their crops, were averse, if not stubbornly opposed, to having them destroyed.

Against every proposition to get meat through the inland military lines, President Davis set his face as flint. He had got an idea into his head that the enemy's finances were about to collapse, and that if a little cotton might be kept from them they would be unable to pay the January interest of 1863. It appears, indeed, to have been impossible for him and his associates to rid themselves of their early conceit of the power of cotton; and it was this wretched delusion in hoarding this inert wealth of the South, that did more than any thing else to wreck the finances of the Confederacy, and eventually to reduce the rations of its armies to one-quarter of a pound of meat a day per man.

The venality of the enemy afforded full opportunity to the Richmond authorities to use the Mississippi from Memphis to New Orleans, until all their needed supplies should be obtained. But no advantage was ever taken of this ample and obvious opportunity. The arguments used against trade in cotton through the lines were:

First-That the Federal finances were in such a condition that if they could not obtain cotton, upon which to draw bills wherewith to pay their then accruing interest, their credit would explode, and the war would speedily cease from the bankrupting of our assailants. Hence they wanted cotton.

Second-That they did not want cotton, but only sought, under cover of a contract for supply, to find out the channels of navigable streams, to ascertain the location and condition of certain defences, and otherwise to spy out the land.

Third-That the trade on the part of the Government would demoralize the people among whom it might be conducted.

Fourth-That to trade through New Orleans, and let cotton clear from that port, "would make Europe think we had caved, who thereupon would decline to recognize us, or to intervene."

The reader will recognize for himself the little value of these arguments--some of them childish-by the side of the great necessity of feeding the armies of the South.

The record of the narrow escapes of Lee's army alone from starvation, is sufficient commentary upon the management at Richmond. In consequence of the refusal to be allowed to

purchase on the Mississippi, the army, especially in Virginia, was put upon short rations. First, they were reduced to onehalf pound of meat per day,-which, if it could have been kept up at that, would have been sufficient; then to one-third of a pound-though this allowance was not agreed to or adhered to by several of the generals commanding; and then to one-quarter of a pound. Upon this last allowance the Army of Northern Virginia wintered in 1864-5.

On the 18th of October, 1864, a memorandum was communicated to President Davis, showing that there were on hand in the Confederate States 4,105,048 rations of fresh meat, and 3,426,519 rations of bacon and pork, which would subsist three hundred thousand men twenty-five days. The authorities were now compelled to subsist, independent of the armies of the Confederacy, many thousand prisoners of war who were collected in different camps throughout the country.

In 1863 a feeble and badly organized attempt had been made to get meat from Europe through the blockade. Much of it was allowed to remain at Nassau and Bermuda until it spoiled. Contracts for supplies, payable in cotton in our Atlantic ports, were made with several parties; but in no instance with success. Either the amount involved was too small, to tempt the venality of those who could control or purchase an evasion of the blockade; or the engagement to deliver meat alone, was found to be too small an inducement to those engaged in blockade-running.

In the winter of 1864 the subsistence of the Confederate armies appeared to be in the last stages of exhaustion. Major Ruffin, assistant-commissary-general, testifies before a secret committee of Congress:

"On the 5th of December I brought the condition of things to the attention of the Secretary of War, coupling it with a statement of subsistence on hand, which showed nine days' rations on hand for General Lee's army; and, quoting his letter to the commissary-general, that day received, stating that his men were deserting on account of short rations, I urged prompt action; but none was taken. On the 14th of December, nine days afterwards, General Lee telegraphed Mr. Davis that his army was without meat."

In January, 1865, the following points were presented in secret session of Congress:

First-That there was not meat enough in the Southern Confederacy for the armies it. had in the field.

Second-That there was not in Virginia either meat or bread enough for the armies within her limits.

Third-That the bread supply from other places depended absolutely upon the keeping open the railroad connections of the South.

Fourth-That the meat must be obtained from abroad through a seaport, and by a different system from that which has heretofore prevailed.

Fifth-That the bread could not be had by impressment, but must be paid for in market rates.

Sixth-That the payment must be made in cash, which, so far, had not been furnished; and, if possible, in a better medium than treasury scrip.

Seventh-That the transportation was not adequate, from whatever cause, to meet the necessary demands of the service. Eighth-That the supply of fresh meat to General Lee's army was precarious; and if the army fell back from Richmond and Petersburg, there was every probability that it would cease altogether.

Nothing was done by the Confederate Government commensurate with the necessities indicated above-nothing, in fact, done to meet them beyond a visionary scheme, enacted in the last days of Congress, to raise three millions in specie to purchase supplies from those producers of the Confederacy who were no longer willing to take scrip for their commodities. But few persons outside of official circles in the Confederacy were acquainted with the true state of affairs; so hedged in with secrecy was the weak and recluse government of Mr. Davis. To the well-informed and intelligent the appalling fact was manifest-that the whole system of Confederate defence was bound to break down by sheer mismanagement in the commissariat, even without a catastrophe of arms.

Before we reach the final and sudden catastrophe that was to befall the arms of the Confederacy, there is a slight space in our military narrative which we have to cover by a brief relation of the events of the war in Virginia in the winter of

1864-5. This record is a very slender one. But it is the preface, in point of time at least, to those great events which, in April, 1865, were to bring the war to a singularly abrupt close, and with a precipitation heretofore but little known in the history of great contests.

MILITARY EVENTS IN

VIRGINIA IN THE WINTER OF 1864-5—
SHERIDAN'S RAID.

Our last reference to the campaign in the Valley of Virginia was, when the forces there had been much reduced and the scale of operations had become inconsiderable; the bulk of Early's troops having been withdrawn to General Lee's lines. Sheridan, too, had sent most of his infantry to Grant. In December, the Sixth Corps was returned to the Army of the Potomac; and the Army of the Shenandoah for nearly two months acted principally as an army of observation.

Towards the last of February, 1865, Sheridan began to "ride" again up the Valley of the Shenandoah, leaving Hancock in command of his department at Winchester. On reaching Waynesboro' a battle occurred between Early and Custer's divisions, which resulted in the rout of the Confederates. Sheridan captured about thirteen hundred prisoners-nearly all of Early's little command; which indeed fell an easy prey to the magnificent Yankee cavalry. Early himself escaped with difficulty, some of his staff-officers and his personal baggage being captured.

Charlottesville was surrendered the next day. From this point, on the 6th of March, Sheridan moved in two columns southward towards the James. One division, under General Deven, took a directly southern route to Scottsville, destroying all mills, merchandise, and bridges on the line of march, and along the Rivanna River to Columbia. The other division proceeded down on the railroad to Lynchburg, destroying it as far as Amherst a distance of over forty miles. From Scottsville, Deven's division proceeded westward along the banks of the James, destroying every lock on the canal as far as Dugaldsville, twenty miles from Lynchburg. Not being able to cross the James on account of the high water, Sheridan

moved around the north side of Richmond, and, crossing at Deep Bottom, joined General Meade's army south of Petersburg.

The destruction accomplished by this raid was serious enough. The country through which it passed was devastated, and a Yankee correspondent, who accompanied the expedition, boasted that two million dollars worth of provisions and war material were destroyed in a single day. The damage to the Kanawha and James River Canal was almost irreparable; as to the railroads between Waynesboro' and Charlottesville, Charlottesville and Amherst Court-house, and Louisa Courthouse, and the South Anna, and between Chesterfield Station and the Chickahominy River, every bridge, nearly every culvert, and scores of miles of the rail itself, had been completely destroyed; and in thirteen counties traversed by the expedition, mills of various kinds, tobacco warehouses, manufactured and leaf tobacco, and various other descriptions of private property were pillaged or destroyed.

THE RICHMOND LINES-HATCHER'S RUN.

On the lines around Richmond and Petersburg, during the winter of 1864-5, there were no very important events. Two very considerable engagements were fought on them in this time; but they were wholly indecisive and strangely barren of results commensurate with the scale of fighting. Pegram's division, of Lee's army, whilst reconnoitring on the morning of the 6th of February, was attacked by cavalry and infantry in heavy force. The enemy's cavalry at one time broke through one of his brigades, but the men fought them all the while. Capturing some in rear of our lines, driving the others off, the division was pressed slowly back, occupying a very long line, but fighting obstinately, under the direction of its gallant commander.

Evans, commanding Gordon's division, arrived, and was formed on the left. The two divisions now charged, and drove the enemy back. They were finally overpowered, and driven back a short distance; but reforming, charged again and again.