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settled, the Senate and House presented to the President their answers to his inaugural speech.* These answers voiced the sentiments of the entire country, and glowed with expressions of love, veneration and confidence, which seemed to forecast that the session of Congress would be harmonious and the members diligent in the discharge of their public duties.

Among the matters first considered by Congress was the organization of the various departments of the government. Until this organization was

completed, Washington retained John Jay as Secretary for Foreign Affairs and General Knox as Secretary of War.

The treasury was under the control of a Board of Commissioners. The first dispute arose over the question of salaries to be paid the President, Vice-President, members of Congress, and other governmental officials.

Some thought $70,000 a year should be allowed the President, while others thought $15,000 or $20,000 sufficient; after a short debate, the sum of $25,000 was agreed upon,— and this salary was not raised until Grant had

vol. i., p. 118; William Maclay, Sketches of Debate in the First Senate of the United States, p. 38; McMaster, United States, vol. i., pp. 540542; John Adams, Works, vol. viii., pp. 511-513;

Madison's Works (Congress ed.), vol i., pp. 469, 471; Griswold, Republican Court, p. 152; Garland, Life of Randolph, vol. i., p. 43; Curtis, Constitutional History, vol. ii., pp. 147–151. Jefferson said: "The President's title as proposed by the Senate was the most superlatively ridicu lous thing I ever heard of."- Ford's ed. of Jefferson's Writings, vol. v., p. 104.

* Richardson, Messages and Papers, vol. i., pp. 54-57.

† On entering upon his duties Washington

found it imperatively necessary to make certain arrangements in regard to the time of receiving of visits, etc. See Ford's ed. of Washington's Writings, vol. xi., pp. 405-408; John Adams,

Works, vol. viii., pp. 489-493; Schouler, United States, vol. i., p. 126 et seq. See also the chapter entitled "The Republican Court" in Bassett, Federalist System, pp. 150-162. This, which, it would seem, would commend itself as only right and proper, was made a subject of complaint by some of the suspicious and squeamish politicians of the day. For Washington's dignified rebuke of those who ventured to carp at his doings, see Marshall, vol. ii., pp. 144-146; Sparks, pp. 412-413; Lodge, vol. ii., p. 52 et seq.; Irving, vol. v., p. 8 et seq. See also McMaster, vol. i., pp. 563-565; Parton, Life of Thomas Jefferson, pp. 364-370; Sullivan, Familiar Letters; Tucker, Life of Jefferson, vol. i., p. 312; Morse, John Adams, p. 253.

time. The Vice-President's salary also provoked a long dispute. His position and duties were inadequately defined, and the question arose as to whether he should be paid by the year or by the day, in accordance with his attendance at the Senate as its presiding officer. Finally it was determined to pay him an annual salary of $5,000. The heads of the various departments were allowed $3,500; the chief justice of the Supreme Court $4,000; and the associate justices $3,500.

Members of the House were to be paid $6 per day for every day of attendance at the sessions and were to be allowed mileage between their

* Brooks, Life of Knox, p. 212; Pellew, John Jay, p. 262.

Curtis, Constitutional History, vol. ii., pp. 145-147; Annals of Congress, 1st Congress, 1st session, vol. ii., p. 2181.

Acts of September 11 (c. 13), 23 (c. 18), 24 (c. 19); Annals of Congress, vol. ii., pp. 2176,

2181.

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homes and the seat of Congress; and the same rate was fixed for Senators, who were thus paid until March 4, 1795, after which their remuneration was $7 per day.*

Three departments were then established for conducting the affairs of the government; the foreign office, now known as the Department of State, the Treasury Department, and the War Department. † Under the direction of the Secretary of War came such matters as pertained to the naval affairs of the country. Much excitement was caused by the debate on the acts establishing these departments. According to the Constitution, the President," by and with the advice and consent of the Senate," possessed the power to appoint the officers in the various departments; but the Constitution was silent as to the person in whom was vested the power of removal. This immediately became a subject of contentious debate. It was said, on the one hand, that if the President could appoint officials only Iwith the advice and consent of the Senate, it was reasonable to suppose that the same condition applied to his removal of officials. On the other

Schouler, United States, vol. i., pp. 117-118; Annals of Congress, vol. ii., pp. 2179-2181; Benton, Abridgment of Debates, vol. i., pp. 116–133; McMaster, vol. i., pp. 542-544.

The separate acts for each department were passed as follows: State Department, July 27 and September 15, 1789; War Department, August 7, 1789; Treasury Department, September 2, 1789. - Schouler, United States, vol. i., pp. 105-106; Bassett, The Federalist System, p. 16; Annals of Congress, vol. ii., pp. 2132, 2157, 2175, 2177.

hand, it was believed that, as the President had taken an oath to faithfully execute the laws, it was necessary that he should have the power to remove any official, on what might seem to him good and just grounds, without consulting anyone. But again it was affirmed that this power was of the nature of monarchial prerogative, and, in the hands of an ambitious President, would be especially dangerous; that it would tend to make the cabinet officers servile dependents upon the caprice of the President; and, finally, that it was utterly inconsistent with the principles of a free government.

The thought in the minds of those who framed the Constitution was that such power should not be lodged in any single individual.

Those who held the opposite view argued that by dividing the power of removal between the President and the Senate the responsibility for its proper exercise would be destroyed, and the public interests would necessarily suffer. Furthermore, secrecy in such matters was often necessary, and facts regarding officers might come to the President's knowledge requiring the immediate removal of an officer when the Senate was not in session. But if the President should have to wait until the Senate convened, the interests of the country might suffer severely in the meantime. On the other hand, with this power resting solely with the Chief Executive, the interests of the country could not suffer for any great length of time;

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for, should the President choose executives unfit for their duties, he would be less likely to secure a reëlection to office, since he was held responsible to the government for the conduct of its affairs and the proper execution of its laws. While in case the President should remove an officer for insufficient cause, it would be impossible for him to appoint a successor, because the Senate had the power to refuse a confirmation. Madison, among others, declared that should the President at any time thus wantonly abuse his prerogative, he would make himself liable to impeachment proceedings and removal from his own office.*

Many others in the House agreed with Madison; and though a number took the opposite view of the matter, the question was finally settled in the House (by a majority of 12) by (1) an amendment to the second clause of the bill, clearly implying that the President had the power of removal, and by (2) striking out the entire clause under discussion, thereby leaving the President to exercise the power of removal as a constitutional privilege. In July the matter came

* See also his letters on this subject, in Madison's Works (Congress ed.), vol. i., pp. 474-475, 476, 477-479, 483-484, 487, 488.

See Annals of Congress, 1st Congress, 1st session, vol. i., pp. 368-397, 455-585, 590-608, 612-615; Benton, Abridgment of Debates, vol. i., pp. 85-94, 102-112; Hunt, Life of Madison, p. 174 et seq.; Hart, Actual Government, pp. 282–295; Fish, in Report of the American Association for 1899, vol. i., pp. 67-86. In connection with the subject of the power of the President, see Lucy M. Salmon, History of the Appointing Power of the President, in Papers of the American Histor

before the Senate, in connection with a bill establishing the Department of Foreign Affairs. At this time the Senate was equally divided (9 to 9), and the deciding vote was cast by Vice-President John Adams.* Subsequently, on another bill, there was a majority of 2 in favor of the same construction, and later the law was so worded as to imply that the constitutional power already rested in the President, the expression being " that whenever the secretary shall be removed by the President of the United States," etc. In The Federalist, Hamilton says:

"It has been maintained, as one of the advantages to be expected from the co-operation of the Senate, in the business of appointments, that it would contribute to the stability of the administration. The consent of that body would be necessary to displace, as well as to appoint. A change of the chief magistrate, therefore, would not occasion so vehement or general a revolution in the officers of the government, as might be expected, if he were the sole disposer of offices. When a man, in any situation, had given satisfactory evidence of his fitness for it, a new presi dent would be restrained from attempting a

ical Association, No. v. (1886); the article Appointments and Removals in Lalor, Cyclopædia of Political Science, vol. iii., p. 586. See also Mason, The Veto Power (1890); and the article in Lalor, vol. iii., p. 1064; Curtis, Constitutional History, vol. ii., pp. 143-145.

* John Adams, Works, vol. i., pp. 448-450; vol. viii., p. 494.

+ See United States Statutes-at-Large, vol. i., p. 28, for the act of July 27, 1789. For the organization of the State Department and its work, see Foster, Century of American Diplomacy, pp. 103-135; Eugene Schuyler, American Diplomacy and the Furtherance of Commerce, chaps. i.iii. In general see George N. Lamphere, The United States Government — Its Organization, and Practical Workings (Philadelphia, 1880); Towle, History and Analysis of the Constitution, p. 377; Lossing, in Harper's Magazine, vol. xxxviii., p. 319.