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Union, and had not meditated an armed resistance; a peaceable secession," to be accomplished by threats, was probably the ultimatum really contemplated. In spite of Jackson's warning, the nullifiers were surprised by his unflinching attitude, and quite naturally regarded it as inconsistent with his treatment of Georgia. When the 1st of February came the nullifiers deferred action. In the course of that month a bill for enforcing the tariff passed both houses of congress, and at the same time Clay's compromise tariff was adopted, providing for the gradual reduction of the duties until 1842, after which all duties were to be kept at 20 per cent. This compromise enabled the nullifiers to claim a victory, and retreat from their position with colors flying.

During the nullification controversy Jackson kept up the attacks upon the United States bank which he had begun in his first annual message to congress in 1829. The charter of the bank would expire in 1836, and Jackson was opposed to its renewal. The grounds of his opposition were partly sound, partly fanciful. There was a wholesome opposition to paper currency, combined with great ignorance of the natural principles of money and trade, as illustrated in a willingness to tolerate the notes of local banks, according to the chaotic system prevalent between Jackson's time and Lincoln's. There was something of the demagogue's appeal to the prejudice that ignorant people are apt to cherish against capitalists and corporations, though Jackson cannot be accused of demagogy in this regard, because he shared the prejudice. Then there was good. reason for believing that the bank was in some respects mismanaged, and for fearing that a great financial institution, so intimately related to the government, might be made an engine. of political corruption. Furthermore, the correspondence between Sec. Ingham and Nicholas Biddle, president of the bank, in the summer of 1829, shows that some of Jackson's friends wished to use the bank for political purposes, and were enraged at Biddle's determination in pursuing an independent course. The occasion was duly improved by the "kitchen cabinet " to fill Jackson's ears with stories tending to show that the influence of the bank was secretly exerted in favor of the opposite party. Jackson's suggestions with reference to the bank in his first message met with little favor, especially as he coupled them with suggestions for the distribution of the surplus reve

nue among the states. He returned to the attack in his two following messages, until in 1832 the bank felt obliged in selfdefence to apply, somewhat prematurely, for a renewal of its charter on the expiration of its term. Charges brought against the bank by Democratic representatives were investigated by a committee, which returned a majority report in favor of the bank. A minority report sustained the charges. After prolonged discussion, the bill to renew the charter passed both houses, and on 10 July, 1832, was vetoed by the president. An attempt to pass the bill over the veto failed of the requisite two-third majority.

Circumstances had already given a flavor of personal contest to Jackson's assaults upon the bank. There was no man whom he hated so fiercely as Clay, who was at the same time his chief political rival. Clay made the mistake of forcing the bank question into the foreground, in the belief that it was an issue upon which he was likely to win in the coming presidential campaign. Clay's movement was an invitation to the people to defeat Jackson in order to save the bank; and this naturally aroused all the combativeness in Jackson's nature. His determined stand impressed upon the popular imagination the picture of a dauntless "tribune of the people" fighting against the "monster monopoly." Clay unwisely attacked the veto. power of the president, and thus gave Benton an opportunity to defend it by analogies drawn from the veto power of the ancient Roman tribune; which in point of fact it does not at all resemble. The discussion helped Jackson more than Clay. It was also a mistake on the part of the Whig leader to risk the permanence of such an institution as the U. S. bank upon the fortunes of a presidential canvass. It dragged the bank into politics in spite of itself, and, by thus affording justification for the fears to which Jackson had appealed, played directly into his hands. In this canvass all the candidates were for the first time nominated in national conventions. There were three conventions-all held at Baltimore In September, 1831, the Anti-Masons nominated William Wirt, of Virginia, in the hope of getting the national Republicans or Whigs to unite with. them; but the latter, in December, nominated Clay. In the following March the Democrats nominated Jackson, with Van Buren for vice-president. During the year 1832 the action of congress and president with regard to the bank charter was

virtually a part of the campaign. In the election South Carolina voted for candidates of her own-John Floyd, of Virginia, and Henry Lee, of Massachusetts. There were 219 electoral votes for Jackson, 49 for Clay, 11 for Floyd, and 7 for Wirt. Jackson interpreted this overwhelming victory as a popular condemnation of the bank and approval of all his actions as president. The enthusiastic applause from all quarters which now greeted his rebuke of the nullifiers served still further to strengthen his belief in himself as a "saviour of society" and champion of "the people." Men were getting into a state of mind in which questions of public policy were no longer argued upon their merits, but all discussion was drowned in cheers for Jackson. Such a state of things was not calculated to check his natural vehemence and disposition to override all obstacles in carrying his point. He now felt it to be his sacred duty to demolish the bank. In his next message to congress he created some alarm by expressing doubts as to the bank's solvency and recommending an investigation to see if the deposits of public money were safe. In some parts of the country there were indications of a run upon the branches of the bank. The committee of ways and means investigated the matter, and reported the bank as safe and sound, but a minority report threw doubt upon these conclusions, so that the public uneasiness was not allayed. The conclusions of the members of the committee, indeed, bore little reference to the evidence before them, and were determined purely by political partisanship. Jackson made up his mind that the deposits must be removed from the bank. The act of 1816, which created that institution, provided that the public funds might be removed from it by order of the secretary of the treasury, who must, however, inform congress of his reasons for the removal. As congress resolved, by heavy majorities, that the deposits were safe in the bank, the spring of 1833 was hardly a time when a secretary of the treasury would feel himself warranted, in accordance with the provisions of the act, to order their removal. Sec. McLane was accordingly unwilling to issue such an order. In what followed, Jackson had the zealous co-operation of Kendall and Blair. In May, McLane was transferred to the state department, and was succeeded in the treasury by William J. Duane, of Pennsylvania. The new secretary, however, was convinced that the removal was neither necessary nor wise, and,

in spite of the president's utmost efforts, refused either to issue the order or to resign his office. In September, accordingly, Duane was removed, and Roger B. Taney was appointed in his place. Taney at once ordered that after the 1st of October the public revenues should no longer be deposited with the national bank, but with sundry state banks, which soon came to be known as the "pet banks." Jackson alleged, as one chief reason for this proceeding, that if the bank were to continue to receive public revenues on deposit, it would unscrupulously use them in buying up all the members of congress and thus securing an indefinite renewal of its charter. This, he thought, would be a death-blow to free government in America. His action caused intense excitement and some commercial distress, and prepared the way for further disturbance. In the next session of the senate Clay introduced a resolution of censure, which was carried after a debate which lasted all winter. It contained a declaration that the president had assumed "authority and power not conferred by the constitution and laws, but in derogation of both." Jackson protested against the resolution, but the senate refused to receive his protest. Many of his appointments were rejected by the senate, especially those of the directors of the bank, and of Taney as secretary of the treasury. An attempt was made to curtail the president's appointing power. On the other hand, many of the president's friends declaimed against the senate as an aristocratic institution, which ought to be abolished. Benton was Jackson's most powerful and steadfast ally in the senate. Benton was determined that the resolution of censure should be expunged from the records of the senate, and his motion continued to be the subject of acrimonious debate for two years. The contest was carried into the state elections, and some senators resigned in consequence of instructions received from their state legislatures. At length, on 16 Jan., 1837, a few weeks before Jackson's retirement from office, Benton's persistency triumphed, and the resolution of censure was expunged. Meanwhile the consequence of the violent method with which the finances had been handled were rapidly developing. Many state banks, including not a few of the "wildcat " species, had been formed, to supply the paper currency that was supposed to be needed. The abundance of paper, together with the rapid westward movement of population, caused reckless speculation and an

inflation of values. Extensive purchases of public lands were paid for in paper until the treasury scented danger, and by the president's order in July, 1836, the "specie circular " was issued, directing that only gold or silver should

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be received for public lands. caused a demand for coin, which none but the "pet banks" could hope to succeed in meeting. But these banks were at the same time crippled by orders to surrender, on the following New-Year's day, one fourth of the surplus revenues deposited with them, as it was to be distributed as a loan among the states. The "pet banks' had regarded the deposits as capital to be used in loans, and they were now suddenly obliged to call in these loans. These events led to the great panic of 1837, which not only scattered thousands of private fortunes to the winds, but wrecked Van Buren's administration and prepared the way for the Whig victory of 1840.

onchew, Jackson

In foreign affairs Jackson's administration won great credit through its enforcement of the French spoliation claims. European nations which had claims for damages against France on account of spoliations committed by French cruisers during the Napoleonic wars had found no difficulty after the peace of 1815 in obtaining payment; but the claims of the United States had been superciliously neglected. In 1831, after much fruitless negotiation, a treaty was made by which France agreed to pay the United States $5,000,000 in six annual instalments. The first payment was due on 2 Feb., 1833. A draft for the amount was presented to the French minister of finance, and payment was refused on the ground that no appropriation for that purpose had been made by the chambers. Louis Philippe brought the matter before the chambers, but no appropriation was made. Jackson was not the man to be trifled with in this way. In his message of December, 1834, he gravely recommended to congress that a law be passed authorizing the capture of French vessels enough to make up the amount due. The French government was enraged, and threatened war unless the president should apologize-not a hopeful sort of