CO-OPERATION WITH GENERAL POPE. General Burnside, with his command, was the first to leave the peninsula. He landed at Aquia and proceeded to Fredericksburg, relieving General King, who proceeded at once to rejoin his corps (McDowell's) then with General Pope. Soon after, General Burnside was ordered to send all possible assistance to General Pope, and at once ordered two of his three divisions (Reno's and Stevens's) up the Rappahannock. Shortly after that the advance of the army of the Potomac, Fitz-John Porter's corps, reached Aquia, and was sent forward by General Burnside to General Pope. The rest of the army of the Potomac, except Keyes's corps, left to garrison Yorktown, proceeded to Alexandria, and from there joined General Pope. General Sumner stopped at Aquia and debarked a portion of his corps there; but he received orders to re-embark them again and proceed to Alexandria, which he did. The troops sent to the assistance of General Pope were sent by orders of General Halleck; for those sent from Aquia the orders were given through General Burnside; for those sent out from Alexandria, the orders were given directly to the corps commanders, until General McClellan arrived, on the 26th of August; after which the orders were given through him. The circumstances connected with the campaign of the army of Virginia have been so fully investigated by the military courts in the cases of General McDowell and General Fitz-John Porter, the proceedings of which were public, that your committee have not deemed it necessary to make so thorough an investigation of that campaign as they would otherwise have done. They refer, therefore, principally to the orders and correspondence, in relation to the delays in the forwarding of General Sumner's and General Franklin's corps from Alexandria to the assistance of General Pope. At 10 a. m., August 27, General Halleck telegraphs General McClellan that "Franklin's corps should march in that direction [Manassas] as soon as possible." At 10.40 a. m. General McClellan replies: "I have sent orders to Franklin to prepare to march with his corps at once, and to repair here [Alexandria] in person to inform him as to his means of transportation. Kearney was yesterday at Rappahannock; Porter at Bealton, Kelly's, Burnett's, &c. Sumner will commence reaching Falmouth to-day." At 12 m. on the same day General Halleck telegraphs to General McClellan : "Telegrams from General Porter to General Burnside, just received, say that Banks is at Fayetteville. McDowell, Sigel, and Ricketts, near Warrenton; Reno on his right. Porter is marching on Warrenton to re-enforce Pope. Nothing said of Heintzelman. Porter reports a general battle imminent. Franklin's corps should move out by forced marches, carrying three or four days' provisions, and to be supplied as far as possible by railroad." From General McClellan to General Halleck, same day, sent 12.5 p. m., received 1.40 p. m.: "My aide has just returned from General Franklin's camp. Reports that Generals Franklin, Smith, and Slocum, are all in Washington. He gave the order to the next in rank to place the corps in readiness to move at once." From same to same, sent 1.15 p. m., received 1.50 p. m.: "Franklin's artillery has no horses, except for four guns without caissons. I can pick up no cavalry. In view of these facts, will it not be well to push Sumner's corps here by water as rapidly as possible, to make immediate arrangements for placing the works in front of Washington in an efficient condition of defence. I have no means of knowing the enemy's force between Pope and ourselves. Can Franklin, without his artillery or cavalry, effect any useful purpose in front? Should not Burnside at once take steps to evacuate Falmouth and Aquia, at the same time covering the retreat of any of Pope s troops who may fall back in that direction? I do not see that we have force enough on hand to form a connection with Pope, whose exact position we do not know. Are we safe in the direction of the valley?" At 1.50 p. m. General Halleck replies: "Yes; I think Sumner's corps should come to Alexandria. The enemy has appeared at Leesburg, and the commanding officer at Edwards's Ferry asks for cavalry. Have you any to spare him. The enemy seems to be trying to turn Pope's right. Is there no way of communicating with him?" On the morning of the 28th of August General Halleck telegraphs to General Franklin: "On parting with General McClellan, about two o'clock this morning, it was understood that you were to move with your corps to day, toward Manassas Junction, to drive the enemy from the railroad. I have just learned that the general has not returned to Alexandria. If you have not received his order, act on this." At 1.5 p. m. of the same day, the 28th, General McClellan telegraphs to General' Halleck: "Your despatch to Franklin received. I have been doing all possible to hurry artillery and cavalry. The moment Franklin can be started with a reasonable amount of artillery he shall go. * * * * Please see Barnard, and be sure the works towards Chain Bridge are perfectly secure. I look upon those works, especially Ethan Allen and Marcy, as of the first importance.' At 3.30 p. m. General Halleck telegraphs to General McClellan: "Not a moment must be lost in pushing as large a force as possible towards Manassas, so as to communicate with Pope before the enemy is re-enforced." At 4.45 p. m. General McClellan replies: "Your despatch received. Neither Franklin's nor Sumner's corps is now in condition to move and fight a battle. It would be a sacrifice to send them out now. I have sent aides to ascertain the condition of the commands of Cox and Tyler; but I still think that a premature movement in small force will accomplish nothing but the destruction of the troops sent out. I repeat, that I will lose no time in preparing the troops now here for the field, and that whatever orders you may give, after hearing what I have to say, will be carried out." At 8.40 p. m. General Halleck telegraphs to General McClellan : "There must be no further delay in moving Franklin's corps towards Manassas; they must go to-morrow morning, ready or not ready. If we delay too long to get ready there will be no necessity to go at all, for Pope will either be defeated or victorious without our aid. If there is a want of wagons, the men must carry provisions with them till the wagons can come to their relief.” At 10 p. m. General McClellan telegraphs: "Your despatch received. Franklin's corps has been ordered to march at six (6) o'clock to-morrow morning. Sumner has about 14,000 infantry, without cavalry or artillery here." At 10.30 a. m., of the 29th, General McClellan telegraphs to General Halleck: "Franklin's corps is in motion; started about six (6) a. m. I can give him but two squadrons of cavalry. If Sumner moves in support of Franklin, it leaves us without any reliable troops in and near Washington. Yet Franklin is too much alone. What shall be done? Have but three squadrons belonging to army of Potomac. Franklin has but forty rounds of ammunition, and no wagons to move more. I do not think Franklin is in condition to accomplish much if he meets strong resistance. I should not have moved him but for your pressing orders of last night." Rep. Com. 108-3 At 12 m. General McClellan telegraphs: 66 Do you wish the movement of Franklin's corps to continue? He is without reserve ammunition and without transportation." In another despatch of same date he telegraphs: "Franklin has only between 10,000 and 11,000 ready for duty. How far do you wish this force to advance?" At 3 p. m. General Halleck telegraphs to General McClellan : "I want Franklin's corps to go far enough to find out something about the enemy. Perhaps he may get such information at Anandale as to prevent his going further; otherwise he will push on towards Fairfax. Try to get something from direction of Manassas, either by telegram or through Franklin's Our people must move more actively, and find out where the enemy is. I am tired of guesses." scouts. What, generally?" At 2.40 p. m. the President asks of General McClellan : "The last news I received from the direction of Manassas was from stragglers, to the effect that the enemy were evacuating Centreville and retiring towards Thoroughfare Gap. This is by no means reliable. I am clear that one of two courses should be adopted: First. To concentrate all our available forces to open communication with Pope. Second. To leave Pope to get out of his scrape, and at once use all means to make the capital perfectly safe. No middle course will now answer. Tell me what you wish me to do, and I will do all in my power to accomplish it. I wish to know what my orders and authority are. I ask for nothing, but will obey whatever orders you give. I only ask a prompt decision, that I may at once give the necessary orders. It will not do to delay longer." "Yours of to-day just received. I think your first alternative, to wit: 'to concentrate all our available forces to open communication with Pope,' is the right one. But I wish not to control. That I now leave to General Halleck, aided by your counsels." At 7.50 p. m. General Halleck telegraphs to General McClellan: "You will immediately send construction train and guards to repair railroad to Manassas. Let there be no delay in this. I have just been told that Franklin's corps stopped at Anandale, and that he was this evening in Alexandria. This is all contrary to my orders. Investigate and report the fact of this disobedience. That corps must push forward, as I directed, to protect the railroad and open our communications with Manassas." To this General McClellan replies, at 8 p. m., received 8.50 p. m.: "It was not safe for Franklin to move beyond Anandale, under the circumstances, until we knew what was at Vienna. General Franklin remained here until about 1 p. m., endeavoring to arrange for supplies for his command. I am responsible for both these circumstances, and do not see that either was in disobedience to your orders. Please give distinct orders in reference to Franklin's movements of to-morrow. * # * In regard to to-morrow's movemeets I desire definite instructions, as it is not agreeable to me to be accused of disobeying orders, when I have simply exercised the discretion you committed to me." At 10 p. m. General McClellan telegraphs: "Not hearing from you,, I have sent orders to General Franklin to place himself in communication with General Pope, by advancing as soon as possible, and at the same time cover the transit of Pope's supplies." At 10 p. m. General McClellan forwards to General Halleck a despatch received from General Franklin, at Anandale, dated 7.15 p. m., in which General Franklin gives rumors concerning the battle of that day, closing thus: 66 Pope is said to be very short of provisions, and the country will not support him." At 5 a. m. of the 30th of August General Pope sent a despatch to General Halleck, received at 3.20 p. m., from battle-field near Groveton, Virginia, containing an account of the battle of the day before, and closing as follows: "I think you had best send Franklin's, Cox's, and Sturgis's regiments to Centreville, as also forage and subsistence. I received a note this morning from General Franklin, written by order of General McClellan, saying that wagons and cars would be loaded and sent to Fairfax Station as soon as I would send a cavalry escort to Alexandria to bring them out. Such a request, when Alexandria is full of troops and we fighting the enemy, needs no comment. you have these supplies sent, without the least delay, to Centreville?" Will At 9.40 a. m., August 30, General Halleck telegraphs to General McClellan : "I am by no means satisfied with General Franklin's march of yesterday, considering the circumstances of the case. He was very wrong in stopping at Anandale. Moreover, I learned last night that the quartermaster's department could have given him plenty of transportation, if he had applied for it, any time since his arrival at Alexandria. He knew the importance of opening communication with General Pope's army, and should have acted more promptly." At 11 a. m. General McClellan telegraphs: "Have ordered Sumner to leave one brigade in the vicinity of Chain Bridge, and to move the rest, via Columbia Pike, on Anandale and Fairfax Court-House, if this is the route you wish them to take. He and Franklin are both instructed to join Pope as promptly as possible. Shall Couch move also when he arrives?" At 12.20 p. m. General Halleck telegraphs: * * "I think Couch should land at Alexandria and be immediately pushed out to Pope. Send the troops where the fighting is. Let me know when Couch arrives, as I may have other information by that time.. * Send transports to Aquia to bring up Burnside's command. I have telegraphed to him, and am waiting his answer." At 2.15 p. m. General Halleck telegraphs: "Franklin's and all of Sumner's corps should be pushed forward with all possible despatch. They must use their legs and make forced marches. Time now is everything." At 5 p. m. General McClellan telegraphs to General Halleck : Major Hammerstein, of my staff, reports, from two miles this side of Centreville, at 1.30 p. m., that Franklin's corps was then advancing rapidly. Sumner's corps moved at 1.45 p. m. The orderly who brought the despatch from Hammerstein states that he learned that the fighting commenced five miles beyond Centreville, and that our people had been driving them all day. Hammerstein says all he learns was favorable." At 10.10 p. m. General Halleck telegraphs to General McClellan : "All of Sumner's corps on the south side of the river, not actually required in the forts, should march to Pope's relief. Replace them with new regiments. Franklin should also be hurried on to re-enforce Pope." On the same day-August 30, hour not given-General McClellan sent the following to General Halleck : "Ever since General Franklin received notice that he was to march from Alexandria, he has been using every effort to get transportation for his extra ammunition. But he was uniformly told by the quartermasters here that there was none disposable, and his command marched without wagons. After the departure of his corps, at 6 a. m. yesterday, he procured twenty wagons to carry a portion of his ammunition, by unloading some of General Banks's supply train for that purpose. "General Sumner was one entire day in endeavoring, by application upon quartermasters and others, to get a sufficient number of wagons to transport his reserve ammunition, but without success, and was obliged to march without it. "I have this morning sent all my headquarters train that is landed to be at once loaded with ammunition for Sumner and Franklin, but they will not go far towards supplying the deficiency. "Eighty-five wagons were got together by the quartermaster last night, loaded with subsistence, and sent forward under an escort at one a. m. via Alexandria. "Every effort has been made to carry out your instructions promptly. The difficulty seems to consist in the fact that the greater part of the transportation on hand at Alexandria and Washington has been needed for current supplies of the garrisons. At all events, such is the state of the case as represented to me by the quartermaster, and it appears to be true. I take it for granted that this has not been properly explained to you." At 10.45 a. m. of the 31st of August General Pope sends the following to General Halleck, from Centreville: "Our troops are all here, and in position, though much used up and worn out. I think it would, perhaps, have been greatly better if Sumner and Franklin had been here three or four days ago. But you may rely upon our giving them (the enemy) as desperate a fight as I can force our men to stand up to. I should like to know whether you feel secure about Washington should this army be destroyed. I shall fight it as long as a man will stand up to the work. You must judge what is to be done, having in view the safety of the capital. The enemy is already pushing a cavalry reconnoissance in our front at Cub Run, whether in advance of an attack to-day I don't yet know. I send you this that you may know our position and my purpose." On the 2d of September General Pope was ordered to fall back to the vicinity of Washington, where his army came under the command of General McClellan. The following is from the testimony of General Halleck: "Question. Had the army of the Peninsula been brought to co-operate with the army of Virginia with the utmost energy that circumstances would have permitted, in your judgment, as a military man, would it not have resulted in our victory instead of our defeat? "Answer. I thought so at the time, and still think so." In relation to the command of General McClellan, he himself testifies as follows: 66 Question. What position did you occupy after your arrival at Alexandria, you had forwarded the troops which had been under your command to the assistance of General Pope? and "Answer. I was for some little time-one or two days, two or three days, perhaps without any position; merely at my camp, without any command. On Monday, the 1st of September, I received verbal instructions from General Halleck to take command of the defences of Washington. I was, however, expressly prohibited from, in any way, assuming any control over the troops under General Pope. I think it was on the next day after that that I was instructed verbally by the President and General Halleck to go out and meet the army which was coming in, and to assume command of it when it approached the position that I considered it ought to occupy for defensive purposes, and to post it prop erly." |