tol), on the 22d day of June, 1863, ordered Lieutenant-General Ewell to move his corps to the line of the Susquehannah—one division to cross over the mountain and pass through Gettysburg to York, Pa., with a view of indicating a movement upon Baltimore, as he writes in his first report (p. 307): In order to retain it (the Union Army), on the east side of the mountains, after it should enter Maryland, and thus leave open our communications with the Potomac through Hagerstown and Williamsport, General Ewell had been instructed to send a division eastward from Chambersburg to cross the South Mountain. Early's division was detached for this service. and proceeded as far east as York." Ewell, with the other two divisions was directed to proceed north, up the Valley, through Chambersburg to Harrisonburg, which place, General Ewell says in his report, he was ordered to capture.

THE FIRST ERROR.

Longstreet and Hill crossed the Potomac on the 26th, and reached Chambersburg on the evening of the 27th. The same day Ewell with his two divisions reached Carlisle, and Early with the other, the neighborhood of York. The infantry was now admirably arranged for an advance upon Harrisburg, and from there, upon Philadelphia and New York, with nothing in that direction to oppose it but hastily gathered militia. The army had found, in the country occupied, abundant supplies of subsistance and forage, as well as horses and other quartermaster supplies.

Unfortunately, General Lee had, before leaving Virginia given his consent that Stuart, with three brigades of his cavalry, should pass around in rear of Hooker's army and cross the Potomac between it and Washington, whilst the other two brigades were left to guard the mountain passes in Virginia, and observe the movements of Hooker's army, with orders to make reports directly to General Lee or Longstreet. Nothing was heard from either division until Stuart reported at Gettysburg in the afternoon of July 2nd, and Robertson on the 3rd. The consequences of that error were soon apparent, for to it was due the fact that General Lee assumed the aggressive against Meade's army and attacked it in position as will

appear.

On the 28th, General Lee, thinking from not hearing from the cavalry that Hooker had not left Virginia-writes (p. 307): "Preparations were now made to advance upon Harrisburg; but on the night of the 28th, information was received from a scout that the

Federal army, having crossed the Potomac, was advancing northward, and that the head of the column had reached the South Mountain. As our communications with the Potomac were menaced, it was resolved to prevent his further progress in that direction by cencentrating our army on the east side of the mountains. Accordingly, Longstreet and Hill were directed to proceed from Chambersburg to Gettysburg, to which point General Ewell was also instructed to march from Carlisle."

THE ADVANCE ARRESTED.

Again, in his later and more carefully considered report, after the reports from all the different parts of the army had been received by him, he writes (p. 316): "The advance upon Harrisburg was arrested by intelligence received from a scout on the night of the 28th, to the effect, that the army of General Hooker had crossed the Potomac, and was approaching the South Mountain. In the absence of the cavalry it was impossible to ascertain his intentions; but to deter him from advancing further west and intercepting our communications with Virginia, it was determined to concentrate the army east of the mountains."

Acting under the impression produced by the scout's information, that the Union army was moving westward towards Hagerstown, on the line of his communications with Virginia, it must have been a great surprise to him, when his leading divisions approached Gettysburg, to find Meade's advance was there ahead of him.

It had evidently been General Lee's plan to operate west of the South Mountain range, and keep General Meade east of it, as the sending Early east of it to threaten Baltimore clearly indicates. In case the Union army crossed over in spite of his manœuvres to prevent it, he relied upon the fact that the concentration of his army at Gettysburg would place him nearer to Baltimore than it, and unless his move was quickly responded to by it, he could interpose his army between Baltimore and Washington on the one side and the Union army on the other. He was in error in supposing that contingency had arisen, though it appears from the fact on the morning of the 28th, three of the seven corps of the Union army were in the Catoctin Valley, near Middleton, and one other at Knoxville, with the passes in the South Mountain heavily guarded, that it was Hooker's purpose to have crossed over as General Lee supposod he was doing.

WAS NOT INFORMED.

But, on the 28th, General Hooker was displaced and General Meade placed in command of the army. He immediately drew back the corps from Middleton to Frederickstown, so that they might be prepared to join in the general advance of the whole army towards the Susquehannah on the east side of the mountain range, which advance was to be put in motion early on the morning of the 29th. Of this change of arrangement, General Lee had no intimation until the two armies came into collision near Gettysburg. Had he known that General Meade had withdrawn the corps from Middleton on the 28th, as he should have known if his cavalry had been watching those gaps, and was advancing as rapidly as possible east of the mountains as it advanced, are that he would not have ordered the concentration of his army east of the mountain, for he so distinctly states: "To deter him from advancing further west and intercepting our communications with Virginia, it was determined to concentrate the army east of the mountains."

If the Army of the Potomac had crossed over the South Mountain at the passes in Maryland, as General Lee supposed it was doing, and approached him from that direction, occupying his line of communication and taking possession of the gaps in the mountain as it advanced, a prompt concentration of his whole army east of the mountains, alone could prevent. Meade from soon occupying the gaps between him and Gettysburg, and thus forcing him to turn back and make the attack with all the strong strategic and tactical positions occupied by his adversary. Thus, it was not what Meade did, but what General Lee thought he was doing that caused him to fall back from before Harrisburg. Just enough information to mislead, brought on the battle of Gettysburg. When the army crossed the Potomac, it was expected of the cavalry to furnish reliable informamation of the movements of the Army of the Potomac. I can find nothing in the records that throws any light upon what it was that detained the two brigades under Robertson in Virginia until July 1st, when they crossed the river at Williamsport. The Army of the Potomac had been withdrawn from Loudoun—the last of the cavalry crossing the river on the 27th, and the positions taken up that night. General Jones, commanding one of the brigades, takes up his report on the 29th, with his command at Snickersville, Loudoun county. There were no reports from the other brigade, and it appears there

were no reports from either of them to General Lee at the time of the movements of the enemy.

WOULD NOT HAVE CROSSED.

What General Lee would have done, had he known the facts fully instead of being compelled to act upon the imperfect information of the scout, is a question open to speculation, for General Lee never disclosed what were his plans in contingencies that never arose. But had he known that Meade's army was moving-the left wing, composed of three corps-through Emmetsburg to Gettysburg, and the other four moving on lines east of that route and kept within easy supporting distance, the 12th and 2d Corps directed upon Gettysburg, the 5th upon Hanover, and the 6th to Manchester, to be a general reserve to the whole, it is almost positively certain that he would not have crossed his army over the mountain.

The Union correspondence may throw some light to guide the speculations of those inclined to construct a theory based upon probabilities.

General Couch, commanding in that department, with headquarters at Harrisburg, wrote to the Secretary of War June 29th (page 497): "I hold from Altoona along the Juniata and Susquehannah to Conowingo bridge above Havre-de-Grace (a distance of more than 200 miles). My whole force organized is, perhaps, 16,000 men. 5,000 regulars can whip them all to pieces in an open field. I am afraid they will ford the river in its present state." Again, on the same day, to General Meade: “I have only 15,000 men, such as they are, on my whole line-say 9,000 here."

Lieutenant Thomas, Adjutant-General, wrote to Secretary E. M. Staunton from Harrisburg July 1st (page 478): "This is a difficult place to defend, as the river is fordable both above and below," and proceeds to comment upon the "want of artillery and especially of practiced artillerists," and the deficiency of cavalry, and concludes: "The excitement here is not so great as I found it in Philadelphia, and the people begin to understand that the fate of this city depends entirely upon the results of the operations of the Army of the Potomac."

FEDERAL APPREHENSION.

Simon Cameron to Mr. Lincoln from Harrisburg June 29th (409): "Let me impress upon you the absolute necessity of action by Meade to-morrow, even if attended with great risk, because if Lee

gets his army across the Susquehannah and puts our army on the defensive on that line, you will readily comprehend the disastrous results that must follow to the country.”

Secretary E. M. Stanton to General Dana in command at Philadelphia, dated War Department, June 29th (408): "It is very important that machinery for manufacturing arms should not fall into the hands of the enemy, and that it should be preserved for the use of the government. In case of imminent danger to the works of Alfred Jenks & Son, of Philadelphia, who is manufacturing arms for the government, you are authorized and directed to impress steam tugs, barges or any description of vessels to remove the gunmanufacturing machines beyond the reach of the enemy.”

These extracts indicate what the highest officials of the United States Government thought were some of the possibilities before General Lee, and also that Harrisburg would not have attempted to resist an attack by Ewell. It is presumed that General Lee knew something of these conditions, for he had always heretofore kept himself well-informed in regard to the conditions he had to encounter. He must have known something of the quality of the militia, for Early's cavalry had come upon a full regiment of this militia at Gettysburg, which had dispersed so quickly that Jenkins could not get in sight of it. York had been abandoned by the military, and the municipal officers met Early several miles from the city to treat for its surrender. Again, at Wrightsville, 1,200 militia had retreated across the bridge and set fire to it, before Gordon could get his brigade in position to attack. General Early writes (p. 467): "I regretted very much the failure to secure the bridge, as, finding the defenseless condition of the country generally, and the little obstacle likely to be afforded by the militia to our progress, I had determined, if I could get possession of the Columbia bridge, to cross my division over the Susquehannah.'

EWELL'S POSSIBILITIES.

General Ewell reached Carlisle on the 27th, and writes (p. 443): "From Carlisle I sent forward my engineer, Captain H. B. Richardson, with Jenkins' cavalry, to reconnoitre the defences of Harrisburg and was starting on the 29th for that place, when ordered by the General commanding to join the main body of the army at Cashtown, near Gettysburg. General Rodes writes (p. 552): “On the arrival at Carlisle, Jenkins' cavalry advanced towards Harrisburg