In an action against the defendant for fraud in the negotiation of a loan from the plaintiff to H. upon his bond and mortgage, and for fraudulent representations and concealments relative to the mortgaged premises, it appeared that the negotiation of the loan was conducted by C., an attor ney employed by the defendant; that on the discovery of the fraud, C., being charged therewith, executed, together with one T., a bond to the plaintiff, conditioned for the payment of the mortgage-debt; that C. subsequently confessed judgment in favor of the plaintiff for the amount then unpaid upon the mortgage-debt, and paid a portion of such judgment. Held, That, if there was any evidence to connect C. with the fraud and to show a guilty complicity on his part, it should have been submitted to the jury, with instructions that, if they found the defendant and C. were engaged in practising a fraud upon the plaintiff, then the sum paid by C. on his bond and the judgment recovered thereon should be allowed to the defendant in diminution of the damages, to that amount: Id.

And that the jury should have been further instructed that, if they found the defendant and C. together practised the fraud upon the plaintiff, and that upon C.'s being charged with it, he and T. executed their bond to the plaintiff in settlement and satisfaction of the cause of action then existing, the plaintiff was not entitled to recover: Id.

Will; subscribing Witness a Marksman.-It is not an insuperable objection to the valid execution of a will that one of the subscribing witnesses makes his mark, instead of writing his name. It is still a signing of his name, or subscription, within the meaning of the statute in regard to the execution of wills: Morris et al. vs. Kniffin.

Agreement to compound a Felony.-An agreement between B. and G. H. recited that certain promissory notes were to be executed by G. H. and P. H. to B. and placed in the hands of T., to be held by him until certain criminal prosecutions against G. H. then pending should be "discontinued and ended," and then the notes were to be delivered by T. to B. A further condition on which the notes were to be delivered to B. was that he should not arrest G. H., or cause him to be arrested, on any process whatever, but should cease all proceedings against him. Notes were executed in pursuance of this agreement, and put into the In an action thereon by a subsequent holder, Held, That in effect both agreements were similar, and that the object and intent of both were to obstruct the course of justice, for a pecuniary consideration: Porter vs. Havens et al.

hands of T.

That they implied that B. should drop the criminal prosecutions, so far as he was concerned; that he would not appear against G. H.; and that he would, if possible, cause the criminal proceedings to be brought to a close. And that it was therefore a contract forbidden by law, and immoral and corrupt upon its face: Id.

And that the facts being undisputed and uncontradicted, there was no error in the judge directing a verdict for the defendant, and refusing to submit the evidence to the jury to determine the question of fact, whether the notes were given to settle or compound a criminal offence, or for any unlawful consideration: Id.

NEW YORK COURT OF APPEALS.1

Vendor and Vendee of Land-Strict Performance of Agreement.The vendor in a contract for the sale of land being in default, and the time extended for his convenience, the vendee may insist upon strict performance at the very hour appointed: Friess vs. Rider.

The vendor again making default, but tendering performance after the lapse of three hours, the vendee is not required to assign any reason for his refusal to accept it, and it is, therefore, immaterial that he assigns a reason which is not well founded in fact: Id.

So held in an action by the vendor for stipulated damages, where the vendor, on the day for giving his deed, the vendee being then ready with his money, requested a postponement to a fixed hour the next day. At the time appointed the vendee attended, and, after waiting three hours, departed. At a subsequent hour of the same day, the vendor tendered a deed, and the vendee stated, as reason for declining, not the lapse of time, but waste of the premises, which was not supported by the facts: Id. The case of Gould vs. Banks (8 Wend. 562) considered and limited, per ALLEN, J.: Id.

Receipt.-A writing in this form, "F. bought of W. one horse, $150. Received payment. W.," given upon the purchase of and payment for the horse, is a mere receipt, and not a contract or bill of sale, so as to exclude parol evidence of a warranty of soundness of the horse by the vendor: Filkins vs. Whyland.

Defective Mortgage.-An instrument, in the form of a mortgage, but containing the name of no mortgagee, does not become effectual by its delivery to one who advances money upon the agreement that he shall hold the paper as security for his loan: Chauncey vs. Arnold.

1 From E. P. Smith, Esq., Reporter; to appear in the 10th volume of his Reports.

Whether it could be made effectual by parol authority from the mortgagor to insert the lender's name as mortgagee: Quære: Id.

Sale of personal Property—Insolvency of Vendee-Rescission.—The vendee of goods which had come to his possession, ascertaining his insolvency, deposited them in warehouse subject to the order of the vendor, and notified him thereof by letter: before the vendor had signified his assent, the goods were attached by another creditor. Held, that the title of the vendor prevailed: Sturtevant vs. Orser et al.

The delivery to the warehouseman was a rescission of the contract of sale by the vendee, and the subsequent assent of the vendor relates to the time of such delivery: Per SMITH, J.: Id.

An actual assent to the rescission by the vendor's agent is to be assumed in support of the judgment, upon a statement of facts in harmony with such actual assent, and the absence of any facts tending to repel such presumption: Per DENIO, J.: Id.

Mutual Insurance Company-Note given to as Subscription to Capital.— A note given to a mutual fire insurance company, organized under the general law, as one of the notes required by the statute (chap. 308 of 1849) to make up its capital, is, in legal effect, payable on demand, i. e., at its date, though by its terms payment was to be made at such times and in such portions as the directors might require: Howland vs. Edmonds et al.

No actual demand is necessary in respect to such a note. The statute under which it is given fastens on it the character of a note payable absolutely, or at the mere will of the holder: Id.

The statute of limitations begins to run against such a note at the time it is given, and is a good defence at the expiration of six years from that time: Id.

Mortgagee-Remedy.-A mortgagee may maintain a personal action. against a grantee of the mortgaged premises who has assumed to pay the incumbrance: Burr vs. Beers.

He may pursue this remedy without foreclosing the mortgage and without joining the mortgagor as defendant: Id.

Railroad Company-Exemption from Liability to gratuitous Passenger.-A railroad corporation cannot, by contract, exempt itself from liability to a passenger for damage resulting from its own wilful misconduct or

recklessness which is equivalent thereto: Perkins vs. New York Central Railroad Company.

But in respect to a gratuitous passenger it may contract for exemption from liability for any degree of negligence in its servants, other than the board of directors or managers who represent the corporation itself, for all general purposes: Id.

Whether the corporation is liable to a free passenger, so contracting, for negligence in the construction of the road, as upon an implied guaranty of its security, when the misconduct from which the injury resulted was that of a trackmaster who, knowingly, used rotten material in building a bridge, there being no evidence that it was known to the superior managing officers. Quare: Id.

Railroad-Liability for injury to free Passengers-Who are not free Passengers. It seems that the owner of cattle, transported for hire on a railroad, and who goes along in charge of them, under a contract that "the persons riding free to take charge of the stock do so at their own risk of personal injury from whatever cause," is not to be regarded as a gratuitous passenger. Per WRIGHT, DENIO, and DAVIES, JS.: Smith vs. New York Central Railroad Company.

Whether, as to one who, in the manner stated, gives some consideration for being carried, a contract is valid which aims to exempt the carrier from liability for damages resulting from the negligence of his servants. Quare: Id.

The owner of cattle travelling in charge of them, under such a contract, and paying no independent consideration for the conveyance of himself, was injured by the gross negligence of an agent of the carrier in using an unfit and dangerous car. The carrier was held liable by a divided court, four of the judges going on the ground that the contract for exemption from liability was void, as against public policy; and the fifth, that the negligence, as it respected the machinery of transportation, is imputable to the carrier himself: Id.

NOTICES OF NEW BOOKS.

DIGEST OF AMERICAN CASES Relating to PatenTS FOR INVENTIONS, Copyrights, AND TRADE-MARKS, from 1789 to 1862. By STEPHEN D. Law, Counsellor at Law, Author of "Law's United States Courts," &c. New York: Published by the Author, 52 John Street. 1862.

STATUTE LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES RElating to CoPYRIGHTS AND PATENTS FOR

INVENTIONS from 1790 to 1862, with Notes and References. By the same Author. Bound together in one volume. Price $6.50.

Compendia sunt dispendia, said Lord Coke; and in the sense he meant, that a lawyer who relies on a syllabus rather than go to the case itself as the fountain head, is trusting to a frail support, the maxim is even truer now than when he wrote. But the lawyer who wanders about in the present day amid a wilderness of reports, need not be told that decidedly the most useful books given to the profession are indexes and digests, and that the man who gives us a new and good book of the kind has amply discharged his debt to his profession.

It is with great satisfaction, therefore, that we notice the appearance of Mr. Law's excellent Digest of Patent and Copyright Cases. The fact that there was sufficient material for a digest of this size, is evidence enough of its necessity, but especially is this true in a department like that of patent and copyright law, where the cases are scattered through hundreds of volumes not perhaps generally found in a moderate library, and in so many instances, not anywhere in print so as to be accessible to the profession.

The plan of Mr. Law's work is excellent, the cases being systematically arranged under appropriate heads, and the substance of the decisions given briefly, yet with sufficient fulness. Of the correctness of the references there is no complete test but long use of the work, but we can say that the adoption of the only proper mode of reference, to wit, the name of the case as well as the volume and page of the Report (a mode so often neglected in such works, for the saving of space), disposes us to accept the assurance given in the preface, that no pains have been spared to attain this most important end. Another valuable feature of the Digest is the date of the decision and the name of the Judge by whom it was made, by which we may see not only the relative value of decisions perhaps apparently discordant, but also the law under which the case arose and the general current of judicial views on the subject.

In addition to the Digest itself, there is the usual table of cases alphabetically arranged, and, what are of much greater value, tables of the cases arranged under the subject-matters of which they treat, and of all the cases affirmed, explained, or overruled.

The Statutes, with Notes and Indexes, are bound with the Digest, making a handsome volume of over 800 pages, which may be considered to contain the entire American law on the subjects of Patents for Inventions, Copyright, and Trade-Marks.

J. T. M.