But he considered it his duty to act otherwise, and on March 30 sent a message to the House in which he positively refused to accede to the demands for the executive papers.* This message was received with very ill grace by the opposition, † and, on being referred to the Committee of the Whole, was very freely and sharply criticised. On April 7 by a vote of 57 to 35, two resolutions were adopted: first, that the President and Senate had the exclusive power to make treaties, and that the House did not claim many agency in making or ratifying them; and second, that when a treaty had been made, it must depend for the execution of its various articles upon a law or laws to be passed by Congress, the House having the right to deliberate on the expediency or inexpediency of carrying treaties into effect.‡

On April 14 the subject of the British treaty was again taken under consideration. The friends of the

Richardson, Messages and Papers, vol. i., pp. 194–196; Annals of Congress, 4th Congress, 1st session, pp. 760-761; American State Papers,

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treaty urged that the question be decided immediately, for it was said that every member had already made up his mind and that dispatch was necessary inasmuch as the posts were to be delivered by Great Britain on June 1, which transfer required previous arrangements on the part of the United States. They appeared to believe that the majority would hardly dare to accept the reponsibility of breaking the treaty without previously ascertaining that the great body of the people were willing to take the consequences of such action. But the opponents of the treaty, though confident of their power to reject the resolution, called for its discussion. The minority soon desisted. from urging an immediate decision of the question, and the discussion of the treaty was entered into with equal thoroughness by both parties.* Among those freely discussing the merits and demerits of the treaty and opposing its execution were Madison, Gallatin, Giles, Nicholas, and Preston, while Fisher Ames, Dwight,

Life of Washington, pp. 469-470; Lodge, George Washington, vol. ii., pp. 204-206; Irving, Life of Washington, vol. v., pp. 267-268. See the opinion of the various members of Washington's first Cabinet regarding this power, in Ford's ed. of Jefferson's Writings, vol. i., pp. 189–190.

sage

Madison said that "the absolute refusal was as unexpected as the tone and tenor of the mesare improper and indelicate."- Letter to Jefferson, April 4, 1796, Madison's Works (Congress ed.), vol. ii., pp. 89-90. See also pp. 96-97. Annals of Congress, 4th Congress, 1st session, pp. 770-783; Benton, Abridgment of Debates, vol. i., pp. 696-702; Stevens, Albert Gallatin, p. 119; Hunt, Life of Madison, p. 233.

others set forth their weightiest arguments in its favor.

* As Madison said: "The progress of this business throughout has been the most worrying and vexatious that I ever encountered; and the more so, as the causes lay in the unsteadiness, the follies, the perverseness, and the defections among our friends, more than in the strength, or dexterity, or malice of our opponents."- Letter to Jefferson, May 1, 1796, Madison's Works (Congress ed.) vol. ii., pp. 99–100. See also Gay, Life of Madison, p. 227.

Stevens, Albert Gallatin, p. 121 et seq.

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The chief objections were that the treaty lacked reciprocity; that claims for compensation for negroes carried away and for the detention of the western posts were abandoned; that it was wholly in the interests of Great Britain; that it interfered with the legislative powers of Congress, especially by prohibiting the sequestration of debts; that the United States would receive few commercial advantages, etc. Some of the Republicans did not advocate an unconditional refusal to carry the treaty into effect. In defining his position, Gallatin said:

"The further detention of the posts, the national stain that would result from receiving no reparation for the spoliations on our trade, and the uncertainty of a final adjustment of our differences with Great Britain, were the three evils which struck him as resulting from a rejection of the treaty; and when to these considerations he added that of the present situation of the country, of the agitation of the public mind, and of the advantages that would arise from union of sentiments; however injurious and unequal he conceived the treaty to be, however repugnant it might be to his feelings, and perhaps, to his prejudices, he felt induced to vote for it, and would not give his assent to any proposition which would imply its rejection."

He thought that, considering England's conduct since the negotiation of the treaty, it would be advisable to postpone the enactment of laws carrying the treaty into effect until England should manifest a more friendly spirit toward us. Madison arraigned the treaty in three leading particulars: First, want of reciproc

Annals of Congress, 4th Congress, 1st session, p. 1196.

ity with reference to the treaty of 1783, since the principal and interest of the British debts were to be paid, while Great Britain did not compensate the United States for carrying off the negroes or detaining the posts, but even hampered the surrender of the posts by keeping her Indian influence on the continent still open; secondly, lack of reciprocity in the neutral and international rules, since we yielded on the sequestration of debts and the principle that free ships make free goods - a principle so desirable to neutral commerce and which all our other treaties have recognized, while the clauses concerning contraband were even still more disadvantageous; and thirdly, the lack of commercial reciprocity, for, while the Mississippi and Indian trade was to be open to Great Britain, she surrendered no such privileges in the West Indies, and even our rights in the East India trade were doubtful.* Others spoke of the injustice done France and of the possibility of an immense award of the British debt, while, on the other hand, American

spoliations might fail altogether.

The advocates of the treaty, on the other hand, contended that, though doubtless not perfectly satisfactory in all respects, the best interests of the country demanded that the treaty be carried into effect. They said that many disputes of long standing, which it was important that the United

Speech of April 15, Annals, pp. 975-987. See also Schouler, United States, vol. i., pp. 326-327.

States should bring to a close, were settled by the treaty; that provision was made for settling other disputes of more recent date in which the commercial interests of the country had much at stake; that the rights of France were not abrogated; that the question of contraband, though not settled, was left as before the treaty, etc. Goodhue, from the Salem district, assured the House that the clause relating to the East India trade positively benefited the mercantile community.* Members from the frontier districts of New York asserted, upon their own knowledge, that the Indian traffic, after the actual surrender of the Western posts, would fall principally into American hands. Hillhouse scouted the idea that the American government should reject advantages from one nation for the sake of pleasing another. The advocates of the treaty asserted also that the sequestration of private debts was contrary to every principle of morality and good faith and ought never to take place; that, should the United States reject the treaty, the only alternative was

war.

It can hardly be doubted, however, that the principal cause of the Federalist opposition to every measure that might lead to war with Great Britain, was the fear that such a war would not only throw their country into the arms of France, but that it

* Annals, pp. 1053-1059.

Ibid, pp. 1077-1094; Benton, Abridgment, vol. i., pp. 721-726; Schouler, p. 327.

VOL. IV- 19

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would also place in power in the United States the same anarchical elements that had deluged France with blood. Marshall says:

"That war with Britain, during the continuance of the passionate and almost idolatrous devotion of a great majority of the people to the French republic, would throw America so completely into the arms of France as to leave her no longer mistress of her own conduct, was not the only fear which the temper of the day sug gested. That the spirit which triumphed in that nation, and deluged it with the blood of its revolutionary champions, might cross the Atlantic, and desolate the hitherto safe and peaceful dwellings of the American people, was an apprehension not so entirely unsupported by appearances as to be pronounced chimerical. With a blind apprehension which treated reason as a criminal, immense numbers applauded a furious despotism, trampling on every right, and sporting with life as the essence of liberty; and the few who conceived freedom to be a plant which did not flourish the better for being nourished with human blood, and who ventured to disapprove the ravages of the guillotine, were execrated as tools of the coalesced despots, and as persons who, to weaken the affection of America for France, became the calumniators of that republic. Already had an imitative spirit, captivated with the splendor, but copying the errors of a great nation, reared up in every part of the Continent self-created corresponding societies, who, claiming to be the people, assumed a control over the people and were loosening its bands."

A bare abstract of the debates in

Congress can give no idea of the force and eloquence of the speeches delivered on this occasion. Madison and Gallatin were the principal speakers on one side, and ably advocated the Republican views;* but on April 28, just as the debate was closing, Fisher Ames delivered what was undoubtedly the most eloquent of all the speeches.

* Stevens, Albert Gallatin, p. 125.

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This treaty, like a rainbow on the edge of the cloud, marked to our eyes the space where it was

in the debates a misfortune the

more keenly felt as Tracy, who had been put forward to answer the speeches of Gallatin, had shown too much asperity to make a strong counter-impression and had marred his argument by ill-natured flings at Gallatin's nativity.

Against the advice

of his physician, Ames determined to speak, and when he arose, pale and feeble, the gallaries were crowded with persons eager to hear him. He soon warmed up to his subject. Delicately touching upon French excesses and the commotion which the treaty had excited, deprecating foreign partisanship, and making no attempt to vaunt unduly the merits of the treaty (as other Federalists had done), he earnestly and forcefully pressed home the strongest points in favor of passing the necessary laws. But his greatest outbursts of eloquence came when he depicted the horrors sure to follow a rejection of the treaty. He pictured the new frontier war which the British retention of the posts would provoke the war-whoop of the Indians, the torture of the victims, the blaze of log-houses. By a vivid imagery of these dreadful scenes and a wonderful pathos of expression, he held his hearers spell-bound. He then said:

"This alone would justify the engagements of the government. For, when the fiery vapors of the war lowered in the skirts of our horizon, all our wishes were concentered in this one, that we might escape the desolation of the storm.

prognostic of fair weather. If we reject it, the vivid colors will grow pale, it will be a baleful meteor portending tempest and war.

"In my view, even the minutes I have spent in expostulation, have their value, because they protract the crisis, and the short period in which alone we may resolve to escape it.

* *

*

Yet.

I have, perhaps, as little personal interest in the event as any one here. There is, I believe, no member who will not think his chances to be a witness of the consequences greater than mine. If, however, the vote should pass to reject, and a spirit should rise, as it will, with the public disorders, to make confusion worse confounded, even I, slender and almost broken as my hold upon life is, may outlive the government and Constitution of my country."

This speech, the pathetic utterances of which were wrung from a suffering heart, had a powerful effect on the members of the House and, fearing the consequences of the great orator's impassioned appeal, adjourned before the question was taken.* The delay delay occasioned by these debates favored the passage of the treaty. Not only the members of the House, but also the great mass of the people, began to reflect on the serious consequences which would follow its rejection. Numerous petitions were presented to the House from various parts of the Union, urging the ratification of the treaty, which resulted in changing the opin

* Parton, Life of Thomas Jefferson, pp. 519520; Schouler, United States, vol. i., pp. 328-329. The text will be found in the Works of Fisher Ames, pp. 58-93 (ed. 1809); Annals of Congress, 4th Congress, 1st session, pp. 1239-1263; Benton, Abridgment, vol. i., pp. 743-748.

† Annals of Congress, p. 1264; McMaster, vol. ii., p. 281 et seq..

ions of a few members.* Finally, on April 29, the question was taken in Committee of the Whole, and was determined in favor of passing the

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necessary laws by the casting vote of the Speaker.* On the 30th the resolution was carried in the House by a vote of 51 to 48.†

ARTICLE I.

There shall be a firm, inviolable and universal peace, and a true and sincere friendship between His Britannic Majesty, his heirs and successors, and the United States of America; and between their respective countries, territories, cities, towns and people of every degree, without exception of persons or places.

ARTICLE II.

His Majesty will withdraw all his troops and garrisons from all posts and places within the boundary lines assigned by the treaty of peace to the United States. This evacuation shall take place on or before the first day of June, one thousand and seven hundred and ninety-six, and all the proper measures shall in the interval be taken by concert between the Government of the United States and His Majesty's Governor-General in America, for settling the previous arrangements which may be necessary respecting the delivery of the said posts: The United States in the mean time, at their discretion, extending their settlements to any part within the said boundary line, except within the precincts or jurisdiction of any of the said posts. All settlers and traders, within the precincts or jurisdiction of the said posts, shall continue to enjoy, unmolested, all their property of every kind, and shall be protected

*Writing to Monroe May 14, 1796, Madison says: "It [the passage of the treaty] is to be ascribed principally to an appeal to petitions under the mercantile influence and the alarm of war. A circular letter from the Merchants of Philadelphia gave the signal to all the other towns. The people were everywhere called on to chuse between peace and war, and to side with the Treaty if they preferred the former. This stratagem produced in many places a fever, and in New England a delirium, for the Treaty, which soon covered the table with petitions. The counter petitions, though powerful from Philadelphia, and respectable from some other places,

therein. They shall be at full liberty to remain there, or to remove with all or any part of their effects; and it shall also be free to them to sell their lands, houses, or effects, or to retain the property thereof, at their discretion; such of them as shall continue to reside within the said boundary lines, shall not be compelled to become citizens of the United States, or to take any oath of allegiance to the Government thereof; but they shall be at full liberty so to do if they think proper, and they shall make and declare their election within one year after the evacuation aforesaid. And all persons who shall continue there after the expiration of the said year, without having declared their intention of remaining subjects of His Britannic Majesty, shall be considered as having elected to become citizens of the United States.

ARTICLE III.

It is agreed that it shall at all times be free to His Majesty's subjects, and to the citizens of the United States, and also to the Indians dwelling on either side of the said boundary line, freely to pass and repass by land or inland navigation, into the respective territories and countries of the two parties, on the continent of America, (the country within the limits of the Hudson's Bay Company only excepted), and to

did not keep pace. Indeed, there was not time for distant parts, where the Treaty was odious, to express their sentiments before the occurrence was over. Besides the alarm of war in the smaller States, a great excitement was produced in them by the appeal of the President, in his message, to their particular interest in the powers of the Senate."- Madison's Works (Congress ed.), vol. ii., p. 102. See also pp. 103–104.

*Hunt, Life of Madison, p. 233; McMaster, vol. ii., p. 281.

† Annals of Congress, 4th Congress, 1st session, p. 1291; Benton, Abridgment, vol. i., pp. 753–754.