SHERMAN PITTED AGAINST JOHNSTON. 625 XXVIII. SHERMAN'S ATLANTA CAMPAIGN. his forces around Chattanooga with an army barely short of 100,000 men of all arms, with 254 guns. It was far superior in every thing but cavalry to that which it confronted; and which, though estimated by Sherman at 55,000 to 60,000, probably three corps, led by Hardee, Hood, and Polk. Sherman was from time to time rëenforced, so as nearly to keep his original number good; but, as he advanced into Georgia, the necessity of maintaining his communications seriously reduced his force at the front. GEN. WILLIAM T. SHERMAN, at the instance of Lt.-Gen. Grant, succeeded him in command of the military division of the Mississippi, embracing the four great departments of the Ohio, the Cumberland, the Tennessee, and the Arkansas. Receiving the order at Memphis,' he re-numbered hardly more than 50,000.* paired at once to Nashville, where Johnston's army was organized in he met the Lt.-General, and accompanied him so far as CincinnatiGrant being then on his way to Washington to direct thenceforth our operations generally, but more especially those in Virginia. The plans of the superior were freely imparted to and discussed with his most trusted. subordinate, ere they parted to enter respectively on their memorable campaigns against Richmond and Atlanta. Those campaigns were to be commenced simultaneously on the Rapidan and the Tennessee; and either movement to be pressed so vigorously, persistently, that neither of the Rebel main armies could spare troops to reenforce the other. When Sherman received his final instructions from Grant, it was settled that the campaign should open with May; and Gen. Sherman set forth' accordingly from the Winter encampments of 2 March 14, 1864. April 30. 'May 6. Army of the Cumberland-Gen. Thomas: Infantry. 4 54,565 Cavalry. Cavalry. 624 Artillery. Artillery. 1,404 Total. Army of the Tennessee-Gen. McPherson: Infantry. 22,437 Total. Artillery. Total. 679 18,559 98,797 The country between Chattanooga and Atlanta is different from, but even more difficult than, that which separates Washington from Richmond. Rugged mountains, deep, narrow ravines, thick, primitive woods, with occasional villages and more frequent clearings, or irregular patches of cultivation, all traversed by mainly narrow, ill-made roads, succeed each other for some 40 miles; then intervenes a like distance of comparatively open, facile country, traversed by two considerable rivers; then another rugged, difficult region of mountains and passes reaches nearly to the Chatta Johnston reported his infantry at 40,900. Sherman estimated his cavalry (under Wheeler) at 10,000. Estimating his artillery at 3,100, his total force would be 54,000. It was occasionally swelled rather than strengthened by drafts of such Georgians not already in the service as passed for militia. The force which Sherman, after passing the Oostenaula, could show at the front, was probably about 70,000 to Johnston's 45,000. hoochee; across which, 8 miles distant, lies the new but important city of Atlanta a focus of several railroads, having some 20,000 inhabitants, and then the seat of extensive manufactories of Confederate supplies. It had been well fortified, early in 1863. Johnston's position at Dalton was covered by an impassable mountain known as Rocky-Face ridge, cloven by the passage of Mill creek called Buzzard's Roost gap. The railroad traverses this pass, but our army could not; it being naturally very strong and now thoroughly fortified. Hence, while Thomas menaced' and feebly assailed it in front, McPherson flanked the enemy's left, moving down by Ship's gap, Villanow, and Snake creek gap, to seize either Resaca or some other point well in its rear, while Schofield should press on Johnston's right. In executing these orders, Thomas was compelled to bear more heavily on the Rebel front than was intended: Newton's division of Howard's (4th) corps, and Geary's of Hooker's (20th) corps, assaulting in earnest and even carrying portions of the ridge; whence they were soon repelled with loss. Meantime, McPherson had reached the front of Resaca, scarcely resisted; but he could not carry it, and dared not remain between it and Johnston's main body; so he fell back to a strong position in Snake creek gap, which he could hold for some hours against all gainsayers. Sherman now, leaving Howard's corps and some cavalry to threaten Dalton in front, moved' the rest of his forces rapidly in the track of Schofield, and through Snake creek gap; which compelled Johnston to evacuate his stronghold and fall back rapidly to Resaca; advancing in force against which, Kilpatrick, fighting the enemy's cavalry, was disabled by a shot. Sherman had calculated on seriously damaging Johnston when he thus retreated, but was unable to reach him-Johnston having the only direct, good road, while our flanking advance was made with great difiiculty. Howard entered Dalton on the heels of the enemy, and pressed him sharply down to Resaca. Sherman forthwith set on foot a new flanking movement by his right to turn Johnston out of Resaca; which Johnston countered by an attack on Hooker and Schofield, still in his front and on his left; but he was rather worsted in the bloody fight thus brought on: Hooker driving the Rebels from several hills, taking 4 guns and many prisoners. The Rebels retreated across the Oostenaula during the night, and our army entered Resaca in triumph next morning. McPherson crossed on our right at Lay's ferry next day; Gen. Thomas moving directly through Resaca, on the heels of Hardee, who covered the Rebel retreat; while Schofield advanced on our left, over a rough region, by such apologies for roads as he could find or make. Jeff. C. Davis's division of Thomas's army kept down the north-west bank of the Oostenaula to Rome, where he took 8 or 10 great guns, and destroyed mills and founderies of great importance to the enemy; leaving here a garrison. Johnston made a momentary stand against our central advance in a strong position covering Adairsville; but, on the approach of our main body, he again retreated, with only May 15. 7 May 10-11. sharp skirmishing between our van | well sheltered foe. Next morning, and his rear-guard; until, having the Rebel intrenched lines stretched passed through Kingston, he was unbrokenly from Dallas to Marietta, again found' holding a strong and over a most difficult region, wherein fortified position about Cassville, ap- days were necessarily spent by Sherparently intent on a decisive battle. man, amid continual skirmishing and Upon being pressed, however, he re- fighting, in making careful approachtreated, under cover of night, across es. He had just ordered Schofield the Etowah; burning the railroad to advance our left and flank the enand other bridges, and taking a still emy's right, when Johnston struck stronger position covering the Alla- heavily at our right at Dallas, held toona pass, where the country again by McPherson. But this attack becomes mountainous, rugged, and gave our men the advantage of difficult, and where he doubtless had breast works, and was repulsed with determined to fight in earnest. loss; as one made by Howard's corps on Cleburne, farther toward the center, was repulsed by the enemy. Our army was now moved" to the left along the Rebel front, enveloping the Allatoona pass, and compelling the enemy to evacuate it; as he soon after did his intrenchments covering New Hope church, and Ackworth also. Allatoona pass was promptly garrisoned by Sherman, and made a secondary base of supplies: the railroad bridge across the Etowah being repaired, and our trains down the road run to this point. Sherman, after halting two days to rest and reconnoiter, decided to flank him out of this by moving well to the right, concentrating his army on Dallas; to which point Jeff. C. Davis, at Rome, had already been directed, and on which Thomas now advanced; McPherson moving still farther to the right, by Van Wert, and swinging in on Thomas's right; while Schofield, moving on the east, should aim to come in on Thomas's left. Johnston promptly divined this movement, and prepared to baffle it. 10 Gen. Frank Blair here came up," with two divisions of the 17th corps, and Col. Long's brigade of cavalry; raising Sherman's effective force nearly to that with which he left Chattanooga; and he moved forward next day to Big Shanty. Thomas, advancing from Burnt Ilickory to Dallas, was confronted at Pumpkinvine creek by Rebel cavalry, whom he rapidly pushed across, gaving the burning bridge; but, as Hooker's corps, in the van, pushed on, his foremost division (Geary's) found the enemy in line of battle; and a severe conflict ensued, without decisive result. Hooker finally concentrated his command four miles north of Dallas, and struck hard, by Sherman's order, at Stewart's posi-nable by nature-lines which the ention covering New Hope church; whence, though he gained some ground, he was unable to drive the Kenesaw mountain, with its almost equally formidable neighbors, Pine and Lost mountains, now loomed before him, with Rebel lines two miles long covering the points not impreg emy were actively strengthening each hour. Here Sherman halted perforce, and studied and planned OUR REPULSE AT KENESAW MOUNTAIN. and manoeuvered; finally attempting to force, by sharp fighting, a way between Kenesaw and Pine mountains. In the desultory conflict that ensued, Lt.-Gen. Polk, Protestant Episcopal Bishop of Louisiana, was instantly killed" by a cannon-ball. He was engaged, with Johnston and Hardee, in making observations, when they were observed on our side, and two shots fired at them-it was said by Thomas's order-the first of which scattered the party to places of safety; but Polk soon tired of his, and, coming out to watch the firing, was struck in the side by a three-inch shot, which tore him to pieces. He neither spoke nor breathed thereaf ter. Pushing forward wherever the rugged nature of the ground would permit, with frequent assaults and constant battering and picket-firing, Sherman compelled the enemy to abandon Pine mountain," and then Lost mountain," with the long line of strong breast works connecting the latter with Kenesaw. Meantime, rain fell almost incessantly; the narrow mountain roads were rocky gullies; and the Rebel batteries on Kenesaw belched iron constantly at our lines-the balls generally passing harmlessly over the heads of our men, whom the enemy's guns could not be depressed sufficiently to reach. It being evident that we were steadily though slowly gaining ground, especially on our right, a sally and attack were made" by the enemy, led by Hood, with intent to interpose between Thomas's right and Schofield's left, near what was known as 'the Kulp house.' The blow fell on Williams's division of 629 Hooker's corps, and Hascall's of Schofield's army, but utterly failedthe enemy being repulsed from our lines with heavy loss, including some prisoners. Sherman now determined to assault in turn, and did " so, after careful preparation, at two points, south of Kenesaw, and in front of Gens. Thomas and McPherson respectively; but the enemy's position was found, at fearful cost, absolutely impregnable-each attack being signally repulsed, with an aggregate loss of 3,000, including Gens. Harker and Dan. McCook, killed, and Col. Rice, with other valuable officers, badly wounded. The Rebels, thoroughly sheltered by their works, reported their loss at 442. Gen. Sherman, in his report, de. fends this assault as follows: "Upon studying the ground, I had no alternative but to assault or turn the enemy's position. Either course had its difficulties and dangers. And I perceived that the enemy and our own officers had settled down into a conviction that I would not assault fortified lines. All looked to me to outflank. An army, to be efficient, must not settle down to one single mode of offense, that promises success. I wished, therefore, but must be prepared to execute any plan for the moral effect, to make a successful assault on the enemy behind his breast works. ** ** ** which I assume the entire responsibility, I yet claim that it produced good fruits; as it demonstrated to Gen. Johnston that I would assault, and that boldly; and we also gained and held ground so close to the enemy's parapets that he could not show a head above them." Failure as it was, and for If these be sound reasons, they at least as fully justify Grant's order to assault at Cold Harbor: Kenesaw being a palpable Gibraltar, which Cold Harbor is not. Sherman did not choose to rest on this bloody repulse; but, waiting only |