she meditates a formal war, as soon as she shall have crippled our marine resources, or that she calculates on the pusillanimity of this Country, and the influence of her party, in a degree that will lead her into aggressions which our love of peace can no longer bear. The commercial propositions are, in this state of things, not the precise remedy to be pressed as first in order; but they are in every view, in any event, proper, to make part of our standing laws, till the principle of reciprocity be established by mutual arrangements."

The members of Congress, however, radically differed as to what measures should be adopted. The opponents of the administration favored the adoption of commercial restrictions, while its supporters favored another course, the members submitting plans to the House in accordance with their diverse views. On March 12 Sedgwick introduced sundry resolutions, the purport of which was that 15,000 troops be enlisted for two years; should war break out within that time between the United States and any European nation, these troops were to be bound to serve three years from the commencement of the war,- if the war continued that long. These troops were to receive no pay until the war began, save that 50 cents per day be given them for each day's military training. The President was author

6-7.

Madison's Works (Congress ed.), vol. ii., pp.

"The probability of a war with England was increased during the winter, not only by the violent hostility of the opposition, but by the conduct of that power itself; and it became evident, that the defensive preparations recommended by the president, were absolutely necessary. Measures for this purpose were accordingly introduced; and let it be remembered, by the so

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ized also to lay an embargo for forty days, should he deem such a course necessary*

The attempt to take this resolution under consideration was ineffectual, and on March 14 the discussion of Madison's resolution was resumed, when the debates grew exceedingly heated. The opponents of the measure contended that as a peace measure it was impolitic and as a war measure it was inadequate, for the great injuries which the United States had received demanded a more energetic course; that the time had arrived when war preparations must be seriously considered; and that, unless these injuries were speedily redressed, war was inevitable. The advocates of the measure claimed that the proposed plan was adequate, and argued that its adoption would not

called British party. From the federalists originated the embargo, the navy, the additional troops and the provincial army. In all these measures, they were encountered by the majority of the opposition. The conduct of the anti-federalists was indeed extraordinary. While on the other hand, they opposed to the utmost, the establishment of a small naval force for the suppression of the Algerine cruisers, and recommended in lieu thereof, the purchase of peace with those pirates; on the other, they passed every measure which could plunge the country into a war with the most powerful maritime nation in the world; and the principal weapons with which they proposed to coerce her, were commercial restrictions, non-intercourse and the sequestration of the debts due to her subjects."- Gibbs, Administrations of Washington and Adams, vol. i., P. 122.

* Hunt, Life of Madison, p. 226. Madison wrote to Jefferson that Hamilton had prompted Sedgwick's motion and that it was only the "old trick of turning every contingency into a resource for accumulating force in the government."

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preclude any other that might be proposed. That it probably never was the intention of the Federalists to allow the country to be plunged into war with England, is indicated by various private letters. Writing to a friend. May 3, Oliver Wolcott says: "During this interesting period, the duty of an American citizen, above all, is to come to an absolute determination that we will on no account become a party to the war. On March 26, in an effort to prevent further depredations on American commerce, Congress authorized the President to lay an embargo for a term of thirty days on all ships and vessels in American ports bound to any foreign port or place.t Sedgwick's resolutions for raising troops were defeated, and he proposed "that measures ought immediately to be taken to render the force of the United States more efficient." This proposition was referred to a committee which sug

Gibbs, Administrations of Washington and Adams, vol. i., p. 136.

*

*

The embargo was laid March 26 and continued to May 25, 1794, when "amidst the hearty curses of the people," it was lifted. McMaster, vol. ii., pp. 173-174. See also Madison's Works (Congress ed.), vol. ii. p. 8. Writing to his wife April 1, 1794, John Adams says: "The embargo begins to be felt by many who have been the most noisy and turbulent. But the foolish tradesmen and laborers, who were so ready to follow the heels of their scheming leaders, are now out of employment, and will lose thirty dollars a head by this embargo. If they had been taxed half the sum to the most necessary and important measure, they would have bitterly complained. I can see little benefit in the embargo, except that it may cool down the courage of such kind of people."John Adams, Works, vol. i., p. 469.

gested that the military force of the country be augmented and that the President be authorized to call on the State executives to organize 80,000 militia for service at the call of the nation.*

Smith, of South Carolina, now urged the subject of indemnity to the owners of vessels and cargoes which had been captured by any of the belligerent powers, introducing a resolution to that effect. As he considered it proper to designate the fund from which this indemnity should be paid, Jonathan Dayton, on March 27, introduced two resolutions for sequestering all debts due British subjects, and for taking measures to secure their payment into the United States treasury. † Before any action was taken on these resolutions, Clark introduced a resolution prohibiting intercourse with Great Britain until that country should fully compensate the citizens of the United States for all injustices done by any armed vessels or any person or persons acting under British authority, and until the western posts should be turned over to the United States government.‡

On April 4 the President submitted to Congress a letter from Mr. Pinck

* McMaster, vol. ii., p. 186.

Ibid, note; Annals of Congress, 3d Congress, 1st session, pp. 535-556; Schouler, United States, vol. i., pp. 283-284.

McMaster, vol. ii., p. 187, note. For the debates on the sequestration of British debts and non-intercourse with Great Britain, see Benton, Abridgment of Debates, vol. ii., pp. 482-498. See also Madison's Works (Congress ed.), vol. ii., P. 10.

ney, enclosing copies of instructions issued to the commanders of British was vessels, dated January 8 and revoking those of November 6, by which such war vessels were directed to bring in neutral vessels only, laden with cargoes, the produce of the French Islands, and which were on a direct voyage from those islands to Europe.* Pinckney transmitted also the details of a conversation with Lord Grenville, concerning the order in council of November 6, 1793. The Federalists were greatly interested by Pinckney's communication, and, believing that an amicable adjustment of the contentions between the two nations could still be made, opposed all measures calculated to irritate Great Britain, or that might be construed into a dereliction of the neutral character they desired to maintain. At the same time they lent their influence to such measures as provided for placing the country in readiness for war, should peace negotiations fail. The Republicans continued to oppose such measures and endeavored to keep alive and to increase the hostility toward England.‡ Marshall says: "Language

will

* American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. i., pp. 430, 431; Lodge, George Washington, vol. ii., p. 173.

Irving, Life of Washington, vol. v., p. 215. John Adams says: "You cannot imagine what horror some people are in, lest peace should continue. The prospect of peace throws them into distress. Their countenances lengthen at the least opening of an appearance of it. Glancing gleams of joy beam from their faces whenever all possibility of it seems to be cut off."- Works, vol. i., p. 471.

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scarcely afford terms of greater outrage, than were employed against those who sought to moderate the rage of the moment. They were denounced as a British faction, seeking to impose chains on their countrymen. Even the majority was declared to be but half aroused, and to show little of that energy and decision which the crisis required.'*

In connection with the debate on the Non-Intercourse resolution, several facts are worthy of note: first, that though Great Britain had inflicted the greatest damage on the commerce of New England, the Congressmen of that district almost to a man opposed the measure, the ostensible object of which was to protect that commerce; second, that the Southern members, representing a non-commercial section, favored it almost unanimously; third, that the Federalists wished to adjust the dispute by negotiation, while in the meantime preparing for war (" to speak softly but use the big stick "); and fourth, that the Republicans opposed alike all peace negotiations and prepIt would not be arations for war. correct to state, however, that the antagonistic interests of the two sections were responsible for the differences between Federalists and Republicans. Madison did not favor commercial restrictions simply because the New England commerce, and not that of Virginia, would be hampered thereby, though probably

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*

the attitude of Jefferson and Madison would have been somewhat different had Virginia been a commercial State (since the loss to their constituents would have had great weight with them and would have compelled them to scrutinize more carefully the arguments advanced to show how this loss would eventually be made good). The Republicans thought that the best policy for the country was to cultivate the commercial friendship of France rather than that of England. The Federalists were less eager to avoid war out of fear that it would tend to create a strong central government; yet the charge of Hamilton's enemies that he desired a war simply to strengthen the government, appears to have been groundless, for he was too astute a statesman not to see the disasters and disadvantages that a war would bring to the Nation. He, in common with all intelligent men of his day, realized that war would place a heavy burden upon the young government, would disarrange the finances, ruin many industries, and possibly endanger the stability of the Nation itself. The Republicans opposed negotiations probably because they thought commercial restrictions were sufficient to compel the acknowledgment of American commercial rights, and a treaty would only hinder this object. They thought the best treaty obtainable might deprive the country of its most power

* Gordy, Political History, vol. i., pp. 233–234.

an appearance which must be surprising to a stranger and painful to ourselves. The Congress of the United States is seen deliberating, not upon the welfare of our own citizens, but upon the relative circumstances of two European nations, and this deliberation has not for its object the relative benefit of their markets to us, but which form of government is best and most like our own, and what measures we can adopt which will best humble one and exalt the other."'*

Despite the conflicting opinions of Congressmen, newspapers, and private individuals, Washington was not to be driven from the course which he considered right and just. He looked upon war as a last resort and considered peace essential to the prosperity of the country. He wished also to prevent the consummation of any entangling alliance with France. He was convinced that the contentions between the United States and England had not reached a point

* See also Gordy, vol. i., pp. 235–236.