Argument for Plaintiff in Error. The Federal questions alleged to be involved in these cases are thus stated by the plaintiff in error: (1) Did the Supreme Court of Minnesota, in rendering its judgments in these cases, fail to give to the judgments of the United States Circuit Court in the Marshall and Ilsley cases such faith and credit as they were entitled to under the Constitution and laws of the United States? (2) Did it, in rendering these judgments, disregard the provision of the Constitution of the United States that no State shall pass any law impairing the obligation of a contract? They are otherwise stated in another of the briefs. for the plaintiff in error as follows: (1) The Supreme Court of Minnesota, in rendering the judgments under review, disregarded the provision of the Constitution of the United States that no State shall pass any law impairing the obligation of a contract, in that it erroneously decided that the contracts and bonds of the towns were invalid, and on that ground gave effect to the act of March 3, 1881, as making the Winona and Saint Peter Railroad Company liable for the transfer of the bonds; (2) The Supreme Court, in rendering its judgments in these cases, disregarded the Constitution and laws of the United States in deciding that the Winona and Saint Peter Railroad Company was liable to the towns, because it was responsible for the consequences to them of the judgments in the Marshall and Ilsley cases, although the company would not have been liable but for said judgments. The towns have moved to dismiss the writs of error for want of jurisdiction in this court, on the ground that the records present no Federal question. Mr. Lloyd W. Bowers (with whom was Mr. Thomas Wilson on the brief) for plaintiff in error. I. It is not necessary, in order that a subsequent statute shall impair a previous contract's obligation, that the statute should itself be made the reason for declaring the contract invalid or for restricting the contract's full and proper operation. Even if, as here, the state court declares the contract invalid on grounds independent of the later statute, still if the de Argument for Plaintiff in Error. clared invalidity of the contract, though placed upon such independent or general grounds, is made the reason for giving the subsequent statute an effect which it could not have but for the contract's invalidity, the contract is impaired by the later act. The essential thing is only that the subsequent act be given an effect which it cannot properly have if the contract is valid. An inconsistency between the subsequent statute, as judicially given effect, and the rights growing out of the contract, correctly construed, makes a case of impairment of the obligation of the contract. Bridge Proprie tors v. Hoboken Co., 1 Wall. 116, 144, 145; Delmas v. Merchants Ins. Co., 14 Wall. 661; University v. People, 99 U. S. 309; Wright v. Nagle, 101 U. S. 791, 793, 794; Louisville Gas Co. v. Citizens' Gas Co., 115 U. S. 683, 696; Southwestern Railroad v. Wright, 116 U. S. 231; Vicksburg &c. Railroad v. Dennis, 116 U. S. 665; Given v. Wright, 117 U. S. 648; Chicago, Burlington &c. Railroad v. Guffey, 120 U. S. 569; Hoadley v. San Francisco, 124 U. S. 639; New Orleans Water Works v. Louisiana Sugar Co., 125 U. S. 18; Yazoo & Miss. Valley Railroad v. Thomas, 132 U. S. 174. It is the effect actually given to a statute, subsequent to a contract and claimed to impair it, which determines whether, if the contract exists, the statute does in fact impair it. The statute, as construed by the state court, and with the operation there accorded it, is what this court looks at to decide whether a contract has had its obligation impaired. II. It is settled on principle and by the express adjudications of this court that due effect is not given to the judgments of Federal courts sitting in a particular State unless they are accorded such effect as would in a like case, under similar circumstances, be accorded to the judgments of the state courts of equal authority in such State; and the question whether a state court has given such effect to any such judgment is a question. arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States and falls within the jurisdiction of this court. Crescent Live Stock Co. v. Butchers' Union, 120 U. S. 141; Embry v. Palmer, 107 U. S. 3; Dupasseur v. Rochereau, 21 Wall. 130. Did the Supreme Court of Minnesota in these cases give to Argument for Plaintiff in Error. the judgments of the United States Circuit Court in Marshall and Ilsley's cases such force and effect as it would have allowed them had they been rendered by it? That it did not hardly admits of discussion; and it follows that it did not accord to them such credit and effect as it should have accorded under the Constitution. To break the force of this conclusion counsel are understood to argue that the state courts are not bound to give full faith and credit, or any faith and credit, to judgments of the Federal courts except in a suit and between parties where such judgments would operate as a technical estoppel. This court has in well-considered language answered this contention. Speaking of the Federal courts, it says: "Their judgment or decree when rendered is binding and perfect between the parties until reversed, without regard to any adverse opinion or judgment of any other court of merely concurrent jurisdiction. Its integrity, its validity, and its effect are complete in all respects between all parties in every suit and in every forum where it is legitimately produced as the foundation of an action, or of a defence, either by plea or in proof, as it would be in any other circumstances. While it remains in force it determines the rights of the parties between themselves, and may be carried into execution in due course of law to its full extent, furnishing a complete protection to all who act in compliance with its mandate." Crescent Live Stock Co. v. Butchers' Union, 120 U. S. 141, 157. The learned counsel of the defendants in error rely on the case of Dupasseur v. Rochereau, 21 Wall. 130, which they claim is on all fours with this case and decisive of this question. If I have intelligently read that case, all it decides is that, inasmuch as the judgment of the United States Circuit Court relied on by Dupasseur as a defence did not touch or affect the rights of either party or any question involved in that suit, the state court acted properly in not regarding it. It has no application to the question to which it is cited. Green v. Van Buskirk, 5 Wall. 307; S. C. 7 Wall. 139; Crapo v. Kelly, 16 Wall. 610; Factors' & Traders' Ins. Co. v. Murphy, 111 U. S. 738; Crescent Live Stock Co. v. Butchers' Union, 120 U. S. 141. Mr. Cushman K. defendants in error. brief. Opinion of the Court. Davis and Mr. Frank B. Kellogg for MR. JUSTICE BLATCHFORD, after stating the case, delivered the opinion of the court. To present a Federal question on the ground that full faith and credit were not given by the state court to the judgments of the Circuit Court of the United States in the Marshall and Ilsley cases, it must appear that the state court denied to the plaintiff in error, within the terms of § 709 of the Revised Statutes, "some title, right, privilege or immunity" held by the plaintiff in error under the judgments of the Circuit Court of the United States in those cases, and claimed by it in the state court under the Constitution or a statute of the United States; and that the decision of the state court was against the title, right, privilege or immunity specially set up or claimed by the plaintiff in error under such Constitution or statute. This does not appear by the records. The Marshall and Ilsley cases were suits by citizens of Wisconsin against the towns. Neither the plaintiff in error nor the Plainview company was a party to those suits, nor was any one in privity with either company such party. Those cases settled only the question whether the towns were liable to Marshall and Ilsley on the bonds. They did not settle the rights of the towns, and of the Plainview company or the plaintiff in error, as between each other, with regard to the bonds. The Circuit Court of the United States sustained the validity of the bonds on the ground that Marshall and Ilsley were bona fide holders of them. The fact that the Supreme Court of Minnesota, in the present cases, did not acquiesce in the correctness of the decision of the Circuit Court of the United States, did not constitute a Federal question. Neither the Constitution of the United States nor any act of Congress guarantees to a suitor that the same rule of law shall be applied to him by a state court which would be applied if his citizenship were such that his suit might be brought in a Federal court. Dupasseur v. Opinion of the Court. Rochereau, 21 Wall. 130; Brooks v. Missouri, 124 U. S. 394; French v. Hopkins, 124 U. S. 524; Chappell v. Bradshaw, 128 U. S. 132; Clark v. Pennsylvania, 128 U. S. 395; Hale v. Akers, 132 U. S. 554; Manning v. French, 133 U. S. 186; Giles v. Little, 134 U. S. 645; County of Cook v. Calumet & Chicago Canal Co., 138 U. S. 635. The cases cited by the plaintiff in error, of Green v. Van Buskirk, 5 Wall. 307, and 7 Wall. 139; Crapo v. Kelly, 16 Wall. 610; Factors' and Traders' Ins. Co. v. Murphy, 111 U. S. 738; and Crescent Live Stock Co. v. Butchers' Union, 120 U. S. 141, are not applicable to the present cases. The state court gave to the decisions of the Circuit Court of the United States all the effect which they could possibly have, namely, the conclusive settlement of the liability of the towns on the bonds to Marshall and Ilsley, as bona fide purchasers. The right of action of the towns depended upon sustaining the Marshall and Ilsley judgments as conclusive and not to be reviewed by the state courts. It was an essential element of the suits of the towns to show that they had been legally compelled to pay the bonds, in suits by bona fide holders of them. In pursuance of that claim, the state court held that the judgments of the Circuit Court of the United States were valid and conclusive in favor of the towns in the present suits. There was no question before the Circuit Court of the United States as to the liability of the towns to the Plainview company upon the bonds. The decisions of the Circuit Court of the United States held that Marshall and Ilsley, as bona fide purchasers of the bonds, acquired rights which were superior to those of the Plainview company. The judgments in the present suits are founded on the fact that the wrongful acts of the Plainview company enabled Marshall and Ilsley to acquire those rights. The contention that the act of March 3, 1881, impaired the obligation of a contract is raised for the first time in this court. The records do not show that any such proposition was set up in, or considered by, the state court. Butler v. Gage, 138 U. S. 52. No Federal question was involved in Harrington v. Town |