ville, as I had intended to do in the first place. The line of march would have been nearly three-quarters of a circle, liable to be ruptured by them at several points, with only one road for us to go over. I gave that up and went around and undertook what was not so conclusive an operation to get around by our right, the more so that I was apprehensive that the compact with me that General Johnson should be kept in the valley of Virginia might not be fulfilled. Therefore I wanted to get between him and Beauregard, and I tried to do so. You now ask about turning their left. They are now at Centreville; their largest force is at Centreville. They occupy a ridge between Slaty and Rocky runs, an excellent ridge for them to defend against any approach coming from the same point we went before, that is, by the Warrenton turnpike, which goes into Little River turnpike a short distance from Germantown. Little River turnpike runs in almost a straight line a little north of west from Alexandria to Fairfax Court-House. A little before you reach Germantown the road forks, Warrenton turnpike going a little south of west, and Little River turnpike continuing on a little north of west. Centreville is some six miles from Germantown. The best road to go by their left is by Little River turnpike, which is a good, broad stone road. This road passes close by Centreville, and is intersected by two roads running north from the neighborhood of Centreville, and a force going to turn their left would have to pass with its flank exposed towards Centreville, so that if you go out that way you would have to go with the whole in army force ready for a general engagement. They are said to have 75,000 men at Centreville. I do not know but it might be a good way to go, but it would not be as conclusive as to go the other way. The way I would prefer to go would be to send forward the whole army. I would place a corps d'armée of three divisions at Vienna; another of three divisions at Fairfax Court-House; another of three divisions at Fairfax Station; and another at Occoquan; and then I would have another of three divisions for a reserve. The various corps d'armée would then be close to each other; if one was attacked there would be one on each side to come to its assistance. Vienna is supplied by railroad from Alexandria; Fairfax Court-House is supplied by Little River turnpike; Fairfax Station is supplied by another railroad, and the corps below would also have the same railroad by which to be supplied; so that you could use these railroads and Little River turnpike, and also Leesburg turnpike, to supply your force. These roads all radiate from the central point of Alexandria, which is a strategetical point of great consequence, so far as that force is concerned; and the roads should be made good between these different corps. Your side communications should be made good, and the country occupied in sufficient force to enable you to use your side communications; have all your secondary communications made good, that is, from Falls Church to Fairfax Court-House, and from Flint Hill, so that you could have abundant means to go forward, or to fall back if too hardly pressed. You would then have a force as large as theirs. I think it is a rule that when your force is as large as that of the enemy you should not avoid battle, but only seek to give it on favorable terms; when it is less, you then avoid battle, and when it is greater you seek to bring it on.

Now, admitting that our force would be as large as that of the enemy-I cannot tell about that-we are then on an inner circle, and have that advantage. They occupy an outer concentric circle, with a line that is probably thirty miles long. I give it approximately. The force of General Banks could then come down here, and the force of General Hooker could come up; for, if we press this large body of men forward, they would only think of defence, not of attack. They would not think of touching the capital; in fact, I have never supposed that they entertained such an idea since the blue times of last April, before we had got sufficiently strong to defend Washington. I do not believe they would attempt to cross the Potomac either below or above, for I think they have given up the idea of getting Maryland out. I think if they are pressed in this man

ner by this large force in the centre they would be obliged to weaken their extremities, or, if not, then they would run the risk of being broken; for, with this large force pressing them, I think we should find some place along their long line that we could penetrate; and, if that is done, then they are gone. You would have this advantage: if you penetrated their lines at any place, then you could throw yourself upon the right or left, holding the other portion in check; you are upon the interior, and your forces are closer together; while we should have a line, say of fifteen miles in extent at the furthest, they would have one of thirty miles.

I cannot but come back to that plan of going around by their right, which I could not accomplish by a move, but which I think could be done by approaches, under the cover of a large force, intrenched so as to leave its lines protected, and send this force to the right or left. I do not mean such defences as are thrown up around here, but such as are thrown up in the field; what the English call half-sunk batteries, abattis, rifle pits, &c. I would have met at Vienna and at Fairfax Court-Honse; at once sent forward men in the beginning to make a line, behind which we could go, either to the right or to the left.

They are undoubtedly expecting us to do that, and that is one reason against the plan. It is a good thing not to do what the enemy expect you to do, merely because they expect it. Now they want us to go to Centreville; I do not wish to do that, because it is a strong place. If they have done what they should, they have made it too strong, What they have done at Occoquan I do not know. I am told that they have defended it, as it has great facilities for defence.

I am speaking merely upon suppositions. I have not before me that precise information that a person ought to have before he proposes a plan upon which is to rest the fate of an expedition and the lives of men; but, if it is possible to do so, I am satisfied there is the place that ought to be pierced.

Question. Do you suppose this plan you speak of would be practicable soon? Answer. I do not know. That depends so much upon those things I have already fatigued you by repeating; that is, my not knowing what our own army is and what their army is. I am speaking upon the supposition that we have a force equal to theirs. Suppose an equality of force, and our position gives us the advantage.

Question. That is, because our line is much shorter than theirs.

Answer. We operate upon an interior line, and if we break theirs we have this advantage: we throw them upon diverging lines, while we can throw our whole force upon either. Strategically we have every advantage of them. What you cannot do in presence of an army you can do strategetically. That is to say, it would be a very dangerous thing to put a body of men between two other bodies of men to be crushed by their cross-fire; but if you can do it strategetically, penetrate their line and divide it into two parts, while you hold the one in check you can throw yourself upon the other and crush it. Now, I cannot tell whether that would be reasonably sure of success. I do not know what their force at Occoquan is; I have heard of no reconnoissance made there at all.

Question. From the best information you have, what do you suppose to be the number of their troops here?

Answer. All that I have as a basis to go upon is this: I saw a letter written from Centreville, and not intended, of course, to divulge information, and that is the reason why I give faith to it. The writer was referring to the flutter that existed in the ranks of their army over there in regard to the creation of a certain number of major generals. He told how the army was organized; into brigades of four regiments each, the same as ours; but that they only put two brigades into a division. That is, they put eight regiments, or battalions, in at division, instead of twelve, as we have. "Now," says he, in his letter, "this

makes quite a stir as to the appointment of the twelve major generals." That would then give them twenty-four brigades, or ninety-six regiments. Their regiments are about as strong as ours, and that would give them a force, perhaps, of 75,000 men. That undoubtedly is the greatest number they have at Centreville. They have a corps on the Occoquan, and we also know they have a corps at Aquia with the batteries there. They also have a small force, some 5,000 men, at Leesburg. What number they have back at Manassas is purely a matter of conjecture. Altogether, I should think this might give them a force of 130,000 I know it has been said by some that they probably had a force of some 200,000 or 210,000 men; but I do not think so. I know the dfficulties we have encountered in getting our force here. What our force is I do not know; but I do not think it is 200,000.

men.

Question. I do not see how they can get more than we have, with much less population to draw from?

Answer. They have two advantages over us. Public opinion there is so intense, their hatred to us is so violent, that they can take measures which we cannot take. They have practically a system of conscription there. They do not pay railroads or manufacturers anything. Their paper currency answers their purpose quite as well as gold and silver answers ours, for everybody is forced to take it, and they thus get what they want with it. The people there are obliged to go into the ranks, for there is a far greater degree of pressure upon them at the south than there is upon us at the north; they cannot stay at home. At the north it is voluntary; there they cannot help themselves.

Question. That is so. But their ability to supply their men with food, clothing, transportation, &c., is less than ours?

Answer. There never was an army in the world that began to be supplied as well as ours is. I believe a French army of half the size of ours could be supplied with what we waste. The amount of waste is fearful. I am ashamed of the amount of scolding I have to do on the subject of the waste of bread. I have seen loaves of bread thrown away that had not even been broken open. Our men will not use it if it is a little stale. I have begged them not to draw it, if they cannot eat it. They get large pay, and when the sutlers come around with their pies, tarts, and cakes, the men stuff themselves with those things and waste the rations drawn from the government. It is a waste that comes out of the country at large. But I believe we ought to supply twice the force we do with what it costs us to supply this force.

Question. Now about the cavalry. That is a very expensive arm of the service, and of course we must retrench wherever we can without impairing at all the efficiency of the army. Now what amount of cavalry do you suppose we can make use of in this army of the Potomac to advantage?

Answer. We have twelve regiments, I think. I think that is an abundance with the condition of the army; and then there is the cavalry of reserve; I do not know how much there is of that. I should think that a brigade of cavalry might answer all the purposes of reserve. I should think that fourteen or sixteen regiments altogether would be sufficient here. I do not know how much we have here.

Question. I do not suppose we have that amount of cavalry?

Answer. Yes, sir, we have. I have one regiment in my division, and I am told that all the other divisions have a regiment each, and there are twelve divisions; and I know there are regiments in reserve.

Question. Then I understand you that you think you have not more than you need here?

Answer. I think we might do with less than that. I think that I might perhaps have done with two-thirds of the amount of cavalry I have. But then the nominal amount of cavalry is so much greater than the actual.

Question. Some have thought that in view of the unevenness of the ground

here, the wooded nature of the country, &c., we could not use so much cavalry to advantage, and we desired to know if there was more than was needed in order to retrench?

Answer. Cavalry regiments are of six squadrons each, and there are two squadrons to a brigade. That amount might be diminished. We are now organized by divisions. If we were to be organized by corps of three divisions each, two regiments of cavalry would be perfectly sufficient for the three divisions.

By Mr. Johnson:

Question. How many divisions have you?

Answer. We have eight on the other side of the river, and then there are here three others formed, and one now in process of formation. There are twelve divisions right around Washington, besides the divisions of General Banks and General Dix; and then there is a division of regulars besides; or rather they intend to make one, if they can get it up, I believe.

By the chairman :

Question. If no advance is contemplated until spring, is there any way to clear this river of the batteries of the enemy?

Answer. I do not know. I cannot say. I do not know what batteries there are below here, how they are placed, what their strength is, or what naval preparations we have. The best way to get at them would be to break their line in the centre. If we could force our way across Occoquan, it seems to me that all that matter must terminate of itself.

Question. If you get all the country in rear of their batteries, of course, they must go.

Answer. I do not mean to say quite that. What I mean to say is, that that is my remedy for all the difficulties.

Question. I find, so far as we have investigated, that there is great uncertainty as to the position of the enemy, the amount of their force, and the strength and extent of their fortifications.

Answer. They are so far off that we cannot tell much about them. If we were closer to them we could tell more about them They are off at Centreville, and if you send out a small party, the chances are that it will be cut up by some party of the enemy three times its size, which would have a bad effect upon the morale of the men. It makes it hazardous to send out a party. I am always anxious when I send out a party for forage until they return, for I cannot tell what they may meet with on their way, as the country is all covered with woods, and they are continually liable to be surprised.

Question. Is there any remedy for that unless we do come closer to them? Answer. I do not know of any. The only remedy I know is to get closer to them.

Question. Of course, all war is more or less hazardous. But we are in a condition now where we must stir ourselves, on account of the expense.

Answer. It must be horrible.

Question. It is awful; and we are endeavoring to see if there is any way in God's world to get rid of the capital besieged, while Europe is looking down upon us as almost a conquered people.

Answer. I appreciate that. I have always thought, and have so said among my friends, that in the month of December we could operate. I did not think to be here Christmas. I thought that before New Year's we should have cracked this thing in front of us. I hope you will appreciate one thing. I am not in a condition to know their force. But their force being admitted to be equal to ours, we are much the superior in position. And I do not think the winter an insuperable obstacle to our operating in front here.

Question. But you do not favor this expedition by water up the York river, to Richmond?

Answer. I think it is too late in the day for that. We would have to go to work now and make all our preparations for it. It is a thing to begin a thing of this kind without getting everything on hand to overcome every obstacle that you can reasonably foresee to the accomplishment of your expedition. Suppose you make a landing with your forces there. The very moment you do that, if you have not the means to go forward at once to Richmond, and commence the siege of that place, they will get around you, just as they have in our expedition below, and as they did over here. We did here the very worst thing we could do; that is, to go over there and sit down without advancing at all. The very moment we did that they brought up their forces, and we had to fight a battle, which we lost. If we start to Richmond, we must be prepared to move on there at once after we land, with everything necessary to prosecute the siege. We must be prepared to take their batteries, which I am satisfied they have on the river, for they know the value of them. We must be prepared to build and stock a railroad from our landing place across to Richmond, to carry forward the material necessary to besiege Richmond. That is one of the good things we ought to have done before this time.

Question. It does seem to me that you military gentlemen would do well to compare opinions upon these matters. I do not believe but what you ought to have a council of war, and each one make his suggestions. So it seems to me from what I have been able to find out. I understand you to say that you

have had casual conversations with the commander-in-chief.

Answer. Yes, sir. A great while ago, and he agreed with me then. I submitted a plan to do this in September, if not in August.

By Mr. Chandler:

Question. What has there been to prevent our building these wood roads upon your plan of advance at any time during the last two months?

Answer. I am told that it was a question of force. My impression is that that is the reason given, for there is no question about one thing, that our position is better than theirs strategetically. A line of thirty miles over such ground as that, full of hills and ravines, is a long one.

By the chairman :

Question. And with the forces comparatively the same, it would have been better two months ago than it is now?

Answer. Yes, sir, all other things being equal. Considering our position at Alexandria, they occupy a circle on the outside, of which we have the centre. It is plain upon its face that we have the position. Now if we go and take a position in front of them, behind which we can mask our movements, they cannot tell where we are going to strike.

Question. In other words, we have "the inside track," as they say? Answer. I was going to use that very expression. I occupied just such a position at Centreville last summer. Centreville is a central point to Blackburn's ford, and other fords, so that the opposite general did not know whether I was going here or there. If we should move forward now, we could supply the large bulk of our army by railroad from Alexandria, as we do now. Now by fortifying our approaches to their line, and being in as large force as they are, if we break their lines in any place we can then throw a large force upon either portion of them. If in approaching we come under fire, we must dig a trench and throw up the earth so as to keep off the shot. Go forward a certain distance and make a parallel, then go forward again and make another parallel, and so approach the enemy. I do not propose to go out and give them battle, as we did last July, but to throw out columns to Vienna, and Fairfax Court-House, and Fairfax Station, and some place on the Occoquan. The country is a