Moore et al. v. American Transportation Co. of any fire happening on board the ship or vessel, unless caused by the design or neglect of such owner. 2. The third section limits the liability of the owner in cases of collision, &c., &c., happening without the privity or knowledge of the owner, to the amount or value of the interest of such owner in the ship or vessel and her freight then pending. 3. The fourth section of the act provides substantially that the vessel owner, in certain cases, may exempt himself from liability, by assigning his interest in the vessel to a trustee for the benefit of the claimants against him. 4. The last clause of the seventh section reads as follows: "This act shall not apply to the owner or owners of any canal boat, barge, or lighter, or to any vessel of any description whatsoever, used in rivers or inland navigation." II. For the purpose of arriving at the meaning of the last quoted clause of the act, it is necessary, in the first instance, to refer to former legislation on the subject in England, (the act in question being virtually a re-enactment of English statutes;) the state of the law before that legislation; the causes which led to the passage of the English acts, as well as our own, and the objects sought to be promoted by the legislation. of both countries. Such aids in interpretation of the law are. beyond question, proper. 1 Kent's Com., 460. Tonnell v. Hall, 4 Comstock, 140. Aldridge v. Williams, 3 Howard, 1, 24. 1. The principle of the act, unqualified by the limiting clause in question, has been operative in all modern civilized nations, possessing a national commerce, whenever the policy of such nations has been finally adapted to the exigencies of that commerce. 2. By the civil law itself, the owners of vessels were liable, in matters ex delicto, according to the amount of their respective interests in the ship. This, however, was not the case in matters arising ex contractu. 2 Brown's Civ. and Ad. L., 136, 138, 141. Moore et al. v. American Transportation Co. 3. The principle of this rule was adopted by nearly, if not quite, all the maritime powers of Europe, (excepting England, though England soon adopted it by legislation,) with the important qualification, however, that the extent of the liability, both in matters arising ex contractu and ex delicto, should be equal only to the amount of the interest of the owner sought to be charged in the ship itself. It was the law of Holland, Hamburg, and Sweden, (and indeed of the whole north of Europe,) with the same right in the owner as that given by the fourth section of the act immediately in question, of exempting himself entirely from personal liability, by surrendering the ship to the injured parties. It was the law of France. by special ordinance, which, however, was said by Cleirac to be but a recognition of a rule acknowledged as generally existing. It was the general law of the Mediterranean. Grotius De Jure Belli et Pacis, Liv. 2, c. 11, sec. 13. 2 Peters Ad. Decis., Appendix XVI. Cleirac, Navigation des Rivieres, art. 15, p. 502. The Rebecca, Ware, 195, 196, 197. 4. The whole principle which led to the legislation in E land, (and which legislation was the source of our own act,) was recognised in its application to ships; and that, too, without limitation as to the waters upon which the ships were navigated. Abbott on Shipping, 395. 5. The case of Boucher v. Lawson was decided in 1733. It held that the ship owner was liable for coin embezzled by the master after shipment. Boucher v. Lawson, Rep. Temp. Hardwicke, 85. The merchants of London, alarmed by this decision, on petition to Parliament, procured the passage, in 1734, of the act 7 Geo. II, c. 15. Abbott on Sh., 395. This act provided that the owner should not be liable for any such embezzlement, or for any other act of the master or Moore et al. v. American Transportation Co. mariners, done without the privity, &c., of the owner, beyond the value of the interest of the owner in the ship. 6. The case of Boucher v. Lawson was followed by the case of Sutton v. Mitchell; and that by the case, decided in 1785, of Forward v. Pittard. Sutton v. Mitchell, 1 T. R., 18. Forward v. Pittard, 1 T. R., 27. Lord Mansfield, in deciding this last case, says: "There are events for which the carrier is liable, independent of his contract." That further responsibility is "by the custom of the realm; that is, by the common law, by which a carrier is in the nature of an insurer." Upon familiar principles, he therefore decides a carrier, in a case of accidental fire, to be liable for the entire loss happening thereby to the owner of the goods in process of carriage. This was the undoubted common-law rule at the time; and under the custom of the realm, the law of England being established to be thus different from that of continental Europe, these decisions were followed (in the enlightened policy of promoting so much of commerce as was really national) by the act of 26 Geo. III, c. 86, in 1786; and this by 53 Geo. III, c. 159, in 1813. The object of all these acts is stated in some of the acts themselves. It was stated in the preamble to the act of 7 Geo. III, that "it was of the greatest consequence and importance to the kingdom to promote the increase of the number of ships and vessels, and to prevent any discouragement to merchants and others from being interested and concerned therein." The courts have recognised the whole objects of this legislation to be, "to encourage persons to become the owners of ships." Gale v. Laurie, 5 B. and C., 156. 7. The acts of Geo. III are the sources, and almost the exact originals, of the act of Congress of 1851. The main provisions of the English acts are almost in language, and altogether in principle and object, identical with the act of 1851. The last clause of the act of 53 Geo. III is almost precisely like the portion of the act of Congress more particularly Moore et al. v. American Transportation Co. under consideration. The English statute provides that it shall not extend to "the owners of any lighter, barge, boat, or vessel of any burden or description whatsoever, used wholly in rivers or inland navigation, or vessel not duly registered according to law." 8. The common-law rule, unqualified by legislation, became the law of this country. The case of the Lexington was decided in 1848. The N. J. S. M. Co. v. The Merchants' Bank, 6 How., 344. It was followed by the act of 1851. 9. The causes which led to the passage of the act of 1851 were, therefore, precisely similar to those which led to the English legislation. The acts of both countries are essentially the same. The commercial policy of both countries, and the objects to be subserved by the legislation of each, in this particular, are alike. Beyond all question, therefore, (and particularly under the rules of statutory construction referred to, Point First, II,) each of these acts must illustrate the other. The objects of all must aid in the interpretation of each. The authorities of either country bearing directly upon either of the acts, or upon kindred legislation, must aid in the construction sought for. III. Approaching the immediate question under Point First, after brief review of the causes and objects of the law in question, the defendant in error claims, directly, that the navigation of Lake Erie and the great Western lakes is not "inland." 1. The meaning of the words "inland navigation," as thus employed, does not include the navigation of such waters. 2. The question is not what is the geographical meaning of the word "inland," used in distinguishing seas from oceans, or the waters within the body of a continent from the high seas. The question is as to the meaning of the phrase "inland navigation," employed in reference to a commercial business, and to promoting commercial objects. In this view, the meaning of the same words, or equivalent phrases in the same connection, are the true governing authorities, so far as mere definition is concerned. 3. The exact definition of the word "inland," as well as the Moore et al. v. American Transportation Co. phrase "inland navigation," shows that such navigation is not the navigation of the great Western lakes. Webster's definition, (Webster's Dict., "Inland,") as applied to navigation, is: "Carried on within a country; domestic, not foreign, as inland trade or transportation; inland navigation." Worcester defines the word thus employed (Worcester's Dict., "Inland,") as: "Pertaining to the interior of a country; internal; opposed to coasting; inland navigation." In Rees's Encyclopedia, (Rees's Encyclopedia, "Inland Navigation,") "inland navigation" is defined to be a term "applied to the passage of boats and vessels on canals and rivers within a country, to distinguish it from navigation, properly so called, by means of shipping on the open seas, or on the largest of the lakes." The definition of the Encyclopedia Britannica (Encyc. Brit., "Navigation, Inland ") is as follows: "Inland navigation may be defined as that branch of navigation which extends from the sea to the land, and affords the means of transportation through the interior of a country. The word "inland," thus used, is opposed in meaning to the word "foreign." "Foreign" (Burrill's Law Dict., "Foreign") means "that which is without or beyond the limits of a particular territory," as the Western lakes are beyond the limits of a particular State. The navigation of the lakes is not "inland," as a bill of exchange drawn by a citizen of one State upon a citizen of another State is not an inland bill, and was formerly called an "outland bill," "to distinguish it," as says Justice Story, (Story on Bills, secs. 22, 23,) "from an inland bill, which is governed throughout by one municipal jurisprudence." Such navigation, thus conducted, through the systems of jurisprudence of several States, (when Congress, beneath its power, hereinafter considered, is silent on the subject,) is foreign, in the sense that the ships employed in that navigation are foreign to the State in which they are not owned. Conklin's Admiralty, 57. The consideration of some decisions may further illustrate this view. The statute of limitations of the State of Georgia provided that, in certain cases, it should not apply to parties |