observed, is limited to the political evolution of the United States, and refers mainly to expansion of the national domain. The classic example is that of the war with Mexico and its resulting territorial changes. As this example furnishes the best illustration of certain principles which it is desired to elucidate in this paper, it will be given first and most particular consideration.

I. THE MEXICAN WAR

The orthodox view of this very important event, entertained by a considerable section of public opinion, is that the war was unjust, and was forced upon a weaker power for the purpose of acquiring territory, with a view to the extension of slavery, in the opinion of many. Divested of its net-work of incidental minor controversy, the controlling elements of the case may be stated thus:

(1) Progress of territorial development had convinced the people of the United States of the importance of extending their domain to the Pacific. To them it was a case of manifest destiny. They believed that the future welfare of the people of this remote region, and the interests of civilization therein, as well as the natural development of their own country, were dependent on this consummation.

(2) The Administration which came into power in 1845 shared this conviction fully, and took active measures for its realization, that is, for the acknowledgment by Great Britain of our title to the Oregon country, and for the acquisition from Mexico of that portion of its territory lying between northern Texas and the Pacific Ocean.

(3) The United States endeavored to negotiate with Mexico for the purchase, on very liberal terms, of the territory desired from that country, but entirely without success.

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(4) The United States then availed itself of the opportunity for war with Mexico afforded by the dispute over the Texan boundary, and carried the war to a speedy and successful conclusion.

(5) As a main condition of peace, the United States demanded a cession of the desired territory, not as a spoil of conquest, but as a transfer for which it paid in cash practically what it had offered to pay in the beginning.

There were at that time, there have been ever since, and there always will be those who consider this proceeding morally indefensible. It is one purpose of the present article to advance and enforce with specific reasons exactly the opposite view: that the obligation of the United States to the world at large, to its own political future, and to the welfare of the people of the territory itself, required it to do this very thing; and that its action, far from being any justification of obloquy or criticism, should rather be considered an example of high responsibility courageously assumed and of imperative duty faithfully performed.

The confusion of thought, both as to fact and motive, upon which the adverse view of this case is based, is well illustrated by the following recent utterance: 'I applaud the American Revolution, although it was war, because it was courageous resistance against the barbaric attempt of George III to deprive his colonists of certain inalienable rights. I condemn the Mexican War of 1846 because it was made for the purpose of acquiring the territory of Texas by force. We should have obtained it, as we obtained Louisiana from France, or Alaska from Russia, by purchase, or we should not have obtained it at all.'1

In matters of fact this statement is misleading and erroneous. The acqui

1 'A letter to a German-American Friend,' signed 'L.F.A.' Outlook, January 6, 1915, p. 13.

sition of Louisiana was just as much the result of war as if conquered by the arms of this country. It was the certainty of its capture by Great Britain, and the urgent need of funds in the war then raging in Europe, which led Napoleon to cede the province to the United States. It is also incorrect to say that the Mexican War was for the purpose of acquiring Texas by force. Texas had already been acquired, and Mexico had decided to acquiesce except as to the disputed strip between the Nueces and the Rio Grande rivers. It is possible also that the author of the above quotation may not know that the United States endeavored to deal with Mexico in the acquisition of its northern territory exactly as it later dealt with Russia in the case of Alaska; but utterly without success.

The really significant part of this citation, however, and the one that goes to the root of the matter here considered, is the proposition that we should have obtained this territory in the same way that we obtained Alaska 'or we should not have obtained it at all.' Let us take 'L.F.A.' (and those who think like him) at his word, and inquire where his theory would lead. If we had not 'obtained it at all,' and we could not obtain it by purchase, one of two things must have happened to this territory: it would have remained with Mexico or it would have become an independent state.1

The first alternative suggests the inquiry: would the interests of the inhabitants of this territory, and those of the rest of the world therein, have been better served if it had remained under the control of Mexico than under that of the United States, or would the reverse have been true? In all things pertaining to the influence of government

1 It is assumed that the Monroe Doctrine would have barred its acquisition by any European state. THE AUTHOR.

upon the welfare of a people, a conclusive answer is furnished by the history of Mexico and by the conditions which prevail in that country to-day. But entirely aside from this consideration, every substantial interest pertaining to this territory linked it with the republic to the east rather than that to the south. Trade is the life-blood of a people, and the natural trade routes ran east and west. For thirty years before the transfer, the commerce of the only settlement of importance in Northern Mexico, that of Santa Fé, was exclusively with the United States. Intercourse of all kinds naturally lay in this direction, and it necessarily follows that uniformity of laws under which it was carried on, and the absence of frontiers, would be important factors in its prosperous development. It is impossible, from any point of view, to exaggerate the misfortune which a permanent Mexican connection would have been to the commercial and industrial development of all that region. This, the most zealous partisan of Mexico must fully appreciate. Whatever may be one's opinion of the means by which this territory was transferred to the United States, one must acknowledge that the end was in accord with the best interests of civilization.

Consider now the alternative of an independent state, or more likely two or three such states particularly California and a Mormon state in the Great Basin. It cannot be admitted that such a result could in any way compare with that of the incorporation of this territory into the Union. To the United States it would have been a misfortune of the first magnitude, preventing, as it would, the full rounding out of its continental territory; depriving it of that wonderful Pacific port which had played so great a part in our national development; and interrupting by one or more frontiers all inter

course by land with that extensive region. An independent state of all New England would scarcely be a greater misfortune to the future of our nation. Entirely apart from the consideration just discussed is the portentous probability that, if things had gone on much longer as they were then going, an independent polygamous state would have developed on our very borders.

But the alternative of a permanent independent status is, after all, inadmissible. While it may be accepted as certain that independence of the coast country would promptly have followed the discovery of gold in California, it is equally certain that independence would have been followed by an effort to annex the territory to the United States, just as had been the case with Texas. There might have been other Alamos and San Jacintos, other Austins and Houstons and Davy Crocketts. There would certainly have been the same almost endless negotiations and congressional debates, very likely a war with Mexico, and probably also a Mormon war. With infinitely more trouble and vexation, and doubtless with greater loss of life, the inevitable result would sooner or later have come about.

Such is our speculation as to the course of events in this territory if we had 'not obtained it at all,' or rather if we had given up trying to obtain it direct when we failed to obtain it by purchase. Let us now examine the ethical aspects of the course pursued by the United States, particularly as it relates to Mexico.

In the first place, did Mexico suffer any real wrong by the forced transfer of this territory? and was her attitude in refusing to part with it morally justifiable? Throughout the entire region, nominally under her sovereignty, she exercised almost no authority. Her colonization of it had been insignificant,

and future settlement was certain to come mainly from the United States. She had not a solitary material interest to compare with those of this country. The compensation offered her would more than liquidate any possible damage, far more, considering the almost certain loss of the territory through rebellion, with no indemnity but with heavy military outlay. Every consideration of material advantage counseled acceptance of the offer of the United States. The policy of Mexico in insisting upon retention of sovereignty in opposition to the natural trend of events and the undoubted good of all concerned in the future of the country, placed her in the attitude of blocking the pathway of progress for sentimental considerations only. As for justice, in a broad humanitarian sense, it was Mexico that failed in its exercise. The action of the United States was prompted, not by lust of territory, but by the fulfillment of a duty to civilization; that of Mexico, by lust of territory alone.

Technically, however, Mexico was strictly within her rights, and this fact presents a perplexing problem in international ethics. Here were a major and a minor right, the one embracing vital interests of the world at large, the other purely technical and of relatively insignificant importance. It was for the good of civilization that the major right prevail, for the two could not subsist together; yet the agency which enabled it to prevail is indicted before the bar of history for having wronged the holder of the minor right. How is this? The paradox is evidently an outgrowth of that social institution known as title,

title in land, particularly, — which gives to the holder thereof possession against all comers of that portion of the earth's surface to which it pertains. To the private individual this right becomes a property in the soil which may

be bought and sold; to the state it is in the nature of an exclusive jurisdiction. It matters not how the title was obtained; once recognized as legal, it becomes inviolable. With certain specific exceptions, transfer of possession can be accomplished only by the free consent of the owner as the holder of the title is called. 'Is it not lawful for me to do what I will with mine own?' Lawful, yes; that is, in strict conformity with the letter of the law. It is nevertheless a technical right which may, and often does, work grave injustice. It is a constant experience that title stands in the pathway of important development; yet the holder refuses to recede sometimes, possibly, for fear of injustice, generally as a leverage to pecuniary extortion, not infrequently from motives of jealousy or spite, almost never from an unselfish consideration of the merits of the case. So great is the possibility of evil in this right that society has placed a limited restraint upon its exercise as between private owners and public bodies. This is the power of eminent domain. It does not, however, obtain between private individuals and organizations, or, of course, between sovereign states.

The remarkable force and authority of title, even in defiance of justice and common sense, are probably due to the fact that it is definite and a matter of precise record, known of all men; whereas the right which seeks to displace it is in futuro, not yet reduced to possession, and still subject to attack or denial. As between the two, however convincing the case may stand for the contingent right, judicial finding must be for the established title, and public opinion naturally inclines the same way. It is felt that arbitrary interference with recorded titles would strike at the sacredness of property and lead to abuses greater than that which it seeks to correct. Except in the limited

exercise of eminent domain, therefore, government will not interfere to compel an owner to part with title, and it will interfere to prevent another from attempting by force to compel him to part with it. Thus protection to the private holder in the exercise of this right is well-nigh absolute.

Between states, as already observed, there is no super-authority, no ‘daysman betwixt us that might lay hands upon us both.' The sovereign holder of title cannot be compelled by any outside authority to transfer it to another; at the same time there is no such authority to prevent an attempt by that other to compel a transfer by resort to force. But coercion is always a perilous expedient, because the burden of proof is against it, and the case must be so clear as to carry conviction of rectitude of purpose. That resort to such extreme measures may be justifiable cannot be denied. It cannot be denied. It may be a positive duty to civilization for a state to give up certain territory; but, through a false pride, nations rarely admit such an obligation, and generally consider it more honorable to cede territory as a result of defeat in war than to bargain it away by peaceful negotiations. That is one reason why transfers of territory are so generally a moving force in all

wars.

Akin to this veneration for the sanctity of title is sympathy for the weak as against the strong. If the basis of such sympathy be that the weak are not fitted to withstand the same adversity as the strong and still survive, and are therefore, in charity, entitled to greater consideration, no criticism can be made. But if it be that weakness is a presumption of justice, and strength of injustice, then it is contrary to the experience of mankind. Authority, wealth, and power, mean responsibility; and responsibility inculcates the practice of fair dealing. The absence