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428

HAMILTON AND THE MIRANDA ENTERPRISE.

secure to the United States the advantage to keep the key to the western country. I have long been in the habit of considering the acquisition of those countries as essential of the permanency of the Union, which I consider as very important to the welfare of the whole. If universal empire is still to be the pursuit of France, what can tend to defeat the purpose better than to detach South America from Spain, which is the only channel through which the riches of Mexico and Peru are conveyed to France? The Executive ought to be

put in a situation to embrace favorable conjunc

tures for affecting that separation. It is to be regretted that the preparation of an adequate military force does not advance more rapidly. There is some sad nonsense on this subject in some good heads. The reveries of some of the friends of the government are more injurious to it than the attack of its declared enemies." *

Having become a party a party to the project, Hamilton, evidently dazzled with the idea that he might become the liberator of South America, threw himself into it with zeal and energy. Between April and August of 1798 he received several letters from Miranda himself, the contents of which he concealed from Washington. On August 22, however, he wrote a letter to Miranda which was transmitted to King at London, with the request that he use his discretion in delivering or suppressing it. Hamilton said that his sentiments were wholly in accord with Miranda's schemes; that he hoped the enterprise in question might be undertaken "; that "he should be glad that the principal agency was in the United States, they to furnish the whole laud force if necessary"; that "the command in this case would only fall upon him "

*Lodge's ed. of Hamilton's Works, vol. viii., pp. 523-524.

Ibid, vol. viii., pp. 505-506.

and that while the country was not yet ready for the undertaking he had suggested "certain preliminary steps to prepare the way consistently with national character and justice." King delivered this letter to Miranda, who shortly after wrote to Hamilton saying that England would be ready to coöperate when the United States was prepared; "all is ready for your President to give the word," he wrote. Without the President's sanction, however, the Miranda enterprise must have proved impracticable sooner or later, but Pickering and Hamilton evidently hoped they could gradually draw Washington and Adams into the scheme. Miranda had foolishly written to the President about it. While Adams paid little heed to the scheme, it was evident that from this time his war-fever cooled considerably; and the knowledge that Hamilton was endeavoring to embroil the country in a war with Spain which could not but involve France, probably had much to do with his desire to hasten the resumption of diplomatic intercourse with France and the settle

ment of all existing disputes. Again, it is easy to believe that Hamilton's dreams of expansion may have exerted a vast influence on the attitude of the Federalist party toward the measures then in Congress.

In October of 1798 Adams received

* Schouler, United States, vol. i., pp. 423-425; Briggs, History of Don F. Miranda's Attempt to Effect a Revolution in South America.

ATTITUDE OF THE CABINET MEMBERS.

information through William Vans Murray, minister at The Hague, that Talleyrand was willing to resume regular intercourse.* Murray said that Talleyrand had given assurance that a minister would be received if sent,† and Adams wrote to Pickering to get an opinion of the various Cabinet members as to the wisdom of making further proposals for negotiation.

In this connection, he recalled the verbal reservations of his message of the previous June, named several persons he thought suitable for the new embassy, and suggested that in

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*Schouler, United States, vol. i., p. 429. † John Adams, Works, vol. i., pp. 541, 542. As early as October 20, 1798, Adams wrote to Pickering asking his advice as to the appointment of a new minister. In a note, Mr. C. F. Adams says: "This letter is of great importance, as showing not only the state of Mr. Adams's mind at this time, upon the most disputed question during his administration, but the early knowledge of it on the part of his cabinet officers, who yet complained of his sudden determination in the nomination of Mr. Murray, four months later. It now seems to explain the cause of the measures of counteraction to which they resorted. Instead of sending any answer, or entering into a discussion of the questions involved, a consultation was had, denominated by Mr. Jefferson military conclave,' from the presence of some of the general officers then assembled at Philadelphia, and especially of Mr. Hamilton, at which a draught of a message was prepared, obviously designed to preclude the President's action upon the suggestion contained herein [in his letter to Pickering]. This draught was probably made by Mr. Wolcott under the dictation of Mr. Hamilton, and it is conceded by Mr. Gibbs to have been intended to leave no loophole for retreat.' Yet Mr. Hamilton must at this time have had in his hands Rufus King's private letter to him, from London, assuring him that there would be no war,' and that France would propose to renew negotiations." John Adams, Works, vol. viii., p. 610. See also Morse, John Adams, p. 293 et seq.

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his next message, without actually receding from the firm position he had already taken, he would keep the channel of negotiations open. To this communication Pickering made no direct reply, but summoned a conclave of the Cabinet members and other Federalists, including Hamilton, at which it was determined to coerce the President into a warlike attitude in his opening message, so that he would have no peace-loophole for a retreat. With Hamilton's aid, Wolcott prepared a draft of a message embodying the Cabinet's view on the French question, which set forth that to send another embassy to France would be an act of humiliation to which the United States ought not to submitsave under some extreme necessity, which did not then exist.* But Adams realized the dangers to which a young government like the United States would be liable in case of war and believed that peace with honor was to be preferred to all other conditions. Therefore, when the next session of Congress convened, Adams took matters into his own hands. Congress should have assembled on December 3, 1798, but there was not a sufficient number of members present on that day, and it was not before the 8th that Adams delivered his speech. In preparing his speech the President had followed the advice of his Cabinet,

Schouler, United States, vol. i., pp. 429-430. Richardson, Messages and Papers, vol. i., pp. 271-275; John Adams, Works, vol. ix., pp. 128134.

430

ADAMS' MESSAGE TO CONGRESS.

save in one particular. As stated above, the Cabinet members thought that to send another minister, in the light of the conduct of France, would be a humiliation to which the United States ought not to submit, and that the first overtures for peace should be made by France. Adams, however, had a quick and stubborn temper, and Isaid that if France should send a minister one day, he would kick him out the next. But the arguments of the Cabinet had weight, and after his temper had cooled, he rushed to the other extreme and modified his speech so as

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accommodation) to take the requisite steps. But considering the

late manifestations of her policy toward foreign nations, I deem it a duty deliberately and solemnly to declare my opinion that whether we negotiate with her or not, vigorous preparations for war will be alike indispensable. These alone will give to us an equal treaty and insure its observance.'* In its answer, the Senate severely reprobated the course pursued by the Directory, in making use of "individuals without public character or authority" as the medium of negotiation, instead of " the constitutional and authorized agents of the government," here referring to the mission of Dr. Logan. Adams replied on December 12 that he had "seen no real evidence of any change of system or disposition in the French republic toward the United States."t

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PICKERING'S REPORT.

very plain terms. This report said, in part:

"The sensation which these details irresistibly excite is that of astonishment at the unparalleled effrontery of M. Talleyrand in demanding of Mr. Gerry the names of X., Y., and Z.; after Y. had accompanied him on a visit to the minister, with whom the conversation detailed in the printed dispatches then passed, and who then assured Mr. Gerry, that the information M. Y. had given him was just, and might always be relied on '; after Z. had in the first instance introduced Mr. Gerry to the minister, and served as their mutual interpreter, and when the conversation between them had also been stated in dispatches; and after X., Y., and Z. had all dined together with Mr. Gerry at M. Talleyrand's table, on rising from which, X. and Y. renewed the propositions about the MONEY!* The very circumstances of M. Talleyrand being continued in office, after the account of these intrigues had been published to the world, is a decisive proof that they were commenced and carried on with the privity and by the secret orders of the Directory. It was to accomplish the object of these intrigues that the American envoys were kept at Paris unreceived, six months after their credentials had been laid

before the Directory; and it was only because they were superior to these intrigues, and that no hopes remained of wheedling or terrifying them into a compliance, that two of them were then sent away, and with marks of insult and contempt." i

As a matter of fact, Pickering was laboring, not to let the Gerry correspondence tell its own story, but to make from it, at discretion, a resumé of the French mission, spiced here and there with his own piquant condiments in order to heighten the warfever, which might have been alle

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viated if the documents themselves had been produced. From Pickering's report, Adams struck out much of the most offensive matter, particularly that which reflected upon Gerry, saying "I am not going to send to Congress a philippic against Mr. Gerry.' But what remained was sufficiently irritating in tone and text to give the administration a warlike aspect.* To add fuel to the flame, the President, on January 28, 1799, sent to Congresst an edict of the French Directory (dated October 29, 1798, and received through King) which declared that neutrals taken in the ships of their enemies would be treated as pirates. The Senate immediately be

gan to devise means of retaliation, and a law with that object in view was enacted, even though in the course of the debates the Président received word that the edict had already been. suspended. This fact, for some reason, was not communicated to Congress, and the act was suffered to pass.

Meanwhile Hamilton was pressing Congress so insistently to recruit and

*The Secretary betrayed his vanity for pungent composition and his disregard for official decorum by printing and sending to the leading Federalists copies of those parts of his report which the President had required him to omit.

Richardson, Messages and Papers, vol. i., pp.

281-282.

For text, see American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. ii., p. 238.

|| Schouler, United States, vol. i., p. 440. This was the act of February 9, 1799, "further to suspend the commercial intercourse between the United States and France and the dependencies thereof."- Statutes-at-Large (Peters), vol. i., p. 613.

432

FRANCE PROMISES TO RECEIVE MINISTER.

maintain the military establishment that Sedgwick determined to ascertain the President's views regarding the army bill then before the Senate. "If you must have an army," said Adams, "I will give it to you; but, remember, it will make the government more unpopular than all the other acts. The people have submitted with more patience than any other people ever did to the burden. of taxes, which has been liberally laid on, but their patience will not last always." Surprised as he was at this, Sedgwick was still more astonished when the President asked him what additional authority Congress now proposed to give the commander-inchief. "None," Sedgwick answered; "all that has been proposed is to give him a new title that of general." "What!" exclaimed Adams, "are you going to appoint him general over the President? I have not. been so blind but I have seen a combined effort among those who call themselves the friends of the government, to annihilate the essential powers given to the President. This, sir, my understanding has perceived and my heart felt." Sedgwick then asked him on what he based his assertions, and Adams replied: "If you have not seen it, I cannot properly go into details."

Meanwhile, as we have noticed, Talleyrand had given his assurance that an American minister would be received. It will be remembered also that in his message in June of 1798,

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On September 28, 1798, Talleyrand, through Pichon, the French chargé, sent an informal message to Murray at The Hague, in which he said: “ You were right to assert that whatever plenipotentiary the Government of the United States might send to France to put an end to the existing difference between the two countries, would be undoubtedly received with the respect due to the representative of a free, independent, and powerful nation."'* Joel Barlow also had written a long letter to Washington, which the latter sent to Adams, conveying the idea that France was really desirous of peace. In transmitting this letter to Adams, Washington said:

"Should you be of opinion that this letter is calculated to bring on negotiations upon open, fair, and honorable grounds, and to merit a reply, and will instruct me as to the tenor of it, I shall, with pleasure and alacrity, obey your orders; more especially if there is reason to believe that it would become a means, however

* See Talleyrand's letter to Pichon, in American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. ii., pp. 239240; Annals of Congress, 6th Congress, App., pp. 1087-1091; Richardson, Messages and Papers, vol. i., p. 283. See also Adams' letter to Washington, February 19, 1799, and Murray's reply, in John Adams, Works, vol. viii., pp. 624-625, 677-691.

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