Opinion of the Court.

disabilities of alienage had never been removed, because he had never been naturalized.

Naturalization is the act of adopting a foreigner, and clothing him with the privileges of a native citizen, and relator's position is that such adoption has neither been sought nor obtained by respondent under the acts of Congress in that behalf. Congress in the exercise of the power to establish an uniform rule of naturalization has enacted general laws under which individuals may be naturalized, but the instances of collective naturalization by treaty or by statute are numerous.

Thus, although Indians are not members of the political sovereignty, many classes of them have been made citizens in that way. Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U. S. 94. By the treaty of September 27, 1830, provision was made for such heads of families of the Choctaws as desired it, to remain and become citizens of the United States. 7 Stat. 335. By the treaty of December 29, 1835, such individuals and families of the Cherokees as were averse to a removal west of the Mississippi and desirous to become citizens of the States where they resided were allowed to do so. Ibid. 483. By the act of Congress of March 3, 1843, it was provided that on the completion of certain arrangements for the partition of the lands of the tribe among its members, "the said Stockbridge tribe of Indians, and each and every of them, shall then be deemed to be, and from that time forth are hereby declared to be, citizens of the United States, to all intents and purposes, and shall be entitled to all the rights, privileges and immunities of such citizens." 5 Stat. 647, c. 101, § 7. And such was the act of March 3, 1839, 5 Stat. c. 83, pp. 349, 351, relating to the Brothertown Indians of Wisconsin.

The act of Congress approved February 8, 1887, 24 Stat. 388, c. 119, was much broader, and by its terms made every Indian situated as therein referred to, a citizen of the United States.

Manifestly the nationality of the inhabitants of territory acquired by conquest or cession becomes that of the govern ment under whose dominion they pass, subject to the right of election on their part to retain their former nationality by removal or otherwise, as may be provided.

Opinion of the Court.

All white persons or persons of European descent who were born in any of the colonies, or resided or had been adopted there, before 1776, and had adhered to the cause of independence up to July 4, 1776, were by the declaration invested with the privileges of citizenship. United States v. Ritchie, 17 How. 525, 239; Inglis v. Trustees of Sailors' Snug Harbor, 3 Pet. 99. In Melleaine v. Coxe's Lessee, 4 Cranch, 209, it was held that Mr. Coxe had lost the right of election by remaining in New Jersey after she had declared herself a State, and had passed laws pronouncing him to be a member of the new government; but the right itself was not denied. Shanks v. Du pont, 3 Pet. 242.

Under the second article of Jay's treaty (8 Stat. 116, 117), British subjects who resided at Detroit before and at the time of the evacuation of the Territory of Michigan, and who continued to reside there afterwards without at any time prior to the expiration of one year from such evacuation declaring their intention of becoming British subjects, became ipso facto to all intents and purposes American citizens. Crane v. Ree

der, 25 Michigan, 303.

By section three of Article IV of the Constitution, "new States may be admitted by the Congress into this Union." The section, as originally reported by the committee of detail, contained the language: "If the admission be consented to, the new State shall be admitted on the same terms as the original But the legislature may make conditions with the new States concerning the public debt which shall be then subsisting." These clauses were stricken out, in spite of strenuous opposition, upon the view that wide latitude ought to be given. to the Congress, and the denial of any attempt to impede the growth of the western country. Madison Papers, 5 Elliot, 381, 492, 493; 3 Gilpin, 1456.

And paragraph two was added, that "the Congress shall have power to dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property belonging to the United States; and nothing in this Constitution shall be' so construed as to prejudice any claims of the United States, or of any particular State."

Opinion of the Court.

By article three of the treaty of Paris of 1803, (8 Stat. 200, 202,) it was provided that "the inhabitants of the ceded territory shall be incorporated in the Union of the United States, and admitted as soon as possible, according to the principles of the Federal Constitution, to the enjoyment of all the rights, advantages and immunities of citizens of the United States; and in the meantime they shall be maintained and protected in the free enjoyment of their liberty, property and the religion which they profess."

It was said by Mr. Justice Catron, in his separate opinion in Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 393, 525: "The settled doctrine in the state courts of Louisiana is, that a French subject coming to the Orleans territory, after the treaty of 1803 was made, and before Louisiana was admitted into the Union, and being an inhabitant at the time of the admission, became a citizen of the United States by that act; that he was one of the inhabitants contemplated by the third article of the treaty, which referred to all the inhabitants embraced within the new State on its admission. That this is the true construction I have no doubt."

In Desbois's Case, 2 Martin, 185, (decided in 1812,) one Desbois, of French birth, applied for a license to practise as a counsellor and attorney at law in the Superior Courts of Louisiana, and by one of the rules of the court the applicant could not be admitted unless he was a citizen of the United States. Desbois conceded that he had no claim to citizenship by birth nor by naturalization under the acts of Congress to establish an uniform rule on that subject, but he contended that there was a third mode of acquiring citizenship of the United States, namely, the admission into the Union of a State of which he was a citizen. He contended that as he had, in the year 1806, removed to and settled with his family in the city of New Orleans in the territory of Orleans, in contemplation of the enjoyment of all the advantages which the laws of the territory and of the United States held out to foreigners removing into that territory, and had ever since considered it as his adopted country, he had become a citizen under the act of Congress of March 2, 1805, further providing for the territorial government

Opinion of the Court.

of Orleans, the enabling act of February 20, 1811, and that of April 8, 1812, admitting the State.

Judge Martin, who delivered the opinion of the court, referred among other things to the fact that the act of Congress authorizing the formation of the state government of Louisiana was almost literally copied from that which authorized that of Ohio, and, pointing out that by the first section of the latter statute the inhabitants of the designated territory were authorized to form for themselves a state constitution, while by the fourth section the persons entitled to vote for members of the convention were described as, first, all male citizens of the United States, and next, all other persons having in all other respects the legal qualifications to vote for members of the general assembly of the territory, which were a freehold of fifty acres of land in the district and citizenship of one of the States and residence in the district, or the like freehold and two years' residence in the district, said "The word inhabitants, in the first section of this act, must be taken lato sensu; it cannot be restrained so as to include citizens of the United States only; for other persons are afterwards called upon to vote. There is not any treaty, or other instrument, which may be said to control it. Every attempt to restrict it must proceed on principles absolutely arbitrary. If the word is to be taken lato sensu in the act passed in favor of the people of one Territory, is there any reason to say that we are to restrain it, in another act, passed for similar purposes, in favor of the people of another Territory?" pp. 192, 193.

And after an able discussion of the subject, he concluded that the applicant must be considered a citizen of the State of Louisiana, and entitled to all the rights and privileges of a citizen of the United States.

In 1813, in United States v. Laverty, 3 Martin, 733, Judge Hall of the District Court of the United States held that the inhabitants of the territory of Orleans became citizens of Louisiana and of the United States by the admission of Louisiana into the Union; denied that the only constitutional mode of becoming a citizen of the United States is naturalization by compliance with the uniform rule established by Congress;

Opinion of the Court.

and fully agreed with the decision in Desbois's case, which he cited.

By the ordinance for the government of the Northwest Territory, of July 13, 1787, it was provided that as soon as there should be 5000 free male inhabitants of full age in the district thereby constituted, they were to receive authority to elect representatives to a general assembly, and the qualifications of a representative in such cases were previous citizenship of one of the United States for three years and residence in the district, or a residence of three years in the district and a fee simple estate of 200 acres of land therein. The qualifications of electors were a freehold in fifty acres of land in the district, previous citizenship of one of the United States, and residence, or the like freehold, and two years' residence in the district. And it was also provided that there should be formed in the territory not less than three nor more than five States, with certain boundaries, and that whenever any such State should contain 60,000 free inhabitants, such State should be admitted by its delegates in Congress on an equal footing with the original States in all respects whatever, and should be at liberty to form a permanent constitution and state government, provided it should be republican and in conformity with the articles of compact. 1 Stat. 51a; Rev. Stat. 2d. ed. Organic Laws, 13, 14.

Reference to the various acts of Congress creating the Indiana and Illinois territories, 2 Stat. 58, c. 41; 2 Stat. 514, c. 13; the enabling acts under which the state governments of Ohio, Indiana and Illinois were formed, 2 Stat. 173, c. 40; 3 Stat. 289, c. 57; 2 Stat. 428, c. 67; and the act recognizing, and resolutions admitting, those States, 2 Stat. 201, c. 7; 3 Stat. 399; 3 Stat. 536; and to their original constitutions; establishes that the inhabitants or people who were empowered to take part in the creation of these new political organisms, and who continued to participate in the discharge of political functions, included others than those who were originally citizens of the United States. And that the action of Congress was advisedly taken is put beyond doubt by the language used in the legislation in question.

In the case of the admission of Michigan this was strikingly