worlds, we might reason on our expectation with greater assurance. Or, finally, if the records of all the inhabited worlds in the universe were before us, we might argue on the subject of revelation on assured premises, and arrive at incontrovertible conclusions. We might, perhaps, then be allowed to lay down laws about the nature of revelation; and if any book claiming the title of God's word came to us, contradicting in the manner of its development any one of these laws, we might perhaps be justified in rejecting its claim and repudiating its statements. But we are absolutely without any premises of experience to guide our expectation. The circumstances of revelation are to us unique, and within the range of our knowledge unprecedented. If we repeat the question, "Have we anything to guide our expectation of what a revelation must be?" experience says, "It is not in me;" history answers, "I know it not."

If experience fails to lead us to any expectation about the nature of revelation, it fails equally to lead us to any expectation about the manner of its development.

Had we at hand any records of the mode in which it had pleased the Supreme Being to give His revelation to other worlds, we might with reason have argued that our revelation would have been made in a similar manner.

Had we certain knowledge that other revelations had been given without the authentication of miracles, we should have had a reasonable ground for expecting that ours would have been so given; and we might have been, in consequence, to some degree justified in rejecting as absurd the position that a revelation needs the authentication of miracles.

But here we see that experience altogether fails us.

It is argued, however, that a miracle, as an infringement of law, is a violation of the uniformity of the Divine operation, and therefore involves in its very idea a contradiction of the necessary attributes of Divinity. In answer, we argue that a miraculous operation is no infringement of any law furnished by past experiences of the manner of God's revealing himself to His creatures, for experience furnishes us with no such law.

But if natural laws be infringed by miraculous operations, and this infringement be objected against their very possibility, or at least probability, it may be answered that experience furnishes us with no reason for assuming it as utterly unlikely that natural laws should be infringed for the high purpose of instructing and elevating rational and immortal creatures: but, on the contrary, experience is very much in favour of the probability of such a thing taking place. It is evident that certain natural phenomena exercise a considerable influence upon men. It is clear from the history of the world, as well as from the observation of particular nations at the present time, that such things as the variations of climate, the nature of the soil, the

face of the country, the frequent occurrence of storms or otherwise, do exercise a very considerable influence upon the human

race.

It is impossible to deny that a climate, where all that is necessary for life is easily and without much labour obtained, has an enervating effect upon those subjected to its influence; while a severe climate, and a soil demanding much labour from its cultivators, have their effect in bracing and nerving men to patience, industry, and fortitude. In one word, it is impossible to deny that physical phenomena have had their use in the education of the world. Hence the conclusion is irresistible, that these phenomena are subordinated to the use of man. Nature is for man, and not man for nature. Admit this, and it follows that there must be a suitability between the arrangement of the phenomena of nature and the disposition of the creature to be influenced by them. If this disposition were perfectly uniform, and evidently regulated by fixed laws, we might reject utterly the idea of any infringement of the uniformity of the phenomena. But is it so? Are the acts, the feelings, the habits of man regulated by fixed laws? In the reasoning of the fatalist they are. But fatalism destroys the responsibility of man, and practically denies the power of a Creator to form a creature endowed with a free-will. In the light of such reasoning miracles are an absurdity. But admit his free-agency. Admit his liability to receive impression from external objects (such as those referred to) and the absurdity ceases, and a strong probability in favour of miraculous operations necessarily follows. In fact, the denial of miraculous agency as a means of instruction to man amounts to a denial of man's free-will and responsibility. The possibility of a Creator instructing his creature by extraordinary and abnormal means, is a correlative doctrine with that creature's free-agency. Deny the one and the other falls; admit the one and the other follows rationally.

Any apparent infringement of a lower law of nature by means of which God may convey instruction to a creature, is but a fulfilment of a higher law of benevolence, whereby God regulates the things of nature so as best to meet the needs of the constitution which Himself has given to that creature.

Before leaving this part of our subject, it may be well to notice how the discoveries which geology has opened out to us confirm the position that nature is for man.

At periods long distant the barns of nature were being stored with treasures for man's use. The crust of the earth has been subjected to violent, and as far as we might say, abnormal convulsions, and by means of these, treasures, and blessings, and wealth, and beauty have been either created or brought within reach for the benefit of man.

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It is no answer to this reasoning to say, that the miracles which took place years ago are no argument to the man of the present day for the question is, would the revelation have been formerly received without the authentication of miracles? Clearly it would not. And if the Jew in times past had not been induced by miracles which he saw, to receive and preserve a book of revelation as genuine, there would have been no Scripture now for the professor to speculate upon and the sceptic to mock at.

All the argument here brought forward does not in any degree avail to prove that miracles have actually taken place, but it only avails to take away any à priori objection to them, and to show the probability of their being wrought for such an important purpose as the information and instruction of man.

But if experience affords no ground of expectation, à priori, as to the nature of revelation and the manner of its development, do we learn anything from analogy? Are there any circumstances bearing a likeness to the circumstances of a Creator speaking to his creature? Is there any relationship analogous in any degree to the relationship between God and man?

The relationship existing between parents and children is so. As the Creature is dependent on the Creator, so in a subordinate sense are the children on the parent. To the will of the parent the child must in some degree conform: and to the parental training is the formation of the child's character due. The mode of moral, and it may be added, of intellectual, training which the parent adopts, is analogous to God's training and instruction of men.

Now, from the child the parent claims implicit and trusting obedience. This is a necessity resulting from the weakness of the child. He is incapable of understanding the reasons of his parent's conduct, or the principles on which his commands are based. Experience abundantly shows that where there has been a failure in the establishment of such a habit of implicit obedience, there results disastrous to the well-being of the child have followed. It is only in the course of the child's advance from childhood to manhood that he becomes capable of understanding the reasons of parental commands, and appreciating the wisdom of parental training. In proof of this, how many are there to be found who regret in after life that they thought themselves wiser than their teachers, and so did not fulfil their commands or submit themselves to their instructions! The first step, then, in parental training, is to require of the child only so much knowledge as is necessary to make the command understood and then to demand unquestioning obedience. And as the child advances in life, knowledge and obedience go hand in hand for a time. But the analogy fails us here, for while the authority

of the parent is of necessity temporary, the authority of the Creator must be continuous.

However, from this analogy, as far as it does guide us, we might conclude it probable that the first thing that revelation would require of men would be sufficient knowledge of a simple command to make obedience possible-and then obedience— and that afterwards knowledge and moral training would advance in equal degrees.

And in the matter of intellectual instruction, we have an analogy here. It is plain that the best way of imparting in struction (not to children only, but generally) is by the eye; perhaps it would not be too much to say that the only way of teaching is by the eye. No amount of description, no accuracy of well-arranged language, will ever give half such a correct idea of an object as one picture.

How often do we find persons exclaim on seeing a face, building, a landscape, which have been fully described to them, How different this to what I expected! Perhaps it would be found that those only have formed an expectation something like the actual reality who have seen the like before; but in the case of those who have never witnessed the like, the description will be found to have conveyed to their minds something widely differing from what they are called upon to gaze at. And what is here said about an object of sight, may be true also of what is related about a person's character, his words, his habits, or the conduct of an individual or nation under par. ticular circumstances.

An account in writing, read by two different persons, may convey very different impressions to each of them. One who has seen a character like that described, or is familiar with the biography of the man whose words are recorded, or the history of the nations whose conduct is narrated, will receive one impression. Another person, who is unacquainted with these particulars, or their like, will receive another impression.

The saying of a man is repeated in company: one of the company perceives in it a particular meaning; another, in answer says, If you had known and seen him, you would have taken quite a different view.

Hence it appears that language by itself is at best a defective medium of instruction; the eye must be called in to verify the deductions of the ear.

Hence arises the necessity of calling in illustrations, models, pictures, diagrams, in aid of instruction, for without such aids it would be, perhaps, impossible to convey to a learner the exact

truth.

Whether this be owing to any defect in language, or to any other cause, is a question beside our present purpose.

What pictures do for us in correcting and verifying our notions which we have derived from verbal descriptions of the things painted, history and details of facts do for us with regard to the sayings, habits, and character of men and nations. History may be regarded as a series of pictures bringing before us life-like representations of men and nations; and the more dramatically history is written, the more truthful will be the impression; because the nearer will it be to a life-like representation of the action-the man-the nation.

The power either of an author or an orator to interest, in giving any description, will always be proportioned to his power of bringing the subject in living colours before the reader or the listener. To be thoroughly interesting, he must be a complete painter; and the more accurate his drawing, the more natural his colouring, the more instructive will be his description and the more truthful will be the impression which he will produce.

According to this analogy, we might expect revelation to appear primarily to the eye. We might expect its records to be pictorial and historical, a series of scenic paintings and dramatic representations. Is it so? Were the Hebrews taught by the eye? Were the prophets taught by the eye? Are we in these later days taught by the dramatic representation of what these men saw? We answer, So it was; so it is. The prophets frequently refer to what they have seen in vision as the groundwork of what they believe themselves, as well as of their appeals to the people. Moses was instructed by the eye as to the construction of the tabernacle. The pattern showed him in the mount was, we can hardly doubt, a visionary model of the building to be erected.

One of the sublimest and noblest truths about God and God's mode of dealing with his people, was manifested to Elijah by what he saw on the mount of Horeb. The whole system of the Jewish ritual may be looked on as a series of instructions by the eye respecting the great truths of God's holiness and justice, and of man's approaching ruin. Further on, it is by the exhibition of a God incarnate that man is taught to apprehend what a living God is. Hence Christ is to the creature the express image of the Creator's person: and it is seen by that image how the only begotten Son declares that God whom no one has

seen.

By the living exhibition of Christ's walking about, and with unwearied and unchanging love ever doing good, man is taught what that word means,-God is love. By the help which men saw that Christ was able to afford to the body, they learned that He was the one mighty to deliver the soul. Finally, what was the language which turned the world upside down? No