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348

INSTRUCTIONS OF AMERICAN ENVOYS.

graves were no longer dug, the bodies being placed in a huge trench. All employment ceased, the shops closed, credit was discontinued,and the bakers fled from the town. These conditions soon resulted in general penury and consequent starvation. Thousands of the citizens fled, and of those who remained about 50 died every day. The

deserted city became a prey to thieves and vagabonds; houses and shops were plundered and banks looted. But, as before, cold weather ended the ravages of the disease, and the people again returned to the city. All together, it is estimated that between 3,500 and 4,000 died during the pestilence.*

CHAPTER XIII.

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1797-1798,

THE X. Y. Z. MISSION.

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Arrival of the American envoys at Paris- Their instructions Irritation of the Directory-X., Y. and Z.'s demand for money - Talleyrand's demand that the United States loan money to France Threats of coercion - The envoys' refusal to hold further indirect intercourse Gerry's interview with Talleyrand The envoys' discussion of differences between the two nations - Federalist and Republican views of the envoys' letter - The French decrees - Talleyrand's offer to treat with Gerry alone — The envoys' reply The departure of Marshall and Pinckney, without Gerry -The latter's revelation of the identity of X., Y. and Z. His departure- Convening of Congress - The President's message Dispatches from envoys transmitted to Congress - The country's indignation - Action of Congress The people's enthusiasm Republican ridicule of Adams Jefferson's rebuke of the secession sentiment Spirit of the country Attitude of Congress toward declaration of war - Treaties with France declared no longer obligatory.

Soon after their appointment, the American envoys departed for France, and, after joining General Pinckney, reached Paris October 4, 1797. In their letters of instruction the envoys were requested to exert their greatest efforts to restore harmony and good understanding and to reopen commercial intercourse between the two nations. They were to urge France to recompense American citizens for spoliations upon American commerce, though this was not represented as indispensable to a treaty. On the other hand, however, such claims would not be renounced

by the United States under any circumstances, nor would these claims be assumed by our government as a loan to France. The envoys were not to commit the government to any stipulations incompatible with its complete sovereignty and independence, but, if need be, they might grant concessions regarding the seizure of enemies' goods in neutral vessels, provisions, and contraband, similar to the terms contained in the British treaty. If they broached the subject of a mutual renunciation of

*McMaster, vol. ii., pp. 410-414.

ENVOYS PRESENT THEIR CREDENTIALS; X., Y., AND Z.

the guarantee clause of the treaty of 1778, they were to do so delicately, for during the present European war France had neither insisted upon American observance of that clause nor had she made any serious attempt to controvert the American argument that the guarantee related only to the defensive wars of France, and not to a war of the kind in which she was now engaged.* Thus carefully instructed and admonished, the envoys immediately entered upon the task set before them. They had hoped to be met by men of the same character as themselves and to be allowed to to discharge their duties promptly and satisfactorily. But as Marshall says: "History will scarcely furnish the example of a nation not absolutely degraded, which has received from a foreign power such open contumely and undisguised insult as were on this occasion suffered by the United States in the persons of their ministers." On October 8 the envoys waited upon Talleyrand, the French minister of foreign affairs, and delivered to him their letters of credence, requesting him to appoint a day for an interview. He replied that, by order of the Directory, he was preparing a report upon the existing relations be

*The instructions are in American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. ii., pp. 153-157. See also Schouler, United States, vol. i., pp. 385-386.

For Adams' view of the negotiations, see his letters in his Works, vol. viii., pp. 546-549; for the Democratic view, see Randall's Jefferson, vol. ii., pp. 381-394; Jefferson's Works, vol. iv., pp. 238-240 (ed. 1854).

349

tween the United States and France which was to be submitted to the Directory, and that when it was finished he would tell them "what steps were to follow."*

A few days later (October 18) Talleyrand's secretary waited upon the envoys and informed them that the Directory were exceedingly irritated at some passages in the President's speech to Congress, and that these passages must be softened and satisfactorily explained before the envoys would be received at a public audience.t The minister of foreign affairs would, however, open negotiations with them through an indirect channel, and for this purpose three agents, M. Hottinguer, M. Bellamy, and M. Hauteval (designated as X., Y. and Z. in the dispatches transmitted to Congress), waited upon the American envoys, and disclosed the plans and expectations of Talleyrand. They said that the wound which had been inflicted upon the feelings of France could not be healed except by money.|| Talleyrand's cupidity, the Directory's cupidity, the National cupidity must be satisfied, and this could be done only by a present of money, and plenty of it. Talleyrand wanted" twelve hundred thousand francs," or only $240,

*American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. ii., p. 158; Parton, Life of Thomas Jefferson, p. 545.

+ Ibid, p. 158.

Moore, American Diplomacy, p. 57 et seq. See also American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. i., p. 211.

|| Magruder, John Marshall, pp. 106-107.

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FRANCE DEMANDS MONEY.

000 in gold for his private use." These agents evidently supposed that the Americans would submit without much objection. Bellamy read the President's speech and enlarged upon the resentment it had occasioned and upon the" satisfaction " which was an indispensable preliminary to any negotiation. "But I will not disguise from you that, this satisfaction being made, the essential part of the treaty remains to be adjusted; you must pay money; you must pay a great deal of money." While careful to state that the proposals did not emanate from either the minister or the Directory, Bellamy, who professed to be in direct communication with Talleyrand, proceeded to unfold the means by which the United States could reach a good understanding with France and a treaty procured placing our neutral rights on the same footing as existed under the British treaty. He said that a disavowal of the President's speech, a loan to the government, and douceurs for the Directors were indispensable. In order that the British might not suspect the nature of the transfer of money to France, Bellamy suggested that the United States take, by assignment from France, certifi

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cates of an extorted Dutch loan, the face value of which was about $12,800,000, but which in the open market were worth but half that sum. In other words, the United States was to loan $6,000,000 on worthless security and make a present of the other $6,800,000, in the hope that, upon the termination of the European war, the security would attain par value.* On October 27 Hottinguer announced that since the peace with the Emperor of Austria the Directory was disposed to take a higher tone than ever before. with respect to the United States and all other neutral nations. In fact, it was resolved not to have any neutrals whatsoever and that nations who did not aid France would be treated as enemies. He reproved the Americans for injecting into the controversy matters which he deemed irrelevant, saying: "Gentlemen, you do not speak to the point. It is money; it is expected that you will offer money." † The envoys listened to these speeches in amazement and finally returned an indignant reply. They said that their powers to conclude a treaty were ample, but that they had no power to make a loan; however, one of their number would return home to ascertain the disposition of the government regarding a loan, if in the meantime the Directory would suspend depreda

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TALLEYRAND BEGINS TO THREATEN.

tions on American commerce and discontinue prize proceedings, including awards unfavorable to American interests. On the other hand, it would be absolutely impossible to make a recantation of the President's speech, as that was beyond the range of diplomatic revision.

Hauteval then assured the envoys of Talleyrand's good disposition toward the United States and suggested a private and unofficial interview with the French minister. It was agreed that Gerry, who had known both Talleyrand and Hauteval in America, should represent the envoys. Accordingly, on October 28, Talleyrand received him in company with Hauteval, who acted as interpreter. This interview served but to confirm the impression that X., Y. and Z. had acted under Talleyrand's inspiration; for, though discreetly silent as to douceurs, Talleyrand made a still more peremptory request for a loan and exhibited a decree lately passed by the Directory requiring reparation for the language used by the President-though he thought the operation of this decree might be prevented by an offer of money. Gerry's response was similar to that made by the envoys to Hottinguer, Bellamy and Hauteval. *

Still the agents of Talleyrand continued at work. They said that nothing could be done without money, that

*American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. ii., pp. 161-163; Schouler, United States, vol. i., p. 388.

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one of the members of the Directory was then in the pay of the privateers, that Hamburg and several other European States had been compelled to purchase peace, and that it would be to the interest of the United States to do likewise.* The immense power of France was painted in gorgeous colors, the humiliation of Austria was dwelt upon, and the conquest of Great Britain confidently predicted. They called attention to the situation of the United States and to the force which France was able to bring to bear upon her, arrogantly pointing out that France alone could save America, and that she ought to take warning from the fate of Venice. They said: Perhaps you believe that in returning and exposing to your countrymen the unreasonableness of the demands of this Government, you will unite them in their resistance to those demands. You are mistaken. You ought to know that the diplomatic skill of France, and the means she possesses in your country, are sufficient to enable her, with the French party in America, to throw the blame which will attend the rupture of the negotiations on the Federalists, as you term yourselves, but on the British party, as France terms you, and you may assure yourselves this will be done." They asserted, moreover, that France would use her power without scruple.† Talleyrand had

* American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. ii., p. 162.

Ibid, p. 164; Bassett, Federalist System,

p. 231.

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REPLY OF THE AMERICAN ENVOYS.

already advised the envoys that they should assume plenary powers and make the loan, and a new course was mapped out for the envoys to pursue. They must propose, in case a commission were appointed to settle American claims, that all sums awarded to Americans be considered as advanced to France; that the envoys should procure from the home government the needed authority to make the loan; but that the douceur money must be paid at once, without awaiting instructions from America. Should the envoys agree to this, possibly during the interval captures and prize proceedings against American property would cease.*

The American envoys replied that the United States highly esteemed the power of France and that no nation wished more ardently to be at peace with her. But one object was dearer to Americans than the friendship of France, and that was their national

independence. America had a right to take a neutral position, and no nation had the right to force her out of it. If she should lend money to a belligerent power abounding in all the requisites of war but money, she would thereby relinquish her neutrality and actually become engaged in war. To lend this money under coercion, was to relinquish her government and to submit to foreign domination. The United States was prepared to make a vigorous struggle, at

Schouler, United States, vol. i., pp. 388-389.

*

least, before she thus surrendered her liberty. Furthermore, they said that the United States had numberless times proven her friendship for France when almost the whole of Europe was leagued against her. But for this display of friendship how has France been treating her?

"Wherever our property can be found she seizes and takes it from us; unprovoked, she determines to treat us as enemies, and our making no resistance produces no diminution of hostility against us. She abuses and insults our Government, endeavors to weaken it in the estimation of the people, recalls her own minister, refuses to receive ours, and when extraordinary means are taken to make explanations * the envoys who bear them are not received. They are not permitted to utter the amicable wishes of their country, but, in the haughty style of a master they are told that unless they will pay a sum to which their resources scarcely extend they may expect the vengeance of France, and, like Venice, be erased from the list of nations." †

*

Finally, on November 1, the envoys resolved that they would hold no more indirect intercourse with the government.‡ Ten days later they wrote to had promised to make known the deTalleyrand, reminding him that he cision of the Directory immediately upon submitting his report on American affairs. Two weeks passed without any answer, and the American envoys sent Pinckney's private secretary to Talleyrand inquiring as to

whether he had submitted their letter to the Directory and at what time they

* American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. iï., p. 162; Magruder, John Marshall, p. 121. † American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. ii., p. 164. Ibid.

|| Ibid, p. 166.

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