This effective substitute for the usual address issued by political meetings of that day, was adopted and nothing resembling a platform issued from this convention.141 The final business was the establishment of an effective campaign organization. This was done by authorizing each delegation to appoint a general correspondence committee for its State, and by the designation by the chairman of the convention of a general central committee to reside in the District of Columbia. Following this the usual votes of thanks to the meeting's officers were passed, and after resolving to wait upon Charles Carroll of Carrollton immediately thereafter, the convention adjourned sine die.142 One other transaction deserves notice. Sumner of New Hampshire, in his remarks at the initial session of the convention, in stating the motives which led his state legislature to call for a national convention, said that prominent among them was the desire to establish thus a precedent for future elections as a means of securing party harmony in making nominations.143 Shortly before the convention adjourned, Simon Cameron of Pennsylvania offered a resolution to secure in future the convention mode of nominating candidates: "Resolved, That it is expedient and it is hereby recommended that such selections should be made by national conventions, composed of delegates to be selected by the democratic party of each state equal in number to the representatives of such state in . . . Congress . . . to assemble in the city of Baltimore the third Monday in May in every fourth year hereafter." Some discussion arose and the resolution was withdrawn. The importance of the above speech and resolution lies in the fact that both clearly indicate, as was the case with the Antimasons, a recognition by the party of the need for larger, more far-reaching and better coordinated party machinery to effect presidential "144 nominations and to promote the ticket's success. They further indicate a consciousness that the national nominating convention was best fitted to meet this need. Although Cameron withdrew his resolution, it is interesting to note that down to 1852, every subsequent Democratic convention was held in Baltimore, every one met in the presidential year in the month of May, and, excepting that of 1840, every one met on the third Monday of that month.145 The Democratic convention was in many respects the most important of the three held during this campaign, even though its object was only a vice-presidential nomination. In the first place it was larger than either of the others, both numerically and in the number of States represented. In the second place, representing a well-organized party, it sprang from a more definite party need, namely, the necessity for a harmonious selection from several vice-presidential aspirants, and was therefore less of an electioneering, propagandic measure than either of the others; hence it was most nearly of them all the true prototype of the nominating convention of today. 145 Stanwood, History of Presidential Elections, pp. 115, 129, 145, 165, 180. CHAPTER V THE INJECTION OF THE BANK INTO THE CAMPAIGN From a region where the banks were few, their operations of the "wildcat " variety, their paper money of dubious value, and their failures frequent, Andrew Jackson voiced his opinion of them when he said "I hate ragg, tagg banks and empty pockets." From this it would appear that he regarded the paper money of banks and a deflated purse as cause and effect respectively, and specie as the only safe medium of exchange. Moreover he had been of this opinion ever since he had read of the South Sea Bubble. More specific than this, he had opposed the founding of a branch of the United States Bank at Nashville, 1817-1818,3 had expressed hostility to it in 1827, and had been near introducing a passage against the parent Bank in his inaugural address." Thus Jackson entered the presidency with a definite bias against the Bank as a financial institution. He further regarded it as unauthorized by the Constitution," and at once began considering a substitute for it, and as early as May 2, 1829, wrote to Felix Grundy asking his views on the subject." About the same time Nicholas Biddle, the able and autocratic president of the Bank, was desirous of winning Jackson's approval for that institution. He hoped to attain this 1 Jackson to A. J. Donelson, August 19, 1820, Donelson MSS. 2 Memorandum in Biddle's hand of a conversation with Jackson in November, 1829, Nicholas Biddle MSS. 3 Bassett, Life of Andrew Jackson, vol. ii, p. 589; Catterall, The Second Bank of the United States, p. 183. Hamilton, Reminiscences, p. 69. Bassett, Life of Jackson, vol. ii, pp. 429-430; Catterall, p. 183. Biddle's memorandum of conversation with Jackson, November, 1829, Biddle MSS. 7 Felix Grundy to Jackson, May 22, 1829, Jackson MSS. object by offers to hand over to the Jacksonians the control of the Nashville branch and by convincing the President of the Bank's utility to the government in Jackson's pet policy, the payment of the last of the national debt by March 4, 1833.8 The institution of which Jackson disapproved had been chartered in 1816, primarily for the purpose of extricating the country from the financial debacle resulting from the War of 1812. After six years of struggle it came under Biddle's direction. Thanks to his able financial policy and careful attention to its affairs, the Bank soon thereafter began to prosper and by 1829 was entirely sound and flourishing, with its stock worth 122.9 Of its capital of $35,000,000, one-fifth was subscribed by the United States, which likewise appointed one-fifth of the governing board of twenty-five directors, the remainder being chosen by the private stockholders. It was authorized by its charter to issue notes without restriction, provided it could redeem them in specie when presented or else pay interest on them at 12 per cent. These notes were receivable for government dues, a privilege accorded the notes of state banks only when they were redeemed in specie. In addition, the Bank enjoyed the use of the government's deposits without paying interest, but the Secretary of the Treasury could remove these at will provided he at once stated to Congress the reasons for so doing. Another power of great importance enabled the parent Bank at Philadelphia to establish branch offices of discount and deposit wherever it saw favorable openings. These branches were to be administered and governed by officers chosen by the central board of directors.10 In 1829 the Bank had twenty-four branches, one or more 8 Thomas Cadwalader to Jackson, October 15, 1828, Jackson MSS.; William B. Lewis to Biddle, June 28, 1829, Biddle MSS.; Biddle to Asbury Dickins, May 19, 1829, Biddle's Letter Book among Biddle MSS. Niles' Register, vol. xxxvii, p. 359. 10 Charter in United States Statutes at Large, vol. iii, pp. 266–277. in every State except Delaware, Indiana and Illinois.11 This widespread, highly centralized banking system was all-powerful in the country's banking operations. Its size and charter privileges gave it power over all state banks, no combination. of which could hope to combat it successfully. By presenting for payment the quantities of state bank notes it received, it forced the latter to maintain reserves of coin adequate to support their note issues, and in this lay its chief advantage to the country. At the close of 1829, more than one-fourth of its $28,000,000 of privately owned stock was in the hands of three hundred and eighty-three foreigners who had little. influence in determining its policy. Of the remaining $20,800,000 in privately owned shares, over $16,000,000, or more than half the total amount of stock not owned by the United States government, was in the hands of a group of moneyed individuals, only eight hundred and twenty-two in number. None of these held less than $5,000 worth of stock, and more than half of them held $10,000 worth or more per capita. This group, if it so chose, had sufficient votes to control a decided majority of the twenty directors elected by the private stock holders. The remaining 2,780 American private stock holders held only a little more than $3,000,000 worth of shares.12 This centralization of financial power in the hands of a few, the size and strength of the Bank, its authority to extend its branches wherever it saw opportunity, its power to issue and control notes proportionate to the needs of the country's growing business, all together rendered it strongly monopolistic in character, beneficial to the nation, it is true, but with dangerous potentialities in the direction of centralization at local and state expense. Owing to its power over their note issues, if for no other reason, the Bank was always disliked by the local state in 11 Catterall, Second Bank, p. 376. 12 These facts are drawn from statement in Biddle's Letter Book, December 26, 1829. |
