League v. Egery et al.

The location is within the littoral or coast leagues described in the fourth sections of the colonization laws of Mexico, of 1824 and 1828.

The litigation between the grantees and their assigns and the defendants for this land has been protracted in the courts of Texas, and the opinion of the Supreme Court of that State has been very definitely expressed upon the validity of their titles on two several occasions.

Smith v. Power, 14 Tex. R., 146.

Smith v. Power, 23 Tex. R., 29.

In the latter case the Supreme Court said: "No question is more authoritatively settled by the repeated decisions of this court, than that the consent of the federal Executive of Mexico was essential to the validity of a grant of lands of the character of the present within the border and coast leagues. Edwards v. Davis, 3 Tex. R., 321; 10 Id., 316; Republic v. Thorn, 3 Id., 499; 5 Id., 410; 9 Id., 410, 556. In the case of Smith v. Power, (14 Texas R.,) the parties to this appeal, it was held, that the grant here in question, under which the defendant claims, could not be distinguished from those which had been passed upon in former cases; and upon the authority of those cases, it was decided, that the grant wanting such consent was void. That question, therefore, cannot be considered as now an open one. A series of decisions continued almost from the organization of this court down to the present time, thus settling the construction of the old local law, upon which the titles to real property in the oldest and most densely peopled portions of the State so largely depend, must be regarded as emphatically the law of the State." In accordance with wellestablished principles in this court, we accept this uniform and stable body of judicial decision from the court of last resort of the State in which the property is situated, and in which the transactions that form the subject of this litigation took place, as conclusive testimony of the rule of action prescribed by the authorities of the State, as applicable to their interpretation and adjustment. We do not inquire whether a more suitable rule might not have been adopted, nor whether the arguments which led to its adoption were forcible or just. We receive

Foote v. Egery et al.

the decisions having the character that are mentioned in the extract we have made from the opinion of the Supreme Court of Texas as having a binding force almost equivalent to positive law. Such being our conclusion in respect to this grant, we must sanction the judgment of the District Court that denies to it validity.

Judgment affirmed.

HENRY S. FOOTE, PLAINTIFF IN ERROR, v. CYRUS W. EGERY AND JOSEPH F. SMITH.

The decision in the preceding case of League v. Egery and others concludes this also.

THIS case was brought up by writ of error from the District Court of the United States for the eastern district of Texas.

It was similar to the preceding case with respect to the principal question involved, and was argued by the same counsel.

Mr. Justice CAMPBELL delivered the opinion of the court. The plaintiff claimed in the District Court two leagues and one-half of land in the county of Refugio, in the State of Texas, which were in the possession of the defendants. The defendant answered the claim by asserting title under grants from the State of Texas, and by the operation of the statutes of limitation.

The plaintiff maintained his claim by producing a grant to James Power and James Hewetson, issued under the authority of the State of Coahuila and Texas, in the year 1834, upon a contract of sale of a certain quantity of lands in the colony of Power and Hewetson, situate within the littoral or coast leagues. In deriving his title under these grantees, the plaintiff produced a deed, or an agreement for a conveyance, from Hewetson to Power and Walker; this paper was rejected as testimony by the court. Walker, this vendee, died in 1836,

Greer et al. v. Mezes et al.

being a citizen of, and resident in, the United States. His brother, also a citizen of the United States, succeeded to his estate, and in the year 1837 conveyed his interest to a person under whom the plaintiff claims.

Three questions were made upon the trial in reference to the validity of the plaintiff's title: 1st. Whether the State of Coahuila and Texas, in the year 1829, or in the year 1834, could sell and convey land to a colonist within the littoral or coast leagues, without the consent or approbation of the Central Government of Mexico. 2d. Whether the paper executed by Hewetson to Power and Walker was a conveyance of the land, or merely an agreement to convey. 3d. Whether in 1836, Walker, a citizen of the United States, could inherit land in Texas, from one who was also a citizen of, and a resident in, the United States. The decision of either of these questions in favor of the defendants is fatal to the plaintiff's right to recover.

The first of these questions has been determined by this court in the case of League v. Egery and others in the negative. This decision is in accordance with the decision of the District Court, whose judgment is consequently affirmed.

JOHN GREER AND OTHERS, PLAINTIFFS IN ERROR, v. S. M. MEZES, MARIA DE LA SOLIDAD ORTEGA DE ARGUELLO, AND JOSE RAMON ARGUELLO.

Where the plaintiffs in ejectment showed a legal title to land in California under a patent from the United States and a survey under their authority, it was proper in the court below to refuse to admit testimony offered by the defend. ants to show that the survey was incorrect, the defendants claiming under a merely equitable title.

Where the defendants pleaded severally the general issue, it was proper for the court below to instruct the jury to bring in a general verdict against all those who had not shown that they were in possession of separate parcels.

The mode of proceeding by petition does not alter the law of ejectment under the old system of pleading.

THIS case was brought up by writ of error from the Circuit

Greer et al. v. Mezes et al.

Court of the United States for the northern district of California.

It was an action of ejectment brought, by way of petition, by the defendants in error against Greer and twenty-nine other persons. The plaintiffs below represented the interests of Arguello, whose title was confirmed by this court in 18 Howard, 539, to that portion of the land described in the petition, bounded as follows, viz: on the south by the Arrogo or creek of San Francisquito, on the north by the creek San Mateo, on the east by the estuary or waters of the bay of San Francisco, and on the west by the eastern borders of the valley known as Cañada de Raymundo, said land being of the extent of four leagues in length and one in breadth, be the same more or less.

A survey of this land was made by John C. Hays, United States surveyor general for California, who returned the field notes with a map to the Commissioner of the General Land Office on the 19th of December, 1856. This survey and map included 35,240 acres.

A patent was issued on the 2d of October, 1857, which followed the field notes, and granted the land as follows:

To Maria de la Solidad Ortega de Arguello, one equal undivided half.

To Jose Ramon Arguello, one equal undivided fourth part. To Luis Antonio Arguello, one equal undivided tenth part. To S. M. Mezes, three equal undivided twentieth parts thereof; but with the stipulation that in virtue of the fifteenth section of 3d March, 1851, the confirmation of this said claim and this patent shall not affect the rights of third persons.

At July term, 1858, of the Circuit Court of the United States for the districts of California, in and for the northern district, this ejectment was brought, at first in the name of Mezes alone, the bill having been filed on March 16, 1858. Pleas were put in to the jurisdiction upon the ground that Mezes was not au alien nor a subject of the Queen of Spain, as he had alleged. Afterwards, in October, 1858, an amended bill was filed, making parties of those persons who are named as defendants in

Greer et al. v. Mezes et al.

error in the caption of this report, Luis Antonio Arguello having conveyed his interest to Mezes.

In November, 1858, the cause came on for trial. The principal points in that court and in this arose upon the rulings of the court upon the admission of evidence, under the following circumstances:

John Greer, the principal defendant, had married Maria Louisa, the widow of John Coppinger, and in behalf of his wife and of Manuela Coppinger, an infant child of John, had petitioned for the confirmation of a grant alleged to have been made to John Coppinger by Alvarado on 3d of August, 1840, containing twenty-seven square miles of territory.

On 23d November, 1853, the board of commissioners decided that the claim was valid, and decreed that it should be confirmed.

On the 8th of January, 1855, Mr. Cushing, Attorney General, filed a notice that the United States would appeal to the District Court of the United States for the northern district of California.

On the 14th January, 1856, the district judge, Ogden Hoffman, decreed that said decision be and the same is hereby affirmed. And it is further ordered, adjudged, and decreed, that the claim of the appellees be confirmed to the tract of land known as "Cañada de Raymundo," being the same now occupied by the said appellees, and bounded and described as follows, viz: bordering to the west on the Sierra Morena, to the east on the rancho de las Pulgas, to the south on the rancho of Maximo Martinez, and to the north on the Great Lagune. Reference for further description to be had to a map, which is made a part of document marked C, and filed in this case.

In November, 1856, in consequence of a notice by the Attorney General that no appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States would be taken, Judge Hoffman decreed that the claimants have leave to proceed under the decree of that court heretofore rendered in their favor as on final decree.

What other steps were taken by Greer, the record did not show. As his title stood at the time of the trial, it appeared to be an equitable title only, the decision of the board of com