Cost of European Wars. be, in francs, as follows: Great Britain. France... Turkey The cost of the Crimean | of the population (which, of course, means all war to the parties engaged ages, sexes and conditions) is required to was stated by Mr. Robb to keep up the contingent. Apply that rule to our country-or say one person to every fifty 1,950,000,000 of our population-and the Free States alone 2,284,000,000 would have about four hundred thousand 758,000,000 59,000,000 men to furnish as a standing force, whose ab1,291,000,000 sence would scarcely be felt in the avenues 546,000,000 of production and trade. The tables would 132,000,000 stand, in round numbers: 7,000,000,000 (1859) given Sardinia Russia.... Austria Other States... The cost of the Italian war Total........ by the same authority, was: Austria Maine Population. Soldiers. 620,000 12.400 France... Sardinia.. Germany (placing on a war footing).. Total Connecticut.... New York..... 1,333,000,000 Pennsylvania. New Jersey. Indiana... Illinois.. Wisconsin Kansas......... Here we have an expenditure of eight and one-third thousand millions of francs, or about fifteen hundred millions of dollars, as the sum extracted by taxation from the people Michigan of Europe. Such enormous expenditures are appalling; yet they did not prevent those very Governments from maintaining permanent military establishments of a character which, in this country, would be equivalent to a heavy war footing. How little we know of the burdens of war, after all, when compared to those borne by the peoples of Europe! But, to lighten our burdens, light as they are, we have the consciousness of a just California.. What can be done in case of need has been illustrated by our late experiences in placing an army of one million of men in the field. From these experiences none can cause; while in the Old World the sword is drawn in the old cause of crowns and dynas-lion if such a number were required by any doubt our ability to raise one and a half milties, only granting to the people a mere change of masters and tax-gatherers. The people there are nothing but servants to advance the interests of courts and crowns. As to the forces here misfortune of foreign interference or invasion. ADVANCE MOVEMENT UPON MANASSAS. of Government on the total valuation of prop-| erty in the Union, in 1860, viz: $11,296,306,942 would produce a fund capable of wiping out our entire National debt in a brief period. The tax imposed on the city of New York, for several years prior to 1862, for municipal and State purposes alone, if assessed for the General Government would net an amount sufficient to pay the annual interest on a National debt of $1,200,000,000. Averse as the people are to taxes, when they see their own personal good in taxation they bear any necessary burden cheerfully. Still other facts are at hand to show the readiness of the Northern people to submit to patriotic burdens. The amount of contributions in 1861-62 throughout the land, to the outfit of regiments, to the sick and wounded, to bounties, if it could be obtained, would be found to exceed one hundred millions of 247 dollars-all the free-will offerings of a patriotic people. Count in the direct losses (estimated at two hundred and twenty millions of dollars) sustained by the infamous repudiation of Northern debts by the Southern people, months before they could urge the base pretexts afterwards covered by secession, and it will be seen that no people on the earth have, in a briefer period, sacrificed, more in the cause of their country. The masses are inimical to taxation; but, let them feel that their cause is just and there is no end to the sacrifices which they will make. They only ask that the great principle of human rights and a popular Government shall be sustained, in any contest into which they are drawn, to give to it sympathy, men, means, to a limitless extent. Where there is not the clearly defined assu rance of a just cause, no nation is more unwilling to sustain heavy burdens than ours. CONTEST AT BLACKBURN'S FORD. BATTLE OF BULL RUN. A VICTORY AND A FEDERAL ROUT. REVIEW OF THE THE DISASTER. FEDERAL CAUSES OF Design of the Design of the A strong party-spirit prevailed in and out of Congress as to the best policy to pursue. A majority seemed to demand an immediate advance upon Richmond-the minority deem THE advance against though upon them devolved Richmond was arranged the duty of the main adfor early in July. Scott's vance upon Manassas. design was to push the lines of permanent defense of Washington eventually on to the capital of Virginia, thus at once securing the safety of the National Capital, the loyalty of Maryland, and restoring Virginia to the Un-ed the danger of a defeat too great to warrant ion. The campaign of the northern Potomac, under Patterson, was organized as a part of the advance, really comprising the centre, while McClellan, in Western Virginia, represented the Federal right. The forces under McDowell, stretching along the Potomac at Washington, comprised the left, such an advance until an army of conquest was thoroughly equipped, drilled and effective in transportation, artillery, and with reserves enough for holding every inch of soil secured. That Scott was of this latter class was one reason of the clamor " on to Richmond!" which became a rallying cry, design Design of the The Advance. The Grand Army. GENERAL COMMANDING. STAFF. Captain James B. Fry, Assistant Adjutant-General. First Lieutenant H. W. Kingsbury, Major C. S. Brown, Major James S. Wadsworth, Aids. Major W. H. Wood, Acting Inspector-General. Major J. G. Baruard, Lieutenant F. E. Prime, Engineers. Captain A. W. Whipple, Lieutenant H. L. Abbott, Lieutenant H. S. Putnam, Topographical Engineers. Captain O. H. Tillinghast, Assistant Quarter-master. ed to force the Command-| large requisitions were made er-in-Chief out of his known for transportation, munitions policy of delay. That it and stores.* By July 10th the camps east of prevailed so far as to induce an onward the Potomac in the vicinity of the Capital movement in July, appeared to be assured; began to break up, and regiment after regibut, it is not certain that Scott would have ment passed over the bridges, and down to failed to order that advance had there been Alexandria by transports. It was not, howno clamor for it. The expiration of the ser- ever, until July 10th, that the order was isvice of the first seventy-five thousand men sued (General Order No. 15) detailing special called out, doubtless induced the Command- instructions for the march. Three days' er-in-Chief to use them in throwing his per- cooked rations were to be in haversack; all manent lines forward as far as Manassas Junc- regimental baggage not absolutely necessary tion, which, being in his possession, must was dispensed with. The compel the evacuation, by the enemy, of Army of Advance, was, on Fredericksburg. Thus the direct way to that day, announced to be organized as follows: Richmond for a fall campaign would be opened along two railroad routes, while the centre and left columns could, at their leisure, push down from their respective bases. That nothing further than to dislodge the enemy from Manassas was Scott's immediate purpose that no actual advance" on to Richmond," was arranged for-we deem to be a fixed fact. This being conceded, the censures heaped upon the War Department for its inefficient transportation pass for naught; while the loss of the field at Bull Run assumes no greater dimensions than the loss of the movement on Manassas, for which Patterson doubtless was responsible. For the demoralization which followed that extraordinary defeat, the disintegration of the army by the expiration of the time of the three-months regiments will be found to have been the prime cause, for which there was little or no remedy. In passing judgment on the disaster at Bull Run, the mistake has been committed of considering it the loss of a campaign against Richmond. As no “campaign” was designed none was lost; only a check was experienced in extending our lines around Washington and pushing the enemy back from the Potomac, from Cumberland to Fredericksburg on the Rappahannoc. That check was, in truth, a sad repulse, leaving our lines in an exposed condition; but, it served to convince the country of the wisdom of Scott's early determination not to press the advance against Richmond until the volunteers were converted into steady and efficient soldiers. The arrangements for an onward movement became apparent as early as July 4th, when D. L. Magruder, Assistant Surgeon. ARMY ORGANIZATION-FIRST DIVISION. Colonel E. D. Keyes, commanding. First regiment Connecticut volunteers, Colonel Burnham. Second regiment Connecticut volunteers, Colonel Terry. Third regiment Connecticut volunteers, Colonel Chatfield. Second regiment Maine volunteers, Colonel Jameson. Eighth regiment New York volunteer battery, Captain Varian. Second regiment United States cavalry, company B, Lieu. tenant Tompkins. SECOND BRIGADE. Brigadier-General R. C. Schenck, commanding. First regiment Ohio volunteers, Colonel A. D. McCook. Second regiment Ohio volunteers, Colonel Harris. Second regiment New York State militia, Colonel Tomp kins. Second regiment United States artillery, company E, light battery. THIRD BRIGADE Colonel W. T. Sherman, commanding. Seventy-ninth regiment New York State militia, Colonel Cameron. Thirteenth regiment New York volunteers, Colonel Quimby. * See McDowell's Report. He states that July 8th was the day fixed for the forward movement. Second regiment New Hampshire volunteers, Colonel Marston. Second regiment Rhode Island volunteers, (light battery) Captain W. H. Reynolds.. Second regiment United States artillery, section of company A, Lieutenant A. S. Webb. (Reserves). FOURTH DIVISION. Brigadier-General T. Runyon, commanding. First regiment New Jersey militia, Colonel Johnson. Second regiment New Jersey militia, Colonel Baker. Third regiment New Jersey militia, Colonel Napton. Fourth regiment New Jersey militia, Colonel Miller. First regiment New Jersey volunteers, Colonel Montgomery. Second regiment New Jersey volunteers, Colonel McLean. Third regiment New Jersey volunteers, Colonel Taylor. FIFTH DIVISION. Colonel Dixon S. Miles, commanding. FIRST BRIGADE. Colonel Lewis Blencker, commanding. Eighth regiment New York volunteers, Lieutenant-Colonel Stahel. Twenty-ninth regiment New York volunteers, Colonel Von Steinwehr. Garibaldi Guard New York volunteers, Colonel d'Utassy. Twenty-seventh regiment Pennsylvania volunteers, Colonel Max Einstein. SECOND BRIGADE. Colonel T. A. Davies, commanding. Sixteenth regiment New York volunteers, LieutenantColonel S. Marsh. Seventeenth regiment New York volunteers, Colonel Lansing. Eighteenth regiment New York volunteers, Colonel Jackson. Thirty-first regiment New York volunteers, Colonel C. C. Pratt. Thirty-second regiment New York volunteers, Colonel Mat teson. Second regiment United States artillery, company G., light battery, Lieutenant Green Second regiment United States artillery, company A, battery, Captain W. F. Barry. This general organization was maintained Siege Train, battery of eight rifled thirty-two pounders, throughout the succeeding conflict, though Captain T. Seymour, of Fort Sumter. First regiment United States artillery, company I, (light town. Tuesday night (16th) it bivouacked battery.) SECOND BRIGADE. Colonel O. B. Wilcox, commanding. First regiment Michigan volunteers, Lieutenant-Colonel L.. R. Comstock. Fourth regiment Michigan volunteers, Colonel D. A. Woodbury. Eleventh regiment New York volunteers, Colonel N. Farnham. Second regiment United States artillery, company D. THIRD BRIGADE. Colonel O. O. Howard, commanding. at and around Vienna, four and a half miles from Fairfax Court House. Hunter's division pressed to the same point (Fairfax C. H.) by the direct road from Arlington. McDowell accompanied this division. Heintzelman's division proceeded from Alexandria by the old Fairfax and Pohick road, and bivouacked Tuesday night at Pohick Creek. At three A. M. Wednesday morning Third regiment Maine volunteers, Lieutenant-Colonel I. N. the division moved on to the Sangster Sta Tucker. Fourth regiment Maine volunteers, Colonel Berry. tion Cross-Roads, Franklin's brigade on the advance. Several rebel battalions fell back before this brigade, passing Sangster's Sta tion only a short time previous to Franklin's | mishers, firing at them one Miles marched by the Little River turnpike. This division found much obstruction in the way, but moved rapidly forward and kept pace with the other columns. Attack on Fairfax On the morning of the 17th McDowell ordered a direct movement upon Fairfax, where the enemy, it was supposed, would make a firm stand. The place was represented as fortified, and held by a heavy body of troops under General Bonham, of South Carolina. Hunter's division was chosen for the main attack, and the second brigade (Colonel Burnside) was given the advance. "The first barricade, made of trees felled and thrown across the road, delayed the head of the division only a few minutes. This was encountered about three miles from the Court House. It was cautiously examined by the skirmishers, (Second Rhode Island,) but no sign of a rebel force was discovered. The pioneers soon cleared the road with their axes. The barricade was erected at the foot of a long hill, the top of which was covered with a dense thicket, affording an excellent covert for sharp-shooters. The second barricade, of a similar character, was quickly cleared. The third barricade was more formidable. It was at the entrance of a deep cut in the road, commencing about half-way up a steep hill, crowned on one side with a thick woods and on the other by an open field. To pass this a road was made through the field, enabling the army to pass around it, At this point there were stationed two hundred rebel cavalry, who, without waiting to ascertain the strength of the advancing force, fled upon the first appearance of the skir Attack on Fairfax At this point it was ascertained that, one half-mile ahead, a regular fortification, with a strong battery, was planted, defended by about two thousand men. Further reports by the people magnified the rebel force in and around Fairfax Court House until three regiments were made to number ten or twelve thousand. McDowell resolved to drive in directly upon them, let them number any amount-feeling secure in the mettle of his men. The reported fortification was encountered about half a mile from the Court House. It consisted of a single intrenchment, extending for about four hundred yards on each side of the road, pierced for eight guns. The embrasures were formed of sand-bags, and so placed as to command the road. The works stretched along the top of a steep hill, at the foot of which meandered a muddy creek. The trees upon the hill-side for a distance of an eighth of a mile had been cut down to allow no cover from the guns. These works had been occupied for about three weeks by the Second and Third South Carolina regiments, under Bouham. The Second Rhode Island men were the first in the intrenchments. The whole rebel force fell back toward Centreville-but one prisoner being secured, a South Carolina officer. Abundant evidence abounded to prove how rapid must have been the retreat. Sacks of flour, meat, clothing, arms, equipments and camp utensils, everywhere were scattered over the ground, and the campfires, prepared for the noon meal, were still brightly burning. The main body of Bonham's force had left with haste only about two hours before the arrival of the head of Burnside's column. At the moment of its occupation firing was heard off to the left, where Miles' division encountered and quickly sent flying the Fifth Alabama regiment, securing all its tents, stores, &c. Tyler's brigades reached Germantown (one mile west of Fairfax) but a few moments too late to bag the South Carolinians, who passed through the village only about one half-hour prior to the arrival of Keyes' regiments. The enemy had appeared |