820 FRENCH DECREES REPEALED; MONROE'S INSTRUCTIONS. our demands upon Spain and Eng- been delayed many months, and that land."* At length the French government removed all impediments to American commerce, so far as the repeal of decrees could effect it, though this application might have shown Monroe that the French government, in the midst of a costly war, was too distressed for money to render likely a speedy adjustment of our claims for commercial depredations. Everything that Monroe sought, save the concession. that American vessels should protect the goods of enemies, was willingly yielded in form. But by January, 1795, even the "free ship, free goods" stipulation had been agreed to by France as the United States desired, and Monroe thought he had accomplished all the principal objects embodied in his official instructions; for the President had forbidden him to make a new treaty with France without explicit orders, directing him to say that Fauchet had never proposed a revised treaty of commerce. Nevertheless, when it became known that the obnoxious decrees had been repealed and that France was evincing a decided disposition to assist us, the American government, though pleased that our claims were being pushed by Monroe, became silent and inattentive. This was probably due to the fact that Washington had received word of the treaty concluded by Jay, that the receipt of that document had * American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. i., p. 688. Washington entertained grave doubts of the ultimate fate of the disappointing treaty during the many weeks he kept its contents secret.* The French government watched closely the negotiations in progress in London between Jay and the British government, and endeavored to secure from Monroe all the information he possessed on the subject.† In his instructions, Monroe had been authorized to say that Jay was attempting merely to obtain "compensation for our plundered property and restitution of the posts," and he was to state that Jay was "positively forbidden to weaken the engagements between America and France." Randolph had said further in this letter of instructions: "You will let it be seen that in case of war with any nation on earth, we shall consider France as our first and natural ally. You may dwell upon the sense we entertain of past services, and for the more recent interposition on our behalf with the Dey of Algiers." A caution that our confidence in the French Republic be expressed" without betraying the most remote mark of undue complaisance," was the only important restriction upon Monroe's behavior.‡ Accordingly, Monroe assured the French government that Jay's mission "was Schouler, United States, vol. i., pp. 336-337. See the letter from the Committee of Public Safety, quoted in Gilman, Life of Monroe, pp. 5758. Schouler, United States, vol. i., p. 333. MONROE REQUESTS COPY OF JAY'S TREATY. strictly limited to demanding reparation for injuries." It certainly was a strange spectacle to see the American government misinforming its representative and placing him in such an embarrassing position before the French court; for, if Monroe could not be trusted to carry out the policy of the administration, he should never have been appointed, and if he were implicitly trusted, he should have been informed fully concerning all matters coming within the scope of his duties. * When Monroe learned that Jay had actually negotiated a treaty, he notified the French Committee of Public Safety (December 27) and was importuned to disclose its contents, even before it had been submitted to the American government. He promised the Committee a copy of the treaty as soon as he received one; for he believed, if the United States kept the confidence of the French government, there was "no service within its power that the French Republic would not render to us." He later said: "I had reason to believe that it contemplated to take under its care, and to provide for, our protection against Algiers; for the expulsion of the British from the western posts, and the establishment of our right with Spain to the free navigation of the Mississippi, to be executed in the mode we should prefer, and upon terms perfectly easy to us; terms, in short, which sought only the aid of our credit to obtain a loan from our banks for an inconsiderable sum, to be laid * Adams, Lives of Madison and Monroe, p. 250; McMaster, vol. ii., p. 258. † American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. i., p. 695. 321 out in the purchase of provisions within our own clined to believe that, if the arrangement with * Jay had promised to give Monroe information regarding the principal features of the treaty, and when Monroe received word that the treaty had been concluded, he sent a confidential messenger to Jay to receive whatever information the latter could impart, saying: "It is necessary, however, to observe that as nothing will satisfy this government but a copy of the instrument itself, and which, as our ally, it thinks itself entitled to, so it will be useless for me to make to it any new communication short of that."t that." On February 5, 1795, however, Jay wrote Monroe as follows: "You must be sensible that the United States, as a free and independent nation, have an unquestionable right to make any pacific arrangements with other powers which mutual convenience may dictate, provided those arrangements do not contradict or oppugn their prior engagements with other States. Whether this adjustment was consistent with our treaty with France, struck me as being the only question which could demand or receive the consideration of that republic, and I thought it due to the friendship subsisting between the two countries that the French government should have, without delay, the most perfect satisfaction on that head." + He said he had already given what he deemed to be satisfactory information on that point, quoted the clause * American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. i., p. 695. Ibid, vol. i., 322 CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN MONROE AND JAY. in the treaty which provided that nothing in that instrument should be construed as breaking existing engagements with other foreign countries, and continued: * * Considering that events favorable to our country could not fail to give you pleasure, I did intend to communicate to you concisely some of the most interesting particulars of this treaty, but in the most perfect confidence, as that instru-. ment has not yet been ratified, nor received the ultimate forms necessary to give it validity. As further questions respecting part of it may yet arise, and give occasion to further discussions and negotiations, so that, if finally concluded at all, it may then be different from what it is now, the impropriety of making it public, at present, is palpable and obvious. It does not belong to ministers who negotiate treaties to publish them, even when perfected, much less treaties not yet completed and remaining open to alteration or rejection. Such acts belong exclusively to the government who form them. I cannot but flatter myself that the French government is too enlightened and reasonable to expect that any consideration ought to induce me to overleap the bounds of my authority, or to be negligent of the respect which is due to the United States. That respect, and my obligations to observe it, will not permit me to give, without the permission of their government, a copy of the instru ment in question to any person, or for any purpose; and by no means for the purpose of being submitted to the consideration and judgment of the councils of a foreign nation, however friendly." Monroe did not concur in Jay's opinion, for he had " gained such an insight into their councils" that he was satisfied that "all our great material objections, so far as they were connected with this republic, were more easily to be removed by a frank and liberal deportment than a cool and reserved one." Nor could he *American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. i., p. 517. See his letters of March 17, April 14 and May 17, 1795, in ibid, vol. i., p. 700 et seq. "see any condescension in such a line of conduct. On the contrary, between nations allied as we are, I deem it the most magnanimous as well as the soundest policy." When at last he received an outline of the treaty, he at once submitted it to the Committee of Public Safety. On September 10, 1795, before he knew that the treaty had been ratified, he wrote to the Department of State that he believed, by a "timely and suitable attempt," he could engage the aid of France in support of our claims upon England, upon fair and honorable terms." He saw no objections to such an arrangement, saying: "If we were at war with England, none would be urged by any one. If then, remaining at peace, another country is willing to give us the fortune of its arms, in support of our claims against a common enemy, ought we to decline an arrangement, which would be adopted in war, especially when it is considered that peace is the lot we prefer, and that our success depends upon its success? But can we accomplish what we wish by the fortunes of France, by any kind of negotiation we can set on foot, without any effort of our own; and if any such effort is to be made. of what kind must it be? To this I can give no answer, other than by referring you to my former letters on that head. But to secure success by embarking this government with full zeal in our behalf, and striking terror into England, it will be necessary to lay hold of her property within the United States, take the posts, and even invade Canada. This would not only secure to us completely our claims upon Britain, and especially if we likewise cut up her trade by privateers; but, by making a decisive and powerful diversion in favor of France, promote, and very essentially, a general peace." * Meanwhile, early in June, 1795, accounts had reached Paris that the *American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. i., p. 721. ADET'S COMPLAINTS; MONROE'S QUANDARY. British government had revived its order for seizing provision vessels, and in August, in the midst of the panic, came American newspapers which revealed the Jay treaty in full. Utterly disgusted at what appeared to be treachery on the part of the United States toward an ancient ally and benefactor, France no longer confided in the friendly expressions of the United States; though, on learning of the great opposition to the treaty in America, she refrained from ungentle remonstrance. Soon after the treaty was ratified by the Senate, a copy of the treaty was communicated to Adet, the French minister in the United States. Adet immediately complained of the seizure of the goods of an enemy in American vessels and of the contraband clauses in the treaty as tending to favor England as a belligerent before France. He complained, too, that the hospitality guaranteed to British warships was inconsistent with earlier restrictions placed upon the enemies of France by our French treaties. In reply, Randolph defended the construction placed by the American government upon the French treaties, and claimed that every neutral nation possessed the right to enter into commercial arrangements with one belligerent with out consulting the rights of another. Randolph then instructed Monroe to adopt a similar line of argument at Paris and to make the treaty as palatable to France as possible." * Schouler, United States. vol. i., p. 338. 323 On September 12, 1795, Secretary of State Pickering wrote to Monroe that the treaty had been ratified by the President, and gave him the reasons for so doing in order that they might be laid before the French government.* Monroe received the letter on December 1 and was in a quandary as to the proper course of action. An ardent believer in "liberty, equality and erty, equality and fraternity," and deeply in sympathy with the French in their struggle against the oppression of the king, how could he inform the government that his country had made a treaty with a country founded on diametrically opposite principles? With a passionate desire for the success of France, feeling that she and the United States alone represented the cause of true liberty, Monroe had confided in France and had done all he could to prepare her to fight the battles of the United States (which he was positive would soon have to be fought by some one). He had been instructed to maintain the dignity of his own government, but was he not doing so when he cultivated the friendship of the only other nation founded on the doctrine of the inalienable rights of men? They were allies, not only by treaty, but also in spirit, for each was engaged in a holy crusade against oppression. In such a spirit Monroe entered upon his work. But when he was confronted with the fact that Jay was sent to *American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. i., pp. 596-598. 324 JAY TREATY ENRAGES FRANCE. England to do more than demand reparation for injuries; when he learned that a deliberate treaty had been made and ratified by the United States; when he realized that he had been deceived himself and had unwittingly been deceiving the French government as to Jay's mission,-he could not see that the fault lay in his own enthusiasm and his inability to coldly and impartially view his instructions and the relations existing between the the United States and England, on the one hand, and the United States and France, on the other. He believed that the American government had deceived him so that, through him, it might deceive the French government, and that his appointment was merely a link in the chain which would bind the United States to the side of "kings against the people.' He raked his mind for an answer to the question, What was he to do? Would it be better for him to withdraw without making explanations; should he withdraw and explain to the public the reasons; or should he stay in his present postion and promote the interests of the country as best he could, according to his own lights? He resolved upon the last course, and the more confidently because he believed that, sooner or later, the administration would recall him, and thus give him additional data by which he could place his conduct before the public in a more favorable * light. Therefore, instead of using the arguments contained in Pickering's letter, as he was expected to do, Monroe, by way of mollifying at once the nation to whose court he had been accredited, kept the dispatch to himself until the middle of the following February.† On February 15, 1796, M. De la Croix, the French minister of foreign affairs, notified Monroe that the French government had determined upon the course it would pursue with regard to the treaty between Great Britain and the United States. He said that the French would consider the alliance between France and the United States at an end the moment the Jay treaty was ratified, and intimated that the French government would send a special envoy to America to announce this fact to the United States government. Shortly afterward (March 11) he presented to Monroe a summary of the French grievances against the United States, among which the Jay treaty occupied the most prominent place. He charged the United States with having intentionally sacrificed its connection with France by entering into an agreement with England regarding com |