to evacuate this city, so famous in the War, and so long coveted by the Yankees. But he was resolved to leave as little as possible for the enemy's rapacity. "At an early hour of the morning, before the retirement of Gen. Hardee's troops, every building, warehouse, or shed, stored with cotton, was fired by a guard detailed for the purpose. The engines were brought out; but, with the small force at the disposal of the fire department, very little else could be done than to keep the surrounding buildings from igniting. On the western side of the city, the flames raged with great fury. "The horrors of the conflagration were heightened by a terrible catastrophe. It appears, some boys had discovered a quantity of powder at the dépôt of the North-western railroad, and amused themselves by flinging handfuls of it upon the masses of burning cotton in the streets. It was not long before the powder running from their hands formed a train upon the ground, leading from the fire to the main supplies of powder in the dépôt. The result is easily conjectured. A spark ignited the powder in the train; there was a leaping, running fire along the ground, and then an explosion which shook the city to its very foundations from one end to the other. The building was, in a second, a whirling mass of ruins, in a tremendous volume of flame and smoke. About 200 lives were lost by the explosion, and not less than 150 bodies were found charred in that fiery furnace. "From the dépôt, the fire spread rapidly, and, communicating with the adjoining buildings, threatened destruction to that part of the town. Four squares, embracing the area bounded by Chapel, Alexander, and Washington streets, were consumed before the conflagration was subdued. "The destruction of public property had been as complete as Gen. Hardee could make it. He burned the cotton warehouses, arsenals, quartermaster's stores, railroad bridges, two iron-clads, and some vessels in the ship-yard. Among the captured property were 200 pieces of artillery; spiked and temporarily disabled, as they could not be brought off. "The Yankees occupied Charleston on the 18th of February. A scarred city, blackened by fire, with evidences of destruction and ruin wrought by the enemy at almost every step, had at last come into their possession; but not until a heroic defense, running through nearly four years, and at last only by the stratagem of a march many miles away from it. The appearance of the city was eloquent of the sacrifices and heroism of its people. A Yankee correspondent, who had joined in the triumphal entry into | Charleston, thus described the scene before his eyes: 'Not a building for blocks here that is exempt from the marks of shot and shell. All have suffered more or less. Here is a fine brown-stone bank building vacant and deserted, with great, gaping holes in the sides and roof, through which the sun shines and the rain pours; windows and sashes blown out by exploding shell within; plastering knocked down; counters torn up; floors crushed in, and fragments of Mosaic pavement, broken and crushed, lying around on the floor, mingled with bits of statuary, stained glass, and broken parts of chandeliers. Ruin within and without; and its neighbor in no better plight. churches, St. Michael's and St. Philip's, have not escaped the storms of our projectiles. Their roofs are perforated, their walls wounded, their pillars demolished, and within the pews filled with plastering. From Bay street, studded with batteries, to Calhoun street, our shells have carried destruction and desolation, and often death, with them.'" The Lt. Col. A. G. Bennett, commanding on Morris island, receiving information which justified a belief that Charleston had been evacuated, at once dispatched a boat toward Fort Moultrie; which boat, when 40 yards east of Fort Sumter, was met by one from Sullivan's island, containing a band of musicians left behind by Hardee. These confirmed the ru mored evacuation; whereupon, Maj. J. A. Hennessy was sent to raise the flag over recovered Fort Sumter; which was effected at 9 A. M. Fort Ripley and Castle Pinckney submitted promptly and gracefully to a like embellishment-their guns having been left in a serviceable condition. At 10 A. M., Bennett reached the city, which the enemy had not yet wholly evacuated; a mounted force being still engaged in setting fires. He at once demanded of Mayor Macbeth a surrender, which was promptly accorded. A small force was brought up so soon as possible, and the work of extinguishing the raging fires vigorously prosecuted-the Blacks of FORAGING BY SHERMAN'S ARMY. the city being impressed therefor. The U. S. Arsenal was thus saved from destruction, as were large quantities of Confederate rice, which were distributed among the poor of the city. Georgetown was at the same time evacuated—Hardee,with 12,000 men, gathered from all lower South Carolina, making all haste to cross the Santee and Pedee before Sherman could turn upon and crush him; which, as Sherman did not attempt to intercept him, having other objects in view, was safely accomplished. Gen. Gillmore, then in command on the coast, reports the guns captured in Charleston and its defenses at 450; a good part of them 8 and 10-inch Columbiads and 7-inch rifled guns-many of foreign make. Much good ammunition, 8 locomotives, with many passenger and platform cars, also escaped the Rebel conflagration, and came into possession of the victors. Before proceeding with the narrative of Sherman's Great March, it is but just to speak of the devastation of South Carolina by his army. Sherman's general order, prescribing the conduct of his troops in their march, was precise and considerate, though its execution would naturally seem harsh to those it despoiled. He says: "IV. The army will forage liberally on the country during the march. To this end, each brigade commander will organize a good and sufficient foraging party, under the command of one or more discreet offi cers, who will gather, near the route traveled, corn or forage of any kind, meat of any kind, vegetables, corn-meal, or whatever is needed by the command: aiming at all times to keep in the wagon-trains at least ten days' provisions for the command and three days' forage. Soldiers must not enter the dwellings of the inhabitants or commit any trespass; during the halt or at camp, 703 they may be permitted to gather turnips, potatoes, and other vegetables, and drive in stock in front of their camps. To regular foraging parties must be intrusted the gathering of provisions and forage at any distance from the road traveled. "V. To army corps commanders is intrusted the power to destroy mills, houses, principle is laid down: In districts and cotton-gins, etc.; and for them this general neighborhoods where the army is unmolested, no destruction of such property should be permitted; but, should guerrillas or bushwhackers molest our march, or should the inhabitants burn bridges, obhostility, then army corps commanders struct roads, or otherwise manifest local should order and enforce a devastation more or less relentless, according to the measure of such hostility. "VI. As for horses, mules, wagons, &c., belonging to the inhabitants, the cavalry and limit; discriminating, however, between the artillery may appropriate freely and without rich, who are usually hostile, and the poor or industrious, usually neutral or friendly. Foraging parties may also take mules or horses to replace the jaded animals of their trains, or to serve as pack mules for the regiments or brigades. In all foraging, of whatever kind, the parties engaged will refrain from abusive or threatening language, and may, when the officer in command thinks proper, give written certificates of the facts, but no receipts; and they will endeavor to leave with each family a reasonable portion for their maintenance." of course, "the inhabitants" did "burn bridges, obstruct roads," and "otherwise manifest local hostility." Most of them were quite willing; but they would have been compelled so to act if unwilling. And such manifestations of "local hostility," according to the terms of the order above given, constrained the corps commanders to "enforce a devastation more or less relentless, according to the measure of such hostillity." But the mere necessity of subsisting such an army off the country, while passing rapidly through it, necessarily involved its devastation. It was like a cloud of locusts, devouring every thing edible, and many things that were not. And Gen. Sherman, in his report of his passage through the army, and any thing inviting and Georgia, says of his men: "A little loose in foraging, they did some things they ought not to have done;' yet, on the whole, they have supplied the wants of the ariny with as little violence as could be expected, and as little loss as I calculated." Naturally, the "little violence" and "little loss" looked larger, and were regarded with less complaisance, from the other side; but there was not much complaint of wanton destruction or outrage. In South Carolina, new conditions were presented. The region traversed was, in the main, more sparsely settled than central Georgia-the mass of its people poorer, and its supplies more scanty. And South Carolina was regarded by our soldiers with more marked disfavor, as having been the cradle of Secession and Civil War. So, doubtless, the taste for plunder had grown keener by gratification, while the instinct that discerns the location of hidden food and valuables had by use become amazingly sharp and subtle. Though a good many watches and pieces of plate which were claimed to have been "found hidden in a swamp, a mile from any house," were in fact drawn from less occult sources, it would have been difficult to hide a watch or goblet where it would not have been discovered and appropriated. And the business of foraging had been gradually assumed as a specialty by the least scrupulous of the soldiers, who, having mounted themselves somehow on beasts of burden, scoured the whole region in advance of our marching columns-often many miles in advance-gathering provisions for 37Some of these foraging parties had encounters with the enemy which would, in ordi portable for themselves-dismounting and fighting in line of battle when charged or impeded by cavalry or militia in moderate numbers;" but fonder, on the whole, of rifling a house than of fighting its owner; and constantly intent on the mainchance. No other State or section has in modern times been so thoroughly devastated in a single campaign signalized by little fighting, as was South Carolina by that march through its utmost length, and over an average breadth of forty miles, by Sherman's army. Gen. Kilpatrick, with a total force of 5,068 men, including a 6-gun battery of horse artillery, and a small brigade of dismounted men, had demonstrated northward, on our extreme left, so far as Aiken; imbuing the enemy with the fullest belief that Augusta was Sherman's objective, and causing Wheeler's cavalry to confront him in this direction; leaving the passes of the Edisto unguarded. In effecting this, one of his brigades, led by Col. Spencer, had engaged," near Williston's station, Gen. Allen's division of Alabama cavalry (six thin regiments), and routed it with no serious loss to either side. Having destroyed the railroad hereabout to his heart's con tent, and deceived Wheeler as to his purpose, Kilpatrick merely sent " Atkins's brigade into Aiken, where Wheeler was in force, and of course drove Atkins back; charging, at 11 A. M., Kilpatrick's entire command, and being repulsed with a loss of 31 killed, 160 wounded, and 60 prisonnary times, rank as respectable battles."Sherman's Report. 3 Feb. 8. Feb 11. ers. WADE HAMPTON SURPRISES KILPATRICK. 705 (where Blair captured 25 guns), and thence up to the State line at Sneedsboro'; moving on parallel roads with He thereupon fell back into Aiken; and Kilpatrick, after threatening him there till the night of the 12th, suddenly drew off, moved rap-in easy supporting distance, till they idly across the South and then the North Edisto," and, moving on the left of the 14th corps, struck the Lexington and Augusta road 9 miles north-west of Lexington, when barely 1,500 of Wheeler's men had got between him and Columbia, while Cheatham's force (the remnant of Hood's army) was moving parallel with our advance still farther to the left. But, on crossing the Saluda," Wheeler was found to be ahead; and our cavalry marched all day" parallel with Cheatham's corps, moving at times within three miles a difficult stream forbidding an attempt to strike the enemy in flank, as he was strung along the road. Crossing the Greenville and Columbia road, Kilpatrick tore it up down to Alston, where he crossed" the Broad, and pushed north nearly to Chesterville; when he found that Wheeler had moved around his front, united with Wade Hampton, and was before him on the road to Charlotte and Raleigh, N. C., which Sherman's advance northward from Columbia to Winnsboro'" had led the enemy to believe was his intended course. They were at fault, as usual. Though his left wing was thrown north nearly to Chesterville, the movement in this direction was a feint, and the whole army soon turned sharply to the right, crossing the Catawba," and, after halting the right wing three days to enable Slocum (who had been delayed by a flood in the Catawba) to come up, struck the Great Pedee at Cheraw" 44 were concentrated at Fayetteville," N. C.; leaving Charlotte and the bulk of the Rebel army far to our left. Heavy rains and almost impassable streams had delayed our different columns; and Hardee was expected to make a stand at Fayetteville and resist our passage of the Cape Fear river; but he merely burned the bridge and put off as. Blair came up. Kilpatrick, still on: our extreme left had advanced by Rockingham;" striking next day the rear of Hardee's column retreating from Cheraw on Fayetteville; when, learning from prisoners that Hampton's cavalry was behind, he resolved to intercept it. Posting a mounted brigade near Solemn Grove on one road, he made, with Spencer's brigade, a rapid night-march across to another; during which, he rode through a division of Hampton's. cavalry: losing by capture his escort of 16 men, but escaping with his. staff. Hampton skillfully deceived Gen. Atkins, whom Kilpatrick had left behind, passed him by an unsuspected road, and fell in full force upon Kilpatrick and Spencer about 2 a. M.; taking them completely by surprise, routing them and capturing all their guns. Spencer and most of Kilpatrick's staff were made prisoners; Kilpatrick barely escaping on foot. Driven back into a swamp, with most of his men, he succeeded in rallying them, while the enemy, supposing him utterly routed, were intent on plundering his camp; and, 45 46 47 Feb. 15. Feb. 17. Feb. 18. Feb. 19 Feb. 21 Feb. 23. March 3. 7 March 11. "March 7VOL. II.-45 charging on foot, he retook his headquarters and guns, just as the enemy were harnessing the horses to draw them off, and opened upon their receding backs when scarcely twenty paces distant, quickening the pace of all who still retained the power of locomotion. Hampton soon rallied his command, and tried hard to regain all that he had so suddenly won and lost; but Kilpatrick kept him at bay till Gen. Mitchell, hearing the guns, at 8 A. M. came hastily across with a brigade of infantry of the 20th corps; when the enemy disappeared; having inflicted a loss of 19 killed, 61 wounded, and 103 prison ers. nery which had been brought hither from the U. S. armory at Harper's Ferry on its first capture in April, 1861. His army greatly needed rest; and besides, there was reason now to apprehend other resistance than that afforded by the swamps, the streams, and the elements. Hardee from Savannah and Charleston; Beauregard from Columbia; Cheatham from the Tennessee; with a considerable force drawn from North Carolina and her seaward defenses under Bragg and Hoke, made up, with Wheeler's and Hampton's cavalry, a body of not less than 40,000 men, mainly veterans, now united under the able and wary Jo. Johnston. It would no longer answer to move as hitherto; our columns must be kept well closed up, the corps within easy supporting distance, on peril of surprise and disaster. Kilpatrick reached Fayetteville, N. C., on the 11th, and the whole army was concentrated there next day; when the army tug Davidson and the gunboat Eolus steamed up from Wilmington with news of the capture of that city and of all that had occurred during the six weeks that the army had been corduroying its way through the interminable swamps and pontooning across the swollen streams of South Carolina. At Columbia, the disastrous fire and the bitter hostility of the people had prevented the only corps that entered that city from learning much of the outer world; but here Sherman was in full communication with the Government and the cooperating Generals, and able to dispatch full instructions to Gen. Schofield; who, having been brought around from Tennessee to Newbern, was preparing heavily in the advance. ing to rëenforce him at Goldsboro'. True to his favorite policy, Sherman again pushed" four divisions of his left wing, covered by Kilpatrick, directly northward to AVERY SBORO', as if intent on Raleigh; while Slocum's train, his two remaining divisions, and the right wing, moved by various roads nearly east, toward Goldsboro,' his true destination. The incessant rains had reduced the roads to a state wherein horses would mire almost anywhere, and 'cordu roy' was essential wherever guns or wagons were to be moved. Sherman halted three days at Fayetteville; completely destroying the U. S. Arsenal and the costly machi Sherman was on the left with Slocum, who was that day required to send up a brigade of infantry to the aid of Kilpatrick, who was skirmish Next morning, when near Averysborough, on approaching the road, which runs eastward to Bentonville, the enemy, under Hardee, was found 40 March 15. |