Gov. Pickens and to compel obedience to the laws?' Gen. Beauregard, with reference, it Now, the War Department had, for was said, to the terms on which nearly eight years prior to the last Fort Sumter should be evacuated, if few weeks, been directed successively evacuated at all, the 25th brought to by Jefferson Davis and John B. Charleston Col. Ward H. Lamon, a Floyd. The better portion of our confidential agent of the President, little army had been ordered by who, after an interview with the Floyd to Texas, and there put under Confederate authorities, was permitthe command of Gen. Twiggs, by ted to visit the fort, and hold unrewhom it had already been betrayed stricted intercourse with Major Aninto the hands of his fellow-traitors. derson, who apprised the GovernThe arms of the Union had been sed- ment through him that their scanty ulously transferred by Floyd from the stock of provisions would suffice his Northern to the Southern arsenals. little garrison only till the middle of The most effective portion of the April. Col. Lamon returned immeNavy had, in like manner, been dis- diately to Washington, and was said persed over distant seas. But, so to have reported there, that, in Major early as the 21st of March, at the Anderson's opinion as well as in his close of a long and exciting Cabinet own, the relief of the fortress was session, it appears to have been defi- impracticable. nitively settled that Fort Sumter was not to be surrendered without a struggle; and, though Col. G. W. Lay, an Aid of Gen. Scott, had visited Charles

2 The New York Herald of April 9th has a dispatch from its Washington correspondent, confirming one sent twenty-four hours earlier to announce the determination of the Executive to provision Fort Sumter, which thus explains the negotiations, and the seeming hesitation, if not vacillation, of March:

"The peace policy of the Administration has been taken advantage of by the South, while, at the same time, their representatives have been here begging the President to keep hands off. While he was holding back, in the hope that a forbearing disposition, on the part of the authorities of the seceded States, would be manifested, to his great surprise, he found that, instead of peace, they were investing every fort and navy yard with Rebel troops and fortifications, and actually preparing to make war upon the Federal Government. Not only this, but, while the Administration was yielding to the cry against coercion, for the purpose, if possible, of averting the calamity of civil war, the very men who were loudest against coercion were preparing for it; the Government was losing strength with the people; and the President and his Cabinet were charged with being imbecile and false to the high trust conferred upon them.

"At last, they have determined to enforce the

By this time, however, very decided activity began to be manifest in the Navy Yards still held by the Union. Such ships of war as were

laws, and to do it vigorously; but not in an aggressive spirit. When the Administration determined to order Major Anderson out of Fort Sumter, some days since, they also determined to do so on one condition: namely, that the fort and the property in it should not be molested, but allowed to remain as it is. The authorities of the Confederacy would not agree to this, but manifested a disposition to get possession of the fort and United States property therein. The Government would not submit to any such humiliation.

The

"It was immediately determined to keep Major Anderson in Fort Sumter, and to supply him with provisions forthwith. *** There is no desire to put additional men into the fort, unless resistance is offered to the attempt to furnish Major Anderson with supplies. fleet will not approach Charleston with hostile intent; but, in view of the great military prepa rations about Fort Sumter, the supply vessels will go prepared to reply promptly to any resistance of a warlike character that may be offered to a peaceful approach to the fort. The responsibility of opening the war will be thrown upon the parties who set themselves in defiance to the Government. It is sincerely hoped, by the Federal authorities here, that the leaders of the secessionists will not open their batteries."

FIRE OPENED ON FORT SUMTER.

at hand were rapidly fitted for service and put into commission; while several swift ocean steamers of the largest size were hurriedly loaded with provisions, munitions, and forage. By the 6th or 7th of April, nearly a dozen of these vessels had left New York and other Northern ports, under sealed orders. Lieut. Talbot, who had arrived at Washington on the 6th, from Fort Sumter, bearing a message from Major Anderson that his rigidly restricted supplies of fresh food from Charleston market had been cut off by the Confederate authorities, and that he must soon be starved into surrender, if not relieved, returned to Charleston on the 8th, and gave formal notice to Gov. Pickens that the fort would be provisioned at all hazards. Gen. Beauregard immediately telegraphed the fact to Montgomery; and, on the 10th, received orders from the Confederate Secretary of War to demand the prompt surrender of the fort, and, in case of refusal, to reduce it. The demand was accordingly made in due form at 2 P. M., on the 11th, and courteously declined. But, in consequence of additional instructions from Montgomery-based on a suggestion of Major Anderson to his summoners that he would very soon be starved out, if not relieved-Gen. Beauregard, at 11 P. M., again addressed Major Anderson, asking him to state at what time he would evacuate Fort Sumter, if unmolested; and was answered that he would do so at noon on the 15th, "should I not receive, prior to that time, controlling instructions from my Government, or additional supplies." This answer was judged unsatisfactory; and, at 3:20 A. M., of the 12th, Major Anderson

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was duly notified that fire would be opened on Fort Sumter in one hour.

Punctual to the appointed moment, the roar of a mortar from Sullivan's Island, quickly followed by the rushing shriek of a shell, gave notice to the world that the era of compromise and diplomacy was ended-that the Slaveholders' Confederacy had appealed from sterile negotiations to the last argument' of aristocracies as well as kings. Another gun from that island quickly repeated the warning, waking a response from battery after battery, until Sumter appeared the focus of a circle of volcanic fire. Soon, the thunder of fifty heavy breaching cannon, in one grand volley, followed by the crashing and crumbling of brick, stone, and mortar around and above them, apprised the little garrison that their stay in those quarters must necessarily be short. Unless speedily relieved by a large and powerful fleet, such as the Union did not then possess, the defense was, from the outset, utterly hopeless.

It is said that the Confederate leaders expected to reduce the fort within a very few hours; it is more certain that the country was disappointed by the inefficiency of its fire and the celerity of its reduction: But it was not then duly considered that Sumter was never intended to withstand a protracted cannonade from batteries solidly constructed on every side of it, but to resist and repel the ingress of fleets from the Ocean-a service for which it has since proved itself admirably adapted. Nor was it sufficiently considered that the defensive strength of a fortress inheres largely in its ability to compel its assailants to commence operations for its reduction at a respectful distance, and to

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