METHODIST

QUARTERLY REVIEW.

OCTOBER, 1880.

ART. I.-ADMINISTRATION OF CHURCH LAW. Ecclesiastical Law and Rules of Evidence, with Special Reference to the Jurisprudence of the Methodist Episcopal Church. By Hon. WILLIAM J. HENRY and WILLIAM L. HARRIS, D.D., LL.D. Cincinnati: Hitchcock & Walden. New York: Phillips & Hunt. 1879.

THIS treatise is designed to assist in the orderly and legal, and thereby just and fair, administration of the rules and discipline of the Church. A portion of it is specially adapted to our own. denomination, but it likewise contains a compendious statement of principles of law and rules of evidence which might well be commended to the observance of other Church tribunals. The importance of the subject is to be estimated from the object to be attained, and this is set forth in the preface as the maintenance of "sound doctrine and good morals." "In its legislation and administration the Church should seek, in all legitimate ways and to the extent of its authority, to prevent whatever would corrupt its doctrines, subvert its order, interrupt its peace, and stain its purity. Nothing scandalous or offensive should be allowed in its members; every Christian and churchly duty should be faithfully fulfilled; and all things should be done with seemliness and order unto edification and the glory of God. All these things are, therefore, proper subjects for the thoughtfulness, care, and authority of the Church."

This is a clear and temperate statement of the great objects to be attained, as nearly as may be, by a faithful administration of discipline. Essential integrity in morals and doctrine is a FOURTH SERIES, VOL. XXXII.-40

necessary condition of life and efficiency in a Church. We would not lightly esteem the charity which suffereth long and is kind, but every communion of Christians is bound to insist upon rectitude of intention, at least, in its members, and a persistent endeavor to conform the life to the pure standard of the Gospel. No fervors of devotion can atone for a willful and habitual disregard of the moral law. This may seem to be an incongruous joining of ideas, but we sometimes see both the fervor and the immorality, not only in the same Church, but in the same person.

There is at times a tendency to laxity of discipline, when faithfulness would lead to the sacrifice of social and material advantages; and we may be apt to think it better to retain these, even at some cost, as a means of influence and power. But it was found out long ago that "better is a little with righteousness than great revenues without right." The long toleration of wrong not only breeds corruption and contagion within, but repels them that are without.

Neither should a Church continue to harbor those who seek to undermine its cardinal doctrines. We would allow a liberal margin for individuality of opinion, and for the different colorings which are given to the same truth by the wonderful variety of human minds. We would by no means trench upon a becoming independence of thought; but when a man's convictions lead him to discard the recognized and authoritative standards of the Church to which he belongs, its doors should open outward for him. Indeed, it is one of the mysteries, that men finding themselves in such a position should wish to remain. Of course this has no reference to the advocacy of changes in the economy of the organization.

We shall have occasion further on to consider the manner and spirit in which the law should be enforced; but it is pertinent, in this connection, to quote a rule which Chief-Justice Hale laid down for his own administration of justice: "That it be done, 1, uprightly; 2, deliberately; 3, resolutely."

The book before us is very comprehensive in its scope. It gives a summary of principles and rules which have been the subject of many and extended treatises. The attempt to condense within the compass of a volume such various matters, many of them involving ninute and technical learning, has,

we think, been performed as successfully as the nature of the undertaking would admit. The discussions, as a rule, are connected, clear, and very suggestive. While the statements are necessarily brief, they are, at the same time, accurate and precise.

We shall have occasion further on to criticise some of the details, but we have no hesitation in commending the work as a valuable codification of the principles of law and evidence; valuable for the purposes had in view in its preparation.

Part First is a sort of philosophical disquisition on the origin, nature, and binding force of law-divine and human; the relations of ecclesiastical and civil law; and the responsibilities of those who are the subjects of law. Part Second treats of the organization and government of the M. E. Church, with special reference to the judicial administration of its Discipline. Parts Third and Fourth are devoted to a consideration of the rules. of evidence. Part Fifth relates to practice, and this is supplemented at the end of the book with a collection of appropriate forms and precedents. Part Sixth is a discussion of the legal evidence of the authenticity of the Scriptures.

The main feature of this work is the portion devoted to the law of evidence. This includes a considerable part of that which comes under the title of "Practice." It is no overstatement when the author says: "Under this head, which is by far the most important part of a Church investigation or trial, we propose to consider those general rules that experience and the wisdom of ages have demonstrated as important guides to the attainment of truth. Every science has its rules of investigation, the ultimate object being the attainment of truth, whether it be the solution of a mathematical truth that is capable of demonstration, or a moral truth which is incapable of demonstration, except to satisfy the conscience of the tribunal before whom the investigation takes place. The rules of evidence are the means employed for the attainment of this object." -P. 108. To give even a synopsis of the treatment of this subject would monopolize the space allowed to this article.

It will strike the reader of the work that the author has extended his discussion beyond those rules and principles which have a direct or practical application before Church tribunals. There is much that relates to the various and intricate questions

which arise in the civil courts. But, in order intelligently to administer a rule in the simplest case, it is useful to understand its origin, and to trace the sometimes subtle distinctions which attend its application. It is quite the fashion to sneer at the technicalities of lawyers as being artificial, and perhaps absurd; but the thoughtful student of the science of evidence (as of other branches of law) will perceive that it is a system of common sense applied to the affairs of civilized communities. Mr. Phillipps says: "The principles of evidence are founded on our observations of human conduct, of common life, and living manners; they are not just because they are rules of law, but they are rules of law because they are just and reasonable." It is a code which has been built up by gradual accretions, through the reasonings of jurists, the tests of experience, and by the searching and sifting discussions of advocates in the courts, till it comes to us as the crystallized wisdom of ages. In sharp analysis and severe logic no science can excel it, but it is at the same time elastic, fitting itself to the requirements of every topic of investigation. Now, the mastery of these principles is not a matter of instinct. Dogberry says, "To write and read comes by nature," but the knowledge of jurisprudence is an acquisition. It requires, to be sure, a substratum of common sense, for without this any amount of legal learning will be unmanageable rubbish. But no man can safely handle the complicated machinery of justice till he has been somewhat indoctrinated in the principles and rules which have been handed down to us by our predecessors.

And yet, under the Discipline of our Church, those who preside at trials and make the rulings of law, from the lowest to the highest courts, (until we reach the General Conference,) are men who have not, unless outside of their present profession, had any legal training, and whose prescribed course of study, preparatory to the ministry, does not embrace even the most elementary work in juridical science. Of course, it is to be expected that the preachers should hold this important place in our judicial system. The preacher in charge is naturally the president, upon the trial of a member before a committee, and rightly so, as he is responsible for the proper administration of Discipline; the presiding elder, of course, occupies the same position at a Quarterly Confer

ence, and a bishop in a Judicial Conference. The committee of an Annual Conference trying a member must necessarily be composed of ministers, who, in that case, act in the double capacity of judge and jury.* An appeal can only come to the General Conference upon questions of law, and under the present arrangement it is referred for disposition to a Judiciary Committee, which at the General Conference of 1876 was composed of eleven ministers and one layman.† A committee appointed under the authority of the General Conference of 1872 to report a code, and a committee of the General Conference of 1876, to which the report, or rather reports, of the former committee were referred, both proposed to introduce the lay element into our ecclesiastical courts; but the very complete report of the latter committee, which seemed to be received with considerable favor, was presented at a late date, and failed of consideration for want of time. But whether under our present arrangement, or any other which may be adopted, it is obvious that it is very needful for our ministers to familiarize themselves somewhat with the principles and practice which obtain in the courts of law. We would venture to recommend the work under consideration as a sort of postgraduate text-book for those who have passed through the course prescribed by the bishops. And not only this, but that they should, as time and occasion serve, by other studies and by observation, acquaint themselves with legal modes of reasoning and with the practical application of laws to the daily concerns of life. There is a great temptation to suppose that our own ideas of right and wrong, and what we may be pleased to call a natural sense of justice, will guide us to correct results. Hence we are inclined to throw off the restraints of precedents. We say we will decide according to equity and good conscience. But herein lies the germ and opportunity of arbitrary and irresponsible dealing with the rights of others. Our courts, in the exercise of what is specially distinguished as their equity jurisdiction, are governed by principles as

* The last General Conference shut off all opportunity for professional assistance upon the trial of ministers by enacting that in all such cases no one shall appear as counsel either for the prosecution or defense, except a member of an Annual Conference.

In the General Conference of 1880 there were thirteen members of the Judiciary Committee, of whom five were laymen.