Dr. Kissinger's Role in Wiretapping: Hearings Before the ..., 93-2, on Role of Dr. Henry A. Kissinger in the Wiretapping of Certain Government Officials and Newsmen ... 19741974 - 409 pages |
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Common terms and phrases
17 wiretaps ADAMS Alexander Haig Answer approval April 25 asked Attorney believe Cambodia Camp David CHAIRMAN Clark Clifford Colonel Haig concerning conversation cover memo David Young decision DeLoach Department Director discussion Edgar Hoover Ehrlichman fact FBI documents files foreign policy Foreign Relations Committee going Government Haldeman Henry Henry Kissinger highest authority indicated individuals initiated investigation involved John Ehrlichman June June 25 Key Biscayne Kissinger's role knowledge leaks letter logs Mardian matter meeting memoranda memorandum Mitchell names National Security Council never newsmen President President's procedures question recall recollection remember request RICHARDSON Ruckelshaus RUSK SAXBE Secretary KISSINGER Senate Foreign Relations Senator AIKEN Senator JAVITS Senator MUSKIE Senator PERCY Senator SCOTT Senator SPARKMAN Senator SYMINGTON sensitive SMITH specific statement Sullivan summary talking tap on deleted tape telephone testified testimony thing tion told U.S. Senate Vietnam Washington White House wiretap program
Popular passages
Page 61 - Utilization of mechanical or electronic devices to overhear non-telephone conversations is an even more difficult problem, which raises substantial and unresolved questions of Constitutional interpretation. I desire that each agency conducting such investigations consult with the Attorney General to ascertain whether the agency's practices are fully in accord with the law and with a decent regard for the rights of others.
Page 14 - Nothing contained in this chapter or in section 605 of the Communications Act of 1934 (48 Stat. 1143; 47 USC 605) shall limit the constitutional power of the President to take such measures as he deems necessary to protect the Nation against actual or potential attack or other hostile acts of a foreign power, to obtain foreign intelligence information deemed essential to the security of the United States, or to protect national security information against foreign intelligence activities.
Page 18 - It is clear that I don't have anybody in my office that I can trust except Colonel Haig."60 But even so, his treatment of Haig was arrogant and condescending.
Page 193 - Where supporting evidence was available, I personally directed the surveillance, including wiretapping, of certain specific individuals. I am familiar with the testimony given by Secretary Kissinger before your Committee to the effect that he performed the function at my request, of furnishing information about individuals within investigative categories that I established so that an appropriate and effective investigation could be conducted in each case.
Page 346 - Because management of the bureaucracy takes so much energy and precisely because changing course is so difficult, many of the most important decisions are taken by extra-bureaucratic means. Some of the key decisions are kept to a very small circle while the bureaucracy happily continues working away in ignorance of the fact that decisions are being made, or of the fact that a decision is being made in a particular area.
Page 345 - Also, research and intelligence organizations, either foreign or national, attempt to give a rationality and consistency to foreign policy which it simply does not have. I have found it next to impossible to convince Frenchmen that there is no such thing as an American foreign policy...
Page 347 - The typical political leader of the contemporary managerial society is a man with a strong will, a high capacity to get himself elected, but no very great conception of what he is going to do when he gets into office. This is true of many of the cabinet officials as well, and in this sense ... I am pessimistic about the ability of modern bureaucratic society to manage a world which is quite discontinuous with its previous experience.
Page xii - Kissinger's role in placing wiretaps "did not constitute grounds to bar his confirmation as secretary of state.
Page 13 - But beyond this, the issue of wiretapping raises the issue of the balance between human liberty and the requirements of national security. I would say that the weight should be on the side of human liberty and that if human liberty is to be ever infringed, the demonstration on the national security side must be overwhelming. That would be my general attitude.
Page 293 - In order to do this, a special program of wiretaps was instituted in mid-<1969 and terminated in February, 1971. Fewer than 20 taps, of varying duration, were involved. They produced important leads that made it possible to tighten the security of highly sensitive materials.