352 THE LOUISIANA NATIVE GUARD. public good were continually planned and executed, and toward the close of summer he took the first step in the employment of negroes as soldiers, which the enemies of the Government had practised there. When General Banks LOUISIANA NATIVE GUARD. arrived to take command of the Department, there were three regiments of these soldiers, with two batteries manned by them, well drilled for his use, under the common name of the Louisiana Native Guard. The loss of New Orleans was the heaviest blow the Confederacy had yet received, and for a while it staggered under its infliction. "It annihilated us in Louisiana," said the Confederate historian of the war; "diminished our resources and supplies, by the loss of one of the greatest grain and cattle countries within the limits of the Confederacy; gave to the enemy the Mississippi River, with all its means of navigation, for a base of operations, and finally led, by plain and irresistible conclusion, to our virtual abandonment of the great and fruitful valley of the Mississippi." Let us now return to a consideration of the Army of the Potomac, which we left in a quiet condition after the little flurry at Drainsville, at near the close of the year. historian (Parton), that "each of the paragraphs of Jefferson Davis's proclamation which relates to General Butler's conduct is the distinct utterance of a lie." A few days after the proclamation was issued, Richard Yeadon, a prominent citizen of Charleston, publicly offered a reward of $10,000 for the capture and delivery of the said Benjamin F. Butler, dead or alive, to any proper Confederate authority." And "A Daughter of South Carolina," in a letter to the Charleston Courier, said, "I propose to spin the thread to make the cord to execute the order of our noble President, Davis, when old Butler is caught, and my daughter asks that she Jan. 1, 1868. IMMOBILITY OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 353 CHAPTER XIV. MOVEMENTS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.-THE MONITOR AND MERRIMACK. HE Grand Army of the Potomac had gained strength in numbers and discipline during the months it had been lying in comparatively quiet camps around the National Capital. The battles of Ball's Bluff and Drainsville, already mentioned, had kept it from rusting into absolute immobility; and the troops were made hopeful at times by promises of an immediate advance upon the Confederates at Manassas. But at the beginning of the year 1862, when that army numbered full two hundred thousand men, the prospect of an advance seemed more remote than ever, for the fine weather that had prevailed up to Christmas was succeeded by storms and frost, and the roads in many places soon became almost impassable. Very little preparation had been made for winter quarters, and much suffering and discontent was the consequence.' The people were exceedingly impatient, and were more disposed to censure the Secretary of War than the General-in-Chief, for they had faith in the latter. They were gratified when Mr. Cameron left the office, and they gave to the new incumbent, Mr. Stanton, their entire confidence.2 The President was much distressed by the inaction of the great army. He could get no satisfaction from the General-in-Chief, when he inquired why that army did not move. Finally, on the 10th of January, he summoned Generals McDowell and Franklin to a conference with himself and his Cabinet. Never, during the whole war, did he exhibit such despondency as at 1 Various efforts were made by many officers to break the monotony of the camp and keep the soldiers cheerful. With this view, the musical "Hutchinson Family" were permitted, by Secretary Cameron, to visit the camps and sing their simple and stirring songs. They were diffusing sunshine through the army by delighting crowds of soldiers who listened to their voices, when their career of usefulness was suddenly arrested by the following order: By direction of General McClellan, the permit given to the 'Hutchinson Family' to sing in the camp, and their pass to cross the Potomac, are revoked, and they will not be allowed to sing to the troops." Why not? The answer was in the fact, that they had sung Whittier's stirring song, lately written, to the tune of Luther's Hymn, "Ein feste burg ist unser Gott," in which, among eight similar verses, was the fol lowing: "What gives the wheat-field blades of steel? What points the rebel cannon? What sets the roaring rabble's heel Of th' men o' th' South? For the Union's life? Hark to the answer: SLAVERY!" 2 Edwin M. Stanton succeeded Simon Cameron, as Secretary of War, on the 18th of January, 1862. VOL. II-23 354 IMPATIENCE OF THE PRESIDENT AND PEOPLE. that conference. He spoke of the exhausted condition of the treasury; of the loss of public credit; of the delicate condition of our foreign relations; the critical situation of National affairs in Missouri and Kentucky since Fremont left the Western Department; the lack of co-operation between Generals Halleck and Buell, and the illness of the General-in-Chief, which then, it was said, confined him to his house. He said he was in great distress under the burden of responsibility laid upon him. He had been to the house of the General-in-Chief, who did not ask to see him. He must talk to somebody, and he had sent for McDowell and Franklin to obtain a military opinion as to the probability of an early movement of the army. "If something is not soon done," he said in his simple way, "the bottom will be out of the whole affair; and, if General McClellan does not want to use the army, I would like to borrow it, provided I can see how it could be made to do something." Jan., 1862. The President, supported by public opinion, had resolved that something must be done by the army of the Potomac immediately, under the direction ‚f General McClellan, or some other officer, and arrangements were in progress to that effect, when the General-in-Chief, who had been too ill to see the President on the 10th," was out, and "looking quite well," on the following day. McDowell and Franklin, meanwhile, had been charged by the President with the duty of submitting a plan of a campaign. The former was decidedly in favor of an advance in heavy force upon the front and flanks of the Confederates at Manassas, whose numbers he was satisfied had been greatly exaggerated. Such movement, if successful, would end the disgraceful blockade of the Potomac, and drive the army that was really besieging the National Capital back upon Richmond. General Franklin, who had been somewhat informed by General McClellan of his plans, was in favor of moving on Richmond by way of the Lower Chesapeake and the Virginia Peninsula. They consulted with QuartermasterGeneral Meigs (who agreed with McDowell), Colonel Kingsbury, the Chief of Ordnance of the Army of the Potomac, General Van Vliet, the Chief Quartermaster, and Major Shiras, the Commissary of Subsistence. MONTGOMERY C. MEIGS. The subject was discussed by these military officers and the President and his Cabinet on the same evening, when McDowell b Jan. 11. and Franklin, being int general agreement as to the neces 1 Notes by General McDowell of a conference with the President and others, on the subject of the movement of the Army, cited by Mr. Swinton, in his Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac, page 19 Mr. Swinton says he submitted these notes to Mr. Lincoln, during the summer of 1864, who declared that they were substantially correct. 2 At the first meeting of the Cabinet to consider the subject, Mr. Seward stated. that from information which he had received from an Englishman, just from the Confederate lines, he was satisfied that they might HAUGHTINESS OF GENERAL MOCLELLAN. 355 sity now of moving directly upon Manassas, recommended such movement. But there was a difference of opinion in the Cabinet.' Two days afterward there was another meeting of those officers with the President and his Cabinet. General McClellan was present, but took no part in the discussion. He seemed offended; and in reply to some apologetic remarks from McDowell, in explanation of the position in which he and Franklin were placed, the General-in-Chief curtly remarked, "You are entitled to have any opinion you please." When the President asked McClellan "what and when any thing could be done, the latter replied, with more force than courtesy, that the case was so clear that a blind man could see it; and then spoke of the difficulty of ascertaining what force he could count upon; that he did not know whether he could let General Butler go to Ship Island, or whether he could re-enforce Burnside." To the direct question of the Secretary of the Treasury, to the effect as to what he intended doing with his army, and where he intended doing, McClellan answered, that the movements in Kentucky were to precede any from Washington. This part of the plan of the General-in-Chief (the movements in the West) was soon gloriously carried out, as we have already observed; and before the Army of the Potomac had fairly inaugurated its campaign, in the spring of 1862, the active little army under Grant, and the forces of Buell and Pope, in connection with Foote's gun-boats and mortars, had captured Forts Henry and Donelson, Nashville and Columbus; had driven the Confederates out of Kentucky; had seized the Gibraltar of the Mississippi (Island Number Ten); and had penetrated to Northern Alabama, and fought the great battles and won a victory at Shiloh." At that conference, McClellan expressed his unwillingness to develop his plans, "always believing," he said, "that in military matters the fewer persons knowing them the better." He would tell them if he was ordered to do so. The President then asked him if he counted upon any particular time; he did not ask what time that was, but had he in his own mind any particular time fixed when a movement could be commenced. The General replied he had. Then," rejoined the President, "I will adjourn this meeting." 66 A few days after this conference, General McClellan, at the request of the President, laid before the latter a plan for moving against Richmond. It was to abandon his present base, and proceed toward the Confederate capital by way of the Lower Chesapeake. The President disapproved of the plan, because of the long time it would take to prepare for the move concentrate in front of the National army, at short notice, 103,000 men. General Wool, who had excellent means for obtaining correct information, had satisfied himself, and had so reported, that not one-half that number of Confederate soldiers were in all Virginia. It was afterward clearly shown that General Wool's estimate was not too low, and that from October to March, Johnston never had an effective force of more than 40,000 under his orders, and that his preparations for an evacuation were begun as early as October, 1861; and that, after that time, he lay simply in observation." So declared W. H. Hurlburt, a public writer, who had many and rare facilities for knowing the strength of the Confederates. The Postmaster-General (Montgomery Blair) strongly urged McClellan's plans of moving at some future time by way of the Peninsula, because of the great obstacles of bad roads and immense forces to be encountered on the other route; to which the Secretary of the Treasury (Mr. Chase) replied that it was probable that, after losing much time and millions of money, there would be found as many obstacles to success on the newly proposed route. The Secretary of State (Mr. Seward) thought that a victory by the Army of the Potomac sans where was desirable, it mattered not where.-McDowell's Notes. 2 See page 324. • McDowell's Notes. 3 See page 315. 4 McDowell's Notes, See Chapters VII, VIII, IX, and X 356 @ 1862. THE ARMIES ORDERED TO MOVE. ment, and the importance of striking a blow immediately. He could no longer endure the delays of the General-in-Chief, and without consulting him, he, as commander-in-chief of the army and navy of the Republic, issued an order on the 27th of January," known as General War Order No. 1, in which he directed the 22d of February following "to be the day for a general movement of the land and naval forces of the United States against the insurgent forces."1 He also declared that the heads of executive departments, and especially the Secretary of War and of the Navy, with all their subordinates, as well as the General-in-Chief, with all commanders and subordinates of the land and naval forces, should "severally be held to their strict and full responsibilities for prompt execution of the order." This proclamation sent a thrill of joy through every loyal heart. Four days later the President issued a special order to McClellan, directing him to form all the disposable force of the Army of the Potomac, after providing safely for the defense of Washington, into an expedition for the immediate object of seizing and occupying a point upon the railroad southwest of Manassas Junction, the details of the movement (which was to take place on or before the 22d of February) to be left to the discretion of the General-in-Chief. The object was to flank the insurgents at Manassas and Centreville, relieve Washington, threaten Richmond, and paralyze the main strength of the rebellion by destroying its most formidable army. Secretary Stanton at the same time urged McClellan to take immediate steps to secure the reopening of the Baltimore and Ohio Railway, and free the banks of the lower Potomac from the rebel batteries which annoyed passing vessels." Instead of obeying the President's order, McClellan remonstrated against its execution. The patient Lincoln listened to all he had to say, and on the 3d of February wrote him a kind note, saying: "You and I have distinct and different plans for a movement of the Army of the Potomac; yours to be down by the Chesapeake, up the Rappahannock, to Urbana, and across land to the terminus of the railroad on the York River; mine to move directly to a point on the railway southwest of Manassas. If you will give satisfactory answers to the following questions, I shall gladly yield my plan to yours: 1st. Does not your plan involve a greatly larger expenditure of time and money than mine? 2d. Wherein is victory more certain by your plan than mine? 3d. Wherein is victory more valuable by your plan than mine? 4th. In fact, would it not be less valuable; in this, that it would break no great line of the enemy's communications, while mine would? 5th. In case of disaster, would not a retreat be more difficult by your plan than mine ?" McClellan did not reply to the President's kind note and important inquiries; but on the same day he sent a long letter to the Secretary of War, in which he recited a history of his connection with the Army of the 1 He specially ordered the army "at and around Fortress Monroe, the Army of the Potomac, the Army of Western Virginia, the army near Mumfordsville [Buell's] in Kentucky, the army and flotilla [Grant's and Foote's] at Cairo, and a naval force in the Gulf of Mexico [Farragut's and Porter's] to be ready to move on that day." 2 General McClellan's Report, page 42. |