his position until just before he was forced to fall back from his second line, when a single regiment arrived. After about three hours' fighting the division fell back from its second line with a loss of 1,433 in killed, wounded, and missing. In the course of an hour after Casey's division had been driven back, the remainder of our forces were swept back from a mile and a half to two miles from Casey's first line, when the enemy were checked, and the fighing ceased for the day.

During the battle General Sumner, whose corps was on the left bank of the Chickahominy, was ordered by General McClellan to hold his forces in readiness to cross. General Sumner not only did that, but at once called out his forces and moved them until the heads of the columns were at the bridges ready to cross, thereby saving between one and two hours. When the order came to cross he immediately moved his forces in the direction of the field of battle, came up with and engaged the enemy, and relieved the pressure upon the troops engaged on his left.

The next day, the 1st of June, the enemy attacked General Sumner at Fair Oaks. General Hooker, who had been ordered forward the day before by General Heintzelman with one-half of his division, hearing the firing of the enemy upon General Sumner's forces, proceeded at once in that direction and engaged the enemy. In a short time the enemy were repulsed, and fell back in confusion. There was no communication between the forces under General Sumner and those under General Heintzelman, (Hooker's,) but each fought as he deemed best under the circumstances. General McClellan was with the main part of the army on the left bank of the Chickahominy. After the fighting was over he came across to the right bank of the river.

On the morning of Monday General Heintzelman ordered General Hooker to make a reconnoissance in force, which he did, advancing to within four miles of Richmond, meeting with no resistance except a little from the enemy's pickets. Upon being informed by General Heintzelman of what he had done, General McClellan ordered the troops to be recalled and ocupy the position that had been held by Casey's division.

The officers engaged in that battle, who have been examined, testify that the army could have pushed right on to the city of Richmond with little resistance; that the enemy were very much broken and demoralized, throwing away arms, clothing, &c., that might impede their flight. General McClellan seems to have contemplated an immediate movement upon Richmond, for, the day after the battle, June 2, he writes to the Secretary of War:

"The enemy attacked in force and with great spirit yesterday morning, but are everywhere most signally repulsed with great loss. Our troops charged frequently on both days, and uniformly broke the enemy. The result is, that

our left is within four miles of Richmond. I only wait for the river to fall to cross with the rest of the force and make a general attack. Should I find them holding firm in a very strong position, I may wait for what troops I can bring up from Fort Monroe. But the morale of my troops is now such that I can venture much. I do not fear for odds against me. The victory is complete, and all credit is due to the gallantry of our officers and men."

The movement was not made, however, as General McClellan states, because of the high stage of water and the bad roads.

On the 6th of June McCall's division of General McDowell's corps was ordered to join the army on the peninsula. On the 8th of June General McClellan telegraphs: "I shall be in perfect readiness to move forward and take Richmond the moment that McCall reaches here and the ground will admit the passage of artillery." On the 10th or 11th of June McCall's troops commenced arriving at the White House.

Preparations continued to be made in Washington to send down by land from Fredericksburg the remainder of General McDowell's corps, he being directed

to co-operate fully with General McClellan, but retaining an independent command. This does not appear to have been in accordance with General McClellan's wishes; for, on the 16th of June, he telegraphs to the Secretary of War:

"It ought to be distinctly understood that McDowell and his troops are completely under my control. I received a telegram from him requesting that McCall's division might be placed so as to join him immediately upon his arrival. That request does not breathe the proper spirit; whatever troops come to me must be disposed of so as to do the most good. I do not feel that in such circumstances as those in which I am now placed General McDowell should wish the general interest to be sacrificed for the purpose of increasing his command. If I cannot fully control all his troops I want none of them, but would prefer to fight the battle with what I have, and let others be responsible for the results." On the 18th of June General McClellan telegraphs to the Secretary of War that he has received information from deserters to the effect that troops have left Richmond to re-enforce Jackson; that the movement commenced on the 8th; and that, if re-enforcements have gone to Jackson, they are probably not less than 10,000 men; that he cannot vouch for the truth of the statement, but that it seems pretty certain that it is believed in Richmond and among the rebel troops. To this the President replies, on the same day, that the information is corroborated by a despatch from General King at Fredericksburg, and remarks: “If this is true, it is as good as a re-enforcement to you of an equal force."

On the same day General McClellan telegraphs to the President:

"A general engagement may take place at any hour. An advance by us involves a battle more or less decisive. The enemy exhibit at every point a readiness to meet us. They certainly have great numbers and extensive works. If ten or fifteen thousand men have left Richmond to re-enforce Jackson, it illustrates their strength and confidence. After to-morrow we shall fight the rebel army as soon as Providence will permit. We shall await only a favorable condition of the earth and sky, and the completion of some necessary preliminaries.” The returns of General McClellan to the Adjutant General's office give the following as the strength of the army on the peninsula on the 20th of June: Present for duty, 115,102; special duty, sick and in arrest, 12,225; absent 29,511-total, 156,838.

About this time the rebel general, Stuart, with his cavalry, made his celebrated raid, making the entire circuit of our army unharmed, and discovering the nature of our communications with the York river.

On the 24th and 25th of June General McClellan telegraphs the Secretary of War that he is informed by deserters and contrabands that Jackson is contemplating an attack upon his right and rear. As this despatch of General McClellan, and the one of the President in reply, are dated immediately previous to the "seven days' battle," they are given here in full.

"Received 8.50 p. m

"MCCLELLAN'S, June 25, 6.15 p. m. "I have just returned from the field, and find your despatch in regard to Jackson. Several contrabands, just in, give information confirming the suppo sition that Jackson's advance is at or near Hanover Court-House, and that Beauregard arrived, with strong re-enforcements, in Richmond yesterday. I incline to think that Jackson will attack my right and rear. The rebel force is stated at 200,000, including Jackson and Beauregard. I shall have to contend against vastly superior odds, if these reports be true; but this army will do all in the power of man to hold their position and repulse any attack. I regret my great inferiority of numbers, but feel that I am in no way responsible for it, as I have not failed to represent repeatedly the necessity of re-enforcements; that this was the decisive point; and that all the available means of the government

1 should be concentrated here. I will do all that a general can do with the splen did army I have the honor to command; and if it is destroyed by overwhelming numbers, can at least die with it, and share its fate. But if the result of the action which will occur to-morrow, or within a short time, is a disaster, the responsibility cannot be thrown on my shoulders; it must rest where it belongs.

Since I commenced this, I have received additional intelligence confirming the supposition in regard to Jackson's movements and Beauregard. I shall probably be attacked tomorrow, and now go to the other side of the Chickahominy to arrange for the defence on that side. I feel that there is no use in my again asking for re-enforcements. "GEO. B. MCCLELLAN,

"Hon. E. M. STANTON,

"Secretary of War."

The answer of the President is as follows:

Major Gen❜l.

"WASHINGTON, June 26, 1862.

"Your three despatches of yesterday in relation to the affair, ending with the statement that you completely succeeded in making your point, are very gratifying.

"The later one of 6.15 p. m., suggesting the probability of your being overwhelmed by 200,000 men, and talking of to whom the responsibility will belong, pains me very much. I give you all I can, and act on the presumption that you will do the best you can with what you have; while you continue, ungenerously I think, to assume that I could give you more if I would. I have omitted, I shall omit, no opportunity to send you re-enforcements whenever I possibly can.

On the afternoon of the 26th of June, between 2 and 3 o'clock, the enemy, in considerable force, made a vigorous attack upon the troops of Gen. McCall's division, stationed at Mechanicsville, consisting of the two brigades of Seymour and Reynolds. The action lasted until nightfall, when the enemy were repulsed. Troops were sent up by Gen. Porter to the assistance of those engaged; but they were not in the battle, though some of them were in position to support the right of the line.

About 12 o'clock that night the troops were ordered to fall back to Gaines's Mill, which was accomplished without loss.

On the 27th the battle of Gaines's Mill was fought, principally by the troops under Gen. Porter. Our forces there engaged were from 27,000 to 30,000; the force of the enemy being from two to three times that number. The enemy were in such superior force that, although our troops fought with exceeding bravery, they were driven back with a loss of about 9,000 men, in killed, wounded, and missing.

General McClellan was questioned as to the policy of leaving the right wing, consisting of only about 30,000 men, to meet the attack of the superior force of the enemy, instead of withdrawing it to the right bank of the Chickahominy before the battle of Gaines's Mill. His testimony on that point is as follows: Question. Whateɣer might have been the intentions of the enemy, as the attack was to have been made by him, would it not have been better to have placed both wings of our army on the same side of the Chickahominy prior to the battle of Gaines's Mill?

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Answer. I do not think they ought to have been brought to the same side of the river before they actually were.

"Question. What advantage was gained by leaving the right wing of our army to be attacked by a greatly superior force?

"Answer. It prevented the enemy from getting on our flank and rear, and, in my opinion, enabled us to withdraw the army and its material.

"Question. Will you explain what was done by the right wing of our army at or about the time the left was engaged which saved our flank from attack and enabled the army and its material to be withdrawn?

"Answer. By desperate fighting they inflicted so great a loss on the enemy as to check his movement on the left bank of the river, and gave us time to get our material out of the way."

During the night after the battle of Gaines's Mill all our forces were concentrated on the right bank of the Chickahominy, and the next day the movement to the James river was determined upon. General Heintzelman testifies that the night after that battle he was sent for by General McClellan; that he found everything packed, ready to leave; that General McClellan said there were two things to be done to concentrate his forces and risk all on a battle, or to withdraw to the James river; that if he risked a battle there, and was beaten, the army was destroyed. General Heintzelman advised him not to risk a battle under such circumstances, for if that army was lost the cause would be lost; that it were better to go to the James river and await re-enforcements. General McClellan replied that he was of that opinion himself, and that was determined upon. That night, at 12.20 a. m., General McClellan telegraphs the Secretary of War that he (General McClellan) is not responsible for the result, but feels that the government has not sustained his army.

To this the President replies, on the 28th: "If you have had a drawn battle, or a repulse, it is the price we pay for the enemy not being in Washington. We protected Washington and the enemy concentrated on you. Had we stripped Washington he would have been upon us before the troops sent could have got

to you.

"Save

your army at all events. Will send re-enforcements as fast as we can. Of course they cannot reach you to day, to-morrow, or next day."

The 28th of June passed without any serious fighting. Col. B. S. Alexander testifies that on the afternoon of that day he was sent for by Gen. McClellan, and went to his headquarters, at Savage's Station, arriving there about dark. He received instructions to proceed with an escort to the James river, send back a sufficient number of men to act as guides for the different columns of the army, communicate with the gunboats, and order supplies to be brought up the river; to examine both shores of the James to the mouth of the Chickahominy, and ascertain the landing places; proceed up the Chickahominy to the head of navigation and ascertain the places where the army could cross, in case of necessity, and then return to headquarters and report. He left Savage's Station that night, and reached the James river the next afternoon. By the time he had completed his examination the army had reached the James river at Malvern.

While at headquarters, receiving his instructions, he was shown, as he testifies, a printed order, not then issued, directing the destruction of the baggage of officers and men, and the tents, camps, equipage and things of that kind; appealing to the army to submit to this privation, as it would be only temporary"only for a few days." He remonstrated with Gen. McClellan against issuing such an order; that it would have a bad effect, would demoralize the army, as it would be telling them more plainly than they could be told in any other way that they were defeated and running for their lives. The order was not issued, and Gen. McClellan testifies that he has no recollection of any such order.

up

The retreat to the James river having been decided upon, the army took its march, being attacked by the enemy in the day time, and however successful in repelling those attacks, evacuating their positions during the night. The

actions of Savage's Station, Glendale and Malvern were fought during the movement of the army to the James, the enemy being repulsed in each day's fighting, and our army falling back, under orders, during the night.

It would appear, from all the information your committee can obtain, that the battles were fought, the troops handled, new dispositions made and old ones changed, entirely by the corps commanders, without directions from the commanding general. He would place the troops in the morning, then leave the field and seek the position for the next day, giving no directions until the close of the day's fighting, when the troops would be ordered to fall back during the night to the new position selected by him. In that manner the army reached the James river.

The battle of Malvern Hill, of the 1st of July, was the most fiercely contested of any upon the peninsula. The troops were placed in the morning, under direction of General McClellan, who then left the field, returning to it again in the afternoon. The first action of the day commenced about 10 o'clock in the forenoon, but did not continue long. The principal action, when the enemy attacked most vigorously and persistently, commenced late in the afternoon, and continued till after dark, the enemy being repulsed and beaten at every point. Many of the officers examined by your committee are of the opinion that the enemy were so severely punished on that day that they could have been followed into Richmond had our army followed them up vigorously. It is true that our army had been severely tried during the preceding week, fighting, as they did, nearly every day, and retreating every night. The corps commanders and the troops under them fought most bravely-no troops better. However disheartened they may have become by what all must have regarded as a precipitate retreat during the night, they still fought with the most obstinate bravery when attacked in the day time by an exultant and successful

enemy.

The commanding general, however, determined to fall back from Malvern to Harrison's Bar, notwithstanding the victory won there by our army. He seems to have regarded his army as entirely unfitted to meet the enemy, for on the day of the battle at Malvern, evidently before that battle took place, he writes to the adjutant general of the army from Haxall's plantation:

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My men are completely exhausted, and I dread the result if we are attacked to-day by fresh troops. If possible, I shall retire to-night to Harrison's Bar, where the gunboats can render more aid in covering our position. Permit me to urge that not an hour should be lost in sending me fresh troops. More gunboats are much needed."

When

On the 2d of July the President telegraphs to General McClellan: "Your despatch of yesterday morning induces me to hope your army is having some rest. In this hope allow me to reason with you for a moment. you ask for 50,000 men to be promptly sent you, you must surely labor under some gross mistake of fact. Recently you sent papers showing your disposal of forces made last spring for the defence of Washington, and advising a return to that plan. I find included in and about Washington 75,000 men. Now please be assured that I have not men enough to fill that very plan by 15,000. All of General Frémont's in the valley; all of General Banks's; all of General McDowell's not with you; and all in Washington, taken together, do not exceed, if they reach, 60,000. With General Wool and General Dix added to those mentioned, I have not outside of your army 75,000 men east of the mountains. Thus the idea of sending you 50,000, or any other considerable force, promptly, is simply absurd. If, in your frequent mention of responsibility, you had the impression that I blame you for not doing more than you can, please be relieved of such impression. I only beg that in like manner you will not ask impossibilities of me.

"If you think you are not strong enough to take Richmond just now, I do