Moore et al. v. American Transportation Co. "beyond seas." It was held that the phrase meant beyond the limits of the State, irrespective of the question whether or not the party was in fact beyond any sea or other water. Murray v. Baker, 3 Wheaton, 341. Shelby v. Guy, 11 Wheaton, 361. Beyond the jurisdiction of the State of Georgia, the party was "beyond seas"-beyond the control of the jurisprudence of that State, and necessarily, therefore, not "inland.” Upon the actual meaning, therefore, of the word "inland," so used, it must be determined that the words "inland navigation," in the statute, signify only a navigation carried on within the body of the country; and doubtless, (particularly when considered, as the question must be, and is hereinafter, under the powers of Congress over commerce,) when applied to lake navigation, a navigation conducted beneath the jurisprudence of a single State. It means a navigation which, when carried on on the lakes, is not the coasting trade. 4. The navigation, to be "inland," must be upon waters themselves "inland." The great Western lakes are not such inland waters. This is a question of commerce and of law, not of geography. Other waters exist upon the face of the globe, the precise parallel of the Western lakes in commercial and legal view, which certainly are not "inland." Therefore the Western lakes are not "inland." The case of the Genesce Chief, (Fitzhugh v. the Genesee Chief, 12 How., 443,) which will be hereafter adverted to in a more important view, established the principle that the business of the Western lakes and their national position determined their commercial and legal character, and that the distinctions, convenient in England, of the rise and fall of the tide and the saltness of the water, had nothing to do with thus fixing that character. Excluding, therefore, once for all, these immaterial tests, the great Western lakes, when viewed in comparison with other waters, not only are not "inland," but are commercial and legal seas. And, first, as to their not being inland, regarded in the sug gested comparison. Moore et al. v. American Transportation Co. The Baltic sea, with the Gulfs of Finland and Bothnia, form one chain of waters; the Mediterranean, the Adriatic, the sea of Marmora, and the Black sea, another, like the line of the great Western lakes. The Mediterranean long has been known as the "tideless sea," and was, beside, the "mare internum" of the Romans. Edinburgh Review, Oct., 1857, "The Mediterranean." The inlets to both these chains of waters are narrow. In other physical features they are like them. In commercial character they are identical with them. Classed by the geographers, in the loose language which so generalizes such waters, as easily to distinguish them from the great oceans, they are sometimes termed, (as the Western lakes themselves were termed by Chief Justice Taney, in the Genesee Chief case,) "inland seas." Yet would the navigation of these European waters, or of Hudson's Bay, or Long Island Sound, or of the Gulf of Mexico, be termed "inland," in the view in which they must be regarded in this case? To the communities which dwelt along the borders of the European seas, and maintained a commerce petty in comparison with that now upon the Western lakes, we owe the very foundations of that body of admiralty law, never devised or efficient with reference to an inland commerce. From such communities sprang the Rhodian law, the Consulat de la Mer, the Tables of Amalfi, the laws of Wisbuy, of Oleron, and the Hanse towns. There lived those early writers upon maritime law, to whom we now look for the practical exposition of questions arising with respect to a commerce upon our lakes, far more like their own than that carried on upon the high seas. Waters thus situated, over which was extended that body of admiralty law which never was applicable to an "inland" trade, certainly never were "inland." The Twee Gebroeders, 3 C. Robinson, 336. Our waters, their very parallel, in every physical, commercial, and legal feature, and over which the same body of laws (as was decided in the Genesee Chief case, from the very character of the waters) extends to day, equally are not "inland." Moore et al. v. American Transportation Co. But, as has been said, these waters are commercial and legal seas, and therefore their navigation cannot be "inland." They are extra fauces terræ. The Schooner Harriet, 1 Story R., 251, 259. They are waters where, to adopt the language of Sir Matthew IIale, "a man may not discern from shore to shore." De Port. Maris. Harg. Tracts, c. 4, p. 10. Hawkins Pl. C., b. 2, c. 9, sec. 14. U. S. v. Grush, 5 Mason, 290, 298. They are not within the boundary of any county; and, within the definition of Lord Coke himself, are therefore not inland. 4 Inst., 140, c. 22. 2 East. P. C., c. 17, sec. 10. Comyn's Dig. Admiralty E., 7. De Loviot v. Boit, 2 Gallison, 398, 426, 427. They are bordered not only by the States constituting the United States, but by the province of a foreign nation. Their navigation is subject to all the hazards that attend that of the ocean. "Hostile fleets," to use the language of Chief Justice Taney in the Genesee Chief case, "have encountered upon them, and prizes have been made there." The same system of admiralty law applies to them as to the commerce of the remoter oceans. That commerce, as will hereafter be seen, is equally extensive with that of our foreign commerce itself. It is repeated, there is not a characteristic (excluding the immaterial ones of the ebb and flow of the tide and the saltness of the water, excluded by the Genesee Chief case, and which in this view always would have been excluded-2 Peters's Ad. Decis., LXXI; Spelman Reliq. Adm. Juris., 226; 2 Hale, P. C., 16) belonging to the "high seas"—the "main sea" of Coke and Hale, and Selden and Blackstone, which does not belong to the Western lakes. How, then, can their navigation be termed inland? Would the navigation of such waters be termed inland, within the meaning of the statutes of Geo. II and Geo. III? Would the navigation of the waters of the "four seas," (IIargrave and Butler's Notes to Coke upon Moore et al. v. American Transportation Co. Litt., L. 2, c. 8, sec. 157; Chitty on Commercial Law, 88102) including St. George's channel or the Irish sea, be deemed "inland" by an English court, construing the language in question as used in the statutes of Geo. III? 5. Some minor considerations will show, in this connection, that such navigation cannot be called inland. By the law of nations, exclusive national jurisdiction, for certain purposes, is established over at least a marine league from the coast. 1 Kent's Com., 27, 28. The whole of Delaware bay has been determined to be within national jurisdiction. Opinion of Edmund Randolph, Attorney General U. S., 1 The navigation of none of these waters would be termed "inland;" yet it should be, if the Western lakes are "inland." 6. Regarding the language in question, then, beneath all the lights which can be thrown upon it, it must be determined that the navigation in question is not "inland." This, a single question, intelligently put and answered-put and answered with full comprehension of the meaning of all things relating to this commercial and legal subject-must determine “inland." Within what land do these waters lie? That question would hardly be put upon some of the ships and steamboats upon the Western lakes, with nothing in sight above the horizon, nor within many leagues, unless it might be other ships employed in commerce between different States and Provinces, and (through the Welland Canal, which, overcoming the natural obstacle of Niagara Falls, has thus given access to the high seas through those public means, which Sir Matthew Hale says-De Port. Maris, c. 3.-render waters thus opened to public trade, public waters,) with European kingdoms. IV. The object of the law determines the fact that the navigation of the lakes is not "inland," within the meaning of the act. 1. In ascertaining the object of the law, the court cannot, in the language of Chief Justice Taney, in any degree, be influenced by the construction placed upon it by individual Moore et al. v. American Transportation Co. members of Congress in the debates which took place on its passage. "We must gather the intention of Congress from the language used in the law, comparing it, where ambiguity exists, with the laws upon the same subject, and looking, if necessary, to the public history of the times in which it was passed." Aldridge v. Williams, 3 Howard, 1, 24. Bank of Penn. v. the Commonwealth, 7 (Harris) Penn. Southwark Bank v. the Commonwealth, 26 Penn. State 2. In determining whether the objects of the law would necessarily make it apply to the navigation of the Western lakes, it is, of course, necessary to ascertain something of the extent of these waters, and of the commerce carried on upon them. The area of the lakes is some 90,000 square miles, and the aggregate length of the lakes alone exceeds 1,500 miles. Andrews's Rep. on Colonial and Lake Trade, communicated to the Senate Aug. 26, 1852. The value of the property annually carried in the transactions of the lake commerce exceeds $600,000,000, (exceeding the total value of property exported and imported into the United States in its foreign trade.) It is conducted in more than 1,600 vessels, with an aggregate burden exceeding 400,000 tons. Report of Com. on Commerce to H. of R., 1856, vol. 3, Report Hon. I. T. Hatch, Commissioner, &c., to H. of The strictly foreign trade with Canada alone on the lakes exceeds $30,000,000 in amount, annually, making our strictly foreign commerce with Canada third in actual value, and first in the amount of tonnage employed, compared with our commerce with all the foreign countries with which we have any trade. Report of Com. on Commerce, 1856, pp. 10, 12. 3. Considering, therefore, the undoubted objects of the act, |