THE AMERICAN LAW REGISTER. NOVEMBER, 1862. MORTGAGES. THE NECESSITY OF DESCRIBING THE SECURITY UPON THE REGISTRY. MORTGAGES TO SECURE FUTURE ADVANCES, AND WHERE THE SECURITIES HAVE BEEN CHANGED. I. WHAT FORM OF CONDITION AND REGISTRY IS VALID; HOW FAR THE SECURITIES MAY BE CHANGED, WITHOUT AFFECTING THE VALIDITY OF THE LIEN. 1. The question not the same under a registry system, as where no such exists. 2. The early cases seem to require that the securities be described on the registry. 3. The early doctrine of condemning all general mortgages now abandoned. 4. Other cases admitted of general description of the debt upon the registry. 5. This led to great looseness and indefiniteness of description in the conditions of registered mortgages. 6. So that now a mortgage to secure future advances, or an unsettled balance of present indebtedness, may be in the form of a gross sum now due. 7. But such gross sum cannot be made to cover debts not contemplated at the time. 8. Analysis of the nature of liability which may be made the subject of mortgage security. 9. This relaxation of the early practice seems justified by another relaxation, now firmly established, that of allowing the change of securities. 10. This latter is too firmly established to be brought in question. 11. No presumptive payment of a mortgage unless that was the evident intention. 12. This rule constantly applied to banking paper. 13 and 14. Some marked cases of the application of the rule to banking paper. VOL. XI.-1 (1) 15. The result of the authorities stated. 16. There is more difficulty in reducing the facts of the different cases to the same result, but they have been often decided upon the facts. 17. And are thus made to turn upon the intention, rather than the form. II. MORTGAGES TO SECURE FUTURE ADVANCES. THE FORM AND EXTENT OF NOTICE REQUISITE TO DEFEAT THE RIGHT TO CONTINUE SUCH ADVANCES. 1. The germ of this species of contract is found in the Roman civil law. 2. But it appears not quite the same as the English law of tacking. 3. The English law of tacking further illustrated. 4. It seems not founded upon the clearest equity. 5. If the third mortgagee had notice of the second mortgage at the date of his own, he was excluded from the right. 6. Contracts for future advances, if absolute, the same as present indebtedness. 7. The most important class of such contracts optional with both parties. 8. Has reference chiefly to running money accounts. Bankers, &c. 9. Statement of the English rule. Gordon vs. Graham. 10. This case reversed by Sir JOHN ROMILLY, in Shaw vs. Neal. 11. Further reviewed in Rolt vs. Hopkinson. Overruled. 12 and 13. Exposition of the principles involved in the present English rule. 14. The requisite notice to terminate the right to make further advances. The registry sufficient in some States. 15. Most of the cases require notice in fact and in such form as to gain credit. 16. Further exposition of the rule, as defined by different judges. 1. The question how far securities described in a registered mortgage may be changed, without affecting the lien of the mortgagee, is one of great interest and, in some cases, of a good deal of nicety. The same difficulty might not always occur, where no registry existed. For in such cases there would not be the same opportunity to impose upon new parties, by representing the debt as paid, by producing the securities described in the registry. 2. Some of the early cases seem to require that the security shall be correctly and intelligibly described upon the registry. As in Frost vs. Beekman, 1 Johns. Ch. R. 288, S. C. 18 Johns. R. 544, where it is held that the registry of a mortgage to secure a promissory note of $3000, as for one of $300, is good only for the $300. This is upon the principle that the registry is not for the purpose of putting one upon inquiry merely, but to give full knowledge of the contents of the deed and of the security. It therefore does not come within the principle, it was said, that the recital of a deed is notice of the contents of such deed, since it puts the party upon his inquiry, and he must be supposed to pursue it till he find the recited deed, unless something is shown to have occurred short of that to satisfy the mind of the party; and naturally calculated to divert him from further inquiry. Taylor vs. Stibbert, 2 Vesey Jr. 437; Hiern vs. Mill, 13 Vesey 114; Hall vs. Smith, 14 Vesey 426; Jackson vs. Meeley, 10 Johns. R. 374. But it was urged that the registry must go further, and show the precise state of the security. Accordingly: 3. In Pettibone vs. Griswold, 4 Conn. R. 158, it was decided, that, where the condition of a mortgage deed was, that the mortgagor should pay all notes, which the mortgagee might indorse or give for the mortgagor, and all receipts which the mortgagee might hold against him, the deed was void as against the other creditors of the mortgagor. This was put, or attempted to be put, upon the same ground assumed by the New York courts in Frost vs. Beekman, that those interested in the registry were not bound to look beyond it, and must be able to determine from that, the precise state of the title. The learned judge here did not seem to have adverted to the difference between the two cases. When the registry, on its face, seems to be perfect, but is not so, it necessarily misleads the party, who will naturally rely upon it. On the other hand, where the notice upon the registry is general, as by reference to other deeds, or instruments, whether to define the estate conveyed, or the extent of the condition of a mortgage, it has no such tendency to mislead, any more than such a recital in the deed itself would have that effect upon one seeing the deed. And if such a recital in the deed is valid notice of its contents as between the parties, there is no reason, why the registry of the deed should not be as good notice to creditors and purchasers, as the production of the deed itself, or full notice of its contents, which it has never been doubted made the deed as good, as to other parties, having such notice, as it was between the grantor and grantee. And it is no more requisite that those interested in knowing the state of land titles should be able to determine it from an inspection of the registry than that they should be able to do it without looking beyond the deeds, provided these had been shown them. And it would scarcely be contended that any deed, in such form as to be valid -between the parties, would not be equally valid, as to creditors and purchasers, unless it was fraudulent, in fact, or calculated to mislead others, nothing of which is relied upon in Griswold vs. Pettibone, supra. The truth is that this case was early understood to have been put upon ground not maintainable, and has consequently been abandoned in that state, as their reports show, in numerous cases. All that is now required, in that state, is, that the contracts secured by a mortgage should be described with such convenient certainty as the case admits of. Stoughton vs. Pasco, 5 Conn. R. 442; Hart vs. Chalker, 14 Conn. 79; Merrills vs. Swift, 18 Id. 257; Sanford vs. Wheeler, 13 Id. 165; Lewis vs. De Forest, 20 Id. 427; Mix vs. Cowles, Id. 420. See also, to the same purport, Skilman vs. Teeple, Saxton's R. 232; 1 Hilliard on Mort. 285–297. 4. And in some of the states it has been held, that the mortgage will be valid as against future incumbrances, where the debt is either so described in the condition of the deed, that its identity can be traced, or such information given that those interested may be able, upon proper inquiry, to trace it out. Garber vs. Henry, 6 Watts 57; Gardner vs. Webber, 17 Pick. R. 414; Commercial Bank vs. Cunningham, 24 Pick. R. 274. And all that is at present required, in the way of describing the debt secured, or intended to be secured, by a mortgage, is that it should be capable of clear identification, either by matter upon the record, or else by that, in connection with facts proved aliunde, and which may be regarded as pointed at by the registry. 5. Under this rule great looseness and indefiniteness of description has been admitted, both as to present and future indebtedness intended to be secured, where it is clearly made to appear that it was the bona fide purpose of the parties to secure the debt in question, and that there was no fraudulent purpose as to others. As in the case of The Commercial Bank vs. Cunningham, 24 Pick. R. 270, where a copartnership executed a mortgage to secure a promissory note, and took from the creditor an instrument, not recorded, which set forth that such note was held as collateral security for the payment or discharge of certain other notes and liabilities of the mortgagor, and that the note.and mortgage were to be held as long as the mortgagors should be under any liability of any sort to the creditor: It was held that the mortgage was not fraudulent as against other creditors or bona fide purchasers; and that new notes given to the creditor, whether in renewal of the new notes, or not, were covered by the mortgage, notwithstanding the members of the firm had changed and the new notes were made or indorsed in the name of the new firm. And notes, secured by mortgage, given for a round sum, where nothing was due that was intended to be secured, but the object was merely to indemnify the mortgagee against future liabilities expected to be incurred, and where this was evidenced by a writing between the parties, not recorded, have been held valid securities, as against all debts and securities accruing after the mortgagee had assumed responsibilities. Gardner vs. Webber, 17 Pick. R. 407; James vs. Johnson, 6 Johns. Ch. R. 417, 429. 6. It seems now perfectly well settled that a mortgage to secure future advances, may be in the form of a gross sum expressed on the face of the instrument as present indebtedness. The Bank of Utica s. Finch, 3 Barb. Ch. R. 294. And so may a mortgage be taken in this general form to secure present indebtedness arising out of complicated transactions where it may be difficult to describe the securities, or the debts, except in this general way. Bank of Utico vs. Finch, supra. 7. But this must be a constituent part of the original agreement. And where such debts have been all once paid, it has been held not competent to keep the security on foot, and to apply it to other indebtedness, by virtue of a parol contract to that effect. Bank of Utica vs. Finch, supra; Truscott vs. King, 2 Selden R. 147; Mead vs. York, Id. 449; 4 Kent Comm. 176; Ex parte Hooper, 19 Vesey 477; Meland vs. Gray, 2 Y. & C. 199. 8. The forms of these conditions have been very much varied, but since the general principle is now firmly established, that a general description of the indebtedness in the condition of a mort |