2. From what has been said it may appear, that there is no force in that common plea in the mouth of sinners, namely, "That they did not bring their depravity upon themselves, but were born with it. If their hearts are altogether sinful, they did not make them so, nor is it any of their fault; they have only such hearts as were given them, without their choice or consent." Now, in arguing thus, they evidently view a wicked heart, in no other light than as a mere weakness, which a man would not choose, but cannot help. They consider it as a thing not at all faulty in its own nature ;'so that if they are to blame on account of it, it must be

vails, is inconsistent with the prevalence of its opposite, viz. duty, or holiness; and involves a real impossibility of its opposite's taking place, so far as it takes place. Whether depravity is total or partial, native or contracted, transient or permanent, still as long as it continues, and as far as it goes, it implies a kind of impotency and a real impossibility, in regard to having or doing certain opposite things. And if it is of the nature of moral depravity-if it is in itself, anomia, a moral evil, the impotency-the impossibility implied in it, does not in any measure exculpate or excuse, in one case any more than in the other. The divine grace or the manner of divine operation requisite to reform the profligate, and to renew the unregenerate, is different, essentially different.But as to the question about excusing (the only thing under present consideration) there is no difference; since all the difficulty to be overcome, in either case, is of the nature of moral depravity.-The terms natural snd moral it is true have been used in a number of different senses on different occasions, and there are few words but what have been so The sense in which they are here used is not however new. Nor is the meaning of natural and moral inability in these discourses, any more large or loose or indeterminate, than the meaning of natural and moral good, or natural and moral evil; natural and moral perfections, or natural and moral infirmities.

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for something previous to it, and quite of another kind. Concerning innocent natural infirmities, we justly judge in the above manner. Thus if a man is sick we do not blame him for it; we know bodily sickness is no moral evil. But if we are told the man brought his sickness upon himself, by intemperance, or some bad conduct, then we blame and condemn him for that bad conduct; that was a moral evil, though his sickness is not so. Now those who make the above plea, reason just in this manner about sin itself; as if it were no sin, merely to be a sinner; or to commit sin when one has an inclination to do it. But that the bringing a sinful disposition upon ourselves, had we done this, would indeed have been a very wicked thing.

Hence it seems to many, as if the poor sinful children of men, were only as it were under a fit of sickness, which Adam brought on himself and them, by doing an evil deed which he might easily enough have avoided, in as much as he was perfectly holy; but that we his miserable offspring, being by nature sinners, are under a necessity of sinning, and therefore cannot be to blame for it. It seems as if Adam was in reality the only sinner, and his first sin the only sin of the human kind; because that sin was committed while man had not an imaginary, but a real, a moral as well as natural power to abstain from all sin. That is, the first sin did not arise from, or consist in, any defect of the will; and herein consists the sinfulness of it. If Adam did not sin before he had any inclination to sin, and while he was strongly enough inclined to the contrary, it is easy to see, he had just the same excuse for his first sin, as we have for any of ours. Let his first sin be placed where it will, whether in actually eating the forbidden fruit, or in hearkening to any temptations to do it, or in being off his watch, or in whatever

any one pleases; still we must suppose it committed while his heart was perfectly good, else he did not sin without this boasted excuse of all other sinners-want of a moral power to do otherways. Thus by forgetting that sin is in itself sinful, we are led to look for something else that is so, not in sinners, but in perfectly innocent beings! We conceive Adam to blame, because of the uprightness of his heart; and ourselves blameless, because our hearts are so wicked! For in this way we certainly bring nothing but perfect holiness into the account, as an aggravation of Adam's sin, beyond those of his posterity.

The very first idea we can have of sin, is a depraved and wicked heart; and if this is not a blameable thing in itself, there is no danger of finding any thing that is So. Could we entirely confound all distinction betwixt natural and moral evil, and so betwixt natural and moral inability, as being things essentially different, we should be secure enough from the accusations of our own consciences. And in matters of religion, men generally do confound these things, so far as to feel very easy, and very much as if there was no sin. let a neighbour be very unkind and injurious to them, and they presently see a difference. This does not look to them, just as if he was only lame, and unable to go out of their way; nor do they lay the blame upon Adam, but upon the malicious and unrighteous wretch himself; nor does their being told it is in his very nature to be so, make them think much the better of him.

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3. If the distinction now insisted on was well understood, and clearly kept in view, it would appear in like manner, that a sinner's not being able to change his own heart, is really nothing in his favour. Here some may be ready to think lies the grand difficulty after all

What they wanted to know, was, not whether sinners would be able to comply with the gospel, or to obey the law, if their hearts were good; but whether it is in their power to have such an heart in them. For what does it signify what a man could do, if he had that which he has not, and can by no means obtain ? Sinners do not see how it is their own fault, that they have such bad hearts, and do nothing from gracious principles, provided it is not in their own power to alter themselves in this respect.

Now if a wicked heart was not a moral evil, but a thing of the same nature as a weak head, a bad memory, or an infirm constitution, this would be the case. A man is not to blame for having these, provided he cannot help it. But if a wicked heart is a thing of a criminal nature, a thing quite different from any such natural weaknesses, then there is no force in the above reasoning. If to have a heart to hate and oppose God and our neighbour, instead of loving them as we are required, is a moral evil; as certainly it is, and the sum of all moral evil; then to say a man cannot alter in this respect, is only to say, he cannot help being a most vile and inexcusable wretch. To be unalterably in love with sin, does not surely render one less sinful, but the more so. Surely the more wicked a man's heart is, the more faulty and blameworthy he is.

But the fallacy whereby sinners elude their consciences in this matter, lies in a secret supposition that they could not change their hearts, nor would they be changed, though they should ever so sincerely and heartily, and uprightly try to do it; which would indeed be a very hard case. If a sinner honestly, and from a truly virtuous disposition, tried to the utmost of his natural power to alter his wicked disposition, but it would not alter, he was as bad as ever after all;

it would seem indeed that he was in a very pitiable situation, but not very faulty. Yea, it would be difficult to see wherein he was at all to blame. And that something like this is the real view which multitudes have of the matter, is very evident.

Let us put the case (as people would have it) that sinners were, in all respects, able to change their own hearts; only it must take some time, a month suppose; and they must apply themselves very diligently, very faithfully to the work, all that while, in order to accomplish it. There is a sinner, however, that neglects his opportunity and spends the whole month in sin, without ever using any means, or making the least attempt to get a good heart. Is he not to blame now for this? Most certainly he is. But why so? Why so! Does not every one see that such carelessness in a case like this, such indifference about becoming good when it was entirely in one's power, must be inexcusable to the last degree? To continue thus in sin, when there was no manner of necessity for it; surely this can never be justified. But another sinner was much better disposed. He seized the favourable opportunity, and applied himself with the greatest imaginable diligence; and at the month's end, actually became a good man. Now was he to blame, during this time that he was thus faithfully labouring, and doing all in his power to become good? By no means. But why not? He. had a bad heart. Yes, but he did as well as ever he could, notwithstanding that. No man could have done better, under his circumstances. And he was actually of a wicked disposition, no longer, than till he could possibly be otherways.

Thus people would be apt to judge in such cases. And this shews what notions men have of inability with respect to the sinner's changing his heart; as also