The loss of the greater part of those who had been up to this time its allies in the north made the defeat of the south a certainty if its opposition was managed in the same way as in 1824. The representatives of South Carolina therefore labored to bring about common action by all the anti-tariff states in accordance with a definite programme. The discussions in their meetings for counsel showed that matters must come to a decided crisis if everything went according to their wishes.1 Hamilton, the future governor of South Carolina, already weighed the possibility of an attempt to execute the law by force, and declared that the idea of a man's really thinking of this was "an absurdity not to be heard of." No conclusions could be arrived at, and still less was it possible to succeed in forming a common plan of operations with the other members who were of the same general opinions. A part of the press outdid even the members of congress in the violence of its opposition as well as in the scope of its projects. Thus the Southron and the Columbia Telescope, for example, advised the calling of a congress of the Opposition states, an idea, the meaning of which was generally recognized, but which had to be dropped because discontent, at any rate in Georgia, had reached such a height that the extreme proposals of South Carolina might have been agreed to. There was also no lack of moderate counsels on the part of the press-counsels which condemned all unconstitutional opposition.3 The legislatures took up the matter. The South Carolina legislature did so most vigorously. Protests were the order of the day. Every member considered himself bound to introduce a series of resolutions which strove to outdo Compare the declarations called forth from different members by the Hayne-Mitchel debate. Niles' Reg., XXXV., pp. 183-185, 199-203. * Ibid, XXXIV., pp. 300, 301. 3 Compare the numerous extracts in Niles' Reg., XXXIV., pp. 352 PRACTICAL NULLIFICATION. 407 each other in bitterness. Passionate speeches were, moreover, made at meetings in different districts, at banquets and on similar occasions. Men especially delighted in toasts, in which eloquence went far beyond the bounds of good taste, and threats extended to the farthest limits of the "moral high treason" so greatly blamed a short time before. The terrible earnestness of all these demonstrations lay in the theories of constitutional law upon which they were based. They rested wholly on the Virginia and Kentucky resolutions, to which, indeed, the legislature of South Carolina directly appealed." The Colleton district declared: "We must resist the impositions of this tariff . . and follow up our principles .. to their very last consequence."3 Resolutions introduced by Dunkin in the legislature gave the legal formula by which this was to come to pass in a way commensurate, so to speak, with the matter. He demanded in this and in all similar cases the convocation of a convention of the states in order to nullify the laws objected to.1 Simultaneously, all sorts of other means were brought into play in order to nullify the tariff practically if not legally. Numerous leagues were formed, which bound 'A passage in the resolutions introduced by Cook in the legislature of South Carolina deserves to be quoted, because it is a sign of the spirit in which the radical wing of the state-rights party began to look upon the relation of the states to the federal government. It says: "When a state solemnly protests against an act of congress because it is an usurpation of power, congress ought forthwith to call a convention of the states to decide upon it and suspend its operation until the sense of the states be taken, and if congress, on the application of a state or states, should refuse to call such conventions, neglect to suspend its op. eration or not immediately repeal the act on the grounds of its unconstitutionality, it thereupon becomes null and void to all intents and purposes." Niles' Reg., XXXV., p. 306. * Ibid, XXXV., p. 206. Ibid, XXXIV., pp. 288, 290. themselves not to buy from the north and west any goods which were protected by the tariff from foreign competition, but instead to use wares of native manufacture. Even in South Carolina, Georgia and Alabama, the embitterment against the north produced a momentary possibility of building up a manufacturing industry of their own. But it had to be admitted that it would be at least very doubtful whether much could be done by individuals in this way, and an energetic display of state power was therefore demanded. Prohibitory duties were thought of and other projects were broached, which were also in direct opposition to the constitutional provisions in art. I., sec. 10, §§ 1 and 2. It was therefore only talked of, and this did not avail to crown the policy of terrorism with any practical result. The new tariff became a law and the collection of the duties was nowhere opposed. But the accomplishment of the fact did not bring back repose to the land. The outward alarms were weaker for a while, but the agitation was so much the deeper. It was felt on both sides that the decision would come with the next war. The protectionists soon recognized the fact that Tyler's prophecy was still always true and South Carolina prepared herself to test the efficacy of her constitutional means of protection. 'Niles' Reg., XXXV., pp. 15, 48, 60, 62, 63, 64, 83. " Part of the events mentioned above happened after the adoption of the tariff. SECRET WORKINGS OF SLAVERY. 409 CHAPTER XI. THE PANAMA CONGRESS. GEORGIA AND THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT. After the Missouri compromise, the slavery question apparently slept for some years. Its intimate alliance with the tariff-struggle was only understood by slow degrees, and other problems, which would have brought forward the opposing principles and interests involved in it, did not crop out for the moment. The politicians felt no inclination to artificially create such problems. There were, indeed, Catalines in the south even now, but they were not of such extraordinary talents that they would have ventured to play with this fire, when its ravaging strength had just been so powerfully shown. The justification of the complaints which became so current, later, among all parties and were already becoming loud here and there, that the apple of discord had again been thrown among a people longing for rest by ambitious men, fanatics and demagogues, reduces itself, everything considered, to a minimum. The best proof of this is that slavery, despite the silent agreement of the politicians to try to shun every mention of it, often suddenly and unexpectedly became the determining element in questions which in and for themselves stood in no sort of relation to it. The most important instance of this sort, which had, indeed, no practical results, but sharply sketched the situation, happened at the beginning of the presidency of the younger Adams. As early as 1821 the idea of forming a close connection between the Spanish colonies in Central and South America, then engaged in revolution, had been suggested by 1 3 Colombia. A few months before their independence was recognized by the United States, a treaty was negotiated between Colombia and Chili (July, 1822) in which a convocation of a congress of the new republics was contemplated. "The construction of a continental system for America," which should "resemble the one already constructed in Europe," was the apparent project of these two powers. The idea ripened very slowly. It was not until the spring of 1825 that the meeting of the congress in Panama was so far assured that the ambassadors of Colombia and Mexico verbally inquired of Clay, who was then secretary of state of the United States, whether an invitation to be represented at the congress would be acceptable to the president. Adams had an answer sent, worded in his own cautious way, to the effect that he first wished to be informed concerning the topics agreed upon for discussion, the nature and form of powers to be given to the "diplomatic agents," and the "organization and method of procedure" of the congress. The ambassadors of the two mentioned states, in their formal letters of invitation, gave very unsatisfactory assurances on these points. Clay referred to this in his answers, but at the 1 Webster, Works, III., p. 195; report of the senate committee on foreign affairs of Jan. 16, 1826; Niles' Reg., XXX., p. 103. All the documents referring to the congress of Panama, as far as the United States are concerned, can be found in the State Papers (Foreign Relations) and also in Niles' Reg., Vol. XXX. Part of them are printed in Elliot, American Diplomatic Code, II., p. 648, seq. 2 Monroe recommended the recognition to congress in a special mes sage of March 8, 1822, (Elliot, Diplomatic Code, II., pp. 640–642; compare also Adams's dispatch of May 27, 1823, to Anderson, the ambassador of the United States in Colombia) and this was ratified by both houses by the almost unanimous appropriation of the money needed for the creation of embassies. (May 4, 1822, Statutes at Large, III., p. 678.) Report of the senate committee, Jan. 16, 1826. Clay's report of March 14, 1826, to the house of representatives. 'Salazar (the ambassador of Colombia) to Clay, Nov. 2, 1825, and Obregon (the ambassador of Mexico) to Clay, Nov. 3, 1825. |