The resolutions" on the other side" of this letter, to which he refers, are as follows: “Resolved, 1—That in our opinion each of the Southern States should, as soon as may be, Secede from the Union. Resolved, 2-That provision should be made for a Convention to organize a Confederacy of the Seceding States, the Convention to meet not later than the 15th of February, at the city of Montgomery, in the State of Alabama. Resolved, That in view of the hostile legislation that is threatened against the Seceding States, and which may be consummated before the 4th of March, we ask instructions whether the delegations are to remain in Congress until that date for the purpose of defeating such legislation. "Resolved, That a committee be and are hereby appointed, consisting of Messrs. Davis, Slidell, and Mallory, to carry out the objects of this meeting." In giving this letter to the World-from its correspondent accompanying the expedition-the New York Times of March 15, 1862, made these forcible and clear-headed comments: "The telegraphic columns of the Times of January 7, 1861, contained the following Washington dispatch: "The Southern Senators last night (January 5th) held a conference, and telegraphed to the Conventions of their respective States to advise immediate Secession.' Now, the present letter is a report by Mr. Yulee, who was present at this 'consultation' as he calls it, of the resolutions adopted on this occasion, transmitted to the said Finegan, who by the way, was a member of the 'Sovereign Convention' of Florida, then sitting in the town of Tallahassee. "It will thus be seen that this remarkable letter, which breathes throughout the spirit of the Conspirator, in reality lets us into one of the most important of the numerous Secret Conclaves which the Plotters of Treason then held in the Capital. It was then, as it appears, that they determined to strike the blow and precipitate their States into Secession. But at the same time they resolved that it would be imprudent for them openly to withdraw, as in that case Congress might pass 'force, loan, and volunteer bills,' which would put Mr. Lincoln in immediate condition for hostilities. No, no! that would not do. (So much patriotic virtue they half suspected, half feared, was left in the Country.) On the contrary, 'by remaining in our places until the 4th of March it is thought we can keep the hands of Mr. Buchanan tied, and disable the Republicans from effecting any legislation which will strengthen the hands of the incoming Administration.' Ah! what a tragic back-ground, full of things unutterable, is there! "It appears, however, that events were faster than they, and instead of being able to retain their seats up to the 4th of March, they were able to remain but a very few weeks. Mr. Davis withdrew on the 21st of January, just a fortnight after this consultation.' But for the rest, mark how faithfully the programme here drawn up by this knot of Traitors in secret session was realized. Each of the named States represented by this Cabal did, 'as soon as may be, Secede from the Union'-the Mississippi Convention passing its Ordinance on the heels of the receipt of these resolutions, on the 9th of January; Florida and Alabama on the 11th; Louisiana on the 26th, and Texas on the 1st of February; while the organization of the Confederate Government took place at the very time appointed, Davis being inaugurated on the 18th of February. "And here is another Plot of the Traitors brought to light. These very men, on withdrawing from the Senate, urged that they were doing so in obedience to the command of their respective States. As Mr. Davis put it, in his parting speech, 'the Ordinance of Secession having passed the Convention of his State, he felt obliged to obey the summons, and retire from all official connection with the Federal Government.' This letter of Mr. Yulee's clearly reveals that they had themselves pushed their State Conventions to the adoption of the very measure which they had the hardihood to put forward as an imperious 'summons' which they could not disobey. It is thus that Treason did its Work." * *See footnote at p. 157, and pages following it, for other Treasonable work in the Senate about this time. CHAPTER XII. COPPERHEADISM VS. UNION DEMOC RACY. 66 66 66 NORTHERN COMPLICITY WITH TREASON-MAYOR FERNANDO WOOD 66 WH 7HEN we remember that it was on the night of the 5th of January, 1861, that the Rebel Conspirators in the United States Senate met and plotted their confederated Treason, as shown in the Yulee letter, given in the preceding Chapter of this work, and that on the very next day, January 6, 1861, Fernando Wood, then Mayor of the great city of New York, sent in to the Common Council of that metropolis, his recommendation that New York city should Secede from its own State, as well as the United States, and become "a Free City," which, said he, "may shed the only light and hope of a future reconstruction of our once blessed Confederacy," it is impossible to resist the conviction that this extraordinary movement of his, was inspired and prompted, if not absolutely directed, by the secret Rebel Conclave at Washington. It bears within itself internal evidences of such prompting. Thus, when Mayor Wood states the case in the following words, he seems to be almost quoting word for word an instruction received by him from these Rebel leaders-in connection with their plausible argument, upholding it. Says he: "Much, no doubt, can be said in favor of the justice and policy of a separation. It may be said that Secession or revolution in any of the United States would be subversive of all Federal authority, and, so far as the central Government is concerned, the resolving of the community into its original elements-that, if part of the States form new combinations and Governments, other States may do the same. Then it may be said, why should not New York city, instead of supporting by her contributions in revenue twothirds of the expenses of the United States, become also equally independent? As a Free City, with but nominal duty on imports, her local Government could be supported without taxation upon her people. Thus we could live free from taxes, and have cheap goods nearly duty free. In this she would have the whole and united support of the Southern States, as well as all the other States to whose interests and rights under the Constitution she has always been true." That is the persuasive casuistry peculiar to the minds of the Southern Secession leaders. It is naturally followed by a touch of that self-confident bluster, also at that time peculiar to Southern lips-as follows: "It is well for individuals or communities to look every danger square in the face, and to meet it calmly and bravely. As dreadful as the severing of the bonds that have hitherto united the States has been in contemplation, it is now ap parently a stern and inevitable fact. We have now to meet it, with all the consequences, whatever they may be. If the Confederacy is broken up the Government is dissolved, and it behooves every distinct community, as well as every individual, to take care of themselves. "When Disunion has become a fixed and certain fact, why may not New York disrupt the bands which bind her to a venal and corrupt master-to a people and a Party that have plundered her revenues, attempted to ruin her commerce, taken away the power of self-government, and destroyed the Confederacy of which she was the proud Empire City?" * * * After thus restating, as it were, the views and “arguments" of the Rebel Junta, as we may presume them to have been pressed on him, he becomes suddenly startled at the Conclave's idea of meeting "all the consequences, whatever they may be," and, turning completely around, with blanching pen, concludes: "But I am not prepared to recommend the violence implied in these views. In stating this argument in favor of freedom, 'peaceably if we can, forcibly if we must,' let me not be misunderstood. The redress can be found only in appeals to the magnanimity of the people of the whole State." * * * If "these views" were his own, and not those of the Rebel Conclave, he would either have been "prepared to recommend the violence implied in them," or else he would have suppressed them altogether. But his utterance is that of one who has certain views for the first time placed before him, and shrinks from the consequences of their advocacy -shrinks from "the violence implied" in them—although for some reason he dares not refuse to place those views before the people. 66 And, in carrying out his promise to do so-"In stating this argument," presumably of the Rebel Conclave, in favor of freedom, 'peaceably if we can, forcibly if we must'"-the language used is an admission that the argument is not his own. Were it his own, would he not have said in "making" it, instead of in "stating" |