Eberly et al. v. Moore et al. court can never become fully possessed, that there would be more danger of injury in revising matters of this kind than what might result now and then from an arbitrary or improper exercise of this discretion. It may be very hard not to grant a new trial or not to continue a cause; but in neither case can the party be relieved by writ of error, nor is the court apprised that a refusal to amend, or to add a plea, was ever made the subject of complaint in this way. The court, therefore, does not feel itself obliged to give any opinion on the conduct of the inferior court in refusing to receive these pleas. At the same time, it has no difficulty in saying that even in that stage of the proceedings, the Circuit Court might, if it had thought proper, have received these additional pleas, or admitted of any amendment in those already filed." (Pp. 48, 219.) "The allowance or disallowance of amendments is not matter for which a writ of error lies here." Chirac v. Reinecker, 11 Wheat., 280. Walden v. Craig, 9 Wheat., 573. Clapp r. Balch, 3 Greenl., 219. Morgan & Smith v. Dyer, 10 Johns., 163. Toby v. Claflin, 3 Sum., 380. Calloway v. Dobson, 1 Brock, 119. The precise question of permitting a plea to the jurisdiction after general answer to the merits was decided by Judge Story, in Dodge v. Perkins, 4 Mason, 435, in which suit was brought against a citizen of Massachusetts by an administrator, alleging citizenship of his intestate in New York. There was an answer to the merits, also denying the averment of citizenship. Judge Story held that the citizenship of the administrator must be averred, and granted leave therefor. After deciding that the question of citizenship was preliminary, and to be made by plea, and not by answer, he says: "In this case, I should feel it my duty to give the defendant a right to withdraw his answer and put in a plea, if the pos ture of the cause hereafter should render that course desirable to him." (P. 437; and see 1 Sum., 579.) The general rule is thus recognised in Pennsylvania by Ch. J. Tilghman: "The pleadings are always under the control of the court. Pleas in abatement ought not to be put in after pleas in bar, unless under special circumstances, of which the court will judge." Riddle et al. v. Stevens, 2 Serg. and R., 544. Mr. Justice CAMPBELL delivered the opinion of the court. The plaintiffs, as citizens of Kentucky, commenced a suit by petition against the defendants, as citizens of Texas, for the recovery of a parcel of land in their possession. At the return of the process the defendants pleaded to the petition the geueral issue, and the statute of limitations, in bar of the suit. At the next succeeding term they moved the court, upon an affidavit charging that the allegation in the petition, "that the plaintiffs were citizens of Kentucky, was untrue, and fraudulently made to induce the court to take cognizance of the cause," and that they were citizens of Texas, for leave to withdraw their pleas, and to plead this matter in abatement of the suit. This motion was allowed, and pleas in abatement were filed. One of these avers that the allegation of citizenship in said plaintiffs' petition is not true; that said plaintiff's are not citizens of Kentucky, but are respectively citizens of Texas; wherefore he prays the dismissal of the cause for want of jurisdiction. The plaintiffs thereupon moved the court for judgment for the want of a plea. This motion was not allowed, and thereupon the plaintiffs refused to reply to the pleas in abatement, and the court then proceeded to impannel a jury, and directed them to ascertain whether, from the proof before them, the plaintiffs, or either of them, were citizens of the States of Kentucky or Texas at the date of the writ. The jury returned as their verdict, that the domicil or residence of the plaintiff's never had been changed from the State of Texas, and that their domicil or residence was in the State of Texas at the commencement of this suit. The court dismissed their petition. Eberly et al. v. Moore et al. The plaintiffs object to the authority of the District Court to permit the withdrawal of pleas in bar, for the purpose of pleading to the jurisdiction; that a plea in bar admits the jurisdiction of the court, and the capacity of the plaintiffs to sue, and that they cannot be deprived of the benefit of that admission. The equitable jurisdiction of the courts of the United States as courts of law is chiefly exercised in the amendment of pleadings and proceedings in the court, and in the supervision of all the various steps in a cause, so that the rules and practice of the court shall be so administered and enforced as to prevent hardship and injustice, and that the merits of the cause may be fairly tried. Such a jurisdiction is essential to and is inherent in the organization of courts of justice. Bartholomew v. Carter, 2 M. and G., 125. But this jurisdiction has been conferred upon the courts of the United States in a plenary form by acts of Congress. 1 Stat. at Large, p. 83, sec. 17; p. 335, sec. 7; p. 91, sec. 32. It has been uniformly held in this court that a Circuit Court could not be controlled in the exercise of the discretion thus conceded to it. Spencer v. Lapsley, 20 How., 264. In the present instance the jurisdiction was properly exercised. An attempt was made, according to the affidavit on which the motion was founded, to confer upon the District Court, by a false and fraudulent averment, a jurisdiction to which it was not entitled under the Constitution. If true, this was a gross contempt of the court, for which all persons connected with it might have been subject to its penal jurisdiction. The plaintiffs contend that the plea is a nullity, and that they were entitled to sign judgment. It is not a precise, distinct, or a formal plea, but it denies the truth of the averment of the citizenship of the plaintiffs, as they had affirmed it to be in the petition. We may say as Lord Denman said, in Horner v. Keppel, 10 A. and E., 17: "Where a plea is clearly frivolous on the face of it, that is a good ground for setting it aside; but the plea here is not quite bad enough to warrant that remedy." Judgment affirmed. Fitch v. Creighton. JOHN FITCH, APPELLANT, v. EDWARD CREIGHTON. The statutes of Ohio give to the local authorities of cities and incorporated villages power to make various improvements in streets, &c., and to assess the proportionate expense thereof upon the lots fronting thereon, which is declared to be a lien upon the property. The City Council of Toledo directed certain improvements to be made, and contracted with two persons (one of whom purchased the right of the other) to do the work, and authorized them to collect the amounts due upon the assess ments. The contractor who executed the work, and who was a citizen of another State, filed a bill upon the equity side of the Circuit Court to enforce this lien. The court had jurisdiction of the case. The courts of the United States have jurisdiction at common law and in chancery; and wherever such jurisdiction may be appropriately exercised, there being no objection to the citizenship of the parties, the courts of the United States have jurisdiction. This is not derived from the power of the State, but from the laws of the United States. It was not necessary to make the contractor who had sold out a party, nor was the bill multifarious because it claimed to enforce the liens upon several lots. THIS was an appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the northern district of Ohio. It was a bill filed on the equity side of the court by Creighton, a citizen of Iowa, against Fitch, a citizen of Ohio, under the circumstances stated in the opinion of the court. The Circuit Court decreed against Fitch, who brought up this appeal. It was submitted on printed arguments by Mr. Cooke for the appellant, and Mr. Swayne for the appellee. The principal question in the case was whether the Circuit Court had jurisdiction of the case, which depended upon the facts involved in it. A particular statement of these would not be interesting to the profession generally, and therefore they are omitted. The propositions for which Mr. Cooke contended, in support of the demurrer below, were I. That the complainant does not show himself possessed of any right which he can enforce directly against this defendant or his property; and— Fitch v. Creighton. II. That the liability of the defendant is not such an one as can be enforced against him in a court of equity, without the aid of the statute, which cannot confer jurisdiction upon the courts of the United States. Mr. Swayne's points, in opposition to the above, were thus stated: I. It seems to be conceded that, when the local statutes of a State give rights to an individual, the courts of the United States will enforce those rights in cases where they have jurisdiction of the parties. 1. It is not pretended that the States can direct the remedy by which rights are to be enforced, which the Federal courts are bound to pursue. 2. But it is claimed that where the statute of a State creates a right which may be enforced by remedies already existing and resorted to in the latter courts, that these courts will enforce the right by their own known remedies and usages, in cases where they have jurisdiction, although the local statute may direct a special mode of proceeding. The General Smith, 4 Wheaton's Rep., 438. II. By the statute and the contract with the city, the complainant acquired, by operation of law, rights which courts of equity, by their long-established rules and usages, will enforce. Mr. Justice McLEAN delivered the opinion of the court. This is an appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the northern district of Ohio. The bill was filed by Edward Creighton, a citizen of the State of Iowa, against John Fitch, a citizen of the State of Ohio. By the act of March 11th, 1853, Swan's Statutes Ohio, it is provided, "that the City Council shall have power to lay off, open, widen, straighten, extend, and establish, to improve, keep in order, and repair, and to light streets, alleys, public grounds, wharves, landing places, and market spaces; to open and construct, and put in order and repair, sewers and drains; to enter upon or take for such of the above purposes as may |