opinions of others, when he has equal opportunity to form and exercise his own judgment: Picard vs. McCormick.

But it cannot be laid down as a rule of law that value is never a material fact: Id.

And when the purchaser expressly relies upon the knowledge of the seller as to quality or value, the seller is bound to act honorably and deal fairly with the purchaser. When confidence is reposed in him he is bound not to abuse it, and the rule of caveat emptor does not apply: Id.

A jeweller, knowing the purchaser's ignorance, deliberately and designedly availed himself of it to defraud him by false statements of the value of articles in his trade which none but an expert could reasonably be expected to understand. Held, that an action would lie for the fraud: Id.

Value may be the subject of a warranty in a contract of sale: Id. A simple bill of sale does not embody the preliminaries nor the essential terms of a contract in such a way as to exclude parol evidence. designed merely to show the transfer of title: Id.

It is

And when a contract of sale is in writing, if the seller has been dishonest in the transaction, the purchaser may disregard the writing, and sue directly for the fraud: Id.

Right of a Married Woman to engage generally in Business.-D., a married woman, being the owner of a grist-mill, her husband, as her agent, entered into the business of buying, flouring, and selling wheat on a large scale, which was carried on mostly on the credit of the business, and with money derived therefrom. The husband being indebted, one of his creditors levied upon some of the personal property in the business as his. The wife having brought suit against the officer for this property, it was held, that the Statute of 1855, empowering a married woman to contract, sell, and dispose of her property the same as if she were unmarried, did not empower her to engage generally in a business of this character, so as to make the proceeds her own: Glover vs. Alcott.

License Fee not a Tax.-An ordinance of the city of Detroit prohibited the sale of meats at other places than the public market without first obtaining a license, for which a fee of five dollars was charged. This ordinance was attacked as void, because imposing a tax not apportioned as provided by the Constitution. Held, that the license fee was not a tax, but a reasonable compensation demanded by the city from those not selling in the public markets, for the additional labor of its officers, and expense thereby imposed: Ash vs. People.

Seduction of a Woman who had been seduced before.-An act of illicit intercourse to which the woman submits solely in consequence of a promise of marriage then made, constitutes the statutory crime of seduction, notwithstanding the woman had been before seduced on a similar promise: People vs. Millspaugh.

Stare decisis-Notice before Suit to one who continues a Nuisance.— The Court is not bound to follow as precedents adjudications outside the State-except the adjudications of the Federal Courts on questions arising under the Constitution and laws of the Federal Government-any further than appear to the Court to be warranted by the fundamental principles of the common law: Caldwell vs. Gale.

The question discussed, whether, where one erects a dam on his own land which causes the land of another to be flowed, and then conveys the land on which the dam is situated, a suit can be brought against his grantee for the nuisance before he has been served with notice of it and requested to remove it: Id.

If such notice be necessary, and has once been given by the owner of the land flowed, it will enure for the benefit of his grantee, or of any one claiming title under or through the person giving the notice: Id.

Reading Books of Reports to a Jury.-On a question whether a draft was presented for payment within a reasonable time, counsel was allowed to read to the jury, and comment upon, books of reports. Held to be erroneous: Phoenix Ins. Co. vs. Allen.

SUPREME COURT OF MASSACHUSETTS.1

Administrator-Relation to Heirs at Law.-The administrator of an estate, the personal property of which is more than sufficient for the payment of debts, stands in no fiduciary relation to the heirs at law; and they cannot maintain a bill in equity to compel him to give to them the benefit of a purchase of real estate by him from one who had orally agreed to sell the same to the intestate: Gay and Others vs. Gay and Another.

Estate of Husband-Claim of Widow—Ante-nuptial Agreement.—It is no answer to the claim of a widow to a distributive share in the personal estate left by her husband, to show that she made an ante-nuptial agreement with him, by which she covenanted to accept certain provisions therein undertaken to be made for her by him, in the place of and as a

1 From Charles Allen, Esq., Reporter, to appear in Vol. 5 of his Reports.

substitute for dower in his estate, and as a bar and estoppel to any and every other claim by her upon his estate: Sullings vs. Richmond and Another.

Trust Estate Continuance of Business by Trustees-All the Profits of Business not Income-Construction of Intention.-If, under a bequest of the residue of the testator's property to trustees, with a general direction to keep the same safely invested, and distribute the income to certain persons for life, with remainder over, an investment made by the testator in a limited partnership has been allowed by the trustees to continue, the profits arising therefrom after his death are not to be treated exclusively as income; but so much thereof is to be treated and invested as principal, as, if received and invested at the testator's death, would amount, with interest and making annual rests, to the profits actually received at the time they were received, and the residue is to be distributed as income: Kinmonth vs. Brigham and Another.

An intention on the part of a testator that an investment made by him in a limited partnership should be continued after his death, and the share of the profits belonging to his estate should be distributed as income, under a general direction that his property should be kept safely invested, and the income thereof distributed to certain persons for life, with remainder over, will not be inferred from a clause in his will directing his executors not to avail themselves, unless they should see fit, of a provision in the partnership articles, authorizing him or his representatives to assume the management of the business, in case of the death of either of the general partners: Id.

Partners-Guarantee of Private Debt.—The guarantee by a firm of a private debt of one of the partners, if made in contemplation of insolvency, is not a debt which can be proved against the joint estate, by a creditor who knew that the firm was insolvent: Phillips vs. Ames and Another.

Note-Whether of Company or of Officer signing it.-A note in this form,-"$631.46. Boston, Nov. 12, 1860. Six months after date, we promise to pay to the order of A. B. six hundred and thirty-one dollars, value received. Mass. Steam Heating Co. L. L. F., Treasurer,"-is the note of the company, and does not bind L. L. F. personally: Draper and Another vs. Mass. Steam Heating Co. and Another.

Draft-Husband and Wife-Personal Liability.-An indorsement of

a draft by a husband to his wife, and her subsequent indorsement of it, with his assent, to a third person, are sufficient to vest in the latter a valid title: Slawson vs. Loring.

A draft in this form,-"Office of the P. L. Manuf. Co., Hancock, Mich., June 5th, 1861. E. T. L., agent. At four months' sight, pay, &c., and charge the same to account of this company," signed "I. R. J., agent," and accepted by "E. T. L., agent,”—binds the acceptor personally: Id..

Note payable by Instalments-Grace-Mortgage-When Condition broken. The maker of a note which is payable by instalments, at future times certain, with interest, is entitled to grace both on the principal and interest; and the condition of a mortgage given to secure the payment of the same sums and interest at the same times, is not broken until the expiration of the grace which is allowed upon the note: Coffin vs. Loring.

Trespass-Erection of Bay-Window-Highway.—An owner of land may maintain an action for the erection of a bay-window which extends over his line, by the adjoining owner, although that portion of his land which is covered by the bay-window has been laid out and is used as a highway; and evidence of a custom so to erect bay-windows is inadmissible: Codman and Others vs. Evans.

Equity Jurisdiction-General Statutes, c. 145, § 16-Discretion in Location of Road-What may be included in Authority to Construct a Road. The remedy under Gen. Sts., c. 145, § 16, by an application for leave to file an information in the nature of a quo warranto to redress an injury to private rights or interests by the exercise by a private corporation of a franchise or privilege not conferred by law, does not deprive this Court of its jurisdiction in equity in case of a private nuisance: Fall River Iron Works Co. vs. Old Colony and Fall River Railroad.

Under a charter which fixes one terminus of a railroad at or near a certain point, a large discretion is conferred upon the railroad company in locating their road, the exercise of which will not be revised by this Court unless they have clearly exceeded its just limits or acted in bad faith; and where a charter authorized a railroad company to extend, locate, construct, and maintain a railroad ❝ from a point at or near the present terminus of its track in Fall River, in a southerly direction, to the line of the State of Rhode Island," a location starting at a point 2475 feet, by

the line of the railroad, northerly from the termination of the old track, is authorized: Id.

An unrestricted grant of authority to construct a railroad from one designated point to another carries with it the authority to cross a navigable stream, if the railroad cannot reasonably be constructed without doing so: Id.

Corporation

Stockholder-Equity-Statute of 1861, c. 156.-A stockholder in a corporation, the charter of which, by Stat. 1831, c. 81, is subject to alteration, amendment, or repeal, at the pleasure of the Legislature, cannot maintain a bill in equity to restrain the corporation from engaging in a new enterprise, in addition to that contemplated by the charter, but of the same kind, if it is sanctioned by an express legislative grant, and by a vote of the majority of the stockholders: Durfee vs. Old Colony and Fall River Railroad Co.

A lease by the Newport and Fall River Railroad Company, a corporation established under the laws of Rhode Island, to the Old Colony and Fall River Railroad Company, a corporation established under the laws of this Commonwealth, of the unfinished railroad of the former corporation, situated in Rhode Island, for a term of years, at an annual rent, after the same shall have been completed, with a stipulation for the payment in advance of the rent for the whole term, to be used for the purpose of building the road and putting it in order for use, is not a violation of Stat. 1861, c. 156, which authorizes the latter corporation to extend their railroad to the line of Rhode Island, to connect with a railroad to be constructed from Newport, Rhode Island, to the line of Massachusetts, and provides that no part of their present reserved funds shall be appropriated to build any portion of the road in Rhode Island: Id.

SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK.1

Lease and Sub-lease-Right to Re-enter.—An under lease, by the lessee of premises, for the whole unexpired term, reserving the right to re-enter, is a sub-lease, and not an assignment; and the party giving the sub-lease can re-enter for a breach of the condition, although there is no reversion remaining in him: People ex rel. Elston vs. Robertson.

A lease was for the term of ten years, to commence on the 1st day of May, 1852, and to end on the 1st day of May, 1862. W., the assignee of the lessee, underlet the premises to E., from the 1st day of May, 1856,

1 From Hon. O. L. Barbour, to be reported in Vol. 39 of his Reports.