might expect an answer. Talleyrand replied that the letter had been submitted and that he would notify the envoys when the Directory had instructed him as to the course he was to pursue* In the meantime, Hottinguer and Bellamy repeatedly tried to draw the envoys into further discussion, but the envoys persisted in their determination to hold no further indirect intercourse. On December 13, however, Gerry remarked that he would be pleased to invite Talleyrand to dine with them, and at once Bellamy proposed to accommodate Gerry. The unscrupulous Frenchman then again, in Marshall's presence, urged the importance of making the loan to France and paying the bribe to the Directory, saying that unless the envoys should do so, arrangements would undoubtedly be made at once. to ravage the coast of the United States. Gerry replied that France might ravage the coast, but never would she be able to subdue the country. On reaching Talleyrand's office, Gerry stated to him the substance of the conversation he had just held with Bellamy, and was informed that it was correct and that it would be given to him in writing. Talleyrand then made a memorandum stating the exact form of the proposed loan, but after showing it to Gerry, he burned it.†

*Ibid; Schouler, United States, vol. i., p. 389; Gordy, Political History, vol. i., p. 303.

† American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. ii., pp. 167-168. See also the letter of Gerry

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The envoys assiduously labored in an attempt to come to some satisfactory agreement with the Directory. They had become weary at the delay and angry at the demands of X., Y. and Z., and on December 19 decided to write a letter to Talleyrand in which the differences between the two countries would be discussed exactly as if they were accredited ministers. Accordingly, on January 17, 1798, they wrote a letter to the minister of foreign affairs, but this was not delivered until the last of the month.* The seizure of American ships, the embargo laid at Bordeaux, the operation of the Jay treaty on our treaties with France, etc., were all set down in the vigorous language of Marshall — in what Gibbs calls "a monument in the diplomacy of America." While it was satisfactory from the Federalist point of view, it could hardly have been deemed conclusive by those who took the Republican view.

-

To the Republicans perhaps the most unsatisfactory part of the letter was that which dealt with the attacks by France upon the rights of the United States. It was said that on May 9, 1793, the National Convention had passed a decree containing the following paragraph: "The French ships of war and privateers may stop and bring into the ports of the Republic such neutral vessels as are loaded, in

to Adams in John Adams' Works, vol. viii., pp. 610-612; McMaster, vol. ii., pp. 372-374; Schouler, United States, vol. i., pp. 389-390.

* American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. ii., pp. 169–182.

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January 3, 1795. When, however, the United States practically repudiated its treaties with France by ratifying the Jay treaty, it was only natural that France should retaliate; for why should one party be held to a compact which the other breaks at will? This was the French view of the matter and also that of the Republicans.

On January 18, 1798, before the envoys had sent their letter to Talleyrand, a violent and outrageous attack was made by the Directory on the commerce of neutrals. On that day a decree was passed prohibiting the entrance into any French port of any vessel which during her voyage had made an English port or the port of any English colony, also rendering liable to confiscation any vessel laden with merchandise produced either in England or in any of her colonies.*

In their letter the envoys said that, as their labors were of no avail, and as they were not permanent ministers but envoys extraordinary, they felt it to be both wrong and useless to remain longer in France. As Talleyrand made no reply for two weeks, a messenger was sent on February 19 to ask if he had any reply to make and returned with the answer that he had none. On the 27th an interview was requested, and March 2 was set as the day, but the envoys accomplished nothing and left. Still continuing to

* American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. ii., p. 182; Allen, Our Naval War with France, pp. 33, 299.

McMaster, vol. ii., pp. 403-404.

could be overcome

keep the envoys on the defensive, the artful Talleyrand upbraided them for not visiting him privately, and then, assuring them that he desired to establish permanent friendship between the two nations, once again broached the subject of an immediate loan. He stated that the only scruple the United States had was with regard to a charge of neutral infidelity and this could be overcome" by the astute contrivance of some lying subterfuge." But Pinckney and Marshall could not be moved; they sturdily and absolutely refused to make a loan.* No further word was received from Talleyrand until March 18, when he sent a letter accusing the envoys of deceit and charging that the United States had done everything possible to prolong the misunderstanding. How he reached this conclusion is difficult to discover, for he knew that one minister had been driven from France and that three envoys had been waiting for months to adjust the differences, all the while being subjected to the grossest insults, but nevertheless exhibiting an earnest desire to restore. amicable relations between the two countries. As though this were not enough, Talleyrand had the audacity to say that the United States had sent to France as envoys

"Persons whose opinions and connections were too well known to hope from them dispositions sincerely conciliatory. It is painful to be obliged to make a contrast between this conduct and that

* American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. ii., pp. 186-187; Schouler, United States, vol. i., p. 391.

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which was pursued towards the Cabinet of St. James under similar circumstances. An eagerness was then felt to send to London ministers well known for sentiments corresponding with the object of their mission. The republic, it seems, might have expected a like deference.

The Executive Directory is disposed to treat with that one of the three, whose opinions, presumed to be more impartial, promise, in the course of the explanations, more of that reciprocal confidence which is indispensable." *

The envoys sent a long letter in reply. In regard to the charge that the pro-British sympathies of two of the envoys rendered them unfit for a mission to France, they said:

"The opinions and relations of the undersigned are purely American, unmixed with any particle of foreign tint. If they possess a quality on which they pride themselves, it is an attachment to the happiness and welfare of their country; if they could at will select the means of manifesting that attachment, it would be by effecting a sincere and real accommodation between France and the United States on principles promoting the interests of both, and consistent with the independence of the latter. All who love liberty must admit that it does not exist in a nation which cannot exercise the right of maintaining neutrality. If opinions and relations' such as these are incompatible with 'dispositions sincerly conciliatory,' then indeed has the Federal Government chosen unfit instruments for the expression of its pacific disposition."

*

*

*

Regarding Talleyrand's proposal to treat with Gerry, they said:

"The result of a deliberation on this point is that no one of the undersigned is authorized to take upon himself a negotiation, evidently entrusted by the tenor of their powers and instruc tions to the whole; nor are there any two of them who can propose to withdraw themselves from the task committed to them by their government while there remains a possibility of performing it." t

* American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. ii., pp. 188-191.

Ibid, pp. 191–199.

Talleyrand ignored this letter, and, still believing he could make use of Gerry, wrote him a note on April 3 inviting him to remain. He said:

"I suppose, sir, that Messrs. Pinckney and Marshall have thought it useful and proper, in consequence of the intimations given in the end of my note of the 28th Ventose last, and the obstacle which their known opinions have interposed to the desired reconciliation, to quit the territory of the Republic. On this supposition, I have the honor to point out to you the 5th or 7th of this decade to resume our reciprocal communications."

Gerry meekly consented to remain, but Marshall immediately started home, where he arrived in June and was received with unfeigned joy. Pinckney was detained at Paris by the illness of his daughter.†

Gerry now undertook to carry on the negotiotions with Talleyrand single-handed, and for some time foolishly tried to cope with the wily Frenchman. On May 12 he received a dispatch from the United States to the effect that, if the mission of the envoys had failed, they were to return; but Gerry, vainly thinking himself a match for the French diplomat, continued to swallow his insults for three months longer. As Gibbs says:

"He was engaged in a controversy with Talleyrand, in which every manner of insult was heaped by that functionary upon himself and his country, in which his credulity was ridiculed, his understanding derided, and even his veracity impugned; a controversy in which his only object

seemed to be, to obtain the last word, or to get the better of his adversary in florid professions of the amicable disposition of their respective governments."

Talleyrand even dropped a hint that a minister would be sent to the United States, and this, of course, persuaded Gerry that the matter would be amicably settled, until, one morning, the X. Y. Z. dispatches were published in a London newspaper and a demand was made that he pronounce them false and give the names represented by those letters. Instead of stating that these dispatches were absolutely true and refusing to give the names, or else returning home at once,

357

Meanwhile Congress was supposed to have met at Philadelphia on the second Monday in November, 1797, but, owing to the epidemic of yellow fever in that city, the Senators and Representatives refused to enter it and Congress did not assemble until the 22d. On the 23d President Adams made his opening speech." Foreign affairs, particularly relations with France, occupied a large share of the President's attention. As yet, he was able only to announce the arrival of the special mission in France, but he spoke of the "increasing depredations" upon American commerce, the

31, 1798, gave an evasive explanation, and on June 4 meanly disclosed the names. Talleyrand well knew who they were and had sanctioned their actions. Yet he now indignantly disavowed any responsibility for their acts, saying that Marshall and Pinckney had been duped and bestowing on Mr. Gerry some doubtful compliments which everyone knew to mean "worse than duped." A series of letters now passed between the two diplomats which were knavish, insolent, and prevaricatory on the part of Talleyrand, and dull, vacillating, and weak on the part of Gerry. No good resulted from this correspondence, and on July 26 Gerry left Paris for home.*

* The correspondence is in American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. ii., pp. 204-229; McMaster, vol. ii., pp. 405-408; Schouler, United States, vol. i., pp. 426-427. In a letter to

ciated, saying:

ness.

"The commerce of the United States is essential, if not to their existence, at least to their comfort, their growth, prosperity, and happiThe genius, character, and habits of the people are highly commercial. Their cities have been formed and exist upon commerce. Our agriculture, fisheries, arts, and manufactures are connected with and depend upon it. In short, commerce has made this country what it is, and it cannot be destroyed or neglected without involving the country in poverty and distress. Great

66

Adams, Pickering threatens to expose Gerry's "duplicity and treachery." You will start," he says, "at the two last words. I verily believe they are correctly applied, and that the testimonies of General Pinckney and General Marshall (whose veracity will not be questioned) will support the imputation. I verily believe, Sir, that his conduct would warrant his impeachment; and if he should not be impeached, not his innocence, but political expediency alone, may prevent it."-John Adams, Works, vol. viii., p. 616. Austin, Life of Gerry, chaps. v.-viii., says all that can be said in his defence.

* Richardson, Messages and Papers, vol. i., pp. 250-254; John Adams, Works, vol. ix., pp. 121126; Annals of Congress, 5th Congress, 2d session, vol. i., pp. 630-634; Benton, Abridgment of Debates, vol. ii., pp. 167-169.