Connecticut Courant which endeavored to incline the northern states, in such a case, to a division of the Union. We quote: "The northern states can subsist as a nation, as a republic, without any connection with the southern. I shall in future papers consider some of the grave events which will lead to a separation of the United States. endeavor to prove the impossibility of our union for any long period in the future, both from the moral and political habits of the citizens of the United States, and finally examine carefully to see whether we have not already approached the era when they must be divided." This idea, which then could find no support, was now again taken up by the Federalists. The parties had from the beginning corresponded, to a great extent, with the geographical sections; but henceforth the name of Federalist was to be dropped and the war-cry to be expressly and exclusively “the North!" and "the South!" There were interests enough to recommend such a project. If there was no danger of its realization at the present time, the conditions might sooner or later be different. And if it should ever happen that specifically sectional parties should take the place of national parties in the country, the continued existence of the Union would depend entirely on the nature of the fundamental question on which they should divide. But, even assuming that no question should ever arise to make the sectional division the only natural, that is, the only possible, one, and therefore the existence of the Union after the old fashion impossible, it was still imperative that the mere plan should be promptly and energetically checked in the beginning. If this were not done, it might frequently lead to the greatest embarrassment, even if never carried into execution.

The project of fusion was not confined to the ultra Federal agitators. The articles of "New Englander" in the

1 Randall, Jefferson, III., pp. 634, 635.

NORTHERN SECESSION SYMPATHY.

197

Connecticut Courant demanded only an intimate coalition of the northern states to get rid of the "tyranny of the south," and to establish a just "balance of power." The ultras did not consider this possible. They based their judgment on the diversity of material interests, and the alleged assiduity with which the south and the middle states so nurtured this that a reconciliation could never take place. Hence the northern party was to be constituted of men ready to go to the utmost extreme, that is, even to division of the Union. The three Federal New England states, and first of all Massachusetts, were to take the initiative in the building up of the northern party. If they could succeed in securing Burr's election in New York, it might be possible to carry out the whole plan.1 The plan of the ultras was only an extension of the

1 "Are we to submit to the guidance and the tyranny of the south? The purchase of Louisiana at the expense of fifteen millions of dollars for the augmentation of the southern interest must finally convince the states north of the Chesapeake, that they must unite in the common northern interest. Let, therefore, the disinterested among our Federal and Democratic Republicans lay aside their fatal dissensions, which serve to no purpose, but to the purpose of their enemies. We shall then be able to fix a just balance of power in the United States.” * We quote from the letter already cited to a member of Washington's cabinet: "Their [the southern states'] enmity of commerce, on which our prosperity depends, is riveted and unyielding. Besides, there is an inveterate enmity and jealousy of the northern states, which pervades every part of the southern and middle states. This spirit is evidently increasing. Since they have obtained the power, they have become arrogant, and appear determined to carry this spirit into all classes of socie ty, with a view of riveting the prejudices so strongly as to prevent a union of views between north and south under all future circumstances."

"In forming the northern party, it is important to consider what the ultimate views of that party ought to be, and to avoid as much as possible, embarrassing the party with men who will oppose the accomplishment of those ultimate objects. I have no hesitation myself in saying, that there can be no safety to the northern states, without a separation from the confederacy." 1. c.

logical consequences of "New Englander's;" for, as Jefferson said: "The idea of forming seven eastern states is, moreover, clearly to form the basis of a separation of the Union." He was right also in the expectation that the project would fail. Jefferson owed it again to his bitterest enemy that its development did not extend so far as to cause any embarrassment. Hamilton frustrated Burr's election as governor of New York, which was looked upon by both Burrites and Federalists as a condition precedent of the fusion. It was, indeed, more than questionable whether it could have been honorably accomplished, even if Burr had been elected; because there were no great differences between the Burrite and Jeffersonian wings of the Republicans. The northern Republicans were jealous of the southern, and their leaders were bent on obtaining the seats at the head of the table. Since they, as representatives of the minority, had no prospect of being invited there by the majority of their own party, they were prepared to lean on the opposite party which offered them support. If the leaders of both sides had been won over to the plan by its originators, they would perhaps have had enough influence on the masses to make the position of those Republicans led by Virginia a rather hard one in a presidential election. But the ultimate ob

1 Jeff., Works, IV., p. 542.

The assertion made later by Plumer, of New Hampshire, to which Ingersoll (Hist. Sketch of the Second War between the U. S. of Amer ica and Great Britain, II., p. 221, etc.) attaches so much weight, that Hamilton desired to attend the proposed meeting of the conspirators at Boston, is evidently entirely valueless. Even if no historical credit is to be given to the message said to have been sent to Boston, and mentioned by Hamilton's son (J. C. Hamilton, VII., p. 382) the memorial read in Albany is sufficient proof that Hamilton was opposed to the project. If, therefore, he wished to go to Boston, it could only be with the inten tion of hindering the further prosecution of the plan. It is scarcely necessary to add that the insinuation to the contrary is not warranted, because Plumer expected forgiveness for his participation in the intrigue, by accusing his accomplices.

ABSOLUTE POWER OF THE REPUBLICANS.

199

ject of the Federalists could never be attained in this way. The motives of the Burrites were just sufficient to operate a momentary fusion, but not to found a political party that could live, and certainly not a party with such extreme tendencies as the Federalists wished. The whole matter involved not a political principle, but only a corrupt political intrigue. Its significance lies entirely in this, that it serves as a measure by which to estimate how far, up to that time, the national feeling had been developed, and in this also, that it assumed as its basis an idea which, in the course of years, grew, through another question, to be one of terrible vitality.

The only immediate consequence of the intrigue was a still greater diminution of the political credit of the Burrites and Federalists. In New York the feuds between the Republicans still continued, and in Pennsylvania violent dissensions broke out among them. But, looked at from a national point of view, the malcontents were still only a faction, which might indeed be injurious, but not dangerous, while the Federalists, by their abandonment of sound political morals, had clipped their own wings. The preponderance of the administration party was so great that it seemed to depend entirely on their tact and moderation whether the country should at last be secured some years of internal quiet. Its foreign politics alone threatened fresh embarrassment. The character which the struggle between England and France began to assume placed the United States in a situation from which they could not easily escape uninjured. But it would have been readily possible, by a firm, rational, and practical policy, to turn the external dangers into a means of internal strength. But Jefferson was not the man for such a policy, when his antipathy to England and his sympathy for France came into play, and when economical questions constituted an essential factor in the problem to be solved.

CHAPTER VI.

THE EMBARGO. MADISON AND THE SECOND WAR WITH ENGLAND. THE HARTFORD CONVENTION.

Jay's treaty had not removed all the well-grounded grievances of the United States against England, and by degrees new ones were added to the old. The prospects of a friendly understanding were few; partly because Jefferson rode a very high horse, and would accept nothing unless he could obtain everything, and partly because England's attitude, notwithstanding occasional advances, grew more disregardful every day. Napoleon found herein a convenient pretence to assert "might before right" in a still more brutal manner, and it was not long before England and France formally emulated one another in wilful alterations in the hitherto recognized laws of neutrality. England's blockade declaration of May 16, 1806, and the order in council of Nov. 11, 1807, on the one hand, and Napoleon's Berlin decree of Nov. 21, 1806, and his Milan decree of Dec. 17, 1807, on the other, were a Scylla and Charybdis, between which the neutral seafaring nations could not possibly sail uninjured. Neither interest nor self-respect could allow the United States quietly to acquiesce in this violence. The Federalists desired to see the knot cut in two. Their programme was to assume a bold

'See Hildreth (Hist. of the U. S.) for the history of the diplomatic manœuvres precedent to the struggle which began with the embargo and ended in the war of 1812. In Dwight's History of the Hartford Convention, many of the most important documents are given, some in full and some by extracts. The only worth of that verbose and badly-written book consists in these reprints.