sequently the Duke of Leeds said that, if the delay on the part of the American government in fulfilling its engagements should render the final completion of the treaty impossible, Great Britain would refuse to fulfil those engagements which depended upon her, until either redress be granted to English subjects on the specific points of the treaty itself or a fair and just compensation be made for the non-performance of those engagements on the part of the United States.*

At this time Great Britain and Spain were quarrelling, and, as it appeared probable that war might ensue, it was deemed a favorable opportunity to press the claims of the United States to the free navigation of the Mississippi. The American chargé at Madrid, Carmichael, was instructed to urge an early settlement of this matter and was directed to put forth his utmost endeavors to secure the unrestricted use of that river hereafter by obtaining a cession of the Island of New Orleans and of the Floridas. It was supposed that, should England and Spain become involved in war, the English would invade Louisiana and Canada; hence hence Washington turned his attention to the measures which would be necessary in case such an attempt were made. In response to the inquiries made by the President, Hamilton said that we ought to coöperate with England

against

Leeds to Morris, April 28, 1790, American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. i., p. 123.

171

through the territory of the United States, from Detroit to the Mississippi, would not only have an appearance, offensive to the Spaniards, of partiality to the English, but would be a real injury to Spain. The answer, therefore, to his Lordship, should be a refusal, in terms clear and decided, but guarded and dignified.” †

Jefferson, however, held that we should conclude a treaty of alliance with Spain, and, if possible, make France a party to it.‡ Morris summed up the state of affairs with England, basing his assumptions on conversations with the British officials, saying, "I have some reason to believe that the present administration intend to keep the posts, and without payment for the negroes." Washington therefore deemed it useless to press the subject of a commercial treaty and withdrew the powers given to Morris.§ About the same time the differences between Great Britain and Spain were

*Hamilton's ed. of Hamilton's Works, vol. iv., pp. 48-69.

† John Adams, Works, vol. viii., p. 498. Ford's ed. of Jefferson's Writings, vol. v., pp. 199-203, 238-239.

Gordy, Political History, vol. i., p. 216. See also Sparks, Life of Gouverneur Morris, vol. i., chap. xviii., vol. ii., pp. 1-57.

§ See Roosevelt, Gouverneur Morris, p. 227 et seq.

172

adjusted, the latter yielding the main points at issue, because she was convinced of her inability to cope successfully with her powerful adversary."

At length diplomatic intercourse was opened with Great Britain, the latter having of her own volition sent George Hammond as minister-plenipotentiary to the United States. Thereupon Thomas Pinckney was sent to London as the American representative. In the autumn of 1791 Hammond arrived at Philadelphia and shortly afterward engaged in a long correspondence with the Secretary of State regarding the non-execution of the treaty of peace. Each charged the other with non-execution of the treaty, but still no steps were taken to put it into execution.† On December 15, 1791, Jefferson wrote Hammond a letter fully and clearly setting forth the American claims. Nearly three months passed before the minister replied. Then (March 5) he defended the British violation of the treaty on the ground. that the United States had not kept its agreements.‡ On May 29, 1792,

*

Manning, The Nootka Sound Controversy, in Report of the American Historical Association for 1904, pp. 279-478.

For some of the letters, see Ford's ed. of Jefferson's Writings, vol. v., pp. 400-401, 402403, 404-405, 436-437, 504; vol. vi., pp. 7-69. See also American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. i., pp. 135-136, 188 et seq. respondence was subsequently printed as Papers Relative to Great Britain (Philadelphia, 1793) and Authentic Copies of the Correspondence, etc. (London, 1794).

The cor

American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. i., pp. 193–200.

Jefferson replied, presenting the two leading arguments from the American standpoint, saying, first, that the American government had kept its agreement. The United States had agreed only to recommend that the States repeal all laws which conflicted with the collection of debts due British merchants by Americans. Congress had made made such recommendations and, as the English government well knew, had earnestly endeavored to secure the passage of repealing acts. Wherefore, then, could England refuse to give up the posts? Even supposing that the United States was bound to see that the States complied with its recommendations, was it not equally true that England was bound to de

66

"Mr. Jefferson," says Tucker (vol. i., p. 369), was called upon to vindicate the rights and dignity of his country in a long and laborious correspondence, first with the minister of Great Britain, and then with that of France, and which continued to occupy him during the whole time he remained in office. Distinguished for ability as the diplomatic correspondence of this country generally has been, there is no part of it that has been so extolled, both for style and argument, or given such satisfaction to all parties, as that which was carried on by Mr. Jefferson with Mr. Hammond and Mr. Genet." Parton says: "This despatch [that of May 20, 1792] is perhaps un; surpassed among the diplomatic documents of recent times for the thoroughness with which the work undertaken was performed. Its tranquil, dispassionate tone, and its freedom from everything that could irritate the self-love of the English government, or the English people, are as remarkable as the perfect frankness and fulness with which the rights of his country are stated.”— Life of Thomas Jefferson, p. 415. See also Jefferson's report of conversation with Hammond, June 3, 1792, in Ford's ed. of Jefferson's Writings, vol. i., pp. 193 et seq., 210 et seq., 212.

173

liver the posts? Considerable time and great tact were necessary to induce thirteen States to pass the necessary acts, while England could deliver the posts at a minute's notice, and hence could not justify her delay in keeping her engagements by pleading that the United States had been equally remiss. How could England How could England expect the American government to induce the States to pass the necessary laws so long as she still occupied our territory?

Not until England kept her own engagements could she justly complain of the United States. She must cast the mote out of her own eye.*

The British minister, however, had been empowered only to negotiate for the adjustment of the complaints, not to conclude any definite agreement, so that the possibility of any agreement being reached regarding the commercial treaty was very slight. It was evident that he came to continue the old policy of delay.† After waiting more than a year for a reply, Jefferson wrote to Hammond (June 19, 1793) asking when an answer might be expected, and was informed (June 20) that no instructions had as yet been received from the British government.t In fact, no reply was ever made, England regarding possession as nine points of the law, and having

American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. i., pp. 201-237.

Bassett, Federalist System, p. 61. American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. i., p. 238.

power to do as she pleased, determined to exercise it.* She evidently thought criminations and recriminations with the United States a waste of time, and soon began to act as though she had entered into an alliance with the French faction in the country to drive the American Government into the arms of France.

The conduct of England is intelligible only in the light of the intense influence exerted on English politics by the French Revolution. The great majority of the so-called upper classes in England looked upon the French Revolution with disgust and horror, while the effect upon the Whigs was radically different. Many Englishmen sympathized with the French in their attempt to find an escape from the sufferings which oppressed them. Some were constrained to believe that any change would be for the better, while the great majority seemed to think that these miseries were not so great after all. The English sympathizers organized revolutionary societies, issued pamphlets, corresponded with the revolutionary societies in France, and in many other ways sought to create a favorable public opinion.

The English government remained neutral and, when the French King was deposed, the English ambassador was recalled, though the government still protested its friendship for the

*Winsor, Narrative and Critical History, vol. vii., pp. 462-463.

174

French people. France, however, did not recall her ambassador, because "in spite of all the ill-humors of [the English] government, the French people desired nothing more ardently than to merit its esteem and to preserve the good harmony and friendship which ought forever to unite two generous and free nations." Early in 1793 Louis XVI. was sent to the guillotine and on February 1 France declared war against Great Britain, a struggle which for the next twenty years raged like a mighty conflagration all over Europe. England believed that she was making war upon "that anarchy which has broken all the most sacred bonds of society, dissolved all the relations of civil life, violated every right, confounded every duty; which uses the name of liberty to exercise the most cruel tyranny, to annihilate all property, seize on all possessions; which founds its power on the pretended consent of the people, and itself carries fire and sword through extensive provinces for having demanded their laws, their religion, and their lawful sovereign."

Accordingly, regarding the French Revolution as anarchy, England and Russia in 1793 made a treaty in which they agreed to ignore all the rules and usages of international law in this contest with France and to compel other nations to do likewise. Resolving to force the French into submission by starvation, during the summer of 1793 England made treaties

with six nations, in each of which it was stipulated that the contracting parties should stop all provisions going to France. On May 9, 1793, the French government authorized the seizure of neutral ships laden with enemies' goods or with provisions. destined for an enemy's port,* and on June 8 England retaliated by instructing the commanders of British cruisers to stop all ships laden with corn, flour or meal bound to any French port, and to send them to a convenient port where the provisions were to be purchased on behalf of the British government. The ships were to be released on condition that they give security not to go to any country at war with Great Britain.‡

Before the United States had recovered from their astonishment at this invasion of the rights of nonbelligerent nations, another powerful blow was struck by England at the neutral commerce of the United States. During times of peace France had enforced the colonial system as rigorously as any other European nation, but now she was obliged to open the ports of her colonies to the commerce of the whole world; for,

*American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. i., p. 244. The decree was suspended as to the United States, May 23, but was revived soon afterward.

† American State Papers, Foreign Relations, vol. i., p. 240.

Pitkin, Civil and Political History of the United States, vol. ii., pp. 396-400, where documents are given. For Jefferson's protest against this, see Ford's ed. of Jefferson's Writings, vol. vi., pp. 412-417.