means that I had assailed the character of the state, her honor, or patriotism, that I had reflected on her history or her conduct, he had not the slightest ground for any such assumption. I did not even refer, I think, in my observations, to any collection of individuals. I said nothing of the recent conventions. I spoke in the most guarded and careful manner, and only expressed my regret for the publication of opinions which I presumed the honorable

In this, it seems, I was mistaken.

ther. Federalist or not, he may, if he choose, claim to belong to the favored stock, and his claim will be allowed. He may carry back his pretensions just as far as the honorable gentleman himself; nay, he may make himself out the honorable gentleman's cousin, and prove satisfactorily that he is descended from the same political great-grandfather. All this is allowable. We all know a process, sir, by which the whole Essex Junto could, in one hour be all washed white from their ancient federal-member disapproved as much as myself. ism, and come out every one of them, an original democrat, dyed in the wool! Some of them have actually undergone the operation, and they say it is quite easy. The only inconvenience it occasions, as they tell us, is a slight tendency of the blood to the face, a soft suffusion, which, however, is very transient, since nothing is said calculated to deepen the red on the cheek, but a prudent silence observed in regard to all the past. Indeed, sir, some smiles of approbation have been bestowed, and some crumbs of comfort have fallen, not a thousand miles from the door of the Hartford Convention itself. And if the author of the ordinance of 1787 possessed the other requisite qualifications, there is no knowing, notwithstanding his federalism, to what heights of favor he might not yet attain.

I do not remember that the gentleman has disclaimed any sentiment, or any opinion, of a supposed anti-Union tendency, which on all or any of the recent occasions has been expressed. The whole drift of his speech has been rather to prove, that, in divers times and manners, sentiments equally liable to objection have been promulgated in New England. And one would suppose that his object, in this reference to Massachusetts, was to find a precedent to justify proceedings in the south, were it not for the reproach and contumely with which he labors, all along, to load his precedents.

By way of defending South Carolina from what he chooses to think an attack on her, he first quotes the example of MassaMr. President, in carrying his warfare, chusetts, and then denounces that example, such as it was, into New England, the in good set terms. This twofold purpose, honorable gentleman all along professes to not very consistent with itself, one would be acting on the defensive. He desires to con- think, was exhibited more than once in the sider me as having assailed South Caro- course of his speech. He referred, for inlina. and insists that he comes forth only stance, to the Hartford Convention. Did as her champion, and in her defence. Sir, he do this for authority, or for a topic of I do not admit that I made any attack what- reproach? Apparently for both; for he ever on South Carolina. Nothing like it. told us that he should find no fault with The honorable member, in his first speech, the mere fact of holding such a convenexpressed opinions, in regard to revenue, tion, and considering and discussing such and some other topics, which I heard both questions as he supposes were then and with pain and surprise. I told the gentle- there discussed; but what rendered it obman that I was aware that such sentiments noxious was the time it was holden, and the were entertained OUT of the government, circumstances of the country then existing. but had not expected to find them advanced We were in a war, he said, and the counin it; that I knew there were persons in try needed all our aid; the hand of govthe south who speak of our Union with in- ernment required to be strengthened, not difference, or doubt, taking pains to mag-weakened; and patriotism should have nify its evils, and to say nothing of its benefits; that the honorable member himself, I was sure, could never be one of these; and I regretted the expression of such opinions as he had avowed, because I Now, sir, I go much farther, on this thought their obvious tendency was to en-point, than the honorable member. Supcourage feelings of disrespect to the Union, posing, as the gentleman seems to, that the and to weaken its connection. This, sir, is Hartford Convention assembled for any the sum and substance of all I said on the such purpose as breaking up the Union, subject. And this constitutes the attack because they thought unconstitutional laws which called on the chivalry of the gentle- had been passed, or to concert on that subman, in his opinion, to harry us with such ject, or to calculate the value of the Union; a forage among the party pamphlets and supposing this to be their purpose, or any party proceedings of Massachusetts. If he part of it, then I say the meeting itself means that I spoke with dissatisfaction or was disloyal, and obnoxious to censure, disrespect of the ebullitions of individuals whether held in time of peace, or time of in South Carolina, it is true. But, if he war, or under whatever circumstances.

postponed such proceedings to another day. The thing itself, then, is a precedent; the time and manner of it, only, subject of censure.

The material matter is the object. Is dissolution the object? If it be, external circumstances may make it a more or less aggravated case, but cannot affect the principle. I do not hold, therefore, that the Hartford Convention was pardonable, even to the extent of the gentleman's admission, if its objects were really such as have been imputed to it. Sir, there never was a time, under any degree of excitement, in which the Hartford Convention, or any other convention, could maintain itself one moment in New England, if assembled for any such purpose as the gentleman says would have been an allowable purpose. To hold conventions to decide questions of constitutional law! to try the validity of statutes, by votes in a convention! Sir, the Hartford Convention, I presume, would not desire that the honorable gentleman should be their defender or advocate, if he puts their case upon such untenable and extravagant grounds.

Then, sir, the gentleman has no fault to find with these recently-promulgated South Carolina opinions. And, certainly, he need have none; for his own sentiments, as now advanced, and advanced on reflection, as far as I have been able to comprehend them, go the full length of all these opinions. I propose, sir, to say something on these, and to consider how far they are just and constitutional. Before doing that, however, let me observe, that the eulogium pronounced on the character of the state of South Carolina, by the honorable gentleman, for her revolutionary and other merits, meets my hearty concurrence. I shall not acknowledge that the honorable member goes before me in regard for whatever of distinguished talent or distinguished character South Carolina has produced. I claim part of the honor, I partake in the pride, of her great names. I claim them for countrymen, one and all. The Laurenses, the Rutledges, the Pinckneys, the Sumpters, the Marions-Americans all-whose fame is no more to be hemmed in by state lines than their talents and their patriotism were capable of being circumscribed within the same narrow limits. In their day and generation, they served and honored the country, and the whole country; and their renown is of the treasures of the whole country. Him whose honored name the gentleman himself bears-does he suppose me less capable of gratitude for his patriotism, or sympathy for his sufferings, than if his eyes had first opened upon the light in Massachusetts instead of South Carolina? Sir, does he suppose it is in his power to exhibit a Carolina name so bright as to produce envy in my bosom? No, sir, increased gratification and delight, rather.

Sir, I thank God that if I am gifted with little of the spirit which is said to be able

[BOOK III.

to raise mortals to the skies, I have yet none, as I trust, of that other spirit, which would drag angels down. When I shall be found, sir, in my place here in the Senate, or elsewhere, to sneer at public merit, because it happened to spring up beyond the little limits of my own state, or neighborhood; when I refuse, for any such cause, or for any cause, the homage due to American talent, to elevated patriotism, to sincere devotion to liberty and the country; or if I see an uncommon endowment of Heaven, if I see extraordinary capacity and virtue in any son of the south, and if, moved by local prejudice, or gangrened by state jealousy, I get up here to abate the tithe of a hair from his just character and just fame,-may my tongue cleave to the roof of my mouth! Sir, let me recur to pleasing recollections; let me indulge in refreshing remembrance of the past; let me remind you that in early times no states cherished greater harmony, both of principle and feeling, than Massachusetts and South Carolina. Would to God that harmony might again return. Shoulder to shoulder they went through the revolution; hand in hand they stood round the administration of Washington, and felt his own great arm lean on them for support. Unkind feeling, if it exist, alienation, and distrust are the growth, unnatural to such soils, of false principles since sown. They are weeds, the seeds of which that same great arm never scattered.

Mr. President, I shall enter on no encomium upon Massachusetts-she needs none. There she is-behold her, and judge for yourselves. There is her history-the world knows it by heart. The past, at least, is secure. There is Boston, and Concord, and Lexington, and Bunker Hill; and there they will remain forever. The bones of her sons, fallen in the great struggle for independence, now lie mingled with the soil of every state from New England to Georgia; and there they will lie forever. And, sir, where American liberty raised its first voice, and where its youth was nurtured and sustained, there it still lives, in the strength of its manhood, and full of its original spirit. If discord and disunion shall wound it; if folly and madness, if uneasiness under salutary and necessary restraint, shall succeed to separate it from that Union by which alone its existence is made sure, it will stand, in the end, by the side of that cradle in which its infancy was rocked; it will stretch forth its arm, with whatever vigor it may still retain, over the friends who gather around it; and it will fall at last, if fall it must, amidst the proudest monuments of its glory, and on the very spot of its origin.

There yet remains to be performed, Mr. President, by far the most grave and important duty; which I feel to be devolved

the right of nullifying acts of Congress by acts of state legislation, is more than I know, and what I shall be slow to believe.

on me by this occasion. It is to state, and | direct state interference, at state discretion, to defend, what I conceive to be the true principles of the constitution under which we are here assembled. I might well have desired that so weighty a task should have fallen into other and abler hands. I could have wished that it should have been executed by those whose character and experience give weight and influence to their opinions, such as cannot possibly belong to mine. But, sir, I have met the occasion, not sought it; and I shall proceed to state my own sentiments, without challenging for them any particular regard, with studied plainness and as much precision as possible.

I understand the honorable gentleman from South Carolina to maintain that it is a right of the state legislatures to interfere, whenever in their judgment, this government transcends its constitutional limits, and to arrest the operation of its laws.

I understand him to maintain this right as a right existing under the constitution, not as a right to overthrow it, on the ground of extreme necessity, such as would justify violent revolution.

That there are individuals, besides the honorable gentleman, who do maintain these opinions, is quite certain. I recollect the recent expression of a sentiment which circumstances attending its utterance and publication justify us in supposing was not unpremeditated "The sovereignty of the state; never to be controlled, construed, or decided on, but by her own feelings of honorable justice."

[Mr. HAYNE here rose, and said, that for the purpose of being clearly understood, he would state that his proposition was in the words of the Virginia resolution, as follows:—

That this Assembly doth explicitly and peremptorily declare, that it views the powers of the federal government, as resulting from the compact, to which the states are parties, as limited by the plain sense and intention of the instrument con. stituting that compact, as no further valid than they are authorized by the grants I understand him to maintain an author- enumerated in that compact; and that, in ity, on the part of the states, thus to inter-case of a deliberate, palpable, and dangerfere for the purpose of correcting the ex-ous exercise of other powers not granted ercise of power by the general government, by the same compact, the states who are of checking it, and of compelling it to conform to their opinion of the extent of its power.

I understand him to maintain that the ultimate power of judging of the constitutional extent of its own authority is not lodged exclusively in the general government or any branch of it; but that, on the contrary, the states may lawfully decide for themselves, and each state for itself, whether, in a given case, the act of the general government transcends its power.

I understand him to insist that, if the exigency of the case, in the opinion of any state government, require it, such state government may, by its own sovereign authority, annul an act of the general government which it deems plainly and palpably unconstitutional.

parties thereto have the right and are in duty bound, to interpose for arresting the progress of the evil, and for maintaining, within their respective limits, the authorities, rights, and liberties pertaining to them."

Mr. WEBSTER resumed:

·

I am quite aware, Mr. President, of the existence of the resolution which the gentleman read, and has now repeated, and that he relies on it as his authority. I know the source, too, from which it is understood to have proceeded. I need not say, that I have much respect for the constitutional opinions of Mr. Madison; they would weigh greatly with me, always. But, before the authority of his opinion be vouched for the gentleman's proposition, it will be proper to consider what is the fair This is the sum of what I understand interpretation of that resolution, to which from him to be the South Carolina doc- Mr. Madison is understood to have given trine. I propose to consider it, and to his sanction. As the gentleman construes compare it with the constitution. Allow it, it is an authority for him. Possibly he me to say, as a preliminary remark, that I may not have adopted the right construc call this the South Carolina doctrine, only tion. That resolution declares, that in the because the gentleman himself has so de- case of the dangerous exercise of powers not nominated it. I do not feel at liberty to granted by the general government, the states say that South Carolina, as a state, has ever may interpose to arrest the progress of the advanced these sentiments. I hope she has evil. But how interpose? and what does not, and never may. That a great majority this declaration purport? Does it mean of her people are opposed to the tariff laws no more than that there may be extreme is doubtless true. That a majority, some- cases in which the people, in any mode of what less than that just mentioned, consci- assembling, may resist usurpation, and entiously believe these laws unconstitu- relieve themselves from a tyrannical gov tional, may probably be also true. But ernment? No one will deny this. Such that any majority holds to the right of resistance is not only acknowledged to be

just in America, but in England also. | is to say, upon the ground of revolution. Blackstone admits as much, in the theory I admit that there is no ultimate violent and practice, too, of the English constitu- remedy, above the constitution, and defition. We, sir, who oppose the Carolina ance of the constitution, which may be doctrine, do not deny that the people may, resorted to, when a revolution is to be jusif they choose, throw off any government, tified. But I do not admit that under the when it becomes oppressive and intolerable, constitution, and in conformity with it, and erect a better in its stead. We all there is any mode in which a state governknow that civil institutions are established ment, as a member of the Union can for the public benefit, and that, when they interfere and stop the progress of the gencease to answer the ends of their existence eral government, by force of her own laws, they may be changed. under any circumstances whatever.

But I do not understand the doctrine now This leads us to inquire into the origin contended for to be that which, for the sake of this government, and the source of its of distinctness, we may call the right of power. Whose agent is it? Is it the revolution. I understand the gentleman to creature of the state legislatures, or the maintain, that without revolution, without creature of the people? If the government civil commotion, without rebellion, a rem- of the United States be the agent of the edy for supposed abuse and transgression state governments, then they may control of the powers of the general government it, provided they can agree in the manner lies in a direct appeal to the interference of controlling it; if it is the agent of the of the state governments. [Mr. HAYNE here rose: He did not contend, he said, for the mere right of revolution, but for the right of constitutional resistance. What he maintained was, that, in case of a plain, palpable violation of the constitution by the general government, a state may interpose; and that this interposition is constitutional.]

Mr. WEBSTER resumed:

people, then the people alone can control it, restrain it, modify or reform it. It is observable enough, that the doctrine for which the honorable gentleman contends leads him to the necessity of maintaining, not only that this general government is the creature of the states, but that it is the creature of each of the states severally; so that each may assert the power, for itself, of determining whether it acts within the So, sir, I understood the gentleman, and limits of its authority. It is the servant am happy to find that I did not misunder- of four and twenty masters, of different stand him. What he contends for is, that wills and different purposes; and yet bound it is constitutional to interrupt the admin- to obey all. This absurdity (for it seems istration of the constitution itself, in the no less) arises from a misconception as to hands of those who are chosen and sworn the origin of this government, and its true to administer it, by the direct interference, character. It is, sir, the people's constituin form of law, of the states, in virtue of tion, the people's government; made for their sovereign capacity. The inherent the people; made by the people; and right in the people to reform their government I do not deny; and that they have another right, and that is, to resist unconstitutional laws without overturning the government. It is no doctrine of mine, that unconstitutional laws bind the people. The great question is, Whose prerogative is it to decide on the constitutionality or unconstitutionality of the laws? On that the main debate hinges. The proposition that, in the case of a supposed violation of the constitution by Congress, the states have a constitutional right to interfere, and annul the law of Congress, is the proposition of the gentleman; I do not admit it. If the gentleman had intended no more than to assert the right of revolution for justifiable cause, he would have said only what all agree to. But I cannot conceive that there can be a middle course between submission to the laws, when regularly pronounced constitutional, on the one hand, and open resistance, which is revolution or rebellion, on the other. I say the right of a state to annul a law of Congress cannot be maintained but on the ground of the unalienable right of man to resist oppression; that

answerable to the people. The people of the United States have declared that this constitution shall be the supreme law. We must either admit the proposition, or dispute their authority. The states are unquestionably sovereign, so far as their sovereignty is not affected by this supreme law. The state legislatures, as political bodies, however sovereign, are yet not sovereign over the people. So far as the people have given power to the general government, so far the grant is unquestionably good, and the government holds of the people, and not of the state governments. We are all agents of the same supreme power, the people. The general government and the state governments derive their authority from the same source. Neither can, in relation to the other, be called primary; though one is definite and restricted, and the other general and residuary.

The national government possesses those powers which it can be shown the people have conferred on it, and no more. All the rest belongs to the state governments, or to the people themselves. So far as the people have restrained state sovereignty

by the expression of their will, in the con- | injury of the Calcutta cotton trade. Obstitution of the United States, so far, it serve, again, that all the qualifications are must be admitted, state sovereignty is here rehearsed, and charged upon the tariff, effectually controlled. I do not contend which are necessary to bring the case within that it is, or ought to be, controlled further, the gentleman's proposition. The tariff is The sentiment to which I have referred a usurpation; it is a dangerous usurpation; propounds that state sovereignty is only it is a palpable usurpation; it is a deto be controlled by its own" feelings of liberate usurpation. It is such a usurpajustice;" that is to say, it is not to be con- tion as calls upon the states to exercise trolled at all; for one who is to follow his their right of interference. Here is a case, feelings, is under no legal control. Now, then, within the gentleman's principles, however men may think this ought to be, and all his qualifications of his principles. the fact is, that the people of the United It is a case for action. The constitution is States have chosen to impose control on plainly, dangerously, palpably, and destate sovereignties. The constitution has liberately violated; and the states must ordered the matter differently from what interpose their own authority to arrest the this opinion announces. To make war, for law. Let us suppose the state of South instance, is an exercise of sovereignty; but Carolina to express this same opinion, by the constitution declares that no state shall the voice of her legislature. That would make war. To coin money is another ex-be very imposing; but what then? Is the ercise of sovereign power; but no state is at liberty to coin money. Again: the constitution says, that no sovereign state shall be so sovereign as to make a treaty. These prohibitions, it must be confessed, are a control on the state sovereignty of South Carolina, as well as of the other states, which does not arise "from feelings of honorable justice." Such an opinion, therefore, is in defiance of the plainest provisions of the constitution.

There are other proceedings of public bodies which have already been alluded to, and to which I refer again for the purpose of ascertaining more fully what is the length and breadth of that doctrine, denominated the Carolina doctrine, which the honorable member has now stood up on this floor to maintain.

In one of them I find it resolved that "the tariff of 1828, and every other tariff designed to promote one branch of industry at the expense of others, is contrary to the meaning and intention of the federal compact; and as such a dangerous, palpable, and deliberate usurpation of power, by a determined majority, wielding the general government beyond the limits of its delegated powers, as calls upon the states which compose the suffering minority, in their sovereign capacity, to exercise the powers which, as sovereigns, necessarily devolve upon them, when their compact is violated."

Observe, sir, that this resolution holds the tariff of 1828, and every other tariff, designed to promote one branch of industry at the expense of another, to be such a dangerous, palpable, and deliberate usurpation of power, as calls upon the states, in their sovereign capacity, to interfere, by their own power. This denunciation, Mr. President, you will please to observe, includes our old tariff of 1816, as well as all others; because that was established to promote the interest of the manufacturers of cotton, to the manifest and admitted

voice of one state conclusive? It so happens that, at the very moment when South Carolina resolves that the tariff laws are unconstitutional, Pennsylvania and Kentucky resolve exactly the reverse. They hold those laws to be both highly proper and strictly constitutional. And now, sir, how does the honorable member propose to deal with this case? How does he get out of this difficulty, upon any principle of his? His construction gets us into it; how does he propose to get us out?

In Carolina the tariff is a palpable, deliberate usurpation; Carolina, therefore, may nullify it, and refuse to pay the duties. In Pennsylvania, it is both clearly constitutional and highly expedient; and there the duties are to be paid. And yet we live under a government of uniform laws, and under a constitution, too, which contains an express provision, as it happens, that all duties shall be equal in all the states! Does not this approach absurdity?

If there be no power to settle such questions, independent of either of the states, is not the whole Union a rope of sand? Are we not thrown back again precisely upon the old confederation?

It is too plain to be argued. Four and twenty interpreters of constitutional law, each with a power to decide for itself, and none with authority to bind anybody else, and this constitutional law the only bond of their union! What is such a state of things but a mere connection during pleasure, or, to use the phraseology of the times, during feeling? And that feeling, too, not the feeling of the people who established the constitution, but the feeling of the state governments.

In another of the South Carolina addresses, having premised that the crisis requires "all the concentrated energy of passion," an attitude of open resistance to the laws of the Union is advised. Open resistance to the laws, then, is the consti