were given with their "settings" in the October number of EDUCATION! To the darkened intellect of the "average American teacher" such scientific comparisons are practically worthless for every day use, however necessary or entertaining in the realms and functions of psychological pedagogy, or pedagogical psychology.

On the same page the eminent author disclaims the necessity for further descriptions of class work, in the following "scientific" English: Space will not permit me to enter further into the detailed description of Buffalo's class-room work. Indeed, it were needless to do so, for, owing to the general uniformity of methods in vogue in the public schools of that city, their general characteristic features may be summed up in a few words" and he devotes the next page-and-a-half to these "few words." I can remember so far back as when my own public school teacher would not have permitted such a paragraph as the above quotation to remain uncorrected in any of my juvenile efforts at composition; and I can today point to dozens of public schools in the cities "observed," whose twelve-year-old pupils could put the same thoughts (?) into better English and less space, at the first trial. As an experiment, how would the following substitute do:

Space forbids further detailed description of class-room work in Buffalo. The uniformity of methods there in vogue make it needless, and the general characteristic features may be briefly summed up."

Fifty-two words, as against thirty, where economy of space is considered, and to state a seemingly unimportant fact! Well, doubtless, there may be room for improvement in Buffalo schools; but there certainly is in the rhetoric which sanctions the use of such a word as "general" twice in a five-line sentence, and nearly twice the number of words necessary to express the thought. Quantity of "space" should not elbow ideas entirely out of sight!

In the first paragraph on the next page, "Indeed" is used twice to introduce sentences which would have been fully as keen if beheaded, even if less "scientific" in construction. They read, in part: "Indeed, the scientific teaching of geography is an art” and "Indeed, I found but few cities where so little had been done toward lightening the burdens of the children."

Suggestions, theories and directions for "improvement of the schools" abound here as elsewhere in the book; but paper educationists are not always the most practical in dealing with large problems of this nature, nor especially modest in announcing their dogmas. I cull from pages 77-79:

First, the board is composed of laymen, and consequently of persons not qualified to inquire (Why are they not "qualified to inquire"?) into the true competency of a teacher, true competency depending on a knowledge of just those things of which laymen are supposed to know nothing, namely,- psychology and pedagogy, the sciences upon which scientific teaching is founded."

Candidly, that paragraph seems not even tinctured with doubt nor humility, but unquestioningly asserts the lack of qualifications of the laymen in the same magnificent way in which "true competency" is made to depend upon a knowledge of psychology and pedagogy. We could have spared the definition of psychology and pedagogy, however ("the sciences"), and the sentence would not have been fatally marred by the omission!

Besides, as has been pointed out, the quality of the schools does not depend nearly so much on what the teachers know at the time of their appointment, as it does on what is done toward educating them professionally after their appointment.”

I will leave this "scientific" absurdity, the rhetoric (or want of it!) that requires "appointment" to here officiate twice, and all to the judgment of the intelligent readers of EDUCATION, and make but one more quotation from this highly scientific chapter:

"It follows that something much more radical must be done before the schools of Buffalo may be expected to improve to an appreciable extent. As the causes of evil in Buffalo,— politics, untrained teachers and scanty supervision-are identical with those which were found at Baltimore, I can but suggest identical remedies for their eradication. To rid the schools of politics, nothing but a complete reorganization of the whole school system will suffice, for the reason that at Buffalo, politics enter (sic) into every branch of the system. And to remedy the evils arising from incompetent teachers, I know of but one thing that can be relied upon, namely, thorough supervision."

The Buffalo laymen who are "supposed to know nothing of psychology and pedagogy," the "one-third of a superintendent”

(p. 77) and the incompetent teachers of that wind-swept city, are under a weight of obligation to their kindly critic from which this generation can hardly expect to recover; but it is to be hoped that ere the calm of another century fills their eyes with scientific dust, their mouths with scientific phrases, and their heads with scientific nonsense, their critic will have learned at least the rudiments of scientific "observation" of schools and teachers!

I hope to visit Buffalo in the near future, and see for myself how these unscientific schools are kept alive. Until then, I can only wail with Campbell, in his "Pleasures of Hope:

"O star-eyed Science! hast thou wandered there,

To waft us home the message of despair?"

MORAL INSTRUCTION IN SCHOOLS.

S. EDWARD WARREN, NEWTON, MASS.

The times loudly call for serious consideration of this great subject. This is sufficiently evident, without labored argument, from the perennial object lesson afforded by the daily spectacle of rogues, only too keenly intelligent, flying hither and thither to escape the consequences of their offences against good morals-in other words, the consequences of their misuse of knowledge.

Since character determines the uses to which knowledge shall be put, the value of everyone's knowledge, both to himself and to society, depends on his character. Character is therefore of prime importance.

But the formation and fortification of good character, by precept, example, and systematic teaching, is the very purpose of moral instruction. Hence, bearing in mind that intelligence and virtue are the equally indispensable twin foundations of permanent free government, we may proceed to apply to our subject the favorite American idea of equal rights, in behalf both of society as a whole and of its individual members, by laying down the two following propositions.

1. The state has as good a right to protect itself against vice by teaching virtue as it has, by common consent, to protect

itself against ignorance by teaching the elements of knowledge. Likewise :

2. Every child has as good a right to instruction in morals, as a means of defence against vice and its train of evils, as, by general agreement, he has to instruction in the knowledge by which he can escape the evils of ignorance.

No one questions the right of every child to learn to read, in order that he may possess the pass-key to the whole temple of printed knowledge. No one would deprive him of the right to a knowledge of the elements of arithmetic and geometry, that, being thus enabled to measure and calculate, he may be fitted to enter upon various business or industry. Then, since intelligent care can confirm and preserve health, on which the value of the body as the servant of the mind so greatly depends, every child has the right to all the instruction he can get in practical physiology. Every youth, too, having taste and opportunity for it, has a right to study history, that he may profit by the world's experience; and geography, that he may know the scenes of great events, and where the actors in them lived. Much more then, by reason of the relation of character to knowledge, has every child an especial right to an education in morals.

If the progression of thought has thus far been natural and reasonable, the question must here immediately arise: Why, then, is not instruction in morals universally demanded, and everywhere enthusiastically given?

Perhaps the greatest hindrance to giving this most desirable instruction is that undeservedly influential, yet really most unsubstantial, of bugbears,-the cry of "sectarianism." To show how this is so, and also to point out a way of escape from the difficulty, it is necessary to turn aside to make a few explanations in answer to certain questions that arise respecting the plan and the method of moral instruction.

Since man, as

First, as to the plan of moral instruction. shown by his acts, is everywhere found to be a religious being, as well as a moral being, the important question at once arises: Shall moral instruction, by recognizing as thinkably separate what is in fact vitally united, contemplate man as only a moral being, and so limit itself to the consideration of those duties, or grounds of duty, which concern man simply as man? Or, shall

it, by recognizing the vital union of morals and religion, be grounded on a religious basis, and thence regard man as the child of one God and Father of all, and, accordingly, contemplate all men as brethren, as well as competing fellow creatures? In other words: Shall moral instruction be purely secular, that is,shall it recognize no other foundation or higher authority than human opinion and custom? Or, shall it have some kind of religious basis, some reference to a wisdom and goodness and authority superior to man's, whether apprehended through nature and life, or known by revelation?

To aid in answering this fundamental question, let us briefly define morality and religion. By morality we mean, conduct determined by the thought of, and regard for, the nature and consequent claims of man. So far, and in such things, as he is really sufficient unto himself, man is an independent sovereign, who only asks a fair chance. But so far as subject to common limitations and liable to common misfortunes, all men are mutually dependent, and each is his brother's keeper. Complete morality then contemplates man as in part self-sufficient, and in part as mutually dependent.

By religion is meant conduct governed by thought of and regard for the being, character, relation to us, and consequent claims upon us, of God. But though morality and religion are thus thinkably separate, they are, as said before, vitally united in normal life, as can now easily be demonstrated. For, first, one of the foremost of the relations of God to us is that of the common Father of all; from which it follows, that one of his foremost claims upon us is that of right treatment of our fellow creatures as his. I have no right to abuse or injuriously neglect what belongs to another in a higher sense than it does to me, but which is associated with me and for my benefit. Again, since every possible act is in some way either beneficial or injurious to man, and also loyal or disloyal to God, moral acts and religious acts are not necessarily, and, indeed, never ought to be, totally distinct and separate acts, but are the same acts done on different grounds. If I aid my suffering neighbor simply as being a creature of like kind with myself, I perform a moral act. If I add the further motive that he is a child of God, and care for him as such, my moral act takes on also a religious character,becomes an act of piety as well as of morality, by being done