to Congress, and that object was known to be exceedingly dear to Judge Douglas at that time. Harris and Douglas were both in Springfield when the Convention was in Session, and although they both left before the fraud appeared in the Register, subsequent events show that they have both had their eyes fixed upon that Convention.

The fraud having been apparently successful upon that occasion, .both Harris and Douglas have more than once, since then, been attempting to put it to new uses. As the fisherman's wife, whose drowned husband was brought home with his body full of eels, said, when she was asked, 'what was to be done with him?' 'Take the eels out and set him again.' So Harris and Douglas have shown a disposition to take the eels out of that State fraud, by which they gained Harris's election, and set the fraud again more than once.

"On the 9th of July, 1856, Douglas attempted a repetition of it upon Trumbull on the floor of the Senate of the United States, as will appear from the Appendix of the Congressional Globe of that date. On the 9th of August, Harris attempted it again upon Norton in the House of Representatives, as will appear by the same documents-the Appendix to the Congressional Globe of that date. On the 21st of August last, all three-Lanphier, Douglas, and Harris-re-attempted it upon me at

Ottawa.

"It has been clung to and played out, again and again, as an exceedingly high trump, by this blessed trio. And now that it has been discovered publicly to be a fraud, we find that Judge Douglas manifests no surprise at all. He makes no complaint of Lanphier, who must have known it to be a fraud from the beginning. He, Lanphier and Harris, are just as cozy now, and just as active in the concoction of new schemes, as they were before the general discovery of this fraud. Now all this is very natural if they are all alike guilty in that fraud, and it is very unnatural if any one of them is innocent."

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After alluding to the charges made, day after day, by Judge Douglas against Lincoln and Trumbull, "charges," he said," which we know to be utterly untrue"-Mr. Lincoln continued: "After all, the question still recurs upon us, how did that fraud originally get into the State Register? Lanphier then, as now, was the editor of that paper. Lanphier knows. Lanphier cannot be ignorant of how and by whom it was originally concocted Can he be induced to tell, or if he has told, can Judge Douglas be induced to tell how it originally was concocted? It may be true that Lanphier insists that the two men for whose benefit it was originally devised, shall at least bear their share of it! How that is, I do not know, and while it remains unexplained, I hope to be pardoned if I insist that the mere fact of Judge Douglas making charges against Trumbull and myself is not quite sufficient evidence to establish them!

Mr. Lincoln then took up the third interrogatory which he had propounded to Judge Douglas at Freeport, to wit: "If the Supreme Court of the United States shall decide that the States cannot exclude Slavery from their limits, are you in favor of acquiescing in, adhering to, and following such decision, as a rule of political action?" "To this interrogatory," said he, "Judge Douglas made no answer in any just sense of the word. He contented himself with sneering at the thought that it was possible for the Supreme Court ever to make such a decision. He sneered at me for propounding the interrogatory. I had not propounded it without some reflection.

*

*

*

"In the second clause of the Sixth Article, I believe it is, of the Constitution of the United States, we find the following language: 'This Constitution and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made under the authority of the United States, shall be the Supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any

thing in the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.'

"The essence of the Dred Scott Case is compressed into the sentence which I will now read: 'Now, as we have already said in an earlier part of this opinion, upon a different point, the right of property in a Slave is distinctly and expressly affirmed in the Constitution.' I repeat it: • The right of property in a Slave is distinctly and expressly affirmed in the Constitution.'

"What is it to be 'affirmed,' in the Constitution? Made firm in the Constitution-so made that it cannot be separated from the Constitution without breaking the Constitution-durable as the Constitution, and part of the Constitution. Now, remembering the provision of the Constitution which I have read, affirming that that instrument is the Supreme Law of the Land; that the Judges of every State shall be bound by it, any law or Constitution of any State to the contrary notwithstanding; that the right of property in a Slave is affirmed in that Constitution, is made, formed into, and cannot be separated from it without breaking it; durable as the instrument; part of the instrument; what follows as a short and even syllogistic argument from it? "I think it follows-and I submit to the consideration of men capable of arguing, whether as I state it, in syllogistic form, the argument has any fault in it-that:

Nothing in the Constitution or laws of any State can destroy a right distinctly and expressly affirmed in the Constitution of the United States.

"The right of property in a Slave is distinctly and expressly affirmed in the Constitution of the United States.

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Therefore nothing in the Constitution or laws of any State can destroy the right of property in a Slave.

"I believe that no fault can be pointed out in that argument. Assuming the truth of the premises, the conclusion, so far as I have capacity at all to understand it, follows inevitably. There is a fault in it, as I think; but the fault is not in the reasoning; but the falsehood in fact, is a fault of the premises. I believe that the right of property in a Slave is not distinctly and expressly affirmed in the Constitution, and Judge Douglas thinks it is. I believe that the Supreme Court and the advocates of that decision may search in vain for the place in the Constitution where the right of (property in) a Slave is distinctly and expressly affirmed.

"I say, therefore, that I think one of the premises is not true in fact. But it is true with Judge Douglas. It is true with the Supreme Court, who pronounced it. They are estopped from denying it, and being estopped from denying it, the conclusion follows that the Constitution of the United States being the Supreme Law, no (State) Constitution or law can interfere with it. It being affirmed in the decision that the right of property in a Slave is distinctly and expressly affirmed in the Constitution, the conclusion inevitably follows that no State law or Constitution can destroy that right.

"I then say to Judge Douglas and to all others, that I think it will take a better answer than a sneer to show that those who have said that the right of property in a Slave is distinctly and expressly affirmed in the Constitution, are not prepared to show that no Constitution or law can destroy that right. I say I believe it will take a far better argument than a mere sneer to show to the minds of intelligent men that whoever has so said, is not prepared, whenever public sentiment is so far advanced as to justify it, to say the other.

"This is but an opinion, and the opinion of one very humble man; but it is my opinion that the Dred Scott decision, as it is, never would have been made in its present form, if the Party that made it had not been sustained previously by the elections. My own opinion is, that

the new Dred Scott decision, deciding against the right of the people of the States to exclude Slavery, will never be made, if that Party is not sustained by the elections. I believe, further, that it is just as sure to be made, as to-morrow is to come, if that Party shall be sustained.

"I have said, upon a former occasion, and I repeat it now, that the course of argument that Judge Douglas makes use of upon this subject (I charge not his motives in this), is preparing the public mind for that new Dred Scott decision. I have asked him again to point out to me the reasons for his first adherence to the Dred Scott decision as it is. I have turned his attention to the fact that General Jackson differed with him in regard to the political obligation of a Supreme Court decision. I have asked his attention to the fact that Jefferson differed with him in regard to the political obligation of a Supreme Court decision. Jefferson said that Judges are as honest as other men, and not more so; and he said, substantially, that whenever a Free People should give up in absolute submission to any department of government, retaining for themselves no appeal from it, their Liberties were gone.' I have asked his attention to the fact that the Cincinnati platform, upon which he says he stands, disregards a time-honored decision of the Supreme Court, in denying the power of Congress to establish a National Bank. I have asked his attention to the fact that he himself was one of the most active instruments in breaking down the Supreme Court of the State of Illinois, because it had made a decision distasteful to him. * *

*

"So far in this controversy I can get no answer at all from Judge Douglas upon these subjects. Not one can I get from him, except that he swells himself up and says, 'All of us who stand by the decision of the Supreme Court are the friends of the Constitution; all you fellows that dare question it in any way, are the enemies of the Constitution.' Now, in this very devoted adherence to this decision, in opposition to all the great political leaders whom he has recognized as leaders-in opposition to his former self and history, there is something very marked. And the manner in which he adheres to it-not as being right upon the merits, as he conceives (because he did not discuss that at all), but as being absolutely obligatory upon every one simply because of the source from whence it comes-as that which no man can gainsay, whatever it may be-this is another marked feature of his adherence to that decision.

"It marks it in this respect, that it commits him to the next decision, whenever it comes, as being as obligatory as this one. Since he does not investigate it, and won't inquire whether this opinion is right or wrong, so he takes the next one without inquiring whether it is right or wrong. He teaches men this doctrine, and in so doing prepares the public mind to take the next decision when it comes, without any inquiry. In this I think I argue fairly (without questioning motives at all), that Judge Douglas is most ingeniously and powerfully preparing the public mind to take that decision when it comes; and not only so, but he is doing it in various other ways.

"In these general maxims about Liberty-in his assertions that he 'don't care whether Slavery is voted up or voted down;' that whoever wants Slavery has a right to have it;' that upon principles of equality it should be allowed to go everywhere;' that 'there is no inconsistency between Free and Slave institutions.' In this he is also preparing (whether purposely or not) the way for making the institution of Slavery National! I repeat again, for I wish no misunderstanding, that I do not Charge that he means it so; but I call upon your minds to inquire, if you were going to get the best instrument you could, and then set it to work in the most ingenious way, to prepare the public mind for this movement, operating in the Free States, where there is now an abhorrence of the institution of Slavery, could you

find an instrument so capable of doing it, as Judge Douglas? or one employed in so apt a way to do it?"

After repeating Mr. Clay's famous answer to the Colonization Society, and his own application of it to Judge Douglas, Mr. Lincoln proceeded to say: "Among the interrogatories that Judge Douglas propounded to me at Freeport, there was one in about this language: are you opposed to the acquisition of any further territory to the United States, unless Slavery shall first be prohibited therein?' I answered as I thought, in this way, that I am not generally opposed to the acquisition of additional territory, and that I would support a proposition for the acquisition of additional territory, according as my supporting it was or was not calculated to aggravate this Slavery Question amongst

us.

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*

"I then proposed to Judge Douglas another interrogatory, which was correlative to that: 'Are you in favor of acquiring additional territory in disregard of how it may affect us upon the Slavery Question?' Judge Douglas answered that this Country would continue to expand-that. it would need additional territory-that it was as absurd to suppose that we would continue upon our present territory, enlarging in population as we are, as it would be to hoop a boy of twelve years of age, and expect him to grow to man's size without bursting the hoops. I believe it was something like that, consequently he was in favor of the acquisition of further territory, as fast as we might need it, in disregard of how it might affect the Slavery Question, and he would leave the question of Slavery where the territory was acquired, to be settled by the people of the acquired territory. "This will probably, in the run of things, become one of the concrete manifestations of this Slavery Question. If Judge Douglas's policy upon this question succeeds and gets fairly settled down, until all opposition is crushed out, the next thing will be a grab for the territory of poor Mexico, an invasion of the rich lands of South America, then the adjoining Islands will follow, each one of which promises additional Slave fields. And this question is to be left to the people of those Countries for settlement.

*

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"When we shall get Mexico, I don't know whether the Judge will be in favor of the Mexican People that we get with it, settling that question for themselves and all others; because we know the Judge has a great horror for Mongrels, and I understand that the People of Mexico are most decidedly a Race of Mongrels. I understand that there is not more than one person there, out of eight, who is pure White, and I suppose from the Judge's previous declaration that when we get Mexico or any considerable portion of it, that he will be in favor of these Mongrels settling the question, which would bring him somewhat into collision with his horror of an inferior Race.

"It is to be remembered though, that this power of acquiring additional territory is a power confided to the President and Senate of the United States. It is a power not under the control of the Representatives of the People any further than they, the President and the Senate, can be considered as the Representatives of the People.

"Let me illustrate that, by a case we have in our history. When we acquired the territory from Mexico, in the Mexican War, the House of Representatives, composed of the immediate Representatives of the People, all the time insisted that the territory thus to be acquired should be brought in upon condition that Slavery should be forever prohibited therein, upon the terms and in the language that Slavery had been prohibited from coming into this Country.

"That was insisted on constantly, and never failed to call forth an assurance that any territory thus acquired should have that prohibition in it, so far as the House of Representatives was concerned. But at last the President and Senate acquired the territory without asking

the House of Representatives anything about it, and took it without that prohibition. * It is, therefore, as I think, a very important question for the consideration of the American People, whether the policy of bringing in additional territory, without considering at all how it will operate upon the safety of the Union in reference to this one great disturbing element in our National politics, shall be adopted as the policy of the Country.

You will bear in mind that it is to be acquired, according to the Judge's view, as fast as it is needed, and the indefinite part of this proposition is that we have only Judge Douglas, and his class of men, to decide how fast it is needed. We have no clear and certain way of determining or demonstrating how fast territory is needed by the necessities of the Country. Whoever wants to go out filibustering, then, thinks that more territory is needed. Whoever wants wider Slave fields, feels sure that some additional territory is needed as Slave territory. Then it is as easy to show the necessity of additional Slave territory as it is to assert anything that is incapable of absolute demonstration. Whatever motive a man or a set of men may have for making annexation of property or territory, it is very easy to assert, but much less easy to disprove, that it is necessary for the wants of the Country.

*

"I think it is a very grave question for the People of this Union to consider * * whether we shall engage in the policy of acquiring additional territory, discarding altogether from our consideration, while obtaining new territory, the question how it may affect us in regard to this, the only endangering element to our Liberties and National greatness. The Judge's view has been expressed. I, in my answer to his question, have expressed mine. I think it will become an important and practical question. Our views are before the public, I am willing and anxious that they should consider them fully. * 營 I think it

*

is extremely important that they shall decide, and rightly decide, that question before entering upon that policy."

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MR. DOUGLAS'S CLOSING.

Said he

In closing the Joint-debate at Galesburgh, Mr. Douglas renewed his accusation that Mr. Lincoln "makes one speech North, and another South * * has one set of sentiments for the Abolition counties, and another set for the counties opposed to Abolitionism." "The Slaveholding States are governed by the same Federal Constitution as ourselves, and hence a man's principles, in order to be in harmony with the Constitution, must be the same in the South as they are in the North, the same in the Free States as they are in the Slave States. Whenever a man advocates one set of principles in one Section, and another set in another Section, his opinions are in violation of the spirit of the Constitution which he has sworn to support. When Mr. Lincoln went to Congress in 1847, and laying his hand upon the Holy Evangels, made a solemn vow in the presence of high Heaven that he would be faithful to the Constitution-what did he mean? the Constitution as he expounds it in Galesburgh, or the Constitution as he expounds it in Charleston?"

Mr. Douglas then took up Mr. Lincoln's charge of forgery, touching the alleged Springfield Resolutions of 1854. Said Mr. Douglas: "He has used hard names; has dared to talk about fraud, about forgery, and has insinuated that there was a conspiracy between Mr. Lanphier, Mr. Harris, and myself, to perpetrate a forgery"-and, after restating a former explanation as to "what the mistake was, and how it had been made," he continued:

"After giving that explanation, I did not think there was an honest man in the State of Illinois, who doubted that I had been led into the error, if it was such, innocently, in the way I detailed; and I will now