anton had now assumed the immedi- | in pressing steadily westward, so as ate command. A Rebel detachment to get between the enemy and his under Shelby had crossed the Mis- necessary line of retreat, and strike souri at Arrow Rock and advanced him as he attempted to pass; and on Glasgow; which they took, after a it matters not whether he had been fight of some hours; capturing part of drawn so far northward in quest of Col. Harding's 43d Missouri, with food or in order to double on his small detachments of the 9th Mis- pursuers. When Pleasanton's adsouri militia, and 17th Illinois cav- vance, under McNeil and Sanborn, alry. reached" Lexington, the enemy had left, moving rapidly westward, and at the Little Blue striking Blunt's Kansas division, of which Gen. Curtis had now assumed command, in such force as compelled him, after a few hours' conflict, being flanked, to fall back to the Big Blue, where he took up a strong position. Rosecrans, presuming that Curtis could hold his ground, ordered Pleasanton to send McNeil, with a brigade only, on the track of the enemy, and, with his remaining cavalry, move southward, to Lone Jack; whither Smith, with his infantry, was now hastening from his false move to Lexington.

This bold stroke ought to have insured the destruction of at least half the Rebel army, which an overwhelming Union force was now moving to inclose and crush. But A. J. Smith was stopped, with our supplies, at the Lamine, where the enemy had burned the railroad bridge; and where Mower joined him: when, taking five days' rations, Smith advanced" to Dunksburg; Pleasanton, with our cavalry, including Mower's, under Winslow, being well advanced, on a line stretching northward from Warrensburg.

The enemy was north-west of this, and seemed disposed to stay there: his advance" reaching Lexington, driving Gen. Blunt with a force from Kansas, who, after a sharp skirmish, retreated on Independence. Rosecrans, learning this by telegraph, directed" Pleasanton, who had been demonstrating toward Waverly, to move in force on Lexington, ordering Smith to follow; and both, of course, obeyed.

These orders seem to have been mistakes-very natural, perhaps, but not the less unfortunate. It is not easy to overtake an army mainly mounted, which lives off the country, has few guns, and burns every bridge behind it; but our only chance of crushing so nimble an adversary, lay

These orders seem to have been contingent, and, at any rate, were not obeyed. Pleasanton, with all his cavalry, pressed on the track of the flying enemy; reaching the Little Blue" at 10 A. M., only to find the bridge destroyed and the enemy's rear-guard rather stubborn beyond it; he driving them steadily till nightfall; when Independence was taken by a brilliant cavalry charge-Cutherwood's regiment capturing two guns

Pleasanton following sharply, after dispatching McNeil, with his brig ade, to Little Santa Fé, to intercept. the enemy, and telegraphing Rosecrans, "Let Smith come to this place." Hereupon, Rosecrans--"reluctantly," as he very naturally says 7 Oct. 20, 7 P. M.

T1 Oct. 20.

72

73 Oct. 22.

PRICE CHASED OUT OF MISSOURI.

-gave the order solicited; which reached Smith that night at Chapel Hill, just as he was putting his column in motion southward, and sent it westward instead.

Next morning, Pleasanton pressed on to the crossing of the Big Blue; where he found the enemy's main body-which, the day before, had fought Curtis, but had not moved him-prepared for resistance. The fight opened at 7 A. M., and was maintained with spirit on both sides till 1 P. M., when the Rebels decamped were "routed and fled southward," says Rosecrans; though they would of course use different terms in describing the matter. They went, however, beyond doubt; eagerly pursued by Pleasanton and Curtis beyond Little Santa Fé.

Smith, with 9,000 infantry and five batteries, reached Independence at 5 P. M.; when his weary men were forthwith put in motion for Hickman's mills, where it was hoped he would strike the flank of the flying foe. But it was too late. His false moves (through no fault of his own) to Lexington and to Independence, had opened a door of escape to Price, which he was too good a general not to profit by; and he was too fleet and too far ahead to be henceforth overtaken by infantry.

Curtis, with his Kansas men, took" the lead in the pursuit; but soon gave place to Pleasanton's horsemen; who, after a march of 60 miles, struck them about midnight at the Maraisdes-Cygnes, opening upon their bivouac at 4 A. M.," with artillery; setting them at once in motion, and chasing them to the Little Osage, where they turned to fight, display

561

ing S guns in their line of battle. Pleasanton at once ordered a charge by Benteen's and Phillips's brigades, which was superbly made, and resulted in the capture of their 8 guns and 1,000 prisoners, including Maj.Gen. Marmaduke, Brig.-Gen. Cabell, and five Colonels, beside small arms, wagons, colors, &c.

Sanborn's brigade--which was considerably behind-now came up and took the lead; and, when the enemy again made a stand, a few miles farther south, routed them, and drove them till night stopped the pursuit. The burning wrecks of wagons and other materiel marked their course for miles farther; but most of our nearly broken-down cavalry, with all our infantry, was here judiciously halted: Pleasanton turning to Fort Scott for needful food and rest; and Smith moving to Harrisonville with the same purpose.

Blunt, with his Kansas men and Benteen's brigade, followed by Sanborn, kept the trail of the flying foe; striking" them at Newtonia, near the south-west corner of the State, and, being outnumbered, was evidently getting worsted, when Sanborn-who had marched 102 miles in 36 hours— came up, and changed the fortunes of the day. The Rebels resumed their flight having little left to lose but their bodies and their worn-out horses-and escaped into western Arkansas.

Gen. Curtis followed, but did not again overtake them till he reached Fayetteville, Ark., where Col. Larue Harrison, 1st Arkansas cavalry, had been invested" by Col. Brooks, with some 2,000 Rebels; who was held at bay until Fagan's division of Price's

army appeared" and united in the siege; but Curtis came up next day, and drove off the crowd, with heavy loss to them and none at all to our side. So ended the last Rebel invasion of Missouri. Gen. Smith's command had, ere this, taken boats to report to Gen. Thomas at Nashville. Rosecrans says Price's force in this campaign was variously estimated at

15,000 to 25,000 men-that he obtained 6,000 recruits in Missourithat he lost 10 guns (nearly all he had) and 1,958 prisoners, with most of his wagons, and large numbers of horses, small arms, &c. It is not probable that the force he took out of Missouri, with its armament, was half so effective as that he brought into it."

XXV.

GEN. GRANT'S ADVANCE ON RICHMOND.

HON. E. B. WASHBURNE, of Illinois | it as limited the existence of this -the townsman and zealous friend office to the duration of the War of Gen. Grant-having proposed' the revival of the grade of Lieutenant-General of our armies, hitherto accorded to George Washington alone (Gen. Scott being such only by brevet), the House, not without considerable hesitation, assented; after negativing, by the emphatic vote of 117 to 19, a motion, by Gen. Garfield, to lay the proposition on the table, and adopting, by 111 to 41, an amendment moved by Mr. Ross, of Ill., respect fully recommending Ulysses S. Grant for the post. The Senate concurred: Yeas 31; Nays 6: having first amended the joint resolve so as to strike out so much of

78 Nov. 14.

says:

and prescribed that the LieutenantGeneral should, under the President, be commander of the armies of the United States. The House having rejected these amendments, the dif ference was settled by a Conference Committee, in substantial accord with the Senate's views; the House agreeing to the report: Yeas 77; Nays 43. The President promptly approved the measure, and nominated* Gen. Grant for the place; and he was next day confirmed by the Senate. In this action, Congress expressed, and the President promptly conformed to, the popular judgment, that the efficiency of our various and complicated Miliface of a formidable army of veterans, mainly

Gen. Grant, in his all-embracing report, mounted, and moving with great celerity, would,

"The impunity with which Price was enabled to roam over the State of Missouri for a long t me, and the incalculable mischief done by him, shows to how little purpose a superior force may be used. There is no reason why Gen. Rosecrans should not have concentrated his forces and beaten and driven Price before the latter reached Pilot Knob."

As the concentration here suggested, in the

if practicable, have enabled the Missouri Rebels to call out the oath-bound members of their lodges and there with take possession of a large portion of the State, the justice of this criticism is not incontestable. A like judgment was passed on Fremont in 1861; though not by so high ≈ military authority.

GEN. GRANT'S QUALIFICATIONS AND IDEAS.

tary operations would be greatly promoted by placing them under the direction of a single mind, which should not be that of Henry Wager Halleck.

Gen. Grant's qualifications for this most momentous trust were not universally conceded. Though over 40 years of age, he had been a quiet civilian most of his adult life. There were many military men who esteemed Gen. Meade, Gen. Buell, Gen. McClellan, or some other of our commanders, his superior as a strategist; and several of his battles-especially those of Belmont and Shiloh --had not escaped the unfavorable judgment of military critics. There was one point, however, wherein his fitness for chief command was decided if not preeminent: and that was an utter disbelief in the efficacy of any rosewater treatment of the Rebellion. He regarded the South as practically bound and helpless in the hands of a haughty, strong-willed oligarchy, who had not spent thirty years in ration for this supreme effort in order to be bribed, or beguiled, or palavered, or bullied, into its abandonment after the gage had been thrown down and accepted. No love-taps, in his view, would ever persuade the Rebel chiefs to return to loyalty, so long as their military power should remain essentially unbroken; and he had no conception of any mode of breaking that power save by strong armies in bloody battles. IIis comprehensive, final report tersely says:

prepa

From an early period in the Rebellion,

I had been impressed with the idea that active and continuous operations of all the troops that could be brought into the field, regardless of season and weather, were necessary to a speedy termination of the War. The resources of the enemy, and his numeri

Born April 27, 1822.

563

| cal strength, were far inferior to ours: but, as an offset to this, we had a vast territory, with a population hostile to the Government, to garrison, and long lines of river and railroad communications to protect, to enable us to supply the operating armies.

"The armies in the East and West acted

independently and without concert, like a balky team: no two ever pulling together: enabling the enemy to use to great advantage his interior lines of communication for transporting troops from east to west, reenand to furlough large numbers, during seaforcing the army most vigorously pressed, sons of inactivity on our part, to go to their homes and do the work of producing, for the support of their armies. It was a question whether our numerical strength and resources were not more than balanced by these disadvantages and the enemy's superior position.

"From the first, I was firm in the con

viction that no peace could be had that would be stable and conducive to the happiness of the people, both North and South, until the military power of the Rebellion was entirely broken.

"I, therefore, determined, first, to use the greatest number of troops practicable against the armed force of the enemy; preventing ent seasons against first one and then anhim from using the same force at differother of our armies, and the possibility of repose for refitting and producing necessary supplies for carrying on resistance. Second, to hammer continuously against the armed force of the enemy and his resources, until, by mere attrition, if in no other way,

there should be nothing left to him but an equal submission with the loyal section of our common country to the Constitution

and laws of the land.

"These views have been kept constantly in mind; and orders given and campaigns made to carry them out. Whether they might have been better in conception and execution is for the people, who mourn the loss of friends fallen, and who have to pay the pecuniary cost, to say. All I can say is, that

what I have done has been done conscientiously, to the best of my ability, and in

ests of the whole country."

what I conceived to be for the best inter

Such were the views wherewith Gen. Grant, summoned from the West by telegraph, repaired to Washington to receive his commission and instructions as LieutenantGeneral commanding all the forces of the Union. He was formally in

March 8, 1864.

troduced, next day, to the President | vision of the Mississippi, comprising and Cabinet; when he was addressed the Departments of the Ohio, the by the former as follows:

* Feb. 27.