and from 200 to 300 others. We took about 100 prisoners, half of them wounded. Neither party had more cannon at the close than at the beginning of the battle; but the Rebels boasted that they had destroyed Federal munitions and camp equipage of very considerable value. Next morning, Commander Porter, with the Essex, 7 guns and 40 men, accompanied by the Cayuga and Sumter, moved up in quest of the Arkansas, whose two consorts had already fled up the river. The ram at first made for the Essex, intending to run her down; but her remaining engine soon gave out, and she was headed toward the river bank, the Essex pursuing and shelling her; the Arkansas replying feebly from her stern. When the Essex had approached within 400 yards, Lt. Stevens, of the ram, set her on fire and abandoned her, escaping with his crew to the shore. The Essex continued to shell her for an hour; when her magazine was fired and she blew up. cure ice for our sick sailors, and was On Gen. Butler's preparations having rendered the retaking of New Orleans hopeless, the meditated attack on it was abandoned, and the forces collected for that purpose transferred to other service. An incursion into the rich district known as Lafourche, lying south-west of New Orleans, between that city and the Gulf, was thereupon projected, and Generallate Lieut.-Weitzel, was sent with a brigade of infantry and the requisite artillery and cavalry, to rëestablish there the authority of the Union. This was a section of great wealth: its industry being devoted mainly to the production of sugar from cane, its population more than half slaves; and its Whites, being entirely slaveholders and their dependents, had ere this been brought to at least a semblance of unanimity in support of the Rebel cause; but their military strength, always moderate, had in good part been drafted away for service elsewhere; so that Gen. Weitzel, with little difficulty and great expedition, made himself master of the entire region," after two or three collisions, in which he sustained little loss. But the wealthy Whites generally fled from their homes at his approach; while the negroes, joyfully hailing him as their liberator, Sept. 7. Commander Porter, having remained at Baton Rouge until it was evacuated by our troops-who were concentrated to repel a threatened attack on New Orleans-returned up the river" to reconnoiter Rebel batteries that were said to be in progress at Port Hudson. Ascending thence to coal at Bayou Sara, his boat's crew was there fired upon by guerrillas, whereupon some buildings were burned in retaliation; and, the firing being repeated a few days afterward, the remaining structures were in like manner destroyed. A boat's crew from the Essex was sent ashore, some days later, at Natchez, to proAugust 23. 87 38 39 Oct. 22-29. BUTLER SUPERSEDED BY BANKS. 105 speedily filled his camps with crowds | city, there were not a hundred persons in Louisiana outside of our army and fleet who would have dared take the oath, however willing to do so. Toward the end of November, Gen. Butler's spies brought him information from the nearest Rebel camps that he had been superseded in his command, and that Gen. N. P. Banks either was or soon would be on his way to relieve him. Some days before information of the purposed change reached our side, Secessionists in New Orleans were offering to bet a hundred to ten that Gen. Butler would be recalled before New Year's. The fact was known to Jefferson Davis before it was to Gen. Bankslong before it was communicated from Washington to Gen. Butler. It is probable that the French Minister, whose Government had not been pleased with Gen. Butler's management in New Orleans, was the immediate source of Rebel assurance on this point. Gen. Banks's assignment to the Department of the Gulf is dated November 9th, but was not made known to him till some weeks afterward. of men, women, and children, destitute of food, and fearing to go outside of his lines lest they should be reduced again to Slavery. Gen. Butler, after anxious consideration, felt obliged to subject the whole district to sequestration, in order to secure the cutting and grinding of the cane, so as to save the remaining inhabitants from death by famine. Maj. Bell, Lt.-Col. Kinsman, and Capt. Fuller, were appointed a commission, who were to take charge of all personal property, and either apply it to the use of the army or transport it to New Orleans and there sell it to the highest bidders, dispensing to loyal citizens and neutral foreigners their just share of the proceeds, and applying the residue to the uses of the Federal service in this military department. Thus were the negroes employed, paid, and subsisted, the crops saved, and a large sum turned over to the support of our armies, while the number of White loyalists in Lafourche was rapidly and largely increased. Two Congressional districts having thus been recovered, Messrs. Benjamin F. Flanders and Gen. Banks reached New Orleans Michael Hahn were elected" there- Dec. 14th, was received with every from to the Federal House of Repre- honor, and on the 16th formally assentatives: the former receiving 2,370 sumed the high trust to which he votes, to 173 for others, and the lat- had been appointed. On the 23d, ter 2,581, which was 144 more than Gen. Butler took personal leave of were cast against him. The voting his many friends, and next day issued was confined to electors under the his farewell address to the people of laws of Louisiana who had taken New Orleans; leaving for New York, the Federal oath of allegiance since via Havana, by that day's boat. He the repossession of New Orleans; was not then aware that he had been and the aggregate poll in that city honored, the day previous, by a prooutnumbered, it was stated, its total clamation from Jefferson Davis, devote for Secession by about 1,000. claring him a felon, outlaw, and When Gen. Butler first reached that common enemy of mankind, and *Early in December. directing any Confederate officer who | which he had faithfully applied to should capture him to hang him the public service. He had, of course, without trial immediately; and fur-made himself very unpopular with ther directing that all commissioned the wealthy Rebels, whom he had, in officers in his command be regarded as robbers and criminals, deserving death; and each of them, whenever captured, reserved for execution." Mr. Richard Yeadon, of Charleston, S. C., backed this proclamation by an offer12 of $10,000 reward, payable in Confederate currency, for the capture and delivery of the said Benjamin F. Butler, dead or alive, to any proper Confederate authority. proportion to their several volunteer contributions of money in aid of the Rebel cause, assessed for the support of the New Orleans poor, deprived of employment by the war; and he was especially detested by that large body of influential foreigners who, having freely devoted their efforts and their means to the support of the Rebellion, were neither regarded nor treated by him as though they had been honestly neutral in the contest. In his farewell address to the people of New Orleans, he forcibly says: "I saw that this Rebellion was a war of of the rich against the poor; a war of the the aristocrats against the middling menland-owner against the laborer; that it was a struggle for the retention of power in the hands of the few against the many; and I found no conclusion to it, save in the sub Gen. Butler had taken 13,700 soldiers from the North for the capture of New Orleans. He had received no rëenforcements since; and he now turned over to his successor 17,800 drilled and disciplined men, including three regiments and two batteries of negroes. He sent home to the treasury the sum of $345,000; ex-jugation of the few and the disenthrallment pended $525,000 in feeding the poor of New Orleans; and turned over about $200,000 to the Commissary and Quartermaster of his successor. He had collected, by taxation, assess-ings of the humble and loyal, under the roof ments, fines, forfeitures, and confiscations, an aggregate of $1,088,000, 41 Mr. Davis's proclamation recites the hanging of Mumford; the neglect of our Government to explain or disavow that act; the imprisonment of non-combatants; Butler's woman order aforesaid; his sequestration of estates in western Louisiana; and the inciting to insurrection and arming of slaves on our side, as his justifications for proclaiming "First. That all commissioned officers in the command of said Benjamin F. Butler be declared not entitled to be considered as soldiers engaged in honorable warfare, but as robbers and criminals, deserving death; and that they and each of them be, whenever captured, reserved for execution. "Second. That the private soldiers and noncommissioned officers in the army of said Butler be considered as only the instruments used for the commission of crimes perpetrated by his or tion in taking the substance of the wealthy, of the many. I, therefore, felt no hesita who had caused the war, to feed the inno cent poor, who had suffered by the war. And I shall now leave you with the proud consciousness that I carry with me the bless of the cottage and in the cabin of the slave; and so am quite content to incur the sneers of the salon or the curses of the rich.” ders, and not as free agents; that they, therefore, be treated, when captured as prisoners of war, with kindness and humanity, and be sent home on the usual parole that they will in no manner aid or serve the United States in any capacity during the continuance of this war, unless duly exchanged. "Third. That all negro slaves captured in arms be at once delivered over to the executive authorities of the respective States to which they belong, to be dealt with according to the laws of said States. "Fourth. That the like orders be executed in all cases with respect to all commissioned officers of the United States, when found serving in company with said slaves in insurrection against the authorities of the different States of this Confederacy. [Signed and sealed at Richmond, Dec. 23, 1862.] "JEFFERSON DAVIS." 42 Jan. 1, 1863. MCCLELLAN IN WASHINGTON. 107 VI. VIRGINIA-MOCLELLAN'S ADVANCE. THE rooted inaction of the Army | immediate and especial command of of the Potomac,' with the Baltimore this grand army of 200,000 men, apand Ohio Railroad obstructed and parently fatigued by the necessity of broken up on its right, and the navi- framing excuse after excuse for its gation of the Potomac precluded' by inaction,' though the most of it reRebel batteries on its left, was stub-mained under tents, exposed to the bornly maintained, in spite of fit- vicissitudes of a Winter whichful, delusive promises of movement, though it had been remarkably dry throughout the Winter of 1861-2. and fine, with the roads in admirable Gen. McClellan, who, from his com- condition, until Christmas-became fortable house in Washington, issued stormy and inhospitable soon afterorders to all the military forces of ward; so that the since famous Stoneour country, retained likewise the wall Jackson, who, for eminent ser1See Vol. I., p. 627–9. 2 Capt. Fox, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, as early as July 1st, 1861, notified the War Department that the Potomac would " soon be closed by the batteries of the Rebels;" and Secretary Welles reiterated the warning on the 20th of August. "In October, 1861, the Navy Department again urged the matter upon the consideration of the War Department. *** representing that the question was simply: Would the Army cooperate with the Navy in securing the unobstructed navigation of the Potomac, or, by withholding that cooperation at that time, permit so important a channel of communication to be closed ?" McClellan at last agreed to spare 4,000 men for the cooperative measure; but, when Capt. (The foregoing note is condensed from the first Report of the Joint Committee of Congress on the Conduct of the War.) 3 Gen. John G. Barnard, Chief of Engineers to the Army of the Potomac, in a report to Gen. McClellan at the close of the Peninsula campaign, says: "One of the prominent among the causes of ultimate failure was the inaction of eight months, from August, 1861, to April, 1862. More than any other wars, Rebellion demands rapid measures. In November, 1861, the Army of the Potomac, if not fully supplied with all the 'materiel,' was yet about as complete in numbers, discipline, and organization as it ever became. For four months, the great marine avenue to the capital of the nation was blockaded, and that capital kept in a partial state of siege, by a Craven assembled his flotilla at the appointed greatly inferior enemy, in face of a movable army of 150,000 men. out forebodings of the mischief it would do. time and place, the troops were not on hand. The General's excuse was that his engineers 'In the Winter of 1861 and 1862, Norfolk were of the opinion that so large a body of could and should have been taken. The navy troops could not be landed at Matthias Point- demanded it, the country demanded it, and the means were ample. By its capture, the career the place agreed upon. Upon Capt. Fox's asof the Merrimac, which proved so disastrous to surance that the Navy Department would atour subsequent operations, would have been tend to the landing of the troops, he (McClellan) | prevented. The preparation of this vessel was agreed that they should be sent on the follow-known, and the Navy Department was not withing night. Again the flotilla was in readiness; again the troops were missing. No troops were then, nor ever, sent down for that purpose; the only reason elicited from McClellan being that he feared it might bring on a general engagement. Capt. Craven indignantly threw up his command on the Potomac, and applied to be sent to sea-not wishing to lose his own reputation, on account of non-cöoperation on the part of the army. "Though delay might mature more comprehensive plans and promise greater results, it is not the first case in which it has been shown that successful war involves something more than abstract military principles. The true policy was to seize the first practicable moment to satisfy the perhaps unreasonable but natural longing of an impatient nation for results to justify its lavish confidence, and to take advantage of an undivided command and untrammeled liberty of action while they were possessed." 4 | 8 vices in the battle of Bull Run, had, and full responsibilities for the prompt in September, been promoted to a execution of this order." Four days Major-Generalship, and assigned to later, a 'Special War Order No. 1' command at Winchester, and who was likewise issued to Gen. McClelhad led a strong force westward, lan, commanding him, on or before expecting to surprise and capture our the 22d prox. aforesaid, to impel “all detachments holding Bath and Rom- the disposable force of the Army of ney, though he succeeded in taking the Potomac," "for the immediate both those places, driving out their object of seizing and occupying a garrisons, capturing a few prisoners, point upon the railroad south-westand destroying at Romney very con- ward of what is known as Manassas siderable supplies, yet his unsheltered Junction." Though these orders are troops suffered so severely from storm signed Abraham Lincoln, they doubtand frost, while so many of his horses less received their initial impulse from were disabled by falling on the icy the new Secretary of War, who had roads, that his losses probably ex- already urged Gen. McClellan to take ceeded the damage inflicted on us; immediate steps to "secure the reand his blow was fairly countered by opening of the Baltimore and Ohio Gen. F. W. Lander, who led 4,000 Railroad, and free the banks of the men southward from the Potomac," lower Potomac from the Rebel batand, bridging the Great Cacapon in teries which annoyed passing vesthe night, made a dash at Blooming sels." Gen. M. had been previously Gap, which he surprised, killing 13 urged by the President to organize and capturing 75 Rebels, including his army into four or five distinct 17 officers, with a loss of 2 men and corps, under Generals of his own 6 horses. choice; which he had declined, and still declined, to do; alleging that he wished first to test his officers in active service as division commanders, so that he "might be able to decide from actual trial who were best fitted to exercise those important commands." At length, the President issued 'General War Order No. 2,' directing the organization of the Army of the Potomac into four corps, to be commanded by Gens. McDowell, Sumner, Heintzelman, and Keyes respectively, beside the forces to be left for the defense of Washington under Brig.-Gen. James S. Wadsworth, who should also be Military Governor of the District of Columbia, and a fifth, composed of the forces on the upper Potomac, to 6 Gen. Simon Cameron had been succeeded by Hon. Edwin M. Stanton-an eminent lawyer, without pretensions to military knowledge, and of limited experience in public affairs, but evincing a rough energy and zeal for decisive efforts, which the country hailed as of auspicious augury. Two weeks later,' a War Order was issued by the President, commanding a general advance upon the enemy from every quarter on the 22d of February proximo, and declaring that "the Secretaries of War and of the Navy, with all their subordinates, and the General-in-Chief, with all other commanders and subordinates of land and naval forces, will severally be held to their strict 4 * Jan. 1, 1862. 5 Feb. 13. * • March 8. |