"Fremont had a hard fight, day before yesterday, with Jackson's force at Union Church, eight miles from Harrisonburg. He claims the victory, but was badly handled. It is clear that a pretty strong force is operating with Jackson, for the purpose of detaining the forces here from you. I am urging, as fast as possible, the new levies.

"Be assured, General, that there never has been a moment when my desire has been otherwise than to aid you with my whole heart, mind, and strength, since the hour we first met; and, whatever others may say for their own purposes, you have never had, and never can have, any one more truly your friend, or more anxious to support you, or more joyful than I shall be

at the success which I have no doubt will soon be achieved by your arms."

Gen. McCall's division arrived by water during the two following days;" on the last of which, Gen. J. E. B. Stuart, with 1,500 Rebel cavalry and 4 guns, attacked and dispersed two squadrons of the 5th U. S. cavalry, Capt. Royall, near Hanover Old Church; thence proceeding to make a rapid circuit of our grand army, via Tunstall's Station, seizing and burning two schooners laden with forage, and 14 wagons; capturing and taking off 165 prisoners, 260 mules and horses; halting three hours to rest at Talleysville, in the rear of our army; resuming his march at midnight; crossing the Chickahominy near Long Bridge, by hastily improvised bridges, next forenoon; and reaching Richmond unassailed next morning. This was the first of the notable cavalry raids of the war,

18

tempting to many imitations, some of them brilliant in design and execution; some of them damaging to the adverse party; others disastrous to their executors; but, on the whole, involving a squandering of horseflesh and an amount of useless devastation which rendered them decidedly unprofitable, and hardly reconcilable with the legitimate ends of warfare.

Gen. McClellan, at midnight on the 14th, telegraphed to the War Department as follows:

"HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,

"CAMP LINCOLN, June 14, 1862.

"All quiet in every direction. The stamther now very favorable. I hope two days pede of last night has passed away. Weashall advance as soon as the bridges are more will make the ground practicable. I completed and the ground fit for artillery to move. At the same time, I would be glad to have whatever troops can be sent to me. I can use several new regiments to advantage.

"It ought to be distinctly understood that McDowell and his troops are com

pletely under my control. I received a telegram from him requesting that McCall's division might be placed so as to join him immediately on his arrival.

"That request does not breathe the proper spirit. Whatever troops come to me must be disposed of so as to do the most good. I do not feel that, in such circumstances as those in which I am now placed, Gen. McDowell should wish the general in

terests to be sacrificed for the purpose of increasing his command.

"If I cannot fully control all his troops, I fight the battle with what I have, and let want none of them, but would prefer to others be responsible for the results. lowed to interfere with me; but Gen. McD., and all other troops sent to me, should be placed completely at my disposal, to do with them as I think best. In no other way can they be of assistance to me. I therefore request that I may have entire and full control. The stake at issue is to be entertained; you know that I have too great to allow personal considerations

"The department lines should not be al

none.

reconnoissances and from all other sources, that the enemy are intrenching, daily in

"The indications are, from our balloon

151

President:

At this time, his returns to the Adjutant-General's office give the following as the strength of his army on the Peninsula: Present for duty, 115,102; special duty, sick, and in arrest, 12,225; absent, 29,511-total, 156,838.

Stonewall Jackson, having done us all the mischief he could in the Valley, arrested McDowell's overland march to join McClellan, and sent 40,000 or 50,000 of our men on all manner of wild-goose chases, was now on his way in full force to Richmond; hence, misleading reports of his movements were artfully circulated among our commanders. Gen. McClellan telegraphed" to the War Department that he had information from deserters that troops had left Richmond to rëenforce Jackson, and that they were probably not less than 10,000 men. To this the President responded, that he had similar information from Gen. King at Fredericksburg; and added: "If this is true, it is as good as a rëenforcement to you.' McClellan on that day telegraphed to the President:

"A general engagement may take place at any hour. An advance by us involves a battle more or less decisive. The enemy exhibit at every point a readiness to meet as. They certainly have great numbers and extensive works. If ten or fifteen 19 June 18.

will permit. We shall await only a favorable condition of the earth and sky, and the completion of some necessary preliminaries."

To-morrow and to-morrow passed, and still our army did not advance; until, on the 24th, a young man of suspicious character was brought in by Gen. McClellan's scouts from the direction of Hanover Court House, fessed himself a deserter from Jackwho, after some prevarication, conson's command, which he had left near Gordonsville on the 21st, moving along the Virginia Central Railroad to Frederickshall, with intent. to turn our right and attack our rear on the 28th. To McClellan's dispatch announcing this capture, and asking information of Jackson's position and movements, Secretary Stanton replied " as follows:

20

"We have no definite information as to the numbers or position of Jackson's force. Gen. King yesterday reported a deserter's statement, that Jackson's force was, nine 10,000 Rebels under Jackson at GordonsSome reports place days ago, 40,000 men. ville; others that his force is at Port Republic, Harrisonburg, and Luray. Fremont yesterday reported rumors that Western Virginia was threatened; and Gen. Kelly, that Ewell was advancing to New Creek, where Fremont has his dépôts. The last telegram from Fremont contradicts this rumor. The last telegram from Banks says the enemy's pickets are strong in advance at Luray. The people decline to give any information of his whereabouts. Within the last two days, the evidence is strong that, for some purpose, the enemy is circulating rumors of Jackson's advance in various directions, with a view to conceal the real point of attack. Neither McDowell, who is at Manassas, nor Banks and Fremont, who are at Middletown, appear to have any accurate knowledge on the subject.

"A letter transmitted to the department yesterday, purporting to be dated Gordonsville, on the 14th inst., stated that the actual attack was designed for Washington 29 June 25.

20

and Baltimore, as soon as you attacked | Richmond; but that the report was to be ciremiated that Jackson had gone to Richmond, in order to mislead. This letter looked very much like a blind, and induces ine to suspect that Jackson's real movement now is toward Richmond. It came from Alexandria, and is certainly designed, like | the numerous rumors put afloat, to mislead. I think, therefore, that, while the warning of the deserter to you may also be a blind, that it could not safely be disregarded. I will transmit to you any further informa- | tion on this subject that may be received here."

That day, having his bridges completed, Gen. McClellan ordered an advance of his picket-line on the left, preparatory to a general forward movement; and, during the day, Heintzelman's corps, with part of Keyes's and Sumner's, were pushed forward," he reports, through a swampy wood, though smartly resisted, with a loss on our side of 51 killed, 401 wounded, and 64 missing: total, 516. Returning from over looking this affair, Gen. McClellan telegraphed to the War Department as follows:

"Several contrabands, just in, give information confirming the supposition that Jackson's advance is at or near Hanover Court House, and that Beauregard arrived, with strong rëenforcements, in Richmond yesterday. I incline to think that Jackson will attack my right and rear. The Rebel force is stated at 200,000, including Jackson

and Beauregard. I shall have to contend against vastly superior odds, if these reports be true. But this army will do all in the

power of men to hold their position and repulse any attack. I regret my great inferiority in numbers, but feel that I am in no way responsible for it, as I have not failed

to represent repeatedly the necessity of reenforcements; that this was the decisive

"But Brig. Gen. A. R. Wright, of Huger's division, who opposed this movement, reports that he had 3,000 men in all, resisting not less than 8,000 or 10,000 on our side; and adds:

"The object of the enemy was to drive us back from our picket-line, occupy it himself, and thereby enable him to advance his works several hundred yards nearer Our lines. In this, he completely failed; and, although

point, and that all the available means of the Government should be concentrated here. I will do all that a General can do with the splendid army I have the honor to command; and, if it is destroyed by overwhelming numbers, can at least die with it and share its fate. But, if the result of the action, which will probably occur to-morrow, or within a short time, is a disaster, the responsibility cannot be thrown on my shoulders; it must rest where it belongs. Since I commenced this, I have received additional intelligence, confirming the supposition in regard to Jackson's movements and Beauregard's arrival. I shall probably be attacked to-morrow, and now go to the other side of the Chickahominy to arrange for the defense on that side. I feel that

there is no use in again asking for reen

forcements."

The President responded as follows:

"WASHINGTON, June 26, 1862. "Your three dispatches of yesterday in relation to the affair, ending with the statemaking your point, are very gratifying. ment that you completely succeeded in The later one, suggesting the probability of your being overwhelmed by 200,000 men, and talking of to whom the responsibility will belong, pains me very much. I give you all I can, and act on the presumption that you will do the best you can with what you have while you continue—ungene rously I think-to assume that I could give you more if I would. I have omitted-I shall omit-no opportunity to send you reenforcements whenever I can."

Gen. Robert E. Lee, having succeeded to the chief command of the

Rebel army, had, in counsel with the master spirits of the Rebellion, at length resolved on striking a decisive blow. To this end, rëenforcements had been quietly called in from all available quarters, swelling the Rebel Army of Virginia, including JackGen. McClellan at night telegraphed, over his own signature, to the War office in Washington, that he had accomplished his object, had driven me back for more than a mile, had silenced my batteries, and occupied our camps, there is not one word of truth in the whole statement. When the fight ceased at dark, I occupied the very line my pickets had been driven from in the morning; and which I continued to hold until the total rout of the Federal army on the 29th."

Before daylight," however, an order from Gen. McClellan (who had learned, meantime, that Jackson was approaching) directed the evacuation of their strong position, and a retreat to GAINES'S MILL-an order easy of execution had it arrived three or four hours earlier, but very difficult now, as the Rebel attack was renewed a few minutes afterward. The Rebels were repulsed, however, though our men were retiring at the time; Meade's, Griffin's, Reynolds's, and Morell's commands moving steadily off the field as if on parade; our dead all buried, our wounded and arms brought away, with the loss of no caisson, hardly of a musket, by a little after 7 A. M.; leaving the Rebels unaware for the moment that there was no longer an enemy before them. Before noon, each regiment and battery had taken up the new position assigned it, at Gaines's Mill, and was ready to receive the now eagerly advancing Rebels. Meantime, our trains and siege-guns had, by order, been sent off across the Chickahominy during the night.

Gen. McClellan had been" with Fitz-John Porter, behind the Mechanicsville defenses, at 10 P. M.-an hour after the triumphant and sanguinary repulse of their assailants. Four hours later, he sent orders for their prompt evacuation. This he

25 June 27.

This striking a great army on one end, and rolling it up on itself in inextricable confusion, carnage, and rout, is no novelty in warfare. The Allied Emperors tried it on Napoleon at Austerlitz; our strategists attempted it on the Rebels at first Bull Run. It is a critical manœuver; but likely to succeed, provided your antagonist passively awaits its consummation. ("Hunting the tiger, gentlemen," explained the returned East Indian to his associates at the United Service Club, "is capital sport-capital— unless the tiger turns to hunt you; when it becomes rather too exciting.")

Gen. McClellan, as usual, believed the Rebels were assailing or threatening him with twice as many men as they had, supposing them to have 175,000 to 200,000 troops in his front; when they never, from the beginning to the end of the war, had so many as 100,000 effectives concentrated in a single army, or within a day's march. Even had he been outnumbered, as he supposed, by a Rebel force on either flank nearly or quite equal to his whole army, he should have quietly and rapidly concentrated, and struck one of those assailants before it could be supported by the other. Had he chosen thus to rush upon Richmond, on the morning

25 June 26.